Class 251 K Book V754E7
General Theological Seminary Library
CHELSEA SQUARE, NEW YORK

HOMILETICS;

OR,

THE THEORY OF PREACHING.

BY

ALEXANDER VINET,

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT LAUSANNE.

Translated from the French.

SECOND EDITION.

EDITED, WITH COPIOUS NOTES,

BY REV. A. R. FAUSSET, M.A.,

OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, AND EDITOR OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE GNOMON OF BENGEL.

EDINBURGH:

T. & T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.

LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO.; AND SIMPKIN & CO.

DUBLIN: JOHN ROBERTSON.

MDCCCLVIII.

PRES. SEMINARY LIBRARY NEW YORK

257 K
V754E£ 22741

THIS IS THE ONLY TRANSLATION WHICH CAN APPEAR IN THIS COUNTRY,
THE PUBLISHERS HAVING PURCHASED THE COPYRIGHT.

MURRAY AND GIBB, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.

ADVERTISEMENT BY THE EDITORS.

THE observations which we have placed at the head of the "*Pastoral Theology*," are still more applicable to the course of Homiletics, and to these observations we must refer the reader.

The original manuscripts, numerous, and varying on certain portions of the course, have had to be compared together, and that which has served for the basis of our work, has been frequently enriched by ideas borrowed from other manuscripts. For the points on which M. Vinet has left only summary and insufficient notes, recourse has been had to the note-books of his hearers, and, just as was done in the "*Pastoral Theology*," we have marked by brackets [ ], that the reader may recognise them, the passages borrowed from these note-books, and those which, reproducing the original text, had to be modified in some respects, either because it was necessary to complete the unfinished sentences, or because detached fragments had to be connected, when brought together. This precaution has been neglected, only when we had to do with details that were too insignificant to be taken into account.

The work which we now give to the public, would, it is true, have been much more finished, especially in respect of the form, if the author had revised it himself; nevertheless, the last form which he has given, after successive revisions, to several extended portions of his course, is, doubtless, within a very little of that at which it would have stopped, and may be considered as definitive. At all events, this volume reproduces in all its parts, with a strict fidelity, the thoughts of M. Vinet on one of the most important branches on which he gave instruction; therefore we entertain no doubt, that, having been eagerly welcomed by the limited public to which they were immediately addressed, they will be equally read beyond those limits, with a lively interest and great advantage.

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR OF THE SECOND EDITION.

In sending forth to the public a Second Edition of M. Vinet's valuable work on the Theory of Preaching, a few observations will not be deemed out of place.

Care has been taken to render the style and language of this Edition more uniformly in accordance with our English idiom, than was the case in the first Edition. All ambiguous and obscure forms of expression have been removed, and the sense has been made clearly intelligible to the English reader. Notes of the Author illustrative and explanatory have been appended, partly original, but for the most part extracted from various authors, ancient and modern, *e.g.*, Aristotle's *Rhetoric;* Horace's *Epistle to the Pisos;* Augustine, and others of the Christian Fathers; Archbishop Whately's *Rhetoric*, Bridges' *Christian Ministry*, and especially M. Claude's well-known *Essay on the Composition of a Sermon.*

This is a day of progress. All other things are moving forward; it is requisite, therefore, that the preacher should keep

pace with the age; and whilst the primitive Gospel-truth remains, and must always remain unchanged, the form of its manifestation, and the means whereby it is to be brought home to men's consciences, hearts, and understandings, need to be newly adapted to the various new positions and circumstances in which it is now placed. Preaching must not rest satisfied with traditional forms of the past, if it is to act as a living power on living men: it must "bring forth from its treasury things *new*, as well as things old:" it must "be made all things to all men, if by all means it may save some."

Some object to the use of study, arrangement, and logic, in the composition of a sermon, on the ground that it is lost on most hearers. But what is logic? It is not subtle sophistry, as many think, but the art of sound reasoning, so as to draw true conclusions from true premisses. Hearers will, surely, be more edified by what is true in substance and in method, than by what is defective in either, or in both respects. Order puts each thing in its proper place, and logic excludes all that is superfluous and inconclusive. Is not the human mind, inasmuch as naturally loving order, more likely to receive, and to retain, a solid impression from a sermon composed on these principles, than from one utterly destitute of them? Leighton well says, "There could not be too much learning, if it were but sanctified." Perhaps there is more of the latter element, namely, spiritual unction, amongst earnest preachers of our British pulpit, and more of art, logic, and method among the French. If, then, they might derive profit from us in the former respect, we too may very advantageously learn from them in the latter. Would that our universities and divinity schools would devote more attention than they have heretofore, in the education of candidates for the ministry, to Homiletics and Pastoral Theology!

But let us never forget, what is above all needed, is the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the preacher. Without this, all study and method are vain. It was once said to a faithful and successful minister, "You would not reap, as you do, in the pulpit, if you did not sow in the closet." May God grant us all the spirit of prayer and supplication, that so His Church may be refreshed with the dews from above! May this work be blessed by Him who can make even the smallest instrument, the seed of the most abundant fruits!

ANDREW ROBERT FAUSSET,
Lately Sch. and Sen. Classical Moderator,
Trin. Coll. Dubl.

Bishop-Middleham,
Co. Durham.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page

ADVERTISEMENT BY THE EDITORS, ... iii

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR OF THE SECOND EDITION, ... v

INTRODUCTION.

The word, and object of the word.—Eloquence, oratorical discourse, and discourse from the pulpit.—Two errors with respect to Homiletics: undervaluing, and expecting too much from it, ... 1

FIRST PART.

INVENTION.

Of Invention in general, ... 29

SECTION FIRST.—SUBJECT OF THE PULPIT DISCOURSE.

CHAPTER I.—UNITY OF THE SUBJECT.

Idea of unity and its importance.—Its forms in the discourse from the pulpit.—Additional remarks, ... 34

CHAPTER II.—INTEREST OF THE SUBJECT.

Interest in the objective sense; interest in the subjective sense.—Pure oratorical interest; Christian interest.—Subjects to be excluded; subjects to be treated, ... 48

§ I. Dogmatic subjects.—How they must be understood.—Guard against too much analysis.—Discard pure science.—Apologetic subjects: Controversy—Natural religion, ... 54

§ II. Subjects of morality.—Their importance.—Descriptive morality, and preceptive morality.—General and particular morality. Same subjects according to the impression which we wish to produce.—Sermons of circumstance, ... 59

§ III. Historical subjects.—Importance of instructing by means of recitals.—Matter of historical sermons, ... 67

§ IV. Subjects drawn from the contemplation of nature . . 69

§ V. Psychological subjects.—Importance of psychology.—Philosophy in general, ... 71

Observations against these three last classes of subjects.—Counsels to the young preacher, ... 73

Page

Chapter III.—Of the Text.

I. Of the text in general.—Not essential to the sermon.—Inconveniences of the use of texts.—Reasons in favour of this usage.—Means of avoiding the inconveniences of their employment, . 76

§ II. Rules which should guide to the choice of texts: 1st, They ought to be drawn from the Word of God.—2d, To be understood in the sense which the authors have given to them.—3d, To be clear.—4th, To be fruitful.—5th, To be suitable.—6th, To have unity.—7th, To be varied and individual.—The order of the text not to be departed from unnecessarily.—Two texts at the head of a sermon 85

Chapter IV.—Of the Homily and of the Paraphrase. . . 123

Second Section.—Matter of the Pulpit Discourse, . 130

Chapter I.—Of Explanation.

§ I. Explanation of facts.—Narration and description, . . 133

§ II. Explanation of ideas.—What the idea is.—Definition and judgment.—Definition direct and indirect, ... 135

Chapter II.—Of the Proof. 145

§ I. Proof properly so called, or reasons.—Authority, experience, reasoning.—Value of reasoning,—General rules for its employment. Argumentation, affirmative and negative; simple and complex; direct and indirect.—Forms of the latter, . . 146

§ II. Motives.—Of inclination or affection.—Motive from moral goodness.—Motive from happiness.—Self-love.—Ridicule.—Sentiment of the beautiful.—Sympathetic affections.—Of emotion, . 175

§ III. Of unction, ... 192

§ IV. Of authority.—Essential to Eloquence.—Difference betwixt Catholics and Protestants; betwixt our times and the preceding; between individuals.—Conditions on which we can preach with authority.—Reproof, its rules, ... 196

Summary of the preceding Part, ... 219

Page

SECOND PART.

ARRANGEMENT.

CHAPTER I.—OF GENERAL ARRANGEMENT, ... 228

§ I. Idea and importance of arrangement.—Necessity of order.—Its principle, ... 228

§ II. Of arrangement in the logical point of view.—Decomposition of the theme.—Different divisions of the same subject possible.—Rules to be observed in general arrangement.—Counsels regarding the plan of the parts of a discourse, ... 239

§ III. Of arrangement in the oratorical point of view.—It supposes logical arrangement.—Continuous and progressive movement.—Forms of oratorical progress, ... 251

CHAPTER II.—OF THE EXORDIUM.

Rules relative to its contents.—Rules relative to its character, . 259

CHAPTER III.—DECLARATION OF THE DESIGN, AND ENUNCIATION OF THE PLAN.

Must the plan of the discourse be announced?—Different opinions.—Conclusion, ... 270

CHAPTER IV.—OF TRANSITIONS.

Idea and advantages of transitions.—Their difficulty.—Their qualities.—Sources whence they may be drawn, ... 276

CHAPTER V.—OF THE PERORATION.

Its nature.—Its grounds.—Its forms.—Rules to be followed, . 279

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FORM OF THE PULPIT DISCOURSE.

Ideal and reality.—Traditional form.—What must be opposed to the invasion of the form.—Individuality.—Theremin and Herder, . 288

CHAPTER VII.—MEANS OF ATTAINING A GOOD ARRANGEMENT, . . 296

THIRD PART.

ELOCUTION OR STYLE.

CHAPTER I.—OF ELOCUTION IN GENERAL.

To write is still to invent and to arrange.—Importance of style.—Objections.—Conditions of elocution, ... 299

Page

CHAPTER II.—FUNDAMENTAL QUALITIES OF STYLE, . . . 319

§ I. Clearness 320

§ II. Purity.—Correctness.—Propriety.—Precision, . . . 328

§ III. Order, ... 337

§ IV. Naturalness, ... 342

§ V. Suitableness.—Simplicity.—Popularity and familiarity.—Nobleness.—Gravity.—Scriptural colouring, ... 345

CHAPTER III.—SUPERIOR QUALITIES OR EXCELLENCIES OF STYLE.

§ I. Of strength and beauty of style in general.—Difference betwixt poetry and eloquence.—Active character of the latter.—Exclusion of superfluous ornaments.—The whole not to be sacrificed to the details.—Qualities of an eloquent style, ... 368

§ II. Of colour.—Direct means of painting: description, epithet.—Indirect means: antithesis, metaphor, allegory, comparison, . 379

§ III. Movement.—Its relation to eloquence.—its forms: expository style, and style of direct address.—Figures which remain within the limits of the expository: repetition, gradation, accumulation, reticence, correction, pretermission, irony, hyperbole, paradox.—Figures which go beyond the limits of the expository style: interrogation, exclamation, dramatism in its various forms.—Qualities which are connected with colour and movement: variety, elegance, 392

CHAPTER IV.—MATERIAL PART OF DISCOURSE, OR SOUNDS.

Imitative harmony.—Euphony.—Number.—Periodic style and loose style, ... 413

APPENDIX.

Discourse delivered by M. VINET at his installation as Professor of Practical Theology in the Academy of Lausanne, on the 1st November 1837 430

Note relative to page 439, ... 445

HOMILETICS;

OR,

THE THEORY OF PREACHING.

INTRODUCTION.

THE office of the Gospel ministry is composed of different elements, amongst which, that which holds the chief place, is the *Word*. The Christian Religion, a religion of liberty and persuasion, is a *word*. Jesus Christ, who is at once the author and the object of Christianity, is called *the Word*.[1] Even before His coming in the flesh He had already spoken internally to the conscience of every man; for the word is not only that series of articulate sounds which conveys ideas into the understandings of men, it is the thought itself.[2] The thought is a word, as the word is a thought. But this Word which spoke out of time and internally, has spoken in time and externally.[3] Jesus Christ has spoken by facts; He has spoken by His life and by His death; but He has spoken also in the ordinary sense of the word. He has preached.[4] We are called upon to rehearse His words; but He sends us as

[1] John i. 1-4, 14.

[2] Λόγος implies *ratio*, as well as *oratio*.—ED.

[3] The Word, which had been "from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was," Prov. viii. 23, "was made flesh and dwelt among us," John i. 14. The Word dwells in and speaks from Him, just as the Light dwells in and shines from Him. This λόγος which became flesh, is *not from, nor of, Time and Space*, but *eternally pre-existent*, and *manifested in Time and Space*, for the gracious ends of Redemption.—ALF. *Gr. Test.*, John i. 1.—ED.

[4] . . . "Summus ecclesiastes Dei filius, qui est imago patris absolutissima, qui virtus et sapientia genitoris est æterna, per quem Patri visum est humanæ genti largiri quidquid bonorum mortalium generi dare decreverat, nullo alio cognomine magnificentius significantiusque denotatur in sacris literis, quam quum dicitur *verbum* sive *sermo Dei*."—ERASMUS, *Ecclesiastes*, lib. i., ch. ii. [Luke iv. 18, "The Spirit of the Lord hath anointed me to *preach* the Gospel to the poor."—ED.]

He was sent;[1] that is to say, as there was a union of thought between Him and His Father, He wills that there should be such a union between us and Him, that we should be one with Him as He is one with the Father. He strikes our mind as a sonorous brass, which does not resound, unless it vibrate; He wills that, as we are the sons of His thought, our brethren should become the sons of ours. God has willed, that man should be for man the channel of truth. Natural paternity is the symbol of our spiritual relations; we are spiritually begotten one by another.[2] There are not only words to be transmitted and rehearsed, but a life to be communicated: it is necessary that those truths, of which the Gospel is composed, should become living and personal in living persons. The word has not spoken once for all (unless we take the letter for the word), it speaks unceasingly; and the letter of the Gospel is only the necessary medium, through which this word speaks to all. The institution of the ministry is only explained thereby. The ministry is a ministry of the word of God. Christianity, a religion of the thought, ought to be spoken.[3]

We are authorised in calling some men, who do not exercise the ministry of the word, ministers of the Gospel, or pastors; in this we are only following the example of the apostles and the primitive Church; but it is also entering into their ideas, to give the pre-eminence to instruction, that is to say, to the word, above all other labours of the ministry. "Let the elders, that rule well, be counted worthy of double honour, *especially* those" (there were then some pastors, whose office was not to speak) "who labour in word and doctrine." (1 Tim. v. 17. Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 1–5, where 'prophesy' = *preach.*)

[1] John xx. 21, xvii. 23, "I in them and Thou in Me, that they may be made *perfect in one*; and *that the world may know, that Thou hast sent Me.*"—Ed.

[2] See *l'Essai sur la manifestation des convictions religieuses*, pp. 111, 112. ["In Christ Jesus I have *begotten* you through the Gospel:" 1 Cor. iv. 15.—Ed.]

[3] See *Pastoral Theology* (English Translation, T. and T. Clark), p. 16, and the commencement of the *Résumé de la première partie de l'Homilétique.* [Mark iii. 14, "He ordained Twelve—that He might send them forth *to preach.*" So in accordance with their commission, and with their Master's example, "they ceased not to teach and *preach* Jesus Christ:" Acts v. 42. So also the fathers of the Church: Greg. Nazianzen, "Preaching is the *principal* thing that belongs to us ministers" (πρῶτον τῶν ἡμετέρων, Orat. i.). Tertullian says, no congregation of the primitive Church separated without being "fed with holy sermons." In later times also Erasmus, Eccles. l. i., The minister is "then in the *height* of his dignity, when from the pulpit he feeds the Lord's flock with sacred doctrine."—Ed.]

The word is the great means employed by the pastor. It takes different forms according to its different employments; it breaks the bread of life, sometimes into smaller, sometimes into larger pieces,—it crumbles it if necessary.[1]

The minister speaks of man [*i.e.*, of his own wants, as man, and those of others] to God,—this is prayer; and of God to man,—this is preaching. It is only the latter of these, that must here engage our attention.

He preaches as well to individuals, to the community distributively; as also, to the community assembled in the same place. We would only speak of this last species of preaching.

It is necessary to preach to the community assembled, in order to affect those, who would not otherwise be affected; to prepare in the temple[2] the invisible Church which no temple can contain, and which exists in none in its purity; in fine, to give to the word all the characteristics, and all the efficacy, of which it is susceptible. We might address the community in writing; but the written word could not take the place of the other, so as to render it superfluous.

This predominance of the word in the Christian worship impresses upon it a peculiar character. It gives a reality to the notion of a Church. There is no Mohammedan church, nor Brahminical; and certainly there was no church in the religion of Homer. Among the Jews, instruction was separate from worship (we speak of the Jewish people, rather than of the Jewish church); if there was a Jewish church, it was instruction that formed it, not worship: and this church had no centre [was not *Jerusalem with its temple* a centre? Comp. Ps. cxxii. 1–4.—Ed.] It is only among Christians, that worship and instruction, co-ordinate the one to the other, and interpreted, the one by the other, form a whole.[3]

Among the Roman Catholics preaching occupies but a small

[1] 2 Tim. ii. 15, "Rightly dividing the word of truth," ὀρθοτομοῦντα; as a good οἰκόνομος, "steward, whom his Lord shall make ruler over his household to give them their portion of meat in due season:" Luke xii. 42.—Ed.

[2] Not the building of stone, which answers to the synagogue, not to the Jewish temple; but the congregation of living worshippers, "the temple of the Holy Ghost:" 1 Cor. iii. 16.—Ed.

[3] However, Neh. viii. 4–8 is a near approach to our Christian system; Ezra stood on a pulpit,—opened the book in sight of the people,—blessed the Lord, the great God; and the people *worshipped;* and the Levites with him *caused the people to understand* the law, giving the sense.—Ed.

place ; among us, on the contrary, it is almost everything. The temple [the house of God], saving certain moments of worship, and some days of the year, is an auditory. It seems to have no other object, than to assemble hearers around a man, who discourses to them. We also say of the Roman Catholic, that he goes to mass ; and of the Protestant, that he goes to hear a sermon. Thus, without thinking of it, we indicate the, perhaps, too exclusive predominance of preaching in the Protestant worship.[1] Amongst other inconveniences, this system has that of attributing too much to the individual.

[This does not destroy what we have said of the transmission of truth from one individual to another. Meanwhile, is it not possible, that the habit of only going to the temple [church] to hear the discourse, and the reducing all the rest of the service to a secondary place, may have the effect of only exhibiting one person and one office, the preacher and the preaching? And would it not be advantageous, that the efficacy of the worship should be more independent of the person of the preacher?[2]]

Be that as it may, in the two religious services which suggest to us these reflections, the *word* is of high importance. A minister, in the one as in the other, is essentially a man who speaks the word of God. Now the word of preaching,—which is a "word of reconciliation" (2 Cor. v. 19) and of sanctification, "according to the oracles of God" (1 Pet. iv. 11),—can it be the object of an art?

It is certain, that eloquence is *one ;* that a man is not eloquent in the pulpit on other conditions, than in the tribune or at the bar. There are no more two rhetorics, than there are two logics. But the nature of ecclesiastical discourses brings differences, adds rules, which form a particular art, under the name of Homiletics.

Let us see, what Rhetoric and Homiletics have in common ; we shall then see, what Homiletics has that is special.

Rhetoric is the genus, Homiletics is the species.

[1] This hardly applies to the churches in England and Scotland, wherein prayer and praise occupy as much or more time than hearing the word: in the *feeling* of the congregation, perhaps it is, however, often too true. Disuse of preaching, comparatively, was a concomitant of mediæval Popery. Its revival marked the dawn of the Reformation. Among the early acts of the English Reformers was the publication of the Book of Homilies. The Council of Trent was thus driven to the recognition of the importance of preaching: Sess. v., cap. 2, "Prædicatio evangelii est præcipuum Episcoporum munus."—Ed.

[2] See *Théologie pastorale*, pp. 7–10.

The matter of Rhetoric corresponds to the object of public eloquence.

What is eloquence in general?

La Bruyère answers, "It is a gift of the soul, which makes us master of the heart and mind of others; which enables us to inspire them with any sentiments, and persuade them of the truth of any statements we please."[1]

I should say, It is the gift of making one's self master by language; for a gesture,—a look—may be eloquent. The question, moreover, regards a continuous discourse, not a single word only. La Bruyère indicates to us the source and the effect of eloquence, rather than its nature; but there remains of his definition something that is important: eloquence is *a gift*, and *a gift of the soul.* [It is the gift of thinking and feeling with others, what they think and feel, and of adapting the words and the movements of one's discourse, to speak the thought of another. Eloquence rests upon sympathy. One is never eloquent, except on condition of speaking or writing under the dictation of those he is addressing: it is our hearers who inspire us, and if this condition is not fulfilled, we may be profound and agreeable, but we shall not be eloquent. In order to be eloquent, we must feel the necessity of communicating our own life to others, and know intimately the chords which must be made to vibrate within them.[2]]

Pascal, entering further than Bruyère into the secret of eloquence, says:—"Eloquence consists in a correspondence, which we endeavour to establish between the heart and mind of those we address on the one side, and the thoughts and expressions we make use of on the other; which supposes, that we have well studied the heart of man, in order to know all its springs, and then to find the just proportions of the discourse, which we would adapt to them. We must suppose ourselves in the place of those who are to hear us; and make trial upon our own heart of the turn we have given to our discourse, in order to see if the one is made for the other, and if we can assure ourselves that the hearer shall be, as it were, forced to surrender."[3]

[1] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, ch. i. *Des ouvrages de l'esprit.*

[2] "Quocunque volent animum auditoris agunto.
Ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent
Humani vultûs: si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi: tunc tua me infortunia lædent."—Hor. *Ep. ad Pis.*—Ed.

[3] Pascal, *Pensées*, Partie ii., Art. xvii., § cv.

That which in Bruyère was represented as a *gift*, in Pascal is represented as a *method*. But it is at once a gift and a method; and under both the one and the other point of view, the same idea presents itself—a lively and intimate penetration of the soul of the hearer by that of the orator. We still find another element—that of persuasion, which is the direction of the soul and the will into a determinate state of sentiment. Eloquence, in the sense of La Bruyère and Pascal, is an act of real life—an effort against a resistance, a *compulsion*,[1] one might say a drama where only one personage appears, but where there are in reality two [sc., the speaker and the hearer], and which has its plot, its turns of fortune, and its catastrophe. The catastrophe may, according to circumstances, be a determination, a voluntary act of him who is addressed; in others, a sentiment, which is also an act, and, in the view of philosophy and religion, the act *par excellence*.

Thus, without refusing the title of eloquent to any language that is calculated to carry light and conviction into the minds of men, we give it more especially to that, which has for its object and its effect, to bend the will in a certain direction or towards a certain act, immediate or eventual.

But will there only be the subjective, will there be nothing objective in the notion of eloquence? According to Pascal and Bruyère, it is an indifferent power, which lends itself equally to evil and to good, to error and to truth. If it be so with it, ought we not to thrust into the back-ground both eloquence and rhetoric, which are the theory or method of it?

I grant the principle, but deny the consequence.

That there is a power of persuasion for evil, as there is one for good,—that this power has for its principle, in both cases, the gift of finding, and making to vibrate in the soul certain chords, which are there, is not doubtful. If we do not wish to apply to both the term eloquence, we need not do it; but what shall we gain? A word.—It is much better, it seems to me, while we acknowledge that vicious men may be eloquent, and even that they may be eloquent in counselling evil, to add on the other side:

1. That, whatever be the inclination of man to evil, evil has *in his conscience* no witness and representative; that truth, on the

[1] *Compelle intrare.*

contrary, has its witness at the bottom of his soul; that he recognises it, when it shows itself; and that, if the flesh is weak, the spirit is willing.[1] Hence it follows, that eloquence is more closely united to truth than to error, to good than to evil. Truth is eloquent in itself; we do not add eloquence to it; we only get it freed from impediments. Truth, in whatever sense we take this word, is the condition and even the material of eloquence. In order to persuade to evil, it is necessary to give it the appearance of good.

2. That which is not, perhaps, the definition of eloquence, is the rule of it; or, if you will, the rule of eloquence will be for us the definition. We shall say that eloquence is a deliverer, which comes to the aid of a good principle against the bad, to the aid of truth against error. Still this will not be enough; we will say that, although the action or the life which eloquence has ever in view, proceeds always immediately from *affection*, and consequently the orator has in view to create or develop an affection, yet he can only do so, conformably to the eternal and Divine ideas; and that in this sense alone eloquence is a power of liberty, and not a power of tyranny.

3. The consequence of the fact, which we are obliged to admit, is, that it is so much the more necessary to employ eloquence in the service of truth, the oftener it is employed in the service of error, and that it is necessary to defend truth with the arms of truth. [Its best defenders too often dissemble, and that, because faith in the truth, which alone gives courage, is rare. It is to be wanting to a holy cause, to employ means for its defence, which are not in harmony with it.[2] In the main], to be eloquent is to be true; to be eloquent is not to add anything to the truth,—it is to take away, one after another, the veils which cover it; and this part, which it plays, is not negative, for the truth is formed of facts. In this sense, Pascal is the orator *par excellence*, because he is as nakedly true as is possible. But truth is not only in the facts, it is also in the sentiment of the truth. To be united to it

[1] Matt. xxvi. 41.

[2] Towards the close of the third century arose among Christians the method of disputing called κατ' οἰκονομίαν. See Gataker ad *Marc. Anton.*, l. xi., p. 330. The Christian doctors educated in the schools of the sophists, and intent only on defeating the enemy, were less careful about the means employed, whether artifice or truth. This is but too evident in the arguments of Origen against Celsus.—Ed.

[so as to identify one's self with it], to be pathetic on the subject of it, is to be true in a secondary sense. The truth spoken with love,—would it be less the truth? No, certainly; it would be truth *in us; out of us*, it is not yet truth.

These conditions of general eloquence are involved in those, which are proper to a public discourse, and all together constitute the art of oratory.

An oratorical discourse is a discourse delivered before an assembly, with the object of inculcating upon it certain ideas, of inspiring it with certain sentiments, or of calling forth certain resolutions; or of doing these three things at once. But the last is the final end,—that, with respect to which the two others are only means and ways. [The orator speaks to the heart, as well as to the understanding, since it is the will that he wishes to influence, and our will is under the empire of the affections.[1]]

The oratorical discourse appears as a wrestling, a combat. This idea is essential to it. Sometimes the orator combats an error by a truth, sometimes he opposes to one sentiment another sentiment. In its genuine use it is a combat engaged in, with the arms of discourse, against the errors of the intellect and the disorders of the heart. "The orator seeks to master our will. His task is a determined aggression; our soul is a fortress, which he besieges, but which he would never take, if he did not keep fair with the intelligences within the place. Eloquence is only an appeal to sympathy; its secret consists in distinguishing and seizing upon those parts in the soul of others, which correspond to our own and to every soul; its object is, to lay hold of the hand, which unconsciously we are continually holding out to it. It is from ourselves, that it obtains arms against us; it is from our own concessions, that it strengthens itself; of our gifts, that it takes advantage; with our confession, that it overwhelms us. In other words, the orator invokes principles, intellectual and moral, which we hold in common with him; and he only claims with urgency the conclusions from these premises: he proves to us that we are agreed with him,—he makes us feel and love this agreement;—in one word, as has been energetically said, "we only demonstrate to the people what they already believe."[2]

[1] Upon the part played by emotion in eloquence, see Part i., sect. ii., ch. ii. § ii.

[2] Vinet, *Chrestomathie française*, tome iii., Reflections upon Eloquence in the

Oratorical discourse must be distinguished from didactical, which concludes with an idea; and from poetry, which does not [necessarily] conclude, and whose end is not without, but within itself. [Oratorical discourse concludes with an appeal to the will, and aims at calling forth a certain determination of it.]

All that we have said, is found essentially in Homiletics, the object of which is, to give to the preacher rules and counsels drawn from the end of all eloquence, and from the special end of Christian discourse; as also from the circumstances, in the midst of which it is delivered.

What is the religious oratorical discourse, commonly called a sermon?

We have to define a thing, which has no essential existence out of our idea, which is not independent of the idea, which we form of it, since it is our idea itself, which forms it. The object not being given, the definition then becomes a rule or a declaration of principles.

What is given is the aim, the felt want, the general and immutable object of preaching and of worship. Our definition, then, must be neither wider nor narrower than this object, and must permit the preacher to give himself, within the limits of Christian truth, all the scope, which the variety of places, times, and circumstances, and his own individuality, demand.

Accordingly, we define the sermon to be a discourse incorporated with public worship, and intended, now jointly, now by turns, to guide to the Christian truth those who do not yet believe in it, and to explain and apply it to those who admit it. The apostles Paul and Peter give the same idea of preaching:— "That the bishop," says the first, "may be able, by sound doctrine, both to *exhort* (viz., believers) and to *convince* (unbelievers)." (Tit. i. 9.) "I will not be negligent," says the second, "to put you always in remembrance of these things, though ye know them, and be established in the present truth." (2 Pet. i. 12.)

[We have distinguished two classes of hearers, whom we shall designate by the names, *believers* and *unbelievers* (this last being substituted for that of *incredulous* [infidels? or sceptics?], too

Continuation of the *Discours de Royer-Collard sur le projet de loi relatif au sacrilége.* [The warm flame of sympathy, kindled by eloquence, brings out those before—invisible characters, written by the finger of God on the heart and conscience.—Ed.]

often employed, though having a very different sense).] In which of these two categories ought we to range the audience, whom the preacher finds in the temples [our churches]? We ought, according to the definition, to distribute them between the two categories. The legal fiction takes a different view. [It supposes the temple [church] filled with believers, assembled for common, *i.e.*, joint worship.] But the real, evident state of matters is stronger, [*i.e.* is to be more regarded than the legal fiction; and in the actual constitution of things, the supposition of the existence of the two classes is reasonable.] However, the minister has not to alternate between the two classes, so as to share between them his discourse or discourses. The two objects of preaching are not separated in so decided a manner: what is addressed to unbelievers, may profit believers; and what is addressed to believers, may profit unbelievers. As to the latter, we say that everything, in the preaching of Christianity, is fitted to convert them; as to believers, have they not, in one sense, always need of being converted? [This does not exclude special sermons; but in the meanwhile there is no one part of evangelical truth, which is not suitable for all. Though it may have been necessary to distinguish by different names, the various epochs of the spiritual life, they are always only moments of one and the same work: Yes, the work of God in conversion, and in subsequent sanctification, is continuous and indivisible. Therefore, sermons on sanctification, as well as those of appeal (awakening sermons), will suit both classes.] These are "the fat pastures," the verdant fields of the prophet, the grass whereof at one and the same time nourishes the sound sheep, and cures the 'sick.' (Ezek. xxxiv. 13–16.) Very often we are more affected by a discourse, which is addressed to a class, of which we are not thought to form a part. [It is a fact of experience, that some men have been brought to the Gospel by discourses, which, taking the hearer to the highest summits of the spiritual life, were not addressed to them; and that, on the other hand, sermons of pure appeal, such as might have been addressed to pagans, have produced the greatest compunction among advanced Christians. "All Scripture is divinely inspired, and useful for teaching, for convincing, for correcting, for instructing in righteousness." (2 Tim. iii. 16.) Why might not an esoteric discourse convert those without, when it is proved,

that the simple contemplation of the Christian life gains many souls to the Gospel?[1] At first they are surprised; many things appear inconceivable; but they are struck with the beauty of the results,—with their unity; and they are led to study more attentively the cause of them. A discourse, in this sense, possesses for *all* an irresistible charm.]

We see that the object of the eloquence of the pulpit, as that of all eloquence, is to determine the will; but this object is combined in it, with that of instructing. Eloquence is only the form, —the edge, so to speak, of instruction. The preacher is a teacher under the form of an orator. These two objects are found united, if we will, in all eloquence; but here instruction is more prominent, exists more for its own sake, than in the other kinds of eloquence. "I often repeat to myself," says Reinhard, "that after all, the Christian preacher is more an instructor than an orator."[2]

There are two things which characterize the other kinds of oratory, as distinguished from that of the pulpit: 1. A particular occurrence, an interest peculiar to a certain moment, gives occasion to a discourse from the platform or the bar. 2. The political or forensic orator designs a special effect immediately to be produced as the result of his speech, on leaving the assembly; whereas the preacher does not pursue an immediate and visible result; he in general only aspires to put the soul in a certain disposition, with regard to such or such an object. This *interior* act, this *invisible* result, suffices him.

In principle the preacher instructs; that is the ground of his work; exhortation, and reprehension, give point to his instructions, but it is still instruction. The instruction may be eloquent; much more the exhortation, even when it does not refer to an act special, near, and palpable; but there nevertheless result from this some differences, which may be, in appearance, to the advantage of the other kinds; one can only redeem them [*i.e.* counterbalance this apparent advantage of the latter], by doing more or less violence to the nature of the discourse from the pulpit. [The orator of the tribune or of the bar is more naturally eloquent; he has actuality to aid him, his auditory is moved

[1] 1 Pet. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xi. 24, 25.—Ed.

[2] "Ich sage mir immer, der christliche Prediger sey doch mehr Lehrer als Redner." (Reinhard's *Gestœndnisse*, p. 84.) [The very word *doctrine*, διδαχή, 2 Tim. iv. 2, διδασκαλία, Tit. i. 9, Th. διδάσκω, *doceo*, implies this. Comp. 2 Tim. ii. 24, διδακτικόν, "Apt to teach." —Ed.]

and excited beforehand, whether for or against the orator is of little consequence. That is much better, than the sluggishness, which the preacher finds in his audience (*plumbea moles*), and which he has to remove by means of abstract verities.[1] Let him keep this position; let him demand of truth, of God, that eloquence, which is not found in the external circumstances. It is not necessary, that he create for himself a position, like that of the advocate or the tribune.] Instruction supposes a calmness, which we can only replace by vehemence, by ceasing really to instruct.[2] There is a calm eloquence, as there is a vehement eloquence; and if we have spoken of eloquence of the first class, we have understood thereby not one certain mean, but the assemblage of means, which are fitted to bring light into the mind, and decision into the soul. [This is not saying that the preaching ought not to be lively and urgent. We cannot but presume that many souls may, perhaps, hear for the first and last time the message of peace.[3] But this thought ought not to make us neglect instruction.—Our progress in explanation is slow, and we are often tempted to abridge it, and to preach to the nerves of our hearers. God, on the contrary, commands us to preach to souls,—to consciences. Let us not precipitate the results, let us not be more eager than God, who alone has the secret of the times. Nothing hinders from giving instruction at once with calmness, and with charitable urgency.]

Moreover, the orator of the pulpit has the choice, and, in a certain sense, the invention of his subjects. Rarely do circumstances relieve him of the task of making this choice. His ministry *in general* is, indeed, a cause he has to advocate; but *each* of his discourses is not such a cause.

Besides that instruction holds the chief place in the eloquence of the pulpit, let us observe, that the preacher has for the basis of his eloquence a document. We have said, he speaks the word of God.[4] By turns, he advances towards this document, and he

[1] Isa. vi. 10; Ps. cxix. 70; John viii. 15, vi, 26. 27, comp. with 2 Cor. iv. 18, v. 7.—Ed.

[2] Such a one mistakes *perspiration* for *inspiration*.—Ed.

[3] "I'll preach, as though I ne'er should preach again,
And as a dying man to dying men."—Baxter.—Ed.

[4] An old man remarked to Musculus the Swiss reformer, "Si vis fieri bonus concionator, da operam, ut sis bonus Biblicus." If you would be a good preacher, strive to be a good Biblicist.—Ed.

sets out from it. He is in turn advocate, and magistrate: advocate, when he pleads before consciences for the adoption of the document; magistrate, when he demands the obedience of man to the document adopted.[1] The orator at the bar has doubtless a document, the law, but he does not plead, as the preacher, in favour of the law; and in the application, he has by no means that field of expansion, which is open to the preacher.

In fine, if the oratorical act is always a *combat*, the combat in preaching is with an idea, not with a personal adversary; in such a manner, that this species alone of all, never presents the spectacle of a discussion. There is one, notwithstanding; but the same orator undertakes, so to speak, to play two parts, of which one only is *his own;* he produces, in order to refute them, the arguments of the adverse party, who is the unregenerate man. Every hearer, more or less, includes within himself the two contending parties. (Rom. vii. 14–24.)

Let us add, that a great part of the task consists in gaining possession of the field of battle. The preacher is an advocate, who pleads the cause of God before a tribunal of corrupt judges, whom it is his first business to render upright.[2]

Let us conclude by removing two errors; I. The one which expects too little from Homiletics, and the other which expects too much; or rather (for under the appearance of moderation, they are indeed extreme opinions, which we meet with), some see everything in the art; II. others find nothing at all in it. However, we can only discuss the extreme opinions. The intermediate degrees and shades escape us. Let us begin with the last.

I. They send us from art to nature, and their opinion is summed up in these two words: nature is a sufficient guide; nature is a surer guide.

What strikes us at first in this argument, is an opposition between nature and art, which is imaginary; for, so far from these being in opposition, it is not easy to establish the simple distinction. Language is often obliged (and the moral sciences offer us proofs of it in abundance) to present, as two different things and under two distinct names, two moments, two degrees, or two

[1] Bishop Wilson: "A pastor should act with the dignity of a man, who acts by the authority of God." Though in the sense of worldly lordship, his office is "non *magisterium*, sed *ministerium*."—Bucer.—Ed.

[2] ——"Male verum examinat omnis
Corruptus judex."—Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2, 8. See Ezek. xxxiii. 31.—Ed.

relations of the same thing. It is thus, that, in another sphere, we oppose nature to civilisation, or to *the art of living in society*, as if civilisation was not natural; as if the spontaneous development of a germ were less natural than the germ itself; as if the oak were less natural than the acorn! It is with as little reason, that we oppose nature to art; what is art indeed, but nature still? Art assists at the first moment of all creation; where then, if you will exclude art, will this exclusion commence? You will see, that you can never trace the thing too high. What is called nature, or talent, is only an art more easy, more spontaneous, unconscious of itself. What we call art, only serves to prolong and bring to perfection the instinct, which is itself in all things only a more elementary and rapid reasoning. If instinct removes the first difficulties, will it in the same manner remove the second? That is the question; and it still presents itself under this new form. Does looking hinder from seeing? Does not looking assist seeing? [*looking* answers to *art; seeing* to *nature;* the former being the studied act, the latter the natural and instinctive. —Ed.]

Art, indeed, which must not be confounded with artifice, is in all things only the serious searching after means suitable to an end; so that to deny art, we must first establish, that at the first attempt we find everything, and the best possible. Granting that it has been established, we will demand, in what art can be injurious, in what especially, not to abandon the terms of the objection, is art hostile to nature? Setting aside certain privileged geniuses, whom Providence has made dependent on the first movement [impulse], or with whom art has all the spontaneity of instinct, I am persuaded, that, inspiration [*i.e.*, the inspiration of genius in some degree] being supposed (for in everything this is the first condition), the labour of art is always in the direction of truth and nature.[1] I have yet to be shown, in what the works, in which art is systematically neglected, are

[1] "Doctrina vim promovet insitam."—Hor. *Carm. and Ep. ad Pis.*

"Naturâ fieret laudabile carmen an arte
Quæsitum est. Ego nec studium sine divite venâ
Nec rude quid possit video ingenium: alterius sic
Altera poscit opem res, et conjurat amicè."

However in the preacher, though not naturally eloquent, the ordinary influences of the Spirit supply in some degree the place of genius, though certainly not dispensing with art. 2 Cor. iv. 7, "We have this treasure in *earthen* vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God, not of us." 1 Cor. ii. 1.—Ed.

superior in genius to those, to which the principles and means of art have been applied. More than that, we may assert that in general, and in all spheres, it is art, which brings back to nature. We are not naturally so natural, as we think ourselves. Barbarism is not simple; civilisation endeavours, and it is more or less successful, to connect our life and our manners with the indications of nature, which it successfully renews with its skilful chisel.[1] The triumph of Christianity is to reinstate nature in its own position; for nothing is less according to nature than sin, and nothing tends more than sin to estrange us from nature. In religion, and in civilisation, the advance of humanity is in the direction of a restoration. We do not go forward; we return, because we have to return [if we would really progress]. It would be very strange, if the work of the writer formed an exception to this universal law; in fact, this law rules him in spite of himself, and the despisers of art in the matter of eloquence, apply to their productions, without suspecting it, the art common to all, to make up their own deficiency. They are, up to a certain point, artists in spite of themselves.

We must take into consideration the consequences. To exclude art—that is to say, reflection—from one of the most serious spheres of human activity, is to proscribe in all spheres reasoning, observation, and method,—is to renounce all aiming towards perfection. All that may be said of the necessity and of the power of conversion, does not prevent our believing, that there is for the convert an art and method of living well. This is granted without difficulty. I demand, after that, why should there not be an art and method of speaking well? Conversion itself is nothing else than a *talent*, which art cultivates and renders fruitful.

Cannot genius, it may be said, dispense with it? If the power of dispensing with it exists, we do not see, that genius is very eager to take advantage of it. Genius has a method of its own, but it is still a method; and if the poor are easily led to prodi-

[1] What is called "a state of nature" can hardly be called with propriety man's "natural state," since in it a large proportion of his faculties remain undeveloped. A plant would not be said to be in its most natural state when growing in a soil or climate that would not allow it to put forth the flowers and fruits, for which its organisation was destined. It is remarkable that in many respects savage life is decidedly more anti-natural than the civilised: ex. gr. tattooing and other self-mutilations.—Archb. Whately, *Origin of Civilisation*.—Ed.

gality, there is nothing like being rich, in order to be economical. This great word *genius* is imposing; some would give it, I know not what, magical property; but genius being only the happiest of instincts, the most favourable of starting points, could enjoy no prescription against that law, which has made everything in the world according to weight, number, and measure, and has not permitted that in any species wisdom should be a superfluity [*i.e.*, that any can dispense with it]. Besides, have genius, and then dispense with art; but meantime employ art to make the best of the ability you have; have a club; but until then, bind as well as you can your bundle of wands; have wings, and then you may fly; but in the meantime learn to walk.

We grant only this, and that very willingly, that just as instinct, in reflecting upon itself, becomes art, art, in exercising itself, becomes instinct. It is only a knowing instinct. We follow the rules of it involuntarily; it becomes in this domain what habit is in the moral life, a second nature. It is as natural and as easy for those who have cultivated their instinct, to write well and to act well, as for those who have left it uncultivated, to write ill or to act ill. They even cannot help doing so. Nature presents itself at the goal, as much as at the starting point.

Others would put religion in the room of study and of art.

They rely upon the general spirit of Christianity, which is, say they, to make strength resplendent in weakness, and to manifest the power of truth in the absence, and to the exclusion, of means purely human.

Far from denying this general spirit of Christianity, we love to proclaim it. But how shall we continue faithful to it? It will, doubtless, be by not giving the flesh for an auxiliary to the spirit; for this would be to give it for its auxiliary its mortal enemy, to call death to the assistance of life, to take an obstacle for an instrument. Now, the question is, whether art, applied to preaching, is a carnal auxiliary, an instrument contrary to the object which is proposed to us. But this art, by whatever name we call it, is no other thing than observation, reflection, experience, applied to the exposition of truth. Do you proscribe all these? Are not these, on the contrary, the natural auxiliaries of the truth? and to place them in its service, is not this simply to restore to it that which belongs to it? What! it is by their means that we have learned,—that we have recognised,—the truth;

we have applied them, under the Divine direction, to persuade ourselves, and are we to be forbidden to employ them to persuade others? Sooner might you say (provided always that you prove it) that man ought to be as nothing in the work of the ministry; that he must confine himself to reciting the inspired words; in other terms, that it is proper to suppress preaching; but if you grant that the preacher is a man, you must necessarily find it good that he apply and devote himself wholly to his work,—that, in all the force of the term, he speak the word of God; you thereby have sanctioned the study and practice of an art, which is nothing else than the reasoned and well-digested employment of all the means, which the preacher has at his disposal.

Without doubt, it is God who converts; this is the *principle:* but he converts man by means of man; this is the *fact.* I speak of man personal, living, moral. As soon as you have admitted this fact, you admit art in preaching; for what would such a man be without thought? or how will you leave him his thought, and prevent him from reasoning upon what he is doing? or why, if he reason, must he be obliged to reason only in part? If the Holy Spirit does not hold the pen, he who holds it must, under this influence, reflect. Inspiration being set aside, I do not see why he should trust more to his first impulse, than to reflection, to chance, rather than to art. Does the first thought come from the Holy Spirit, and the second from man? Is not this first thought man's, as well as the second? And in both cases, has not the man recourse to himself? Is there more faithfulness to one's self in the first system, than in the second? On the contrary, when once it is admitted that man should have recourse to himself, then faithfulness to himself consists in drawing from himself the best and most complete advantage; in joining to the first movement [impulse], which is perhaps involuntary, the second, which is not so; in a word, to natural force the acquired force, which, apparently, is not its opposite. Do we forget that our true virtues are *acquired* virtues,—works of art? Since we cannot trust our first thoughts, we must correct the first by the second. It is in this, not in carelessness, that faithfulness to one's self consists, and the blessing is found. It is the same with talent and art as with riches, of which it has been said, "Make yourselves friends with the unjust riches," [*i.e.*, riches, which others misapply to unjust ends, do you apply to their true

end. "The mammon of unrighteousness."—Engl. Vers.] (Luke xvi. 9.)

In vain do we despise means; all the while we are despising them, we employ them; what we bring, belonging to ourselves, into our ministry, little as it may be, belongs to the category of means. The first of means is ourselves;[1] since it is necessary to employ this mean, let it be possessed of all the integrity and perfection possible: "That all that is in us (ὁλόκληρον, the three parts constituting *man in his integrity*. "Your *whole* spirit."—Engl. Vers.), spirit, soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." (1 Thess. v. 23.)

Man is, as it were, the medium through which God has willed that the truth should come to man.[2] The truth alone is luminous, the medium is only transparent; but let it be truly transparent, and, as far as depends upon us, let not the rays of truth be obscured and broken in the unfaithful medium.

When we say, with Bossuet, that God does not disdain to make use of means; and that, between Him and man, man is the chief of these means, we do not feel the whole extent of this admission. If God makes use of means, *we* may well make use of them; our faculties are not more unworthy of us, than we are of God; and if it is evident that God consents to make man his means, let us give the whole mean—that is to say, the whole man—to the service of God. Now, man understands art; man is essentially an artist: take away art, and man is no longer man.

Why, therefore, do we so strongly advocate the means of art? Is it, in order to add something to the truth? We have already said, one adds nothing to the truth. All that one can do is to remove, one after another, all the veils which conceal it from the view of man. This is the object and effect of eloquence, and this also serves to distinguish false art from that which is genuine; for nothing would be more arbitrary and less philosophical, than to say, that the genuine is that which disdains detail, since art in the detail is only truth in the detail. Genuine art is that which

[1] 2 Cor. viii. 5, "They first gave *their own selves* to the Lord." So Quesnel on Rom. i. 1. The surest mark of the minister's Divine call is, "where it is his purpose to live, to labour, and to possess nothing but for Jesus Christ and His Church."—Ed.

[2] Heb. ii. 5, 6, "For unto *the angels* hath He not put in subjection the world to come, whereof we speak: But—what is *man*," etc.—Ed.

has truth for its object; false art is that which cultivates illusion and falsehood. It is necessary, besides, if we are able, to be perfect in everything, and to the utmost. But it is true that every species has its proprieties, which art teaches to distinguish, and the beautiful excludes the pretty [the merely ornamental, the "purpureus pannus" stitched on without regard to the harmony and beauty of the whole].

We oppose, then, to the *principle* which has been quoted against us, the *fact*, even the institution of God. If there is a contradiction between the principle and the fact, it is not from us that an explanation must be demanded, but from God; but no! it is not necessary to demand either of us or of God an explanation of a contradiction, which does not exist. When it is said that the truth ought to be sufficient to speak for itself, is it meant that the truth ought not to be spoken, or that those who speak it ought not to speak it, as persons who understand and feel it? Is it meant that they ought not to unite themselves with it? Is the truth, spoken with love, something more than the truth? Certainly not. Why, then, should the truth, spoken with intelligence, be something more than the truth? Is not the adhesion of our intellect, as well as of our heart, to the truth, the natural heritage of the truth? And has not all that testifies of this adhesion—all that is fitted to reproduce it in other minds and in other hearts—devolved by full right to the truth? Those who believe, that something tumultuary and fortuitous in the discourse of the preacher is what is most suitable to his end, or that the absence of art is art *par excellence*, upon what principle—upon what experience—do they found their belief? We are entirely ignorant of it.

Some will, perhaps, be astonished at the pains we are taking, to combat an error, which has so little weight; but there is not one of our arguments, which does not answer some widely-spread prejudice, some opinion often expressed. For this reason, without fearing some repetition of what has been already said, we shall discuss the passages, which are usually opposed to us.

"Be not anxious ["Take no thought," Engl. Vers.] about what you shall say ['how,' Engl. Vers.], or what you shall speak, for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." (Matt. x. 19.)

This recommendation appears to be connected with *the pro-*

mise of a Divine assistance. When such an assistance is *not* promised, must not something else take its place?[1]

Moreover, we do not doubt, that the promise of this assistance subsists for all the cases, in which labour has been impossible, and in which assistance has been demanded.

These two cases excepted, and if the question is about an assistance alike in its principle and in its nature to all the succours, which the Holy Spirit grants to a believer, then we would say, that the promise of this assistance does not forbid the employment of human means; or else that, if the employment of human means impeaches our faith in this case, it impeaches it in all. We ought not to provide for ourselves clothing or nourishment, because it is written, "Be not anxious about ["Take no thought, saying," Engl. Vers.] what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put on; for your heavenly Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." (Matt. vi. 23–32.)[2]

Yet in this latter case we might retort against the objector, in a much higher tone, the reproach of contradiction to Scripture: but the reproach is in neither case applicable. The employment of human means does not exclude either the necessity of assistance from on high, nor the feeling of that necessity. It is with hammer and trowel in hand, that the workman says to God, "Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it." (Ps. cxxvii. 1.) This hammer and this trowel are in the first instance gifts of God, the first witnesses of His goodness, the first subjects of our gratitude. The strength and the will to act are a first instalment advanced to us by our Divine Leader. We do not say, "Work, *although* God work in you

[1] Quakers and fanatics, who claim inspiration in preaching, would see on reflection that they speak better after long *practice*, than they did when novices; better on a subject they are *used* to preach on, than on a comparatively new one; better on *premeditation*, than on a sudden. All this is inconsistent with inspiration. For on that ground the apostles are expressly forbidden to *premeditate* what they should say; because it should be *given* them in the same hour, what they should say.—Archb. Whately.—Ed.

[2] In Matt. x. 19, the words are the same as in vi. 23, μὴ μεριμνήσητε: What is forbidden is *over-anxious* thought of the natural man; just as ch. x. 9, 10, and ch. vi. 23, forbid *extra* provision for *bodily* needs, so ch. x. 19 forbids it for *mental*. Preparation by the use of natural powers and means, *where possible*, was not thereby forbidden, when sanctified by the Spirit. Nay, Timothy is exhorted, Μελέτα, not μερίμνα, 1 Tim. iv. 15.—Ed.

both to will and to do;" but with the apostle, "Work, *because* God worketh in you both to will and to do." (Philip. ii. 12, 13.)[1]

It has been said that Christian wisdom is to *remain still*, as if God did everything, and to *act*, as if He did nothing. Let us state it better; let us say, that He does *all*. He has made *us*, who do; He produces *in* us the will to do; He produces *by* us all that we do; but He does it by means of us, and does not wish to do it otherwise. After having done much, we are not the less called upon to say with Paul, "We are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves." (2 Cor. iii. 5.) Where is the contradiction?

They further cite:—"Christ hath sent me to preach the Gospel, not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect." (1 Cor. i. 17.)

The discourses, or the reasonings of human wisdom, rejected by St Paul, ought to be so by every preacher, when his business is to preach Jesus Christ; for human wisdom, drawing from its own resources, does not find Jesus Christ. To take for our starting-point human wisdom, to which the cross is 'foolishness,' would be to repudiate that, which though 'foolishness' in man's eyes, is nevertheless sound doctrine. But reflection, method, and, in one word, art, have nothing in common with the human wisdom, which is here in question. The ablest of preachers, the wisest in respect to art, may have the fullest sense of the "foolishness of God;" just as on the contrary he, who is most a stranger to this Divine foolishness, may be absolutely destitute of art.

"Our religion," says Pascal, "is foolish, when we look at the effective cause [the *instruments* employed?]; and wise when we look at the wisdom, which prepares for it [which prepares them, *i.e.*, the efficient instruments and means?]."[2] It may, therefore, be wise also in the portion of the preparations, which is entrusted to us. It is even foolish in no sense, unless for fools, of whom, it is true, the number is great. Why, moreover, do we not call the least movement of charity [love] foolishness? It also is above and beyond reason, all the effects of which cannot account for it.

[1] God's prevenient and concurrent grace does not supersede means, but makes them effectual.—Ed.

[2] Pascal, *Pensées*, Edition Faugère, tome ii., p. 354.

St Paul, who refuses human wisdom, has not however abjured art: and although his rhetoric cannot be in everything and always proposed as a model, how many parts of his rhetoric are models for all time! Grant it, that it was the Holy Spirit who instructed him; be it so; but at least, He *has* instructed him. We, who have not the same master, let us not neglect the art, which He has taught to St Paul.

But they oppose to us another passage:—"And I," says St Paul to the Corinthians, "when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God;[1] for I determined to know nothing among you but Jesus Christ, and Him crucified." (1 Cor. ii. 1, 2.)[2]

What Paul says here ought to be repeated by every preacher; these words are the motto of the Christian preacher. He ought to know only Jesus Christ. This signifies that, for him, "there is no other name, which has been given among men, *by whom they are to be saved.*" (Acts iv. 12.) This is the meaning, for, as for the rest, Paul knew many other things.[3] As to eloquence and philosophy, he does not pretend to be brilliant by these means; but he has employed all the powers, that were at his disposal, to be clear, persuasive, conclusive. All the essential parts of an orator are found in him. If he is sometimes unpolished, and, nevertheless, powerful, are you going to conclude that he is powerful because he is unpolished?[4] Does it not suffice you to say, that, what is unpolished in him, makes his power break forth so much the more vigorously? Be unpolished as he is (not, however, of premeditated design, for there could be no premeditation more absurd), be unpolished as he is, but push an argument as he does, and we will be content. But if, in order to imitate him, or rather to parody him, you make yourself barbarous, be satisfied of this, that there is nothing

[1] *καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας.*

[2] Οὐ—*ἔκρινά τι εἰδέναι εἰ μὴ* Ἰησοῦν, "The only thing that I *made it definitely my business* to know was Jesus Christ," not = "I determined to know nothing save Jesus Christ."—ALFORD. But I prefer the Engl. Vers., with Billroth, Rosenm., etc., etc., Theodoret, "He uses *ἔκρινα*, intimating that he could have discussed *other* doctrines, as ex. gr. that of the *Godhead*, but that he determined to dwell with them only on the *incarnation* and *death* of Jesus Christ."—ED.

[3] Upon the idiom of St Paul, see Chrysostom. *De Sacerdotio*, cap. vi.

[4] 2 Cor. xi. 6, "Though I be rude in speech [*ἰδιώτης τ. λόγῳ*, a 'laic,' not professionally acquainted with the arts of an orator], yet not [so] in [real] knowledge," sc., Gospel knowledge.—ED.

essentially common to barbarism and strength. Your business is to be strong; arrive at that by the road that pleases you best; if instinct alone makes you eloquent, I mean an eloquence connected, sustained, and instructive, we will excuse your want of art; we do not keep to the long road merely for its length; we will be content, provided you arrive; but *will* you arrive? it is a question, or rather it is not one. Will you do as much, working at random, with scattered forces, as while concentrating them? Will the fire be as hot, if you have not taken care to collect into a pan the scattered coals, which go out and blacken in their isolation? Will you do as well without meditating, as when you meditate,—without choosing, as when you make a choice,—without combining, as when you combine. Now all this is art, and art is no other thing than this.[1]

Separated from art, that is to say, separated from itself up to a certain point, the truth has been able to produce great effects; some words spoken from the heart may, upon an occasion, be worth the best composed sermon. But if you take the great majority of cases, the whole of preaching, and its fundamental character, which is instruction, you will see, that it cannot proceed by fits nor by inspiration, and that it demands the assistance of art.

[1] See FENELON, *Dialogues sur Eloquence*, Dialogue III.

We reproduce here, after an anterior manuscript, the first form given by M. Vinet to his reply to the objection drawn from 1 Cor. ii. 1, 2.

To know Christ crucified is indeed the science of the preacher, and even, in point of religion, his only science. In point of religion, we say; for, as to other things, Paul is not ignorant, does not care to appear so, and makes an abundant use of his knowledge. The apostle explains himself sufficiently upon this point in the verses following, where he opposes this mystery, which God alone reveals, to the imaginations of human wisdom, which cannot reach the secret of God.—So much for science. As to eloquence, he denies to it, in so far as it is eloquence, the power of creating faith (ver. 5). The great work of conversion can have its principle and its reason, only in the very nature of the fact which the apostle announces, Jesus Christ crucified; and to make this truth to be received belongs only to the power of God. (*Ibid.*) But if this fact is very suitable to inspire eloquence, why should not the preacher apply himself to render back to it what he has received from it? Why should he not strive to multiply the phases of it, to render it sensible to the consciences of all, to appeal to human nature to recognise the necessity of it? How attain this without meditation? How arrive at the greatest possible force of argument without combinations? How find these combinations without having observed human nature, and having discovered the most direct and secret paths to arrive at the inmost recesses of the soul?—If you refuse to all this the name of art, you have it in your power to do so, and we shall not dispute about so small a matter. Adopt the means, and give them what name you please.—*Editors.*

People impose on themselves in this matter a great and dangerous delusion. They deny art to be for the advantage of religion; it is to religion that they pretend to send back the preacher; but what do they do in reality? they send him back to nature, in sending him back to his first inspirations. For who can assure him that his first inspirations will be the most religious, or even that they will be religious at all? I am bold to say, that Christian analogy speaks against this method; for religion itself is a work of art, and it consecrates, in the highest sphere, the rights and the dignity of art. Religion does not trust to our first movement, or our first look; it makes continual appeal to thought, and reflection; it refuses instinct. In despising art, we act then in the spirit and in the sense of nature, rather than in the spirit and in the sense of religion. [And the instinct of our corrupt nature prompts evil, rather than religion.—Ed.]

A generous enthusiasm has been able to put in circulation the maxims, which we have combated; but indolence has laid hold of them to justify herself. It is indolence that makes the most of them. Who would dare to deny it? Zeal, also, I am very willing to grant, takes advantage of them and applies them. Is it right in doing so? Are these maxims necessary for it? This is what we shall have occasion to examine.[1]

II. Let us now turn to those, who are disposed to expect too much from Homiletics; but first, to those, who expect too much from instruction in this art. For though *Homiletics*, or the theory of ecclesiastical eloquence, were capable of creating eloquence, it would not follow that a *course of lectures on* Homiletics, though it were the best that could be heard, and were listened to in the best manner, could of itself make a preacher eloquent.

A course, or a regular instruction in Homiletics, is necessary, since it collects and arranges before the eyes of the student, a number of ideas and facts, which, in general, the student has it not in his power to collect. This course will give an idea of *the object of the art*, of *the art itself*, and of its *extent*, which it is necessary to have beforehand; since practice, which shows us the necessity only too late, does not give a notion of *the whole*, and cannot supply the place of meditation on first principles. We should require to have a very rare organisation, and to be

[1] See Part III., ch. i. On Elocution in general.

also placed in very rare circumstances, if practice alone could teach us the whole art. If facts react much upon ideas, ideas illustrate facts beforehand; now these ideas constitute Homiletics.

But the professor is not one of those instrumentalities, which move and which carry us, wherever we wish to go;[1] he is not a river, but merely a road.

Any course whatever, but especially a course of such a nature as this, has been truly *given*, only when it has been *received*. And this reception is more than passive; it is an act of the will; to apprehend is to lay hold of (*apprendre, c'est prendre*).

Properly, what does the professor give?[2] Not science itself, but directions, by which one may acquire it for himself. It is not *here* that you learn it; you learn [here] to learn it *there* [*i.e.*, how to acquire it in your own researches].

Observe, moreover, that if, in a sense, art is *one*, it is not so in all senses; it multiplies itself with individuals; it individualises itself in each. The question which will one day place itself before you, will not be, What ought one to do? but, What ought *I* to do? In this preparatory period, oratorical discourse may appear to you as the object; in the active labours of the ministry, it will only be *one* means of attaining an actual object on occasions, which will exactly resemble no other. The professor answers the question, What ought *one* to do? he does not answer the question, What ought *I* to do? He himself is obliged to keep out of view his own individuality: he teaches the art of all men, not his own.

The professor whom you hear, the rhetorician whom you read, cannot make that rhetoric individual to you. Every one must in each case do so for himself.

But if we must not rest too entirely on *the course* we attend, no more must we place too great confidence even in *Homiletics*, that is to say, in the abstract ideas of the art. I call them abstract, because they are isolated from the subject, from the circumstances, and from concrete ideas, from the very substance of the discourse.

I might oppose, this time, to art, talent; to art, which is

[1] Pascal, *Pensées*, Part i., Art. x., § xxxviii.

[2] "Ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum
Reddere quæ ferrum valet—
Unde parentur opes—
Quid deceat, quid non: quo virtus, quo ferat error."—Hor. *Ep. ad Pis.*—Ed.

acquired or *developed* talent—talent, which is *native*, *spontaneous*, *intuitive* art—art in the germ; and I might say that no theory can either give talent, or supply the want of it; but with this I am less concerned. I am rather pledged to oppose *theory*, or the abstract ideas of art, to the *substance* of this eloquence, which art professes to govern. Let us not forget it: eloquence is first in the matter; in one sense it is entirely in the matter, from which we only disengage it. Eloquence has no existence in itself, independently of the matter: when you have set aside the truth, the beauty of the objects, and the sentiments which, in the soul of the orator, correspond to them, I demand what remains to you, if it is not logic and psychology, of which eloquence is only an employment more or less happy? What is essentially eloquent is neither psychology nor logic: it is the truth; it is the soul.

This is a chief point. Eloquence is substantial; from that very fact, it is actual; because, though the abstract is of no time or of no place, substance belongs to time and space: it is actual. From the very circumstance, that the matter is first in importance, the moment and the place count for something; the orator has something to learn from them. He would be ill inspired, if he took art for a thing *finished* in itself, absolute, and independent of circumstances, as a form regulated once for all, or an immutable programme; if he did not say to himself, that the task re-appears new every time and for every particular person, and that, as there is a general art of making a discourse *in general* (discourse, which has no existence), there is also an art of making the discourse *of to-day*, an art of making the discourse *of to-morrow*. The Homiletics of the study ought to leave a place for that of the temple [house of God], and of the parish.

Eloquence is a business. Now, what is business is not learned by abstraction. Actual *practice* of commerce alone teaches commerce; we learn politics in the management of affairs, and life in living.

The rules are the summary, the generalisation of particular experiences. A rule does not put one precisely in a condition to act; it has not an active virtue, it does not inspire, it communicates substantially nothing: it merely warns. Rules are not the less useful on that account: they assist us to see, they preserve us from seeing wrong, they abridge the time and the uncertainty of feeling our way in the dark; they are, if you will, an *antici-*

pated experience, composed of the experience of others, and of some reasonings *à priori*. We live upon these savings, as a child lives upon the wealth of its father, until we can gain our own livelihood; and they put us in a condition to gain it,—that is to say, the rules teach us, to make rules for ourselves.

There is even a reacting influence: for if the rules (or the generalisations, the abstract ideas) aid us in seeing the facts, these in their turn give us the true sense of the rules, and measure to us the extent of them.

It may be dangerous to grant a too absolute value to rules, and to suffer one's mind to be captivated by them; we must at least refer them always to the more general principles, from which they emanate. We must maintain always open and free this communication between the principles and the rules, as also between the rules and the facts. The principles,—the facts,—these are our light. The rules are a bond between the principles and the facts; but it is necessary that it be a living bond. A rule, which does not constantly touch with its two extremities the principles and the facts, is an empty formula.[1]

As for models, in what spirit should they be studied?[2] It is the same with the beautiful, as with virtue; neither the one nor the other is mechanically copied. They impose themselves, the one on the taste, the other on the conscience; they have only to show themselves; it is by the contemplation of these types, that we become conformed to them.[3] This does not exclude reflection or analysis; *looking* intentionally does not hinder from *seeing* intuitively and without design. But beauties are not transported ready-made; and we the less resemble our models, the more we deliberately wish to resemble them. It is merely, or rather mainly, a kind of contagion, to which we must expose ourselves.[4] Admiration is fruitful in its effects on the admirer.

And what models? Not only sermons, but all oratorical discourses; not only all these, but eloquence wherever it is found;

[1] See Reinhard's *Gestændnisse*, p. 51; and p. 45 of the translation published in 1816, by M. Jean Monod, under this title: *Lettres de F. V. Reinsur ses études et sa carrière de prédicateur*. Paris, 1816.

[2] Barante, *Mélanges*, vol. ii., p. 374, and Herder's *Briefe*, etc., Letter xli.

[3] "We shall become like to Him, *for* we shall see Him as He is." (1 John iii. 2.) 2 Cor. iii. 18, "We all, with open face, beholding as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image."—Ed.

[4] Good, as well as evil, is infectious: 1 Pet. ii. 12.—Ed.

eloquence not merely oratorical; the eloquence of narration, as well as that of reasoning;[1] eloquence in the most different kinds, in order to have our idea of it the most general, the most pure, the least conventional;—not only eloquence ready-made, but that out of which eloquence is made. Eloquence ready-made might well put yours out of doors.

[1] ——"Vos exemplaria Græca
Nocturnâ versate diu, versate diurnâ."—Hor. *Ep. ad Pis.*—Ed.

FIRST PART.

INVENTION.

THE immemorial and inevitable division of a course upon the art of oratory is: *Invention*, *Arrangement*, *Elocution*.

In reality, invention spreads itself over the whole field of rhetoric; we invent our plan, we invent our language; the same faculty applies itself to everything; it is the whole talent, it is the whole art.

But if we consider here, not the faculty, the active exercise of which is unlimited, but the object, which is special, we shall find a difference, and a reasonable distinction between these three things: the *matter* or the ground (which must be invented), *order* (which must be invented), lastly, *style* (which must be invented): a division which corresponds to the ancient one, and might advantageously take its place in our subject.[1]

Nevertheless we retain the terms, premising, that under the name of *invention* we understand only the invention of *ideas*, or of *the matter;* of which it will afterwards be the business to invent the arrangement, and the expression.

Invention, then, is here taken in a relative sense (invention of the matter of the discourse); for, in the absolute sense, it presents itself in all the movements or successive motions of art. It is true, however, that the invention of the first ideas of discourse is invention *par excellence*.

It is difficult to give an account of invention, taken as an active spring, and a power of the mind. At whatever point in the motions of art we place it, invention, in its principle, is a mystery. Talent may give an account to itself of its *methods*, not of *itself*. The development of the germ is human, the germ is Divine. To say that invention is not a thing *sui generis*,

[1] PASCAL, *Pensées*, Edition Faugére, tom. i., p. 254, § xxiv.

would be to say, that imagination is not a distinct faculty, a primitive force. And if we would see absolutely nothing in it but a method, we should still have to confess that this method is innate in certain minds, in fact, that this method is *a* talent: this method, instinctively divining, is perhaps *talent itself*. Invention is a sort of divining-wand.[1] It is impossible to give it to ourselves absolutely; it is even impossible, when we have invention in a certain sphere, to give it to ourselves in another; one may be inventive in philosophy, without being capable of inventing a simple story. Besides, invention is an element of all intellect; but intellects are, in this respect, very unequal and very different. Where there is nothing to act upon, art loses its rights; but it never loses them, for there is everywhere something. No one can do everything;[2] but no one, also, does all that he can.[3] In order to know our resources, it is necessary to improve them. An inventive intellect can become more so by employing certain means, which are not talent; and an intellect, in which the invention is feeble, but not null, may, by the employment of the same means, develop in itself this force. The means of improving and developing what invention we have, are the following:—

1. *Knowledge.*—The more we know, the more we are in a condition to invent; an original mind does not lose, but gains in originality by knowing.[4] The mutual intercourse of minds, of thought with thought, is hostile to individuality; in this sphere also, "it is not good for man to be alone." All knowledge does not profit originality; but an original mind has an original eru-

[1] "The generality of writers pass and repass a thousand times over mines of gold, without suspecting their existence. Genius alone has the instinct, which informs it, that the mine is rich, and it alone has the strength to dig even into its entrails, and to seize upon its treasures."—MARMONTEL.

[2] "Non omnia possumus omnes."—VIRG.—ED.

[3] He, who hid his *one* talent in a napkin, under the pretext, that his Master had not given him sufficient, wherewith to bring in a profit, was cast out as an "unprofitable servant:" Matt. xxv. 25–30. God encourages us to "stir up the gift that is in us," however small: 1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6; and rewards largely him, who is "faithful in a very little:" Luke xix. 17, xvi. 10.

"The pastors after God's heart feed the people with knowledge and understanding:" Jer. iii. 15, comp. Matt. xiii. 52.—ED.

[4] "He (Petrarch) experienced, that knowing was of great service for inventing, and his genius became thereby so much the more original, so that, like the eternal forces, he was able to be present in all times."—MADAME DE STAEL, *Corinne*, book ii., chap. iii.

dition; science, all-objective element as it appears to be, becomes in it a subjective element. Be that as it may, it is given to no man to bring something out of nothing; the happiest imagination requires a starting-point, or a fulcrum. Talent is the lever, but only the lever. "The human mind can create nothing; it is only productive, after having been made fruitful by experience (its own or another's), and by meditation. Its knowledge furnishes the germs of its productions."

2. The second means is *meditation*,[1] a species of incubation, which warms and makes fruitful the germ. It is the concentration of the thought, and even of the life, upon a point, with which we seek to identify ourselves. Meditation is aided by analysis; but meditation is not analysis. If we are not in error as to the etymology of this word, meditation transports us into *the midst* of the object.[2] We seek to obtain, not the simple nor the formal idea of it, but the sentiment, the immediate perception. There is in it also an analysis,—a logic,—but one which is rather that of the object, than that of the subject, rather that of the sentiment, than that of the thought: it is a continued and profound impression of the thing, a sort of consubstantiation. This supposes a force, a peculiar aptitude; but as the will is much concerned in it, we rank meditation in the number of the *means* of invention, we do not make it the *principle* of invention. Meditation is to talent, what conscience is to the moral sense.

3. *Analysis*, which is not the same thing as meditation, endeavours to ascend to the primary idea of the object, as to a summit, whence one commands all the declivities, and where one sees, in proportion as he gets higher, the bounds of the horizon recede. It climbs unceasingly towards a simpler and higher principle, meeting as it ascends always fewer contingent or accidental elements. When it is guided by a sound logic and profound metaphysics, it arrives at astonishing results,—astonishing, I say, to itself; it finds things new and striking. We must not confound with this proceeding the usage of a trivial

[1] "Meditate on these things, give thyself up wholly to them, that thy profiting may appear to all:" 1 Tim. iv. 15. Ps. i. 2, cxix. 15. Food must be *digested* as well as *eaten* if it is to nourish.—Ed.

[2] *Meditor*, not from *medius*, as Vinet supposes, but akin to μελετάω, μέλει, implying *care*, and *study*· so *d* and *l* are interchanged in Ὀδυσσεύς, Ulysses. 'Lectio inquirit—oratio postulat—meditatio invenit—contemplatio disgustat" [degustat?].—Augustine, *Ap.*; *Bridges' Chr. Min.*—Ed.

logic,[1] which is always sure of giving something, always sure of occupying a certain space, but which never stirs anything more than the superficial layer of the soil.

4. *Exercise.*—The more we demand of a soil, the more it will produce. It is not exhausted. *Nihil feracius ingeniis;* it yields so much the more, the more it has already yielded.[2] It is not to this, that we can apply the passage, "Your strength will be to keep yourselves at rest" (English version, "Their strength is to sit still"), (Isa. xxx. 7); for rest weakens and kills us. It is rust, and not service, that tarnishes the brightness of steel.

For the rest, in the chapter on *invention*, the rhetoricians treat neither of the *talent* of invention, nor of the *means* of developing it: they rather wish to prescribe to it certain *conditions;* they apply themselves to regulate it. In the rhetoric of antiquity, invention is less the faculty of finding, than the art of choosing among what has been found. "The orator, then, will use discernment: it is not enough for him to find ideas to express; he must examine them. Nothing is more fruitful than intellect, especially when it has been cultivated by study. But as a rich and fertile soil does not produce corn only, but all sorts of herbs, which are injurious to the good seed; in like manner, the intellect produces at times frivolous thoughts, or such as are foreign to the object which it proposes to itself, and without utility, and it is necessary that the orator choose with care the ideas which he is to put into his work."[3]

It is necessary to mention that the ancient rhetoricians, having in view only forensic and deliberative eloquence, had nothing to say upon the invention of the subject, which was always *prescribed* to the orator. It is not the same with the eloquence of the pulpit. In vain would we reduce the preacher to the choice of a text. We cannot interdict him from choosing his subject at the first, and his text for his subject; then, in the text itself,

[1] Bridges remarks on "the evil of dissecting our subject rather upon the principle of *verbal*, than *logical* analysis; by which mode the words rather than the materials are distributed under their several heads."—*Christian Ministry*, iv. 2, § 1.—Ed.

[2] Matt. xxv. 29, "Unto every one that hath (*i.e.*, hath to some purpose, avails himself of his talents), shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but from him who hath not (*i.e.*, who has not appropriated them as a living possession by exercise), shall be taken away even that, which he hath" (or as Luke, *which he* only *seemeth to have*).—Ed.

[3] Cicero, *De Oratore*, c. xv.

supposing that one has first chosen the text, there is often a subject to be found, or to be created. Besides, we do not admit that the employment of a text is essential[1] to the eloquence of the pulpit. We may therefore say that the preacher is often called upon to choose his subject. And when we say choose, we do not mean that he is to take it ready-made out of a table of matters all drawn up, from a list of chapters with their subdivisions. The number of subjects is indefinite: each, according to the relation, and the combination which our imagination creates, multiplies itself: it is like the five loaves and two fishes of the gospel. No person, in this respect, is obliged to place his foot in the steps of his predecessors. We may be new, without seeking after novelty. A simple impression received from our text, or a sketch furnished by life, is sometimes sufficient for this. But the surest instrument of invention, as to the subjects of our discourses, is a culture truly philosophical. In this relation we cannot too much recommend to the candidates for the pulpit the study of philosophy, which will multiply for them the aspects of every truth.

But this, in reality, is not the province of Homiletics; it is the business of the anterior preparation. We return to Cicero's point of view; we shall treat, under the name of invention, of the choice of materials, and we shall speak in this sense first of the *subject*, then of the *substance*, of the discourse from the pulpit.

[1] If not absolutely essential, it is most desirable; for wherever the preacher either has no text, or having one leaves it almost untouched, without expounding its component parts, the tendency is "to divert the mind from the direct meditation of the sacred text, which is the true food of the soul and the treasury of Divine wisdom; and to which alone the converting influence of the Spirit of God is annexed."—Vitringa, *Method. Homil. III.*—Ed.

SECTION FIRST.

SUBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE FROM THE PULPIT.

The subject of the forensic discourse and of the political discourse is a question of fact, of right, or of utility, called forth by an *actual* and *contingent fact*. Those discourses treat of genera and species only indirectly and occasionally, in order to go farther; the orator of the pulpit stops in the category of the *species* or of the *genus*. In this eloquence, the *individual* question, and even the actual question, is not wanting, but it is *veiled;* this part of the process is treated in the shade, in the recesses of the conscience of each individual. What is apparent is the generic and the constant.

Further, whatever be its nature, it is always a question, which is included within the limits of a discourse. This is to state beforehand *the first rule* or the first condition of the discourse from the pulpit; that is to say, its subject must be *one*.

CHAPTER I.

UNITY OF THE SUBJECT.

Unity is a want inherent in the human mind. We only see the true, the good, the happy, where we see unity.

We desire in morals a moving and directing principle; in life, the consistency; in institutions, harmony; in poetry, an idea; in history, a point of view; in the universe, a sole cause of all the effects.

Under the name of *unity*, it is not *identity* which we pursue; where there would be identity, the very idea of unity would disappear. There is need of *plurality* to give room for unity. The systems of identity spring from our inability to find unity, and

from our repugnance to see things without seeing their connection.

Unity is essential to every work of art, art itself having for its first object to create a whole, by the bringing together of dispersed elements.[1] When we would define art, the whole of the means for making a thing, we should be brought back to the same idea; for to make is to reunite, as to unmake is to separate.

Every work of art is a work of *subordination* and *co-ordination*. The first involves the second. All the elements subordinate to one and the same principle, are thereby co-ordinate with each other.

Unity in the works of art does not consist only in not making contradictory elements to enter into one and the same whole, into an assemblage, but in referring all the parts to one and the same centre, to one and the same object.[2] There are two degrees of unity. We might call the first *negative*, and the second, *positive* unity.

Oratorical discourse demands unity still more imperatively.

Not being read, but heard, it would very soon weary the attention, if it obliged it [the attention] to turn itself successively to several sides.

Enduring for but a short time, compared with other productions, it is less permitted to entertain the hearer with several subjects.

Called to act upon the will, it gains, in this respect, by concentrating itself on a *single* thought. A full but incoherent discourse, uncertain of its direction, and undisciplined, is as different from this, as a multitude is different from an army.[3] The

[1] *Ars* has formed *artus*.—Ἀρω, to fit, to adapt;—ἄρα, then, consequently;—ἀρι, corroborative particle;—Ἄρης, the god of strength;—ἀρετή, virtue;—ἄρτιος, accomplished.—Harmony has the same etymology. [Rather, the first notion of *goodness* is that of *manliness*, bravery in *war*: thus ἀρετή is akin to Ἄρης, Mars, ἄρρην, vir., virtus, *wehr*, 'war,' ἄρ-ιστος, ἄρω, arma.—Donalds. *N. Cratyl.*, Lidd. and Scott, *Lex.* Though wrong in the etymological connection, Vinet is, nevertheless, right as to the subsequent use.—Ed.]

[2] "Denique sit quod vis, simplex dumtaxat et unum."—

—"Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum."—Hor. *Ep. ad Pis.*—Ed.

[3] A composition without unity, the fruit of meditation, is but "a mob of ideas." Cotton Mather would have discourses (like Elihu's, Job xxxii. 18) to be "full of matter." But this needs the limitation which our Lord used, "He spake the word unto the people, *as they were able to bear it*:" Mark iv. 33. Their digestive powers for receiving spiritual food are limited, and it is not well to tax them too far.—Ed.

most powerful thoughts, but without a common bond, injure one another; and so much the more, the more they are powerful. It would require minds very strong to derive profit from what is not *one*, or from that, which is not of itself reduced to unity. Struck in turns by a crowd of impressions that neutralise each other, they are captivated by none, and fix upon nothing.

Observe, if you have an opportunity, the impression made upon the hearers of such a discourse, taking them at random from among those of a serious turn of mind. Every hearer of this class will endeavour, without knowing it, to put some unity into the discourse, in which you have put none, or he will attach himself to one of your ideas, and adhere to it; or he will force them all to take the direction, that pleases his own thought.

The very solemnity of the act demands unity. It would be less solemn if the discourse, instead of being a *progress*, was a *promenade*.

It is evident that all this is applicable, without deduction, to the discourse from the pulpit; and we have had cause for saying, that the first quality of the subject of such a discourse is to be *one*, or, what comes to the same thing, that the first quality of such a discourse is to have *one subject;* for where there are several subjects, there is properly none. When you tell some one that you have heard a discourse, his first question is this, What was the subject of it? He will never say, What were the subjects of it?[1]

The unity of the subject doubtless involves, in order to be real and felt, a *coalescence*, or the most minute gravitation of all the parts, even *the molecules*, towards the centre. But this regards the execution, of which we shall speak afterwards. Here we are only considering the choice of the subject.

To form for ourselves an exact idea of *oratorical* unity, let us

[1] "It requires as much reflection to know what is *not* to be put into a sermon as what is."—*Cecil's Remains.* "Verbum sic populo Dei dispensandum, ut multum, non multa."—Bowles' *Pastor*, ii., c. 10; adding, "Often the preacher has an itching desire to run through a number of heads of doctrine, heaping together in his sermon a whole forest of materials. But this is neither a proper style of preaching, nor are the people edified by it. The majority, such is their dulness, are rather bewildered by the incongruous variety, than instructed. It is therefore the main question, not how many heads of doctrine we can run through, but what is likely to be edifying to the people." "Qui docet, vitabit omnia verba, quæ non docent."—August. *de doctr. Christ.* iv. 10.—Ed.

distinguish it from pure *historical* unity, and from pure *didactica* unity.

It is distinguished from historical unity, in that it embraces at once *the subject and the attribute*, that is to say, the two terms of the proposition ;[1] whilst history only places unity in *the subject*. Example :—

The Greeks { were united, conquered, were divided, were conquered.

It is true, that in this very example we see how several attributes can be reduced to one : The Greeks were so much the more strong, the more they were united. But this attribute is still only one of those, of which the history of the Greeks is composed, the unity of which (under the purely historical point of view) resides entirely in the *subject* or *judicand*. Between history and the didactic, there is the difference that subsists between the contingent and the necessary, between the individual and the general, between fact and law, which is the primitive and immutable fact. "Union produces strength," is the general truth, which results from several facts, such as those concerning the Greeks, indicated above. And yet this maxim may have two senses, the one *à priori*, the other *à posteriori*.

Oratorical unity is distinguished from *didactic* unity by the circumstance that all the elements, which it unites, have for their last term an *application*, or practical conclusion. We do not allow the truth or the idea we have obtained to plant itself spontaneously, or to wander at random, in the mind ; from all the channels where it spreads itself,—imagination, reason, sentiment,—we collect it, and we confine it to a channel, in which all the others end, that of the will ; and thus we give it a course, more or less rapid, towards action.[2]

In one word, the subject of the oratorical discourse is a simple, imperative proposition :—"Do this ; do not that."

[1] I say this, because every discourse, though it were a book, reduces itself to one proposition.

[2] One may indeed assemble hearers in a public place, to lay before them, without anything more, some truths ; this is a lesson, but not an oratorical discourse, though this lesson may have some oratorical characteristics.

It is so *absolutely* at the bar, and in the tribune: "acquit the accused;—vote this law."

The pulpit orator is in a position somewhat different. Oratorical unity, in its strict sense, resides rather in the *whole* of his preaching, than in each of his discourses. This is because he is not only an orator, like the advocate and politician; he is also, and essentially, a teacher and instructor.[1] He can therefore, and often should, be especially occupied in instructing and expounding; which, in appearance, reduces his oratorical unity to a didactic unity. But let us remark first, that there is in religion no didactic subject which has not, directly or indirectly, practical consequences; here nothing is on a flat (en plaine), everything is on a slope (en pente); no water is stagnant (endormie), all is stream or torrent.[2] Secondly, let us not forget that we can treat these subjects as the best preachers have done, in an oratorical spirit; and *love* gives that spirit. *Truth* commands; the fact becomes law.

I conclude with Schott: "Although it enters into the essential notion of the oratorical discourse, to place its supreme and ultimate object in the determination of the human will, we will not refuse the name of oratorical discourse to a composition, in which this practical direction, without *declaring* itself in the enunciation of the capital proposition, shows itself in a clear and an unexceptionable manner, in the *spirit* and in the substance of the entire work. . . . But a theme, which is in essential relationship with no important practical subject, or which only suffers itself to be brought back to it by painful windings, will never be proper to form the basis of an oratorical discourse."[3]

The subjects drawn from the Christian religion are all, by their nature, more or less proper for the pulpit in this respect; nevertheless I think that, ordinarily, the preacher ought not to content himself with leaving the hearer to draw the consequences, but that he ought to draw them himself,[4] and make them at least apparent in the whole of his discourse.

[1] Matt. xxviii. 20; 2 Tim. ii. 24, 25, i. 11.—Ed.

[2] That is, even these expository teachings do not end in the mere information gained; they are not like stagnant waters on a plain, but like running rivers, which tend downwards along a slope: they tend to an *application* or *practical conclusion*.—Ed.

[3] Schott's *Entwurf einer Theorie der Beredsamkeit*, p. 31.

[4] 'The philosopher's maxim—that every action is done by the *touch*—has a

Saurin has treated, in a direction eminently and expressly practical, several subjects of a very speculative aspect. Thus, the sermon on *The Beatific Vision of the Divinity*:[1] We shall see God as He is, and shall thereby be made like Him; this is the design of God: but it is also the design of the devil: Into which of these two do *you* wish to enter? Subjects of this kind may be compared to an arrow, which, without being armed at the point, by the mere force of projection, pierces the object. In the sermon upon *The Ministry of Angels*,[2] he deduces an example for our imitation from those blessed spirits, who execute the orders of God with the rapidity of the wind, and the activity of the flame. In that upon *The Equality of Men*,[3] after having established the essential equality of men, he says, that he does not wish to conclude in favour either of anarchy, or of fanaticism; his consequences are; Moderation; acquiescence in the decrees of Providence; vigilance (seeking what is the appropriate virtue of your condition); zeal and fervour: Lastly, all the mortifications arising from inequality will one day cease.[4]

From all this I conclude, that there will be unity in the sermon, when it can be reduced to an *assertive* proposition, easily transformable, and virtually transformed, into an imperative proposition.

This being admitted, it remains for us to present some of the principal *forms*, under which this unity may exist.

We do not enter upon imperative or *parenetic* [admonitory] unity, because it is henceforth understood, that this character ought to be reproduced in all the subjects, and that on the other hand the pulpit is essentially didactic. Thus the *impulsive* [hortatory] character of the discourse is supposed in all the examples we are going to consider.

1. Unity is found in a simple proposition, assertive, or impera-

principal place in preaching;' the chief use of which consists in its direct application to the hearts and consciences of our people.—Bish. Davenant, *Ap. Bridges' Chr. Min.* Hearers often have neither the skill nor the will to take home to themselves *general* discourses. Therefore the preacher must make the application himself, as Nathan, "*Thou* art the man:" 2 Sam. xii. 7. Bridges well remarks on Eccles. xii. 11, "The goads and the nails (*i.e.*, the words of the wise) must not be laid by, as if *the posts* would knock them in,—but must be *fastened* by the masters of assemblies."—Ed.

[1] Saurin, vol. iii., p. 85, new ed. [2] *Ibid.*, vol. vi., p. 447, new ed.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 309, new ed.

[4] See also the sermon of Saurin on *The Eternity of God*, vol. viii., p. 209, new ed.

tive; I mean an uncompounded, simple proposition, composed of a single subject and a single attribute. Examples:—

"There is no peace for the wicked." (Isa. lvii. 21.)

"All the thoughts of the wicked are, that there is no God." (English version, "God is not in all his thoughts.") (Ps. x. 4.)

"I am with you alway, even to the end of the world." (Matt. xxviii. 20.)

"Bless those who curse you." (Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28.)

"Proving what is acceptable to the Lord." (Eph. v. 10.)

"To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." (James iv. 17.)

"The wicked worketh a work, that deceiveth him." (English version, "a deceitful work.") (Prov. xi. 18.)

"That, which is highly esteemed among men, is an abomination in the sight of God." (Luke xvi. 15.)

"The work of righteousness shall be peace." (French version, "Peace shall be born of justice.") (Isa. xxxii. 17.)

"He who is not with Me is against Me." (Matt. xii. 30.)

It is to be understood, that the development of the thesis, or the elaborate exegesis [exposition] of the text which contains it, does not constitute, along with the proof of the thesis, a twofold proposition. To characterise fully the subject or the attribute, or both the two, is not to be deficient in unity. This would be as much as to proscribe definition. [It is often even from this detailed knowledge that there result both the proof, and the impulsion [influencing] of the will; Thus, 1 Tim. i. 5, "The end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned;" We have to determine, what is this charity. In certain cases, the subject or the attribute may demand no such determination [delineation]; but these are rare cases, and it is useful to think [take it for granted] that they are rare, and to determine [define] well the object, to which we apply a proof. The simple announcement, which is sufficient for the preacher, is not sufficient for the generality of men. And then, without supposing ignorance, it is necessary to render the thing present [palpable to all], in order that each one may thoroughly feel, to what both the proof and the impulsion [moral suasion], which the preacher wishes to put into his discourse, are applicable, (that each may have the effect produced

on him which the preacher's proof and suasion were intended to produce.)]

2. The proposition does not cease to be simple, even when there are several subjects or several attributes, if these subjects and these attributes form together *a whole*. "By this we know the children of God and the children of the devil: whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither is he that loveth not his brother." (1 John iii. 10.) "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord." (Heb. xii. 14.)

Thus there would be unity in a discourse, which should set forth the different qualities of a thing, provided these qualities were of a nature to be reunited *under the same* [*common*] *attribute*. There is no oratorical unity in the description of a machine,—of a place,—of a man.[1] That a place is beautiful, celebrated, of difficult access, little inhabited,—all this is not of a nature to be united under one and the same attribute. But if you find the idea *common* to several different, or even opposite attributes, then express it. Thus, when Massillon says, that ambition is *restless*, *shameful*, *unjust*, there is unity. In like manner, in this passage, "Christ has been made to us of God wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." (1 Cor. i. 30.)

3. The qualities of a thing may be added, not only in consequence of their affinity or of a common tendency, but because they counterbalance, or moderate, or mutually limit each other. "Nevertheless, the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, *The Lord knoweth them that are His;* and, *Let him that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity*." (2 Tim. ii. 19.) This is the twofold, but inseparable seal of the foundation which God has laid; it is the twofold character of true faith, a character, which is only true, in so far as it is twofold.[2]

[1] So in Aristotle's Treatise on poetry, A *fable*, i.e., plot or plan of composition, is not *one*, merely because the *hero* of it is *one;* for numberless events happen to one man, which are such as cannot be connected into *one event;* and likewise there are many actions of one man which cannot be connected into any *one action:* Homer, when he composed his Odyssey, did not introduce *all* the events of his hero's life, but those only, which have relation to *one action:* For whatever may be either retained or omitted, without making any sensible difference, is not properly a *part*.—Ed.

[2] These are the two sides, the *obverse* and *reverse*, of one and the same seal: the one is the complement of the other: either without the other would be imperfect.—Ed.

As all the characteristic truths of Christianity are each composed of two truths,[1] just as the axis has necessarily two poles,[2] so Christian preaching may often introduce subjects like the preceding. Many discourses are antitheses, because a religion which reconciles all antitheses ought to commence by stating them sharply. Thus Bossuet: "The spirit of firmness and resistance, the spirit of charity and mildness, is the spirit of Christianity."[3] Bourdaloue, in like manner: *Upon the severity and the mildness of the Christian law.*[4]

4. Consequently, on the same principle, there is unity in a double proposition, when the propositions, of which it is composed, are *integral parts of the same truth.* Thus [analysing the following texts, we have]: "There is no perfect bond among men; but charity is a perfect bond." (Col. iii. 14.) "There are things, which have not entered into the heart of man, and which God hath prepared for them that love Him." (1 Cor. ii. 9.)

There is a fine example in Saurin, in the sermon on *the penitence of the woman, that was a sinner.* There, an apparent triplicity is reduced to a perfect unity.[5]

5. I find unity, also, in *two perfectly independent, but contrasted* propositions; for the contrast constitutes a sort of unity. Examples: "Render to Cæsar the things, that are Cæsar's; and to God the things, that are God's." (Matt. xxii. 21.) "The wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into life eternal." (Matt. xxv. 46.) The sermon of Massillon upon *the Death of the Sinner, and the Death of the Righteous,* brings out this contrast.[6]

6. There is unity, when we explain successively a *general*

[1] Remark, for example, the opposition between these two propositions: "Answer a fool according to his folly,—Answer not a fool according to his folly" (Prov. xxvi. 4, 5); and between these two: "He who is not with Me is against Me" (Luke xi. 23); "He who is not against us is for us" (Luke ix. 50).

[2] It is even the property of Christianity to have restored the broken axis, and reunited the two poles.

[3] Third sermon for the Day of Pentecost.

[4] Hence the seeming paradoxes of Scripture. Its truths, like the infinite Author, often, in their seemingly opposed aspects, refuse to be forced into the narrow systems of finite man: ex. gr., Election and responsibility; faith and works: the believing heart harmonises them *practically,* if not fully in theory.—Ed.

[5] Saurin, vol. ii., p. 393, new edition. See also, in the same author, vol. iv., p. 87.

[6] Sermon upon the Advent.

truth, and a particular truth, of which the first serves for the *basis of the second,* or the second of which completes the sense of the first. "And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." (1 Cor. xiii. 13.)

But I think, that in order to be truly one, the orator ought to form, from the particular truth, his object and his end.

To treat successively of the genus and the species, is not to observe unity.[1]

7. There is unity in a discourse, which explains successively a *principle,* and its *consequences;* for the principle has no interest,[2] except from the consequences, and these have no solid foundation except from the principle. Thus: "God is a spirit; and those that worship Him, must worship Him in spirit and in truth." (John iv. 24.)

The plurality of consequences does not break the unity. To speak of the consequences, however numerous they may be, is to speak of the principle; it is to say, what it contains; it is to make known the value and the extent of it; it is to measure it; it is to give to it its entire character as principle; it is to say at what price we receive it; what consequences we must accept, if we accept the principle. Example: the characters of charity. (1 Cor. xiii.)

8. There is unity in a discourse, which, after the explanation of a *duty,* indicates the *motives* to the performance of it. [But then there is an auxiliary, instrumental part, and we cannot give to it the same place, as to the other. Indeed, either we wish to make known an *unknown* duty (in which case we insist but little on the motives; we place them before or after); or else we only recall to the performance of a *well-known* duty (in which case we carefully bring forth the motives to the performance of it). We could not very well conceive of a discourse, which should confine itself to explaining motives, without determining the nature of the duty;[3] we can almost as little conceive of a discourse, only

[1] See, for example, *la Solitude recommandée au pasteur,* in the *Nouvelles études évangéliques,* p. 265.

[2] De la Motte, in the case of the drama, prefers to make the rule of construction, Unity of *interest,* rather than Unity of *action.* The direction of the mind and the enlisting of the interest *towards one end,* seems to be the true rule of unity in discourses also.—Ed.

[3] "To instruct the mind in the knowledge of Divine things, and neglect the pressing of that practice and power of godliness, which is the undivided companion of true faith, is to forget *the building,* that ought to be raised on that *foundation* once laid: as *vice versâ,* to exhort to holiness and the duties of Chris-

speaking of duty, without concerning itself about the motives.[1] Without doubt, deductive (theoretic) unity can dispense with them, but oratorical unity cannot. In every case] *one* of the parts, sometimes the one, sometimes the other, ought to become *prominent*, and to constitute the unity of the subject.

9. There is unity in a discourse, which, treating of a *fact*, takes account of *its different circumstances*, *aspects*, and *bearings*. Thus, the example above: Christ has been made to us, *on the part of God*, "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption." (1 Cor. i. 30.)[2] This does not mean merely, that a proposition, in which the subject is complex, or in which the attribute is complex (I mean complicated with a circumstance, adventitious to its notion), is nevertheless one. Thus, "the double-minded man is unstable *in all his ways*." (James i. 8.) That would be too much to understand. I speak of circumstances, which one might omit, but which give to the principal object light and colour, or which do not divert the attention from this object. "As ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation." (Phil. ii. 12.) One is to understand, that, what we here authorise, depends on the execution.

There are some cases, in which, what is presented as *circumstance*, is the *capital idea*: "Judas, betrayest thou the Son of Man with a kiss?" (Luke xxii. 48.) *To betray* (the action), *the Son of Man* (the object of the action), *the kiss* (the mode of

tian life, without instructing in the doctrine of faith, is to build a *house without a foundation*."—LEIGHTON; 1 Pet. ii. 11.—ED.

[1] "To preach 'practical' sermons, as they are called, *i.e.*, sermons on virtues and vices, without inculcating the great Scripture truths of redemption and grace, is to put together the wheels and set the hands of a watch, forgetting the *spring*, which is to make them all go."—BISH. HORNE'S *Essays*, p. 162. The apostolic Epistles first lay down the doctrines as the *motives*, then inculcate *duties* as the consequences. The inferential particle, 'therefore,' intimates this connection, Rom. xii. i.; Eph. iv. 1; Col. iii. 1. "Per fidem venitur ad opera; non per opera venitur ad fidem." Augustine called the moral virtues of Pagan philosophers, from the defect of the motive, "splendida peccata." To declaim on moral duties, without justification preceding, would be to declaim on the advantages of walking to a man that can neither stir hand or foot. Let the declamation be ever so elegant, St Peter's plain address, I suppose, would be worth ten thousand of them, to a cripple, "In the name of Jesus of Nazareth, rise up and walk.' Such is the difference between an ethical divine and a Christian preacher.—BISH. HORNE. "Christ is the soul of duty, of grace, and of privilege."—BUDD *on Inf. Bapt.*, p. 446.—ED.

[2] See the sermon upon *Sanctification*, in the *Meditations Evangeliques*.

action); *three* things, which may be made to *concur* [in unity as the theme discussed]; but *one* of which also, for example, *the kiss*, may be considered *separately*, and form *the theme* of the discourse. Another example, "Let us do good to all, but *especially to those, who are of the household of faith.*" (Gal. vi. 10.) See also Heb. xii. 14, "Follow peace with all men;" and Eph. ii. 10, "Created in Christ Jesus unto good works," etc. There are thus formed several plans in perspective, and that, which holds the chief place at one time, may, at another time, be replaced by another.

10. There is likewise unity in a discourse that gives several *relations*, or *applications*, *to the same truth.* These relations or applications are accessories, which are not sufficiently prominent to break the unity. "Glory, honour, and peace will be to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek." (Rom. ii. 10.) "Herein I exercise myself, to have always a conscience void of offence towards God, and towards men." (Acts xxiv. 16.) Nevertheless, in a case such as the last, it is difficult to prevent one of the relations indicated from becoming the principal object of discourse.

11. Nor is the distinction of *several classes of hearers*, to whom the same proposition is presented and applied, but upon whom it ought to make different impressions, contrary to unity.—The impressions on the one ought to confirm the impressions on the others, if the truth is, at bottom, the same for all. The re-entering angle strengthens the salient angle, and reciprocally. Sadness enhances joy, to hope corresponds fear, and reciprocally.

12. The same discourse may treat of the *fact*, and of its *mode*, of *duty* and of the *means* of accomplishing it, without the law of unity being violated.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON THE UNITY OF THE SUBJECT.

1. Although a fastidious, *verbal*[1] unity procured by an artifice of language, be only a true unity in the eyes of inattentive minds, the sport of appearances,[2] I could not blame the proceeding, by

[1] See note 1, p. 32.

[2] Thus, in a sermon upon "The truth shall make you free" (John viii. 32), speaking of spiritual liberty, and of political liberty. Thus upon the text, "Thy commandment is exceeding broad" (Ps. cxix. 96), a preacher proved successively, laying a stress upon the word *broad* (etendre), that the law of God included many things, and then that it spread itself over all the earth.

which two objects, which of themselves do not form a unity, are placed under a common point of view, in the envelope of a common idea, which permits them to be presented together to the attention. In fact, there is nothing in this fictitious or false; it is not fabricated, but found; it existed beforehand; the only thing requiring to be done, was to lift up the [curtain on that] side, on which it [the unity] was perceptible.—Thus Bourdaloue, Carême, vol. i., p. 198, col. 2, Lefevre's edition.

2. After having laid down in all its rigour the *principle* of oratorical unity, and having maintained it in each of the forms, which I have indicated, it remains for me to say, that I have exhibited the *ideal* of oratorical composition, without excluding, however, preachings of a form less severe in this respect.

The French preachers of the Roman Catholic communion adhere more closely to this ideal; in general their sermon forms a bundle more compact, a sheaf easier to put into the barn. This adherence to the ideal suited the character of the nation, who required them to satisfy in their preaching, what was perhaps the most dominant idea of art, an æsthetic sentiment.

It is good to attach one's self, like them, to the most rigorous rule, and to reserve the *exemptions* for the *age of experience* and maturity; and the maxim of Fenelon is good, at the *commencement*, to be taken in a literal sense: "*Every discourse, which has unity, may be reduced to a single proposition.* The discourse is the proposition developed; the proposition is the discourse abridged."[1]

This is a most useful experiment to make upon each of your discourses. Let it not suffice you to be able to give them a *title;* endeavour to translate [reduce] them into *a proposition*, and have no confidence in your work, when you cannot do so.[2] Could Reinhard ever have been able to reduce to one proposition the sermon, which he has entitled, *Uber die Freudigkeit des Glaubens* (Upon the Joy of Faith)? Here are the contents:—

I. Conditions of this joy:

1. Seriousness; 2. Docility; 3. Impartiality.

II. Foundations of this joy:

1. Scripture; 2. Excellence of the Gospel; 3. Experience.

[1] Fenelon, *Lettre écrite à l'Académie Francaise*, IV.—The first of these two phrases is not a textual citation, but a summary; the second, on the contrary, is entirely from Fenelon.—Ed.

[2] Theremin, on Heb. xii. 11, composed a sermon, which he entitled, not *Die Leiden* (the sufferings), but *Alles Leiden ist Strafe* (all suffering is a chastisement).

III. Effects of this joy:
1. Firmness; 2. Frank confession ; 3. Zeal to propagate the Gospel.
IV. Value of this joy:
1. Certainty which it gives; 2. Courage in misfortune; 3. Happy hope.

If you urge in favour of such a discourse, the didactic character of the eloquence of the pulpit, the consequence will be to cut down into chapters the materials of morality and theology ; now, we do not think that a sermon is a chapter; in all cases the chapter is too long, I mean intellectually. That is a defect, into which it is easy to fall, when we allow ourselves such a title as that, which Reinhard has given to his discourse.

Even in the other case, that, in which the sermon has a single proposition for its title, is it possible for the subject to be too extensive? We answer, *in itself*, no. There may be subjects *too particular ;* we do not think, that there are any *too extensive.* Extent is not multiplicity; it does not, in this case, exclude unity, which may be as much wanting in a discourse upon a very particular subject, as in a discourse upon a very general subject. All depends upon the execution. It is legitimate and useful to present sometimes to an auditory a subject of vast extent; but then we must not bring into it all the ideas, which we might bring into each of the parts, taken separately, and forming an entire sermon. There are, it is true, some very able auditories ; and perhaps a very able orator may make them listen even to the end of a sermon, which is equivalent to two, without being defective, however, as to the rule of unity.[1] [In first attempts, particular subjects are more useful; they oblige us to dig, to search for ideas, which, in vast subjects, present themselves in a crowd. In this respect, it is necessary to study, with some precaution, the grand models of the seventeenth century. Their majesty, which overawes us, arises in part from the extent of the subjects, which they treat of. Bourdaloue, however, was very popular for the thirty-four years, that his career as a preacher lasted, because, in his vast sermons, he observed the rules which we have stated. But] in general, we ought to prefer a small number of ideas, thoroughly examined, or well illustrated, to a great number of ideas cursorily touched upon.

[1] BOURDALOUE, *Sur la Passion.*

[Let us add, in concluding, to sum up our complementary remarks, that] there are *two criteria of unity:* one *logical*, which consists in reducing the whole discourse to a single proposition; the other *psychological*, or of sentiment, which consists in asking our own impression and that of the auditory, this double question: Has the course been completed [Has the preacher, at the close, reached the goal aimed at, and not exceeded the due limits[1] for attaining it]? have the bounds been passed? The soul and the [inner] life know still better than the intellect, what is the unity of the subject.

CHAPTER II.

INTEREST OF THE SUBJECT.

Some will perhaps think, that this chapter ought to have been the first; but this is not our opinion. Before inquiring in what the interest of a subject of preaching consists, it must be proved, that a discourse from the pulpit ought to have a subject.

That preaching ought only to treat of interesting subjects, has no need of proof: but what is an interesting subject in the view of preaching? This is the question.

Interest, a word subjective and objective, is, in the second sense, the property which an object has of drawing towards it our thought and our soul, in such a manner, that a part, more or less considerable, of our happiness is dependent on it. The etymology (*inter esse*), as usual, defines the word. [In the subjective sense, interest consists in our identification, more or less profound and durable, with an object without us.]

[The *didactic* interest manifests itself, when our thought or our reason perceives a suitableness between it and the object, that is proposed to it.] Pure *oratorical* interest manifests itself in the feeling of the importance, which we see, of our taking such or such proposed *resolution*. When no resolution is to be taken, oratorical interest is wanting.

But when we demand that a sermon be *interesting*, we say little, or much, according to the view we take of 'interest.' Be

[1] "Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat."—Hor. *Ep. ad Pis.*—Ed.

pleased to remark (for this observation will bring us near our object [point]) that, in the eyes of true artists, interest is not the principal object, and the triumph of art. They aim at moving those parts [faculties] of the soul, which may, by comparison, be called *disinterested;* they aspire to a region higher than those, in which our ordinary affections move. It is indeed still interest, but it is not, what is vulgarly called by this name.

The artist in preaching is guided, if not by a holy intention, at least by a superior instinct, and it is in this, that the *dignity of the art* resides. Moreover, if he addresses himself to the contemplative faculty, the preacher addresses himself to a faculty still superior, that which St Paul calls the *spirit,* by which we tend towards things invisible and celestial, to that better *me,* of which St Paul still speaks, which, even in the sinner, feels itself distinct, separates itself from the other me, and disowns it.[1] It is, therefore, an *ideal* auditor, whom the preacher would interest; but he must first evoke and create him, so to speak. The poet has not this difficulty: he finds the man, whom he needs, ready-made; at least, he has not the same trouble in awakening him. Man raises himself voluntarily towards some ideas by contemplation; but man does not raise himself naturally towards spiritual things,[2] or towards God. In his condition as a sinner, he does not think himself able [rather, however well he thinks of himself, so weak is his heart, he finds, he is not able] to raise himself to God, without separating from himself; in other words, God is not happiness for him; happiness is for him out of God.[3] This is not merely an illusion of his corrupt nature, it is also a *revelation of his better nature,* which, showing him in God a terrible Judge, does not permit him to unite two ideas, primitively inseparable: God and happiness [Jer. ii. 13]. Christianity has removed this difficulty; Christianity alone, among all religions, does not separate us from ourselves; it shows us a God appeased,

[1] Rom. vii. 20: "Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more *I* that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me."—Ed.

[2] 1 Cor. ii. 14: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."—Ed.

[3] Ps. x. 4, 5: "God is not in all his thoughts. His ways are always grievous: Thy judgments are far above out of his sight;"—iv. 6, "Many say, 'Who will show us any good?' Lord, lift *Thou* up the light of Thy countenance on us."—Ed.

and permits, or rather obliges, us to unite two ideas, which we forcibly separate. It is in exhibiting this truth, that the preacher bespeaks this ideal hearer, whom he does not find ready-made in each of us; then, when he has gotten him [through the work of the Holy Spirit], he still speaks to him, he speaks to this man of that, which this man [now regenerated] henceforth loves. Such is his task, such his object. Such is the interest of preaching; to reconcile man with God (whereby the natural man is interested); to preach holiness to the ideal (or spiritual) man from henceforth found [2 Cor. v. 20, 17].

It is by this title, or under this double form, that a sermon is interesting.

Such is the *general* principle with regard to interest in preaching. Nevertheless, is it possible to give some rules *more particular*, and more precise, than the principle? At least, it is very necessary that we understand each other as to the meaning, and extent, of the principle. Are those the only subjects suitable for the pulpit, which enunciate a dogma, or a duty of Christianity? In that case, will it be necessary to exclude from the pulpit a subject such as this, which has been treated by Reinhard:—*Distinguished men are an enigma to the multitude?*[1] At this rate [if such subjects must be excluded], as it is evident that the Bible must be as Christian as our sermons, what is to be done with [what account is to be given of] this passage of Proverbs (a subject treated by Irving): "As iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend?" (Prov. xxvii. 17.)

To resolve these, and such like questions, we must get possession of another principle: All truths form part of *the* truth. Christianity embraces everything; it shows the sovereignty of its principle, not in destroying anything whatever, but in *assimilating* all things to itself.[2] Everything becomes Christian for the Christian; nothing is absolutely without the domain of the Gospel; it has saved the *whole* man, it has saved the *whole life*. Hence it happens, that, when once Christianity rules the life, we enjoy

[1] "*Wie rœthselhaft ausgezeichnete Menschen der grossen Menge sind.*" See REINHARD, *Sermons for* 1809, vol. ii., p. 228, upon Acts xxviii. 1–10.

[2] 1 Cor. iii. 21: "*All* things are yours, whether—the *world*, or *things present*, or things to come." Comp. 1 Cor. x. 31; 1 Tim. iv. 8: "Godliness is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the *life that now is*, and also of that which is to come."—ED.

a great *liberty*,[1] [and a little servitude[2] beforehand is the apprenticeship to this liberty.] Nothing is profane, if it is not sin; life is not divided (*scindée*); there is not a certain point, at which Christianity abruptly stops; this would be the same, as to prevent the atmosphere of two countries from mingling together above the mountains, which form their marches. On the contrary, the truth frees us from conventional distinctions or separations, as from all others; our liberty is proportioned to our submission, our latitude to our precision [1 Pet. ii. 16].

What has brought certain subjects into discredit, is, not their *nature itself*; it is, that they have not been treated in *a Christian manner*. Christians would have made them Christian. They must be treated in *a different spirit* from that of the world: but we *may* treat them.

The Bible, it must be acknowledged, takes in, and expresses all that is voluntary, and moral in human life. I do not say, that every verse of the Bible, which presents this character, is proper for becoming a *text* of a sermon;[3] but what it contains may find a place in a sermon, just as in the [Christian] life, and as in religion.

This does not mean, that, because everything is regarded in a Christian light by the Christian,[4] everything may become the subject of a sermon. The pulpit has not been erected, in order that everything may be there treated in a Christian manner; it has a special object, which is to introduce *the Christian idea* into life. It draws from the mine the precious metal, of which each of us will make vessels or instruments for his own particular use. It is properly Christianity, which it teaches, in its principles, and in its general applications; Christianity is first in order; Christianity is the object; the rest is only example, explanation, etc.

I should say, then, under the negative form, the only one, which can be given to this precept: Everything that does not conduce *directly* to edification (to form Christ in us);[5] everything which

[1] The perfect law of liberty, James i. 25. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 17; John viii. 36.—Ed.

[2] "The law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ:" Gal. iii. 24.—Ed.

[3] Thus Eccles. v. 9: "Moreover the profit of the earth is for all; the king himself is served by the field." See also Prov. xxvii. 22–27.

[4] *Omnia pura puris* [Titus i. 15]; comp. Luke xi. 41, "All things are clean unto you."

[5] "We might as well speak of a village, that has no road to the metropolis, as of a point of Christian doctrine, privilege, or practice, that has no reference

an ordinary hearer cannot *of himself* convert into the bread of life; or, at least, every subject which you, preacher, acknowledge to be such, you ought not to make a subject of your preaching.

You will exclude, then, every subject, which has *directly* for its object some *interest of this world.* You will not even present religion under this aspect, except so far as it is necessary to exhibit the goodness of God, and the truth of religion itself.[1] You will never consent to sell the Christian pulpit to the interests of the life, that is passing away. There was a time, when the pulpit preached little more than the doctrines of well-understood self-interest. When the Church, undermined by unbelief, undermined especially by the laxness of its ministers, had to find an excuse for what remained of its existence; it bent itself, in order to gain a miserable life, to traverse from one side to the other, as a hireling would do, all the ideas, with which one might wish to intrust it. Dr Ammon tells us: "Schlez has attempted, in his sermons on rural economy (Nuremberg, 1788), to speak of fallow grounds; before him, instructions had been given, in the homiletic form, on the silk worms; and another preacher had traced, in a touching manner, the duties of Christians, on the approach of a contagious disease among cattle: this preacher

to the cross of Christ."—BRIDGES. "Though the Scriptures are the circumference of faith, the round of which it walks, and every point of which compass it toucheth: yet the centre of it is Christ. *That* is the polar star."—MATT. HENRY. So the apostles, on relative duties, having no seemingly direct connection with Christ, unexpectedly glide into this their favourite topic. 1 Cor. v. 7; Eph. v. 25; 1 Pet. ii. 18–25; Tit. iii. 2–6. In N. America the first convert declared, "I have been a heathen, and know how heathens think. Once a teacher came and explained to us, there was a God: We answered, Dost thou think us so ignorant as not to know that? Another began to teach us, You must not steal or lie, or get drunk. We answered, Dost thou think we do not know that? At length Brother Rauch came and spoke, 'I come to you in the name of the Lord of heaven and earth. He sends to let you know that He will make you happy, and deliver you from the misery in which you lie. To this end He became a man, gave His life a ransom for man, and shed His blood for us.' I could not forget his words; even while I was asleep, I dreamt of that blood which Christ shed for us. I interpreted the words to the other Indians. Thus through the grace of God an awakening took place among us. I say, therefore, brethren, preach Christ our Saviour, and His sufferings and death, if you would have your words to gain an entrance among the heathen."—LOSKIEL'S *Missions to the North American Indians.* See also Dr Chalmers' testimony as to the different results of his own previous moral preaching, and subsequent evangelical preaching.—ED.

[1] Abuse of the passage: "Godliness is profitable for all things." (1 Tim iv. 8.)

was highly praised for the very choice of his subject. From this, to the means of supplying the place of sugar and coffee in the times when these articles are high-priced, to the Christian culture of beet-root, and to the truly pious perfecting of tobacco, it is not very far. Did not Luther announce, that it would not be long before they preached upon blue ducks?"[1] Dr Ammon wrote this in 1812.

Shall we also exclude objects, which respect the *social* good? No; but we shall say, that everything which pretends to contribute to the social good, without being transmitted by the individual (without beginning by the Christian perfecting of *the individual* as the first aim), is beside the object of preaching.

Everything, which has directly for its object *science*, and only in incidental connection with this religion, cannot form the subject of a preaching.

All these rules being observed, I add further, that the interest of a discourse from the pulpit, is, in being *not only religious*, but *Christian*. For the true minister, and for the true Christian, there is only one religion. Whatever subject is treated, it must reproduce without effort the *characteristic* traits of the Gospel,[2] its proper physiognomy, everything which prevents its being confounded, or even compared with any other system; one must find it there, I do not say in *formula* only, nor always in formula, but in *spirit*, in such a manner, that a man, who has never heard of it, should be struck, from the first discourse, with something new and absolutely peculiar, and that he should feel the Divine goad sink into some part of his soul. (1 Cor. xiv. 24.)—What should we say of a political discourse, and especially of a series of political discourses, which did not make the newly-arrived stranger

[1] Ammon's *Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 70.

[2] Cowper in the *Task*, B. V., speaking of the man dead in sin, says,—

"Haste now, philosopher, and set him free.
Charm the deaf serpent wisely. Make him hear
Of rectitude and fitness, moral truth
How lovely, and the moral sense how sure—
Be most sublimely good, verbosely grand,—
Ah! tinkling cymbal and high-sounding brass,
Smitten in vain. Such music cannot charm
The eclipse, that intercepts truth's heavenly beam,
And chills and darkens a wide wandering soul.
The still small voice is wanted. He must speak,
Whose word leaps forth at once to its effect,
Who calls for things that are not, and they come."—Ed.

discover, under what form of government the orator and his hearers were living?[1]

After having come to an understanding upon all these points, and having insured to preaching all the liberty, and all the space, which its principle permits to it, and which its mission opens up to it, we return to the formula [definition], which we deferred adopting until discussed. The Christian dogma, and Christian morality, form the proper and only matter of the discourse from the pulpit. But we give precision to this formula, by substituting for it that of Schott: "The *dogma*, in so far as it can receive a *practical* application, and *morality*, in its *immediate and natural relation to the dogma*."[2]

Analysing with him this general idea, we find, as proper for the pulpit, the five classes of subjects, which he indicates:—

1. Dogmatic subjects, properly so called.
2. Moral subjects, properly so called.
3. Historical subjects.
4. Subjects drawn from the contemplation, or the study of nature.
5. Psychological subjects.

§ I.—Dogmatic Subjects.

Subjects of this order are those, which are proper for giving to the Christian life a solid foundation in all times, and in all places.—Thus, they will never be a pure and simple *scientific* exposition.

It is not the *whole* of dogmatics [which furnishes these subjects]; it is the most *substantial* part of them, the heart of every

[1] "Were all these talents and excellencies (*i.e.*, of classic sages and orators) united in one man, and you were the person so richly endowed; and could you employ them all in every sermon you preach: yet you could have no reasonable hope to convert and save one soul, while you lay aside the glorious Gospel of Christ. Further: Had you the fullest acquaintance that man ever acquired, with all the principles and duties of natural religion, both in its regards to God and your fellow-creatures—had you the skill and tongue of an angel to range all these in their fairest order, and to represent the whole law of God with such force and splendour as was done to the Israelites at Mount Sinai: you might perhaps lay the consciences of men under deep conviction, but you would never reconcile one soul to God, you would never change the heart of one sinner, nor bring him into the favour of God, nor fit him for the joys of heaven, without the blessed Gospel."—Dr Watts.—Ed.

[2] Schott, *Die Theorie der Beredsamkeit, mit besonderer Anwendung auf die geistliche Beredsamkeit*, vol. ii., at the beginning.

truth.[1] Not that the remainder is indifferent, or unworthy of attention, but it has its own use elsewhere; and, what is not made to be brought into the pulpit, might serve to fortify the outworks of such truth, as may very suitably be introduced into the pulpit.

There are some sermons, by excellent masters, which we might call theological. They may have been wrong sometimes in treating of such subjects; we are perhaps more wrong, in the present day, in not treating any of them. Theology, as a discussion of texts, or comparison of systems, is not proper for the pulpit; but as a deep consideration of the truth of salvation, it has its place in preaching. We might compare certain theological sermons to the admired tragedies of Corneille: this is not a species, which we may adopt at pleasure; it is an *exception*, which requires to be justified by the execution; but after all, the exception is admitted. The contemplation of sublime things does not remain without effect upon the heart, and upon the will. It is good, as we have said, to elevate *all* the faculties of man; the soul purifies itself in these high regions.

Besides, it is not easy to say, what is theology, and what is not. We must not trust to the *title*. Tillotson has made, upon sin, a theological sermon; that of Chalmers, upon the same subject, is not so.—Saurin, treating of the *Beatific Vision of God* (1 John iii. 2), might not have been theological, and he is also not theological throughout; but he is so too often. He establishes the position that this vision produces a communication of ideas, of love, of virtue, of felicity.[2]

Transform theology into religion, and, *à fortiori*, do not transform religion into theology. This is what Saurin has done in the sermon, that has been cited. This is what you will do every time you wish to analyse, and dissect too much. Every dissection of a moral truth is provisory, and hypothetical; we separate what is not separate, what cannot be so, what, being separate,

[1] Doctrines are not to be handled as dry, abstract dogmas, and theological formulas, but as living realities: not so much truths of Christianity, as Christ Himself, *the* Truth. "Let Christ be the diamond to shine in the bosom of all your sermons."—Bish. Reynolds. "Christ crucified is God's grand ordinance."—Cecil. This is the root of the tree: make the tree good, and then the fruit will be so.—Ed.

[2] See Saurin, vol. iii., p. 103, new edition, upon the Ideas of God, and p. 114, on the Sentiments of God.

loses its nature; there is, therefore, in the best made analysis, something false, were it only in the character of *successivity*, which it impresses on *simultaneous* facts. It has perhaps been, on the part of God, a precaution taken against us—this synthetic and complex form, which He has given or left to all truths. Without doubt, to express is already to analyse them, however little the expression may be analytical; but we might say that the Spirit, which has dictated the Holy Scriptures, has avoided the rigour of scientific formulas, and preserved to the ideas the most *synthetic* character of which they are susceptible, when we wish to enunciate them. We have not been satisfied with this, and we have analysed the statements of Scripture, and wished to take rigorously, certain classifications, which were only apparent. The abuse has been carried even to puerility. With the same seriousness, with which St Paul distinguishes "spirit, soul, and body," such a preacher, following him, will distinguish "glory, honour, and immortality;" what is "in the heavens, upon the earth, and under the earth;" the "sheep and the lambs," which St Peter was to feed;—not only will he give to each word its intention, to which I consent, but he will erect, into scientific classifications, oratorical enumerations, emphatic accumulations, figures of language, Hebrew parallelisms, etc. Exegesis has rendered too great services, that we should not pardon it much; but truly there is much in it, to be pardoned.

Beware of this cruel anatomy,[1] exercised upon the living, and always murderous. In treating of the passage: "The word of God pierces even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, of the joints and the marrow" (Heb. iv. 12), let us not proceed to distinguish scrupulously the elements, of which the confusion forms the beauty. What would not be the astonishment of St

[1] *Orthotomy* (2 Tim. ii. 15, ὀρθοτομοῦντα) is very distinct from *anatomy*. Beza expounds the former, "Qui primum omnium, quod ad doctrinam ipsam attinet, nihil prætermittat, quod dicendum sit; nihil etiam adjiciat de suo, *nihil mutilet, discerpat, torqueat;* deinde spectet diligenter, quicquid ad ædificationem conducet." Bishop Reynolds warns us against "affectation of *new senses and meanings* of Scripture," which is but an Athenian temper, to spend all one's time in nothing else, but to tell or hear some new theology. "Whenever we judge it needful to interpose any sense of our own, let us, *first*, do it with humility and reverence towards others, with whom we differ, not magisterially with an εὕρηκα, as if we spake rather oracles than opinions; *secondly*, let us take heed of departing from 'the analogy of faith' into *diverticles of fancy* and *critical curiosity*." —*Serm. on Self-denial.*—Ed.

Paul, if he should see a discourse established, or a system built, upon distinctions, of which he never thought!

Sermons of pure science, such as those of Dwight upon the Sabbath, of Clarke [upon the existence of God], do not appear to me to be sermons; though I would not deny, that there are times and places, in which one might preach such discourses.

The *apologetic* may furnish subjects for the pulpit; and, in one sense, the whole of preaching is apologetic. But, taking this word in its ordinary sense, the thing, which it designates, cannot be employed in preaching, but with much discretion. The nature of the auditory, the shortness of discourses, hardly admit of it. We must be afraid of giving offence, when we are seeking for edification. Let us not forget that, in the Christian religion, to exhibit is to *demonstrate—Virtutem videant!*[1]

There is a general apologetic, which, in every country, may furnish subjects of preaching. Saurin *(Sufficiency of Revelation)*, Bourdaloue *(Wisdom and Mildness of the Christian Law)*, Tillotson *(The Tranquillity which Religion bestows*, and *Utility of Religion with respect to Societies)*, have taken care not to neglect them. The sermons delivered at the lectureships founded by Boyle, those of Chalmers on astronomy, may be justified, but they seem to demand a special auditory. It may be desirable to meet with one, to which discourses of this kind might be suitably addressed. Perhaps we need not be so timid as we are, in introducing such subjects.

[After apologetics, it is proper to mention *controversy*.] The true controversy of the pulpit is with *sin*, which is the grand heresy. That between symbol and symbol, church and church, is in general but little suitable. It will be said, that sin is at the bottom of every heresy, or easily attaches itself to it; that, in religion, no error is inactive. This is true; but either this heresy is not produced under the inspection of the Church, and then why speak of it?—or it exists under its eyes, and then, in general, it is much better to overcome evil with good, to absorb the error in the truth. Here also there is an occasion for saying, *Virtutem videant!*

We cannot, however, always avoid controversy. We must watch over the errors, which are produced in the place, where we are preaching, at least those, which gain a footing there; but

[1] Persius, Satire iii., ver. 38.

we must take care, not to render them the service of publishing, and propagating them, while we combat them.

The apostles, who set their faces against vain disputes,[1] had some controversy; but just as St Paul hastens towards his object, bending all his energies towards *edification*, never permitting any question to remain in a state purely *speculative*, so do they all.[2]

[Can the truths of *natural* religion find a place in sermons? The chief difficulty is found in the very statement of the question. What is meant by the truths of natural religion? Where is the limit? These truths have received from Christianity a *new aspect*, a new form, *out* of which the preacher is not at liberty to contemplate them. Since he cannot leave Christianity out of view, he can only place himself on the stand-point of a religion, purely natural, by a fiction, which is neither legitimate, nor profitable. Natural truths are found in the Christian religion, but transformed, and completed. And what advantage would there be in depriving them of the completion, which they have received from Christianity? By the very circumstance that we preach Christianity, we preach natural religion, and there is no necessity for making for it a *separate* class of discourses. In the pulpit itself, it is much better to consider the truths, which religion includes, as *internal moral* facts, than as objective truths.]

Doubtless it is always good to show, that we carry within us truths, which the Gospel has come to confirm, a germ, which it has made fruitful. These are arguments more or less strong in favour of certain truths, on which religion rests, and which it supposes, and in favour of the duties of morality. The Bible itself makes use of these arguments, especially in inculcating morality.[3] As to the dogmas of natural religion, we can only

[1] 2 Tim. ii. 23: "Foolish and unlearned questions avoid, knowing that they do gender strifes." It has been said, "Fill the bushel with good wheat, and there will be no room for chaff:" but the reply is obvious, "If the bushel be already full of chaff, you must first empty it of the chaff before you can fill it with wheat." You must root out the weeds of error, which entails controversy, before you can successfully plant the seeds of the truth.—Ed.

[2] Examples: Rom. xi. 32–36; Gal. iv. 19, 20; Rom. v. (see what precedes); Heb. x. 19–25. One may read in the *Theological Sermons* of Tillotson, vol. iii., pp. 317–371, the sermon on *Transubstantiation*; and vol. ii., on the *Uncertainty of Salvation in the Roman Church.*

[3] Acts xiv. 17: "Nevertheless He (God) left not Himself without witness, in that He did good, and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." Paul to the heathen at Lystra. Also, Rom. i.

sketch the demonstration of them, which Christianity completes. I should wish, not to make these arguments appear stronger, but also not weaker, than they are. [Besides, let us not forget the matter of *fact*, that the preachers who, by condescension, or by a method not well considered, have wished to conduct their hearers to revealed religion by natural, have had little success. Revealed religion conducts better to natural religion, than the latter to the former.[1] This assertion is not paradoxical. Indeed, the so-called natural religion has no reality, and does not merit the name of religion, until it has received the seal of revelation. For natural religion, in the true sense of the term, there is none. Revelation gives a certainty, and a *new* sense to truths presumed, but not yet *living*, and not yet applied to the conscience. In general, evangelical preachers have not essayed this false method; it is rationalism that, from predilection, has treated of these subjects. If it had for its object the development of *eloquence*, it is greatly mistaken.] Even oratorically the truths of natural religion, abandoned to themselves, are nothing; and the oratorical advantage of the Christian preacher, over the rationalist preacher, is incalculable.

§ II.—Subjects of Morality.

[The subjects of morality, even the word *morality*, are in the present day much decried, and that very unjustly. If the *word* is not found in the Gospel, we cannot from this conclude, that it is not lawful to make use of it. The Bible does not employ the

20; ii. 15, The Gentiles "show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another."—Ed.

[1] The Book of Nature does not *reveal* God, but is a noble *testimony* to Revelation when given. How true soever it be, that the knowledge of God is agreeable to nature and reason, and may be deduced therefrom, yet it is remarkable none of the heathen philosophers ever discovered it *of themselves*. The germs of both moral truth and civilisation, widely scattered in the old classic world, were doubtless not indigenous, but derived from primitive tradition, and subsequent indirect importation from the Holy Land. Joel iii. 6 lets fall a hint how this might take place through Jews carried as slaves into Greece by Phœnicians. Revelation, Butler observes in *the Analogy*, was needed: I. As a republication and external institution of religion; revealing the moral system of God's government of the world; free from superstition, with which it was corrupted and in a manner lost. II. As a promulgation of it with *new* light, "life and immortality" being thereby brought to light. Hence it is better to come through revealed religion to the study of natural, than *vice versâ*.—Ed.

language of science, but that of life, and it continually preaches morality, without thinking it necessary or profitable to inform us, in what it makes morality to consist. No more does it employ the word *virtue*,[1] and yet it speaks of Christian virtues, and that without the least inconvenience. What has brought subjects of morality into discredit, is the *manner*, in which they are too often treated; by separating morality from the dogma, from which it draws its authority and its efficacy, thereby making it distasteful and insipid. We may therefore reinstate the word without inconvenience.] Morality is the doctrine of *manners*, or of the *practical* life, considered in its relations towards the law, and towards grace. We shall have little hesitation in drawing from it subjects for preaching, if we dwell upon the following considerations;—

1. Morality abounds in the discourses of Jesus Christ, and in the writings of His apostles. [Jesus Christ was the preacher of *morality;*[2] His discourses contain much more of it, than of *dogma;* And this is quite natural; For He was *Himself* the dogma, the great *fact*, to which all the others attach themselves. When He had said: "I am He, who should come," He gave rules for *the life*. Nor is there any want of morality in the teaching of the apostles, and even very special morality.]

2. It is an excellent "schoolmaster, to bring men to Christ." (Gal. iii. 24.) Let us not despise *morality*, under the pretext that *conversion* is everything. We must be led to conversion, and nothing better shows the necessity of it, than the exposition of

[1] Both the Greek ἀρετή and Engl. *virtue* are employed: though how far *exactly* and *fully* in *our* use of the term is doubtful. Phil. iv. 8: "If there be any *virtue*, etc., think on these things;" this is the closest approach to our use; = general excellency of character. 2 Pet. i. 3: "Him, who hath called us to glory and virtue" (reading διὰ ἀρετῆς. The true reading is, ἰδίᾳ ἀρετῇ, who hath called us *by His own excellency*, answering to *His Divine power*): and ver. 5: "Add to your faith *virtue*," = general excellence, but according to Cruden, *courage*.—Ed.

[2] Not that the teaching of morality was the *primary* design of His mission: it was rather to give *new sanctions* and *motives* to it by "life and immortality," secured for man in and through *His meritorious life, death, and resurrection*. Morality is not first *revealed*, though much *cleared up*, by *Revelation:* it has its witness in man's moral nature: Revelation confirms it, and secures obedience to it, through the Spirit's aid: Rom. viii. 3, 4. See Paley, *Evidences*, ii., c. 2. It would have been wholly *premature* for Jesus in His life to have preached dogma, when the *facts*, on which that dogma is founded, His death, resurrection, ascension, and the descent of the Holy Ghost, were not as yet accomplished.—Ed.

the rules of practical life.[1] Has not God Himself willed, that the law should serve as a precursor of Christianity?

3. *Morality* throws much light on *dogmatical* instruction.

4. It has intimate relations with the *happiness* of individuals and of society. [Mal. ii. 5, 6, My covenant—*life* and *peace*. Comp. Prov. iii. 17.]

It is necessary to distinguish, as to the *subjects* of moral preaching:—

1. *Descriptive* morality, [which endeavours, as the name indicates, to study and to depict the *phenomena* of the moral life, like La Bruyère and La Rochefoucauld,] and *preceptive* morality, [which employs itself about *rules* of conduct. The first is very profitable for the pulpit; facts preach.] It furnishes *matter*, and a basis for *the second*. But preceptive morality alone furnishes subjects for *preaching*.

2. *General* morality, and *particular* morality. We must not abide by the first, nor borrow from the second too particular subjects.

3. The same subjects, *employed with different intentions*, according to the impressions, we wish to produce:—*consolation*, *encouragement*, *humiliation*, *fear*, etc.

4. Lastly, *general circumstances* and *particular circumstances*. It is profitable to dwell upon these last, but only in order to strongly connect, what passes away, with that, which does not pass away. [Let us come back upon these distinctions, in so far as they have for their object *preceptive* morality,—the morality, which furnishes subjects for preaching.

The *general duties* are those, from which all the others flow, which are the chief out-flowing of dogmatical truths towards the practical,—that which is intermediate between dogma and the details of life,—the duties of piety, and of Christian methodology [rule of life]. These duties may be considered as the essential matter of preaching. We may well be astonished in viewing the riches, which Christianity offers in point of general morality. The preacher must necessarily occupy himself much therewith;

[1] "The law must be laid on those that are to be justified, that they may be shut up in the prison thereof, until the righteousness of faith come, that when they are cast down by the law, they should fly to Christ. For God *woundeth*, that He may *heal* again. He *killeth*, that He may *quicken* again."—Luther on Gal. iii. "Thou preachest the law. He which hears, if he be not terrified, if he be not *troubled*, is not to be *comforted*."—Augustine on Ps. lix.—Ed.

here, as in all things, he must be strong upon the *principles*. The task, besides, is facilitated in this sense, that the soil of genuine [general?] morality is by much the most cultivated, and consequently the most accessible. But this very consideration ought to show us the necessity of not stopping at *general* facts. The preacher must display the power of Christianity, which makes its way into the details, and reaches to the extremities [the most minute particulars[1]] of life. We must see it thus in operation, in order to be deeply penetrated by its excellence. Error, or half-error, is not infinite [endless in its applications]; truth alone presses forward even to the *end* of things. Besides, it is very necessary to combat, or to rectify the received ideas, upon certain parts of morality. Very grave errors have been accredited, even in the midst of the most cultivated classes of society. And if we descend lower, we shall find matters still worse. The Christian preacher ought to come to the assistance of the people in this respect, to excite, as far as it depends upon him, the moral ideas, and to bestow his cares in a most particular manner upon the quarters threatened.[2]]

Nevertheless, if it be interesting to show, that the most minute details of life ought to be influenced by Christianity, which has a hand as delicate, as it is powerful; if it be even necessary to rectify ideas upon certain parts of morality, that have been obscured; it is not the less true, that we must not treat of subjects *too particular*. Take from a liquid, coloured or flavoured, a very *small* drop; and it will have, in its *isolation*, neither colour nor savour. It is difficult, at the furthest *extremity* of a branch, not to lose sight of the *trunk*. [Let one represent to himself, for example, sermons upon propriety, upon po-

[1] When John Baptist preached *generally*, "Herod heard him gladly." When he came to *particular* moral duties, violated by Herod, viz., his adultery, he was beheaded. Vaughan records of Robinson of Leicester, "Never did he discuss a doctrine, without drawing practical conclusions: Often he entered into a heart-searching development of *distinct parts* of duty: insomuch that some of his hearers, who did not greatly approve of his doctrinal opinions, were led highly to extol his ministry, as being replete with useful family instructions."—Ed.

[2] To suppose that the Gospel law of love renders needless the particular duties of the decalogue, "is to put the *mainspring* of the watch in place of the *regulator*. A defect in the evangelical preaching of *the law* is as clear a cause of inefficient ministration, as a legal preaching of *the Gospel*. In such a ministry there must be a want of conviction of sin *generally*,—of spiritual sins *particularly*,—and hence a low standard of spiritual obedience."—Bridges.—Ed.

liteness, etc. Such matters may be approached without doubt, but it must be only occasionally, and they cannot furnish the *subject* of a sermon.] Particular morality ought not to be excluded; but such details find their place *incidentally* in more general matters, or in historical subjects.

Akin to subjects, which the Gospel has treated, there are some which it has *not even mentioned*, as *suicide*, *slavery*, etc. These last, far from being of such a nature, that they ought to be excluded, are sometimes to be ranked amongst the most interesting, and the most evangelical. [Complaints have been made of the silence of the Gospel upon these important points;] but we ought much rather to feel grateful to it, for not having said everything. [Besides particular reasons, it must be considered in general, that it wished to create for us the necessity of finishing, and completing. The Church is the continual revealer of the truth: it can add nothing to *the principle;* but in the sense of *development*, of application, of consequence, it has always room for acting, and advancing. If the Gospel had said *everything*, there would have been *no need of preaching*.[1]]

Ought the *morality* applicable to *certain classes* of the auditory, as *parents*, *children*, *magistrates*, to be preached? [We think so. Men are rarely so much affected by general, as by particular truths. We must take each upon his own ground, individualise the truth.] Saurin has composed a sermon on the *Life of Courtiers*.[2] Let us not be afraid, lest, what is spoken with a special view to certain hearers, should reach only them. What does not directly concern us, may furnish us with useful instructions; and we are often most affected by lessons, which were not directly aimed at us. It is a good thing, besides, to be well instructed in the duties of a position, in which we may never be found; we thereby acquire a more complete understanding of the *entire* code of Christian morality.

Certain sins can only be the sins of some persons.[3] [But just

[1] The Gospel lays down *principles*, and some *details* only to illustrate the principles. No *literal* rules in detail could have expressed *all* the various applications, which the spirit of love would find for itself in the various circumstances of a world-wide Church. The Gospel aim was to hide *the leaven* once for all *in the meal*, and then leave it to its silent but certain development, *till the whole was leavened:* Matt. xiii. 33.—Ed.

[2] Saurin, vol. iii., new edition.

[3] Lavater used to fix on certain persons in his congregation, as representatives of the different classes of his hearers, and keep these in his eye whilst compos-

as the virtues are sisters, so the vices are brothers; all the parts of evil are bound together, as well as those of good.] It might be necessary to show a hearer that, if he is exempt from certain vices, at which he is shocked, it is often the effect of circumstances. There is, then, a philosophy of evil, the knowledge of which is closely connected with that of Christianity; and just as it is unsatisfactory to speak of duties, without connecting them all with a central duty, it is so, also, to speak of sins, without showing their organisation [and connection with sin in general]. It is necessary, that the believer should know not only life, but the *whole* of life. And the Bible is not sparing upon this point: it is a plain, complete picture of elementary human life: Such ought preaching to be.

As the morality of certain positions and the sins of certain classes, so cases of conscience, ought to be approached with caution, and only where you believe there is likely to accrue a very evident general advantage; but they cannot be absolutely excluded. [It is not necessary to treat them either in special discourses, or even in a separate discourse, but to show, that they are absorbed in a great principle, which, when the soul is penetrated with it, explains all the difficulties of practical life. If we were brought into perfect union with our Head, we should have no cases of conscience: in real life every person meets with them, and these very difficult and very doubtful, even with the assistance of prayer. But in general, *casuistry*, the manifold subtleties of which have brought a reproach on Christianity, does not belong to the sphere of the pulpit. He who is tormented with a scruple[1] of this nature should have recourse to the *pastor*, rather than the *preacher*.] The task of the latter is not so much to resolve questions of this sort, as to make them disappear. [Love is the supreme casuist.]

We may also [as we have said above] class sermons on morality, according to *the nature of the immediate impression*, which we seek to produce. Considering the auditory as a single individual,

ing, and mould his sermon to meet their respective cases. Louis XIV. said to Massillon, "When I hear other preachers, I admire *them;* when I hear you, I hate *myself*." There is *individual* application and reference to their *several* sins *respectively* in our Lord's reproofs to the Sadducees, Pharisees, Herodians, etc. Comp. Matt. xxii. xxiii.—Ed.

[1] Cecil gives it as a mark of a ripening Christian character, "less of *scrupulosity*, more of *tenderness of conscience:*" the latter is the best casuist.—Ed.

who has different moral wants, we exhort, we encourage, we console; in fine, we censure, or we correct.—This kind of preaching [the *sermons of reproof*] (in German, *Strafpredigten*), which was formerly much more frequent, in the present day appears to be confined to a single day in the year.[1] It is sometimes good to preach in this spirit; [the multitude has need of some of these awakening revivals, and for the believer also those seasons of examination have their great utility;] but there are dangers to be avoided. Age gives in this respect an authority, which does not belong to youth.[2] There is, however, an authority independent of age, and with which every preacher, in so far as he is a preacher, is invested. It was to the *young* Timothy, that the wise and moderate Paul said, "Them that sin rebuke before all, that others may fear." (1 Tim. v. 20.) "Preach the word, be instant in season and out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long-suffering and doctrine." (2 Tim. iv. 2.) It is thus also that he spoke to Titus: "These things speak, and exhort, and rebuke with all authority." (Titus ii. 15.) Besides, the *truth itself* reproves [and it is important that the hearer feel, that it is *the word of God* that corrects him, and not man]: "For the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart." (Heb. iv. 12.) As to the opposite kind, namely *laudatory* preaching, we find examples of it in the epistles of St Paul; but it is difficult to believe, that it can find place in the actual church, or in our churches.

Sermons of Circumstance.—To connect *general* truths with near and known facts, is, without doubt, a means of giving new life to the general truth; and, besides, it is the means of attaching to the particular facts, which are too often misconceived, or which pass unnoticed, a value of instruction.[3] If the preacher, says that God teaches us by events (for God also has sermons of circumstance), there would be on his part inconsequence, if he never spoke of the events. Without doubt, the very substance of preaching is not what passes away, it is that which does not pass

[1] The author alludes to the Fast-day, which is annually celebrated in all the churches of Switzerland.—Ed.

[2] 1 Tim. iv. 12, "Let no man despise thy *youth*."—Ed.

[3] See the sermon of Saurin on the *Malheurs de l'Europe*, vol. viii., new edit.

away: but it is not to take from it this character, to make use of it, in order to connect the events, which are passing away, with truths, which do not pass away. The hearer brings into the temple all the small money of his particular impressions [as to passing events], in order that it may be exchanged for gold [those same events spiritualised]. The whole of history, in the hands of a Christian, becomes a preaching; and preaching becomes history. To him, who preaches in this sense, that is to say, in the spirit of generalising the particular, of eternising the temporary, it is permitted to speak of *circumstances;* to him, who only sees in them a means of exciting the blunted curiosity, we forbid it. The noises of this world ought to be shut out at the gate of this sanctuary, where, as in the eternal world, "there is no more time;" the temple [house of God] is a heaven. We enter for the time being into eternity, in order to re-enter into time with spiritualised hearts; and of all the events, which are passing without, there ought only to penetrate there one single thing, the truth which is conveyed by them.

As to patriotic, and political sermons, [we must rather discard them; and yet one may be obliged, in certain important circumstances, to approach such subjects in the pulpit.] On one side, the humanity of Christianity brings it into contact with all the interests of life, furnishes it with a word to be spoken in all circumstances; and on the other hand it does not suffer itself to be subjected to what is local and temporal, and it mingles only, with extreme reserve, with anything that does not bear the seal of eternity.[1] We must beware of blowing the coals to the passions of the natural man. How in the present day can one speak on politics, without taking a side? We must remark also the *utilitarianism* concealed by the greatest part of these subjects.[2] It is much better for the preacher, as well as for the navigator, to keep the high seas; it is near the shore, that shipwrecks are most frequent.[3] I believe, indeed, that one cannot absolutely avoid discoursing to the public, on that, with which it is preoccupied and absorbed; but we ought to discourse to it of these

[1] The manner in which the fast is celebrated sufficiently shows, that the nation is now no longer identical with the Church.

[2] There are in Saurin several political sermons, but in general they abide within just limits. See also the sermon of Ancillon on *Le Jubilé de la Monarchie.*

[3] . . . Nimium premendo
Litus iniquum.—Horace, *Odes*, Book ii., Ode x.

things, only to *calm* and *moderate* it.[1] Govern the affairs of this world, without touching them; connect yourself with them only to imprint upon them a character; make your hearers view them from the heights of heaven.[2] Look at the Lord and His apostles. I do not wish to press rigorously the example which they have left us upon this point; nevertheless, it is remarkable that, loving their countrymen as they did, they have approached political subjects with so much reserve. The apostles, in accordance with their Master, have left us on this point only one single example. [Our Lord, when pressed to express an opinion on a political question, enunciated the principle, which is to regulate His disciples as to politics and religion respectively: "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's:" Matt. xxii. 16–22.—Ed.]

We ought to distinguish in this the *preacher*, from the religious writer, who may be a journalist, a pamphleteer, if he will. The preacher is moreover, and at the same time, president of an assembly for worship; his discourse even forms part of the worship. This, it appears to me, does not permit him to make of the sermon, all that he might be tempted to make of it. We have in the present day so many other means, besides the pulpit, for teaching, what we think fit, on other topics.

§ III.—Historical Subjects.

What we have said of oratorical unity, does not appear to favour the introduction of *historical subjects*. If, as Quintilian says, we *write* in order to *relate*, and not in order to *prove*, we *speak* in order to *prove*, and not in order to *relate*. But, first, as we have already proved, the chief business of the preacher is to instruct or to teach; and to relate may be a form of instruction. "We only reason," I have said somewhere, "because we do not know, how to relate." Facts well related are instruction the

[1] "Like some tall cliff, that lifts its awful form,
Swells from the vale, and midway leaves the storm,
Though round its base the rolling clouds are spread,
Eternal sunshine settles on its head."—Goldsmith.—Ed.

[2] Christ's kingdom, though *in* the world, is not *of* the world: John xviii. 36. There is such a sublimity about Christianity, that earthly wars, politics, arts, and sciences, compared with it, are, says Cecil, but as "the battles of rooks, the policy of ants, and the industry of bees."—Ed.

most impressive; and I might say the most decisive; because the reader or the hearer administers instruction to himself.[1] It is chiefly by histories, that God gets possession of our heart. It is by means of histories, and romances, that ideas are disseminated. We are too much prepossessed in favour of argumentation, which is only one form of demonstration. But, what is here required, is not merely and simply to relate. The narrative is only the *basis*, or that which supports the instruction, which ought to follow. It is therefore quite conformable to the idea of an oratorical discourse, to relate; but the orator does not relate in the same manner, as the historian.

Let us add, that nothing so much interests the mass of hearers as histories. We have very little regard for the wants of the multitude, when we relate nothing to them. God has been more condescending.[2]

We seek to transform *history* into *precept;* Herder would have transformed every *precept* into *history*.[3] Both methods are good; both must be employed. Thus, in place of saying *avarice*, we should say the covetous man [the *ideal* person], or still better, a covetous man [a *particular* instance].

Independently of sacred history, properly so called, preaching will find abundant materials in the *history of the Church*, in which the history of the Old and New Testaments finds its continuation; in the history of religion, and that of the world, which is as it were a history of Providence. What a field, moreover, is the history of missions, and of Christian labours, and that of the persecutions![4] The history of *individuals*, the biography of men of God, should also find a place in the pulpit.

The Catholic preachers have in this an advantage over us, in having introduced into their preaching as the rule, the panegyrics of the saints, the funeral orations.[5] These sermons excite

[1] *History* is said to be "philosophy teaching by examples." So religious history is religious truth teaching by examples.—Ed.

[2] The Bible is not a collection of abstract truths, but a book abounding in histories of living persons, especially the Lord Jesus, embodying, enacting, and so setting forth those truths. *Precept* must go hand in hand with *history*, if it is to meet the wants of man, who is not merely *soul* or *mind*, but *body* also.—Ed.

[3] *Lehrsatz* (précepte).—See Herder; *Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend*, vol. ii., p. 36. Edition Carlsruhe, 1829.

[4] See my *Discours d'installation* (Appendix).

[5] See Bossuet, *Panégyrique de l'apôtre Saint Paul* and *l'Oraison funèbre de la Princesse Palatine.*

all the interest, which a *general* truth acquires by being *individualised*. Why, instead of taking the words of the apostles for texts, should we not take the apostles themselves? Instead of contemplating their words in their objective sense only, might we not also consider them under the subjective point of view, and seek thereby to portray the distinctive features of the beautiful characters in the primitive Church? They are the types of moral perfection, which it is highly profitable to study. And as it is true, that the work of God is identical with itself, in all ages, let us pass the bounds of the apostolic times, and in the immense field of the Church, even in the Catholic Church, before and after the Reformation, let us reap an ample harvest of beautiful memorials.[1] There would be ingratitude in keeping back the lives of our fathers in the faith.[2] We might be Christians, and yet have only a vague knowledge of Paul, James, and Peter; we might be ignorant, so to speak, of a Luther, and a Viret! The history of the work of the Spirit in the Church, and the biographies of holy men, are often much more edifying than all argumentative demonstrations. [Let us not be afraid of even telling anecdotes.] Why should we deprive our auditory of all this, when they might not find it elsewhere, or so well seasoned? [Let us not forget, however, while we use these materials with freedom, that *every* liberty is not permitted to him, who is the servant of God, and in the proportion in which he is His servant.[3]]

The subjects, which we have just mentioned, are in harmony with a sufficient degree of oratorical unity, and all the proprieties of the pulpit.

§ IV.—Subjects drawn from the contemplation of Nature.

Subjects of this kind have also been abused; this has caused them to fall into a discredit, similar to that, of which subjects of

[1] This requires caution in the case of corrupt churches, like that of Rome, lest our hearers should suppose that, since such good Christians have been in these churches, their errors are matters of comparative indifference.—Ed.

[2] "Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God, whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation." —Heb. xiii. 7.—Ed.

[3] The ridiculous, light, or trifling is to be avoided; nothing but what is serious tends to lasting edification.—Ed.

morality have been the object. Picturesque sermons have been preached to satiety, and the fault of the preachers has been visited upon the subjects, which were their favourite topics. This disgust is doubtless excusable, but it is nevertheless unjust, and it is proper that the subjects, of which we speak should resume the place, which belongs to them.

The God of nature has been placed in opposition to the God of the Gospel. This has been done before the awakening [revival], in one sense; after the awakening, in another. What we have said of the truths of natural religion, finds here its application; for this is no dissimilar case. Grace has not made nature an outcast; and because the heavens do not declare *all* the glory of God, it does not follow, that upon this important subject, the heavens have become altogether mute. Shall we say, that what they declare, is no longer valuable, since the Gospel has spoken? We cannot think so; no, they still speak; we must collect their utterances.—It is a truth, that nature also speaks of the fall, and of sin,[1] and forces us to desire a new earth, and new heavens; therefore it is still, in this respect, profitable to speak of this world, and to show, how it is adapted to the religious education of man.

Besides, the mutual correspondence of the physical world and the moral world is striking: nature is an immense parable.[2]

Let us only remark, that, what, in this kind of subjects, is permitted to the pulpit, belongs neither to science nor poetry, [*i.e.*, it is not the *scientific* or *poetic* aspect of nature, which are permissible in the pulpit.—Ed.], though science, in its general results, and poetry, by a necessary consequence, are admissible there. This contemplation of nature ought to be essentially *religious*. It receives aid from science; it naturally abounds in poetry; but science is only its *means*, and poetry, only its *accident*.[3] It is desirable, that the preacher do not speak of them

[1] Rom. viii. 22: "We know that the *whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain* together until now."—Ed.

[2] This real correspondence between the natural and spiritual worlds is one cause for our Lord's employment of parables from nature for spiritual teaching. —Ed.

[3] King James compares such embellishments to "the *red and blue flowers*, that pester the corn, when it stands in the fields: more noisome to the growing crop, than beautiful to the beholding eye." "Preachers are to feed the people, not with *gay tulips and useless daffodils*, but with the *bread of life* and medicinal plants, springing from the margin of the fountain of salvation."—Bish. Taylor.

vaguely and at random, but with the precision, which science gives. The wonders, which are concealed [*i.e.*, the hidden truths of science], are not its least wonders.[1]

§ V.—Psychological Subjects.

That *psychology*, or the knowledge of the elements, and springs of action of the psychical man [is necessary]; that is, to say all in one word, the preacher ought to be acquainted with *man*, there can be no doubt. Some have despised this study, and said, that the Bible is sufficient; forgetting, that the psychology, which it [the Bible] contains, invites us to study psychology; and that it is a flambeau[2] for looking into man, and that it is man whom we must look at. On the mysteries of the human soul, how many things are to be found in Job and Ecclesiastes! what points of view are indicated! He who will repeat with authority, "Man is this, man is that," without having himself experienced, what he affirms, will produce little effect; he might, for the same reason, allege no other motive of duty, than the *commandment* of the Bible: nobody thinks himself reduced to this. No person should be able to say: "If the preacher knew us better, he would not speak in this manner." The preacher who speaks of man, without having studied him, will fall into serious errors, and will be wanting in authority. He ought to show, that he knows, as far as man can know, "of what we are made." (Ps. ciii. 14.) But in general, psychology is more suitable for furnishing our sermons with *substance*, than with *subjects* properly so called; and in both cases, it ought to be neither that of science, nor of shallow observation; the psychology of the preacher must be practical, and popular. A psychology purely speculative, or too refined, distracts the hearer from that which ought above all things to pre-occupy him; it gives to his self-love a dangerous element;[3]

Another says, "Let me never be guilty, by *painting the windows*, of *hindering the light* of Thy glorious Gospel from shining powerfully into the hearts."—Ed.

[1] We shall cite as examples of this kind of subjects, certain sermons of Cellerier, and that of Manuel upon *Winter*. (*Sermons*, vol. ii., sermon xviii.)

[2] Jesus compares the *soul* and *conscience* to a *light*, Luke xi. 34-36.—Ed.

[3] Very delicate psychology, which goes about prying into all the motions of the soul, surprising all its secrets, starting from it confessions, ferreting, if we may be allowed to say so, into its most obscure corners, and above all, giving to it the consciousness of all its evil, and multiplying its sorrows by naming them to it. . . I think, I have a glimpse of what in it is injurious to the great interests of the soul. As far as the *knowledge of one's self* is the necessary basis

it creates for him imaginary impressions; besides, it is an element little oratorical.

Psychology, such as we understand it here, regards not only the *individual* man, but also man as a *social* being; there is a psychology, as there is a physiology, of society. It forms part of the domain, which we have just opened up to the preacher. Nothing is more natural or more easy, than to attach to the idea of God, that of all providential institutions; to show, for example, from the beginning of the Bible, and of the world, God as the founder of society, and of civilisation, by the almost simultaneous institution of the *family*, of *speech*, of *law*, and of *labour*.

[These subjects, too much neglected, which, however, produce a kind of religious shock among the hearers, are comprised in the preceding.] Indeed, the institutions, the manners, and, along with them, the industry, the arts, the civilisation, and the various other developments, flow from human nature. [All truth leads to *the* Truth. Without doubt, Christ is the centre of all truth; but to show that Christ is the centre, it is necessary to speak of the *circle*, and its distant and outer circumference.]

Let us acknowledge, however, that the word psychology [which we have just employed] cannot be extended in its application without undergoing a kind of violence, to the secret knot, which unites the different portions of the world, and the different elements of human life. It is rather philosophy [which embraces these]. Philosophy, in religion, is an instrument, a method; it is less concerned about a given philosophy, a philosophical system, than about that philosophical spirit, by means of which we classify, generalise, abstract, find the true relations of things, ascend from appearances to reality, from phenomena to principles, and embrace the whole. This spirit assists us in finding the philosophy of religion, that is to say, the relation of the elements, of which it is composed, to each other and to the centre, and its own relation to the world and human life. It is with the aid of this spirit,

of all regeneration, so far, probably, this too minute observation may render this very work [regeneration] difficult. It turns into a mere *study*, into a matter of *curiosity*, the great impressions, which incline the soul towards the side of light. It furtively transforms the *sorrows of repentance* into the *pleasures of self-love;* the reproaches of the conscience become discoveries of the intellect. We do not enter *into*, we rather go *out of* ourselves. Amused *spectators* of a serious evil, we cease to be *identified* with it, we isolate ourselves from it, we separate ourselves from it, while we are engaged with it."—VINET, *Etudes sur la Littérature Française au XIXe siècle*, tome iii., pp. 28, 29.

that we seize upon and make manifest the secret agreement, which subsists among all things: between religion and nature, or human life; and in human life, between individual existence and social existence; between reality and art; between thought and action; between liberty and order; between the particular affections and the general affections;[1] between instincts and duties; between concern for the present and thought for the future. But all this enters into the class of apologetic sermons; and philosophy appears here (as I have said) not as *object*, but as *instrument*.[2]

This almost indefinite extension of the province of preaching, from which hardly anything is excluded, may it not be matter of offence? It may be asked, if Jesus Christ came to discourse of all sorts of matters. No; Jesus Christ spake of a *good part*, of a *one thing needful*, for which we must decide, and for this one thing needful to the exclusion of all others. There is in the evangelical ministry a character of urgency. The instruction of Jesus Christ and His apostles is *vehement*, having little resemblance to the calm development of scientific exposition. "Save yourselves from this untoward generation" (Acts ii. 40); save yourselves though you should leave behind you your treasures, and shreds of yourselves [of your human wisdom];[3]—this is the preaching of Jesus Christ, evangelical preaching. The Christian pulpit is not an academic chair.—We feel, that the objection is

[1] Example: "Weep not for the dead; neither bemoan him; but weep sore for him that goeth away, for he shall return no more, nor see his native country." (Jer. xxii. 10.)

[2] "Metaphysical preaching is chiefly useless, and commonly mischievous; the reasoning is so subtle and abstruse, that the hearer's attention to *the truth* is lost in his attention to *the preacher's ingenuity*: his mind is prevented from feeling what is intended, by the absorption of his thoughts in the difficulties of the argument."—DWIGHT. M. Henry says, "Choose for your pulpit subjects the plainest and most needful truths, and endeavour to make them plainer." "Let all reasoning be grounded upon the simple principles of Scripture, rather than upon inductive or excursive philosophy."—BRIDGES.—ED.

[3] Bish. Hall complains of some preachers, as continually "picking straws in divinity," offering the people metaphysical, antiquarian, and critical husks, instead of the bread of life. King James, in his "Reason of the King's direction for Preaching," traces the defections to Popery and schism, to the "lightness, affectedness, and unprofitableness of preachers, mustering up of much reading, or displaying of their wits, leaving the people's minds, for all this airy nourishment, no better than mere table-books."—ED.

strong. Those who represent to themselves the pastor as a *missionary* (and they are right), cannot comprehend our slackness [when we deal in scientific expositions, rather than earnest personal appeals]. Let us not forget, however, that to preach is to *instruct.* If we had only to drive the sinner speedily to the foot of the cross, the Gospel itself might be too much developed. But the good news is found in *many* subjects. The words, which powerfully affect the consciences of men, are scattered in the Gospel; [and not concentrated, as the objection would imply, in *one* aspect of the truth:] and there are others of them all around us. They ought, doubtless, to be virtually present in every discourse; but they do not dispense with our studying the *different phases* of the truth. To terrify is not everything, it is even a very small matter;[1] we must touch the heart, and in order to do that, we must instruct.[2] There is a great number of souls, that can only be gained to Christ at this price. Let us then be anxious to instruct, and let us instruct at leisure [doing the work *patiently* and *not hurriedly*]; God, in the mean time, will do His own work. Instruction is not an affair of taste, or of choice, but of necessity. An instruction, which, in all its parts, tends to edification, cannot be retrenched from the mission of the preacher.

Besides, we must never lose sight of this, that *novelty* is a great means of interesting; and that preaching only maintains its ground in this respect, on condition of perpetually renewing itself, giving itself *freshness.* Men wish for novelty, and, all things considered, they are not wrong. This craving for novelty is more serious, than we imagine, and the hearer, who is most affected, is far from being a stranger to it. Every prudent preacher "will bring forth from his treasury things new and old." (Matt. xiii. 52.) What is not old is not true, for the question is not to make a *new Gospel.* And, on the other hand, what is not new, that is, accommodated to the form of the intellect, to the tendencies and to the wants of each epoch, is no longer completely

[1] Rather "speak the truth in love:" Eph. iv. 15. Comp. Phil. iii. 18: "Of whom I tell you even *weeping*;" Acts xx. 31. "I am afraid of *driving* my people away *from* the Saviour: I would rather err on the side of *drawing* them"—Rev. J. Escreet. "Circumliniatur poculum cœlestis sapientiæ melle, ut possint ab imprudentibus amara remedia sine offensione potari."—Lactant.—Ed.

[2] "Qui nititur persuadere, nihil horum trium spernat, ut scilicet *doceat, delectet, flectat:* ita enim audietur intelligenter, libenter, obedienter."—Augustine, *Doctr. Christ.* iv. 12, 17, 26.—Ed.

true.[1] The wonderful pliancy of the Gospel, its fitness to adapt itself to the forms of society, to the characters, to the positions, to the most opposite directions of the intellect, is no slight indication of its Divine origin. Would preaching lose by resembling it? It too often resembles itself, retaining the same unvaried form in one preacher and another, and from one age to another. Things, the *force* of which is quite independent of the *form*, are few in number. There are few sermons of the ages that are past, that do not require to be translated [remodelled] for our use.

[There is, therefore, a *legitimate novelty*, a novelty of subjects also, not of *doctrines*, but of *theses*. It is thus, that art, which is a *human* thing, renews itself; the Gospel is immutable, but it is *divine*. To obtain this novelty, of which we speak, genius is not necessary; the preacher has only to open his eyes, and to observe. Let him not abide by the general and *abstract* idea of man, but let him study the men, whom he has before him, and to whom he speaks.[2] If he will indeed take this care, he will be new. But that is a difficult study, demanding continual attention, in which *zeal* sustains and directs, but with which it does not dispense.]

After having let down the barriers, we raise them again, that is to say, after having opened to preaching, in general, five or even six domains, we reduce them for the *young* preacher to two: the *dogmatic* and the *moral*.[3] The three last classes of subjects suppose in the preacher a discernment, a tact, which can only be the fruit of experience. The young preacher is safer within the

[1] A German critic once, when asked by a vain man to give an opinion of his book, replied, "There is in it much that is true and new." The man looked pleased. But the critic added, "The true in it is not new, and the new is not true!" *We* must take care in preaching that the new may be true, and that the true may be new, though not in *substance*, yet in *mode of putting* it.—Ed.

[2] The general sermons that are preached to *everybody*, are really preached to nobody. Luther, when asked by Albert the best style to preach before the Elector, replied, "Look not to the Prince, but to the simple and unlearned people, of which cloth the Prince himself also is made. If I in my preaching should have regard to Melancthon, or other learned doctors, I should work but little good."—Ed.

[3] Cotton preached a sermon at Cambridge University, much admired by those "who relished the wisdom of words more than the words of wisdom." On understanding the truer principles of the ministry, he burnt the sermon: and subsequently preaching in a more scriptural tone, in the same pulpit, he seriously impressed an eminent divine, Dr Preston.—Mather's *New Engl.*, iii.—Ed.

narrower limits, which, however, are not so much so as to cramp his zeal, and to confine the usefulness of his ministry, and into which he can still easily bring many ideas and facts, collected from the domains, from which he does not take the *subjects* of his preaching.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE TEXT.

---

§ I.—Of the Text in General.

In treating previously (Part I., Invention, 4) of this subject, apart from the special consideration of the text, I have sufficiently shown, that I do not consider the employment of a text *essential* to the discourse from the pulpit.[1] And in reality it is not. What makes a sermon Christian, is not the employment of a text, but the spirit of the preacher. A sermon may be Christian, edifying, instructive, without confining itself within the limits of a passage of Holy Scripture. It may also be quite scriptural without having a text, just as, with a text, it may be by no means scriptural. A passage of Scripture has a thousand times served for a passport to ideas, which were not scriptural; and we have seen preachers make for themselves, as it were, a kind of sport, by putting at the head of their compositions very strong Biblical texts, in order to give themselves the pleasure of enervating them. We were once present at one such formal immolation of the Divine Word. When the *text* is there, only as a *false ensign*, when the *belfry* surmounts *a gaming house*, it would doubtless be much better to remove the ensign, and to pull down the belfry.

As to preachers attached to the Word of God, *they* will not fall into this abuse; but how often the text has been to them the occasion of a laborious and violent twisting of language![2] Very

[1] Origin of texts; see Luke iv. 16–21.

[2] "Some men think, they preach Christ gloriously, because they name Him every ten minutes in their sermons. But this is not *necessarily* preaching Christ. There is also a fastidious spirit in some congregations, that would stamp as unevangelical every sermon that has not Christ for its *immediate* subject. Every

far from the text and the subject mutually aiding each other, there is often a kind of war between them. In order that this war should *never* take place, two things would be necessary: the one, that every text should contain a subject, the other, that every subject should be certain of finding a text.[1] Neither the one, nor the other is constant.

And first, every text does not contain a subject. Discarding the *homily*, which is beside the present question, and to which we shall afterwards return, the question is here of the *synthetic discourse*, in which everything is collected into a point. This discourse rests upon a thesis; it is necessary to seek a text, which contains a thesis. Shall we always find it? Observe that the thesis, the result of an abstraction, is a truth carefully detached from a collection of truths, as a member from the body, to which it belongs, upon which it has grown, and in which it forms a distinct and separable whole, a unity. The thesis includes in itself all that constitutes it, nothing more, nothing less; it has no more excrescences than deficiencies, it has its extremities engaged in nothing foreign; it has nothing subjective, historical, or accidental. Conceived as thesis, a thesis in its birth, it advances to its object without deviations, and following the most direct line. There is doubtless a good number of Biblical texts, of which this much may be affirmed; but a larger number, of which the contexture, the form, the very ground, suppose an occasion, a personal emotion, the fortuitous contact with other ideas, in one word, a *complication* foreign to the thesis properly so called, and which, viewed in its isolation, might seem arbitrary. Now it is often in a passage of this nature, as in a species of *gangue*, that such a truth as we require, and wish to treat of, is deposited; and the thesis then raises itself alongside of the text, throws out its roots obliquely there, as into the crevice of a rock;

part of the Bible, indeed, contains the Gospel *substantially*, but not *formally*. It is not therefore legitimate to *allegorise Holy Writ*, for the purpose of introducing His name."—Cecil.—Ed.

[1] It may well be doubted, whether any subject would be a fit one for the pulpit, for which an appropriate text of Scripture could not be found. The written Word is God's appointed instrument of salvation: 2 Tim. iii. 15; John v. 39. Though *logically* the text may not furnish such a *detached* thesis as Vinet requires, having no more and no less than the *basis of some proposition*, yet, whatever unity of subject is thus lost, is more than made up by its connecting our instruction with the *whole* system as set forth in *Scripture*, which is the ordained nutriment of the soul: 1 Pet. ii. 2.—Ed.

it draws there a new life, some new interest, much sooner than it is itself extracted substantially from it. And if it wish to absorb the whole text, it overloads itself, and declines from the perpendicular: it is no longer *thesis*.

Well! it will be said, let us renounce thesis, and the difficulty will disappear. But, I ask, will the preacher, in the course of his career, see no other subjects for preaching present themselves to him, than passages of the Bible? Experience is also a book, experience also furnishes texts. Such a proposition as has its exact expression in no passage of the Bible, proceeds one and entire from the mind of the preacher, rendered fruitful by circumstances, or by meditation. He will seek, however, because usage, which has the force of law, requires it, a text for this preconceived subject; and I doubt not, that he will find a text, which has a perceptible *relation to* his subject; but will he always find a text, which *expresses fully* his subject? We cannot think so. And in this case he will do one of two things: either he will only take from the Biblical Word, what agrees exactly with his subject, and will consider it abstracted from the rest; or the text will become the mould of his discourse: and then, do we suppose, that that will be a very natural plan, which, formed at first in his own mind, after the nature of things, and after his individual point of view, must be afterwards formed anew, according to the sinuosities of a text, which has not the form of *his* thesis, and which has not even the form of *a* thesis at all?

If you tell him to renounce the form of his thesis, or rather his thesis itself, in favour of the text, with what chains do you not load the minister of the Word? And do you not know that the Bible *includes* many more truths, than it *expresses*, and that it is one of its merits, to suggest, and to excite a crowd of ideas, which it includes, virtually I mean, though not actually? If you wish at once, that the preacher should have the air of having no regard to his text, and that he should nevertheless treat his thesis completely and exclusively in the manner, that he has conceived it, it is perhaps much worse. You oblige him to have recourse to an artifice, unworthy of the pulpit; you wish that, under the appearance of an inviolable respect for the letter of the Bible, he should do violence to it and twist it. Is it not evident that he would show more respect for it by not following it so closely, and by not forcing *it* to enter into the circle of *his* conceptions, at the

time that he pretends, on the contrary, to bring his conception into the circle of this word? For all hearers a little exercised, a little clear-sighted, this is a mock respect.

If we be told, that true preaching ought to be, as it was at its origin, a simple explanation and application of the inspired Word, we are transported to quite different ground, into another question, which we can discuss without encroaching upon, or at all compromising, the ideas, which we have just put forth.

Men of very different characters, and of quite opposite doctrines, have agreed in opinion, that the use of texts is an abuse. According to Voltaire (whom we must not be in haste to challenge; for why should he not have fallen in with the truth upon this subject, which is not exactly a question of religion?[1]): "It were to be wished that Bourdaloue, in banishing from the pulpit the bad taste which debased it, had banished from it also this custom of preaching from a text. Indeed, to speak long upon a quotation of a line or two, to labour to bring his whole discourse to bear upon this line, such a labour appears a trifling, little worthy the dignity of the ministry. The text becomes a kind of motto,[2] or rather enigma, which the discourse develops."[3]

We must shake off the yoke of our habits, each of which becomes, in the long run, a second nature; we must transport ourselves to the point of view of a man, who has never heard preaching, who knows only the object of preaching, and not its usages, and ask ourselves, what *he* would feel at seeing an entire branch of the genus, oratory, subjected to this rule, and each discourse developing not an idea of the preacher, or an idea that has become his own, but a word or saying taken from the midst of a foreign discourse. I think it might be said, at the very least, that he would be astonished. And without doubt he would not stop at simple astonishment, if the discourse upon which he had fallen were a discourse of Bourdaloue, who appears, like many

[1] "Fas est et ab hoste doceri."—Ovid, *Metam.*, lib. v., p. 428.

[2] Texts prefixed as mottoes, and left untouched in the sermon, are objectionable, because, says Vitringa, Method. Hom., "they divert the mind from the direct meditation of the sacred text, which is the true food of the soul." Allied to this is the affectation of finding something new and recondite in plain texts. —Ed.

[3] Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*

others of his communion, to have only taken his text, in order to show his ability in getting rid of it;[1] and if the preacher could not have done otherwise, if the text was imposed upon him, the blame would be then laid elsewhere, but it would be laid somewhere; the preacher is innocent, but the institution [the usage of texts] is not. The astonishment would not be less great, if, instead of a sermon of Bourdaloue, it was a sermon of Reinhard; the one *gets rid* of his text, the other *tortures* it, to make it say for him what it has not said, and what it did not intend to say.[2] But if this stranger, this fresh man, were present at one of those preachings, of which the Reformed pulpit offers so many examples, where the text is not a pretext, where the text is not a narrow defile, which is traversed with difficulty, but truly a text, a divine thought, of which we seek to penetrate the sense, to measure the extent, to develop the parts, to deduce the consequences, would he be equally astonished? I think not. He would perhaps make no reflection upon the usage, and if he made any, it is very possible, that they would be favourable to it.

In the long run, however, and in proportion as he entered into the spirit of preaching, and of the ministry, it might also happen, that some doubt would arise in his mind, as to the legitimacy of the usage, at least in so far as it was *invariable*. He would perhaps make the reflections, we have expressed, upon the incompatibility of the text, and of the subject [the two not being *co-extensive*], taking each of them in the rigour of its idea. He might perhaps say, like Claus Harms: "May we be permitted to ask, if the practice of preaching from texts is as much founded on reason, as on custom? May we dare to express the opinion, that the theme and the text come together, only to exclude each other? That a theme does not require a text, and that a text does not require a theme? May we even dare to affirm, that the usage of preaching from a text has been prejudicial, not only to the perfection of preaching as an *art*, but also to *Christian*

[1] Some who run away from their text have been well named "Fugitive preachers." Still, whilst order and connection are essential, there may be a risk, by our being too artificial and under bondage to canons, lest we impede the easy, natural flow of Scripture truth. The Bible is popular in construction, and we are ministers of it, not philosophic orators.—Ed.

[2] See note on "Additional Remarks on Unity" for instances of texts, so tortured.—Ed.

knowledge, and what is still more serious, to the Christian *life?*"[1]

There are two things in this passage. The one is an assertion strictly true regarding the *forced alliance* of a subject, or previously conceived theme, and a text, conceived and expressed by another. We have already subscribed to this objection; the difficulty cannot be denied; we shall shortly see, if it cannot be surmounted. The second part of the passage quoted is a simple allegation, the proofs of which are not produced, concerning the wrong, which this usage must have done to preaching itself, to Christian knowledge, and the Christian life. I do not think we can wholly repel the charge. The manner, at least, in which the usage has been practised, might, up to a certain point, have produced these effects. The continuous interpretation of the text of Scripture, were it the exclusive form of preaching, would not have had all these inconveniences; but the use of isolated texts, joined to the necessity of *never* preaching without a text, has certainly, in its rigour, and in its absoluteness, something false, something servile, which narrows the field, confines the thought, puts restraint upon the individuality of the preacher; I speak of this method, when employed without modification or mitigation, in order that we may be on our guard against it.

There would still remain the question, after this, if the opposite method, or merely the liberty of preaching without a text, would not have still more inconveniences, if the abuses, which would have resulted from it, would not be more serious. We see, indeed, the abuse to which the method, that has been prevalent, has given occasion, and we see not those which the other method would produce; but it is not very difficult to imagine them, and it is not more difficult to understand, that a usage, so constant, and so universal, is not without some solid foundation, and was not from the beginning, and, in its simplicity, an abuse and an error. There would still remain the question, if the use of texts is not susceptible of modifications, which, without reduc-

[1] Harms, *Pastoraltheologie*, vol. i., p. 65. See also vol. ii., p. 153. These opinions of Harms have been discussed by Tholuck, *Theologischer Anzeiger*, for the year 1835, Nos. 63 and 64. See upon the same subject Koester, *Lehrbuch*, p. 194, § 35 *on Homiletics*, and Hüffell *Uber das Wesen und den Beruf des evangelisch-christlichen Geistlichen*, vol. i., p. 345.

Arguments from the *abuse* of a usage, are not valid against the *use*.—Ed.

ing it to be nothing more than a ridiculous formality, would purge it of all that is servile, false, and irrational.

This is, what I shall examine in concluding. But first, taking this method in general, without regarding the application which it may have received, and the abuse which has been made of it, I make the following observations :—

First, the consecration which this method has received from time, and from *universal consent*, has given it such a force, that time only, which introduced, can abolish it, and yet this abolition, perhaps, supposes a violent shaking in the Church.

Secondly, this method well represents, at least externally and formally, the idea, that the preacher is the *minister of the Word of God*.[1] It recalls this idea to others and to himself.

Thirdly, it has some real advantages. The first is the moral advantage for the preacher, from his having to *connect his discourse with a word of the Bible*. The second is the *respect*, with which *the auditory* is impressed, at the commencement of the discourse, by the enunciation of a sacred word. The third is, that in general a text, well laid hold of and closely followed, will produce a *discourse more special*, more striking, and more lively, than a discourse could be, that is based upon an *abstract* conception; it is an originality ready-made. In fine, for the most of preachers, this method is much more suitable, than the other, for *multiplying subjects*.

Ammon has very well summed up the advantages of the use of texts, in the following words :—"The Bible is the source of our external knowledge of religion. It is in a high degree, especially in its historical part, easy to be understood, interesting, and dramatic; it furnishes in abundance materials of the highest importance, for the most varied expositions upon theology, religion, and practical wisdom. Its passages are retained in the memory with the greatest facility, on account of their simple and striking modes of expression; they thus facilitate the particular reproduction of the truths revealed. The *subjective* divinity of its origin gives to the *objective* divinity of its contents an au-

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 13: "We speak, not in the words, which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth;" and ver. 5, "That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." "If anything be spoken without Scripture, the knowledge of the hearers halteth,"—Chrysost. Ps. lxxxvi. And Augustine ad Vincent, "Non valet—hæc *ego* dico, etc., sed hæc dicit *Dominus*."—Ed.

thority,[1] which strengthens the religious convictions of educated men, and holds the place of a proof[2] for the uneducated."[3]

Claus Harms himself, after having made the objections, which we have cited, to the practice of preaching from a text, concludes, nevertheless, for the preservation of this method;[4] he is reconciled to it by a consideration of moral utility, and if he admits of sermons without texts, it is only in the quality of an *exception*.

If preaching from texts presents difficulties in *theory*, it is certain that they can be much diminished in *practice*. We will make ourselves understood by distinguishing *three* cases.

The *first*, which certainly presents itself, and which is even not so rare, is that, in which *our text makes one with our subject*, the one exactly covering the other; in this case there is no difficulty to diminish, no obstacle to remove.

Or, *secondly*, the subject, previously conceived, *does not find its precise formula in a passage of Scripture*. Nevertheless, if the subject is Christian, it should be *capable of being supported by a text from the Bible*, the idea of which is to that of the subject, what the *species* is to the *genus*, or the *genus* to the *species*, —or, which expresses the idea of the subject, while it complicates it with some *accessory* or *adventitious* circumstances,—or, which frames the idea into an individual *fact;*—in short, by a text, with which, without witty conceit, and without subtlety, we can connect the subject of our discourse. We may in such a case form an abstraction of the idea from that which is accessory or contingent, or we may speak of it, without dwelling upon it. The text, in such a case, will be at least the general *announcement* or *starting-point* of the truth, which we wish to establish. It adorns, and solemnises the discourse of the preacher. There is nothing, in this, at variance with that frankness, which is the chief condition of the dignity of the pulpit. The text is not a pretext; the sermon is scriptural. Such a manner of connecting one's self with the Bible is assuredly preferable to that imaginary respect, which does violence to the text, or to the

[1] In German, *Eine Glaubwürdigkeit.*

[2] It ought to be a sufficient *proof* to the *learned* also. Isa. viii. 20: "To the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them."—Ed.

[3] Ammon, *Handbuch der Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 88 of third edition.

[4] Harms, *Pastoraltheologie*, vol. i., p. 83.

thought; and it justifies itself by the necessity, which circumstances may impose, of preaching upon a subject, which finds its exact and adequate expression in no passage of the Scriptures.[1]

Or, *thirdly*, in fine, we have before our eyes, from the first and *exclusively*, *one text*. I remark, that this is the most frequent case, the most natural position of the preacher, and that by a kind of *force* put on things, by a habit, which a mind incessantly occupied with the Bible naturally contracts, there is effected between the text and the subject a conciliation, a fusion, which we do not conceive *à priori*. We are, then, at the service of our text, not, however, in a spirit of servility to minutiæ, and a puerile exegesis; it is to us, as it were, a *mystical fruit*, of which we wish to express all the juice, and to preserve all the perfume; we develop respectfully, not the words exactly, and the accidental details of it, but the ideas; meanwhile, as the idea and the form are always united, and nowhere so closely as in the Bible, the discourse takes the form of the text; and I have already stated the advantage of this. It has nothing abstract, it is concrete as a fact, as a history. The assertion of the sacred author is, as it were, a fact, of which we give an account.

We would willingly form from this method the rule, as, indeed, the case, which we have supposed, is the rule. But then, in order to enter fully into this point of view [this mode of viewing the text], we must abound in the *spirit* of this procedure [we must realise in full its spirit], which is to see in every assertion of a sacred author, not only an assertion, but a *fact*, I mean a fact peculiarly characteristic of the author, a fact, which does not occur twice in the same manner. We set out from the idea, that every text is unique, and individual, so to speak; we set out from the idea, that in a book, the authors of which have not spoken for the sake of speaking, there are as many *thoughts* as *words*, that two *forms* intimate two *ideas*. La Bruyère has justly said, "That among all the different expressions, which may render a single one of our thoughts, there is only one of

[1] This would be the case of the preacher, who, in the United States, should have to preach upon *slavery*. It would be the same for him, who should have to preach upon the necessity of labouring, by the reform of *individuals*, for that of *society*; or upon *order* in *domestic* affairs; or with the object of justifying *mysteries* in religion; or upon *signs*, as a means of determination [determining the will of God respecting us]; or upon progress in understanding the ways of God.

them that is *the good* one."[1]—For the same reason, among all the meanings which we can give to a text, there is only one, that is the good one.[2] One word may serve to individualise a text. Example:—"To do good, and to communicate, *forget not*." (Heb. xiii. 16.) It is to impoverish ourselves, and to render ourselves vague designedly, to proceed otherwise. It is to deprive ourselves of a great part of the subjects, which are found indicated in the Bible. It is to renounce, in many cases, that conciliation between the text and the subject, of which we have spoken so much. For it is often by means of a word, but a characteristic word, that a text may become the exact or approximate expression of the subject, we had in view before seeking, or meeting with, the text. Very often, to effect this conciliation, the true means is not to keep out of view such or such a thought of the text, but on the contrary to take it into account.

§ II.—Rules which should guide to the choice of texts.

I. These things being well understood, we come now to speak of the rules which should guide us in the choice of texts.

The first is as precise, as absolute: the text should be drawn from the Word of God.—"If any one speak, let him speak according to ['as,' Engl. Vers.] the oracles of God." (1 Pet. iv. 11.)

We have the appearance of saying a questionable thing, but we have not said, "The text ought to be drawn from the *Bible*;" this is a statement, that would be questionable. Now, this Bible, translated by Ostervald, Martin, or any other such person, is only the *Word of God*, in a very general sense.[3]

[1] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*. Chap. i. *Des ouvrages de l'esprit.*

[2] Just as in a circle we must find the *one* centre, in order to comprehend fully the equidistance of all points of the circumference. But in Scripture there are often twofold and threefold fulfilments and applications, like many concentric circles, the one not clashing with the other, but answering mutually like type and antitype: the object should be to find the truth which is their common centre.—Ed.

[3] So says the Church of Rome, maintaining there is an *oral, traditionary*, word of God, as well as a *written* word. But *practically*, since no one can *prove* that any one tradition is *infallibly* the Word of God, the written word is the only *safe* rule. The written word is the only guarantee against the *imaginary inspirations* of Quakers and fanatics. "Many other signs Jesus did—which are *not written*—, But *these are written*, that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through His name." John xx. 30, 31. Having 'life' in what is 'written,' we need no other Word,

1. [After what we have just said, texts taken from the Apocryphal books are excluded from our choice.]

2. Can we take for our text a passage, which criticism rejects, or which it has rendered considerably suspected? [There are some texts very beautiful, and very evangelical; but if they are evidently interpolated, or very strongly suspected, they must be rejected. John viii. 1–11, and 1 John v. 7, may serve for examples.]

3. Can we take for our text the defective translation of a passage of the Bible?—No; this would be to elevate translators to prophets, or inspired men. Our text ought to be taken in the original, and if the version in use has altered the sense of it, it is necessary, that it should be rectified. This procedure will cause some surprise, if we deal thus with a passage that is well known; but the offence is already given by the diversity of the translations in use. [This holds good in France: but not in England among Protestants, with whom there is but the one version authorised.—Ed.] It is, therefore, very important, we repeat, to study the text in the original. In a doubtful case, it will be necessary to abstain from attempting to rectify the version, and in all cases to use caution; but, whilst shrinking from introducing into the pulpit discussions, that ought not to find admission there, we cannot well dispense with establishing the true sense; in the exordium of the discourse, for example; or in entering upon the subject. Let us here cite some examples of varying, or faulty translations:—

Isaiah lii. 15: "He will make the blood of several nations to gush forth" (*Ostervald*), or "He will sprinkle" (*English version*), instead of, "He will make several nations to leap."[1] [יזה, Yazzeh, lit. *sprinkle:* but the water sprinkled is usually the accus.: the thing, *on* which, has אל. The LXX. have θαυμασονται, probably from a different reading. The *sprinkling* may refer to baptism, or rather the outpouring of His Spirit and the shedding of His blood.—Ed.]

as an infallible rule. Oral preaching, not being free from possible error, can only be called the word of God in a *vague, lax* sense. The written word is *the* Word in the strict sense. The Lord and His Apostles quote the Septuagint Greek *translation* of the Old Testament, as the authoritative word of God in many passages. Vinet must refer here to *defective* translations of particular passages.—Ed.

[1] "Also wird er viele Vœlker in freudiges Erstaunen setzen.—De Wette. (Thus will He set many nations in joyful astonishment.)"

Philippians ii. 6: "He did not regard it as a usurpation to be equal with God" (*Ostervald*), instead of, "He did not glory in," or, "was not vain of," etc. [Engl. Vers., "He thought it not *robbery* to be equal." Ἁρπαγμόν means this. It would be ἅρπαγμα, if Vinet's rendering, "He was not vain of," or the Socinian, "He did not think it a thing to be eagerly caught at," were right.—Ed.]

Romans ix. 28: "The Lord is about to make a great diminution upon the earth" (*Ostervald*), instead of, "a short business" (*Martin*),[1] or, "the work which He has determined upon."[2]

Romans xii. 6 (comp. ver. 3.) It has often been translated, "According to the analogy of faith." Ostervald translates correctly, "According to the measure of faith." [Engl. Vers., "the proportion." Alf., "According to the proportion or measure of *his* faith;" not "*the* faith." So Beng., Chrysost., etc.—Ed.]

Romans xiv. 5: "Let every one abound in his sense" (*Fénélon*). This translation is faulty. Ostervald renders, "Let every one act, according as he is fully persuaded in his own mind." There is simply in the text, "Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind." ["Let each be fully satisfied in his mind."—Alford.]

Romans xiv. 23: "Everything that is not done with faith, is a sin" (*Ostervald*), instead of, "Everything that cometh ["Whatsoever is."—Engl. Vers.] not of faith is sin."

John i. 9: Martin translates, "The light . . . . which enlighteneth every man coming into the world." It would then concern the *conscience*, a light which lighteneth every man. It must be translated, "The true light, which lighteneth all men, is come into the world." [Lit. "That was the true light, which, coming into the world, lighteth every man."—Beng. But Alf., with Lücke, At the time John Baptist bare witness, "The true light, which lighteth every man, was in process of manifesting Himself;" lit. *was coming*.—Ed.]

Psalm xix. 13: "*Et ab alienis* (from the sins of others)," ac-

[1] "A short work."—*English version.* [In the Hebrew of Isa. x. 23, "The Lord shall make a consumption, even determined (or, and a decree), in the midst of all the land." But LXX. and N. Test., "The Lord will make a rapidly-accomplished *word* in the midst of all the land."—Ed.]

[2] Συντέμνω, *decerno, definio;* to resolve.—"Die beschlossene Sache wird der Herr thun auf Erden."—De Wette. (The thing determined upon will the Lord do upon the earth.)

cording to the Vulgate and M. de Lamennais,[1] instead of, "Absolve me from secret faults." Ostervald renders, "Cleanse me." [Engl. Vers., "Cleanse Thou me from secret faults."]

Proverbs xviii. 3. This passage which serves for a motto to the book of M. de Lamennais, *Upon Indifference*, is translated in the Vulgate by these words, "*Impius, quum in profundum venerit, contemnit.* (The ungodly, when he is fallen even to the bottom of the abyss, despises.)" Ostervald translates, [so Engl. Vers.] "When the wicked cometh, contempt cometh also, and with ignominy, reproach."[2]

"It is really unpardonable," says De Wette, "that several preachers adhere purely and simply to the version of Luther, so often faulty, especially in the Old Testament, and that they thus preach upon a pretended Biblical thought, which is found nowhere in the original text. A reader of my translation once expressed to me his astonishment at not finding in it a text, on which he had just heard a sermon, by which he had been much edified. The passage in question was Isaiah xxviii. 19, 'Trials[3] teach us to give heed to the word.' We know that the original text contains here no thought, which has the least analogy with that."[4] De Wette himself translates, "There is a terror already from hearing the report of it." Ostervald says, "As soon as the report shall be heard, there will only be trouble." [Engl. Vers., "It shall be a vexation only to understand the report." Margin, "When *He shall make* you to *understand doctrine.*]—De Wette also corrects Luther upon John xiv. 1, which he translates, "Let not your heart be troubled, trust in God, and trust in Me." Whilst it is in Luther, "If ye believe in God, ye believe also in Me." [Engl. Vers., "Ye believe in God; believe also in Me."]

4. Can we take for our text a saying of man, contained in the Word of God?—Yes, when this saying is presented as a *fact*. This fact is often of very great importance, and very worthy of being thoroughly examined by preaching, though, all the time, this saying may have proceeded from the mouth of an adversary

[1] *Imitation de Jesus Christ*, liv. iii., cap. xiv., Reflections.

[2] Kommt der Frevler, kommt auch Verachtung, und mit Schande Schmach. —De Wette.

[3] In German, "Die Anfechtung."

[4] De Wette, Preface to his translation of the Bible.

of the truth. God has thought proper, to preserve it in the book of His oracles. If "wisdom is justified of all her *children*" (Luke vii. 37), she is so also by some of her *adversaries*. The following are some passages of the kind, which we have in view :—

Mark ii. 7 : "Who can forgive sins, but God only?"

Mark ix. 24 : "Lord, I believe, help Thou mine unbelief."

Luke xi. 1 : "Lord, teach us to pray."

John vii. 46 : "The officers replied, Never man spake like this man."

Luke vii. 19 : "Art thou He that should come, or look we for another?"

Luke xxiii. 47 : "The centurion, seeing what was done, glorified God, saying, Certainly this was a righteous man."

Luke xxiv. 32 : "Did not our heart burn within us, when He spake to us by the way, and opened to us the Scriptures?"

John vi. 68 : "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life."

Acts v. 38, 39 : "And now I say unto you, Refrain from these men, and let them alone, for if this counsel, or this work be of men it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God."

Romans xv. 4 : "These things have been written for our instruction."

Genesis xlvii. 9 : "The days of the years of my pilgrimage are an hundred and thirty years; few and evil have the days of the years of my life been."—[This is a groaning of Jacob, and of humanity, which we must reflect upon : often *our sighs are prophecies.*]

II. We have not yet passed the threshold of the question. We must penetrate farther. All the rules, which we have just given, are not a sufficient warranty; it must be added, that our text is drawn from the Word of God, only when we give it the sense, which it has in the *intention of the sacred author.*

Let us not occupy ourselves with the task of the translator; though we have supposed that every preacher is also a translator, let us consider the preacher only. In order to arrive at a perfect understanding of the sense of a passage, we must first examine the text itself, then the context.[1]

[1] "Concionem paraturus—textum ante omnia legat, relegat, perleget; phrases

1. *The text itself.* There are to be ascertained in each passage, the *verbal* or *external* sense, and the *internal* sense.

The first is what is commonly called the *signification*, the idea which the signs immediately convey to the intellect, independently of every ulterior consideration, I mean such as is foreign to the philological elements, of which the passage is composed. The second is the idea, which the *author* of the passage, by means of this external sense, wished to communicate to the mind of the reader; so that the first idea obtained is, with respect to the second, only what the words are with respect to the first. The key to the first sense is the knowledge of the *words;* the key to the second is the knowledge of the *matter.*

To avoid error regarding what we call the external sense, it is necessary to have a precise idea of the language of the authors,[1] I mean of the value of the signs, and of the forms of this language, compared with the corresponding forms and signs of our own language. In other words, we must know at what established value (*taux*) we must take the principal words, which most frequently recur, and enter into the most important passages.

There is, in the language of the Bible, a certain number of words, which may be called *capital*, and the meaning of which, correctly apprehended, becomes the key of the Bible. If we stop purely and simply at the usual signification of the terms, by which the translator has rendered such words in our language, we shall run great risk of committing serious errors. Thus it is with the words *fear*, *flesh*, *soul*, *heart*, *faith*, *righteousness*, *understanding*, *foolish*, *light*, *just*, *good man*, *wicked*, *virtue* (2 Pet. i. 5). The translator has translated for you the *words:* you must translate

seu locutiones, vocumque, tum singularum, tum complexarum, significationes accuratè examinet; idque faciat, vel consultis ipsis fontibus, vel saltem omnium optimis versionibus, unde sensum germanum eruat cum περιστάσει loci, fidei analogia, et aliis Scripturæ locis convenientem."—Bucan.

[1] As to the need of learning and study, Jerome, *Ep. ad. Paulin.*, complains, "Sola Scripturarum ars est, quam sibi omnes vendicant. Hanc garrula anus, hanc delirus senex, hanc sophista verbosus, hanc universi præsumunt, lacerant, docent antequam discunt." I heard of a lady, who argued that controversy was unscriptural, because Paul says, "*Without controversy* great is the mystery of godliness!"

Though preachers, so ignorant as this, could hardly be found, yet often many misinterpret Scripture from not taking the trouble to examine the original text. Martial's joke, *V. Epig.* 56, is still not altogether untrue—

"Si duri puer ingenî videtur
Præconem facias."—Ed.

the *ideas* for yourselves.[1] The preacher, or more frequently the exegetist, will have here two things to consider, which perhaps are only one, the character, *i.e.*, the *usage of the language*, and the *philosophy of the people.* [Let us speak first of the first point.]

The same words, the same forms, have a different value in a language, in which the spirit of *synthesis* predominates, from that which they have in a language, which is distinguished by an *analytic* spirit. [The synthetic language is that of *pure* poetry; the analytic, that of *pure* prose. Neither the one nor the other exists. Analysis *predominates* in our language, and synthesis in that of the sacred writers.]

[A synthetic language seems to have for its characteristic, the establishing of *communication between all the ideas*, which are susceptible of it; so that the language, as an entire whole, becomes a continuous line. Analysis classes and *distinguishes* with ever-increasing precision: every sign appropriates a circumscribed domain, from which it is forbidden to wander. Words which were very elastic before the reign of analysis, end by confining themselves to their own sphere (*rentrer dans leur coquille*). It

[1] It is not for the translator to explain, or comment. He has to render the expressions of the original, and, without troubling himself about the consequences, to preserve its harshnesses, its obscurities, its paradoxical character; he must not be startled by metaphors which will appear strange, just because they are strange. ("Vinum dat cornua pauperi." See the word *horn*, 1 Sam. ii. 10, and Ps. cxii. 9.) However, even here there is a limit. These metaphors, for example, come to lose much of their force in the language of the text; they are revived in the translation, and thereby exaggerate the thought in the original. This depreciation of the signs of language is found in all idioms, and explains to us, how it is that we receive, in certain respects, a more lively impression from works written in another language, than from those written in our own. We are even led into an error regarding the force of the expression. It requires some time for a Frenchman who reads English books, to reduce to its just value the adjective *anxious*, which does not signify full of *anguish* (*angoissé*), but often simply *desirous*. Then there are modes of speaking, the exact reproduction of which would produce, without any advantage, a strange effect. How can we translate literally a phrase such as this: οὐ παραγγελίᾳ παρηγγείλαμεν (Acts v. 28)? We should, however, be wrong in not translating מוֹת תָּמוּת (*moth thamouth*, Gen. ii. 17), by "thou shalt die the death." Would it be a certain rule always to translate the same word by the same word? That is neither certain nor rational. We must not flatter ourselves with being more *faithful*, the more we are *literal;* we shall often be less so; this is easily understood.—We are far from possessing an exact translation, and if, to have the word of God, we must have the *letter* of this word, we do not possess the word of God; [*i.e.*, not in *every word* of translations.—Ed.]

is in this sense, that Bossuet has said of the style of Calvin, that it is *triste* [severe], that is to say, *without ornament* (*nu*), *austere*. Thus everything becomes more and more regular in languages; nothing is left arbitrary; they become constitutional; and if this difference does not escape our observation in our own language, on observing it at the comparatively short distance of two centuries, how much more striking still will not the difference be between the French and the Hebrew!]

When we have to do with a book written in a poetic language, in which synthesis predominates, we must take into account the usages of this species of language.

A poetical language, that is to say, a language spoken by a poetical people, delights by turns to *diminish* and to *augment*, to leave to the imagination of the reader the pleasure of performing a part of the journey, to add or to retrench.[1] [The Bible is full of these modes of speaking, and they have often been abused.]

It loves, by turns, to render what is *relative*, *absolute*, and what is *absolute*, *relative*.[2]

It *generalises* what is *particular*, and *particularises* what is *general*, taking duty sometimes at its *summit*, and sometimes at its *base*.[3]

It *does not separate*, in a decided manner, *the notions which touch each other: wicked* and *foolish;* to *say* and to *do;* to *know* and to *prove;* to *regret* and to *repent;* to *repent* and to *change our design* [hence the *seeming* of opposition, due to the different senses of *repent* in the texts, which assert that God *repented*, and

[1] Examples: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me" (Rom. vii. 11). "He who is born of God *doth not commit sin*" [meaning, is not *in the habit* of committing] (1 John iii. 9). "If any man come to Me, and *hate* [i.e., *love less* than Me] not his father and his mother, . . . he cannot be My disciple" (Luke xiv. 26). "*That which is highly esteemed* [*i.e.*, not *all*, but *much* that is highly esteemed] among men, is an abomination in the sight of God" (Luke xvi. 15). "Against such things *there is no law*" [*i.e.*, not only is there no law *against*, but the law of God is altogether *for* such things] (Gal. v. 23). "The *unfruitful* [*i.e.*, injurious, hurtful] works of darkness" (Eph. v. 11). ("Onesimus) which in time past was to thee *unprofitable*" [*i.e.*, a *bad* servant: meiosis] (Philem. ver. 11).

[2] "*Call not thy friends*" [i.e., *Rather* call the poor, etc., *than* thy friends] (Luke xiv. 12). "He returned to his house justified, *rather than the other*" [*i.e.*, and *not* the other] (Luke xviii. 14).

[3] "Thou shalt not bear *false witness* [not only *false witness*, but all evil speaking and lying] against thy neighbour" (Exod. xx. 16).

yet "God is not a man, that He should *repent:*" His calling *is without repentance*"—Ed.]; to *forget* and to *betray;* to *judge* and to *condemn.* It takes the sentiment for the act, and *vice versâ.* It delights in concordances of ideas, in synonymes, in symmetry, in parallelism,[1] in proceeding by couples or pairs of ideas.[2]

It *classifies without scientific intention.*—"Create in me a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within me." (Ps. li. 12.) The Old and New Testaments abound in such examples; we frequently find in the Prophets and Apostles series of substantives or adjectives, which have been wrongly taken for the basis of *divisions of discourses.*

It loves to *play upon sounds*, a characteristic, which is also found in some measure in all languages.[3]

Such is the language of the Bible; and, moreover, each of the epochs, which are there represented, as well as each of the authors, whose writings form a part of it, has its own peculiar style. [We must even go further, and compare not only the

[1] Parallelism is the principle of Hebrew poetry. Whereas in uninspired poetry the rhythm is made to depend on certain *sounds and syllables* recurring at certain intervals; in Hebrew it consists in the correspondence of the same *ideas*, but often *expanded*, in parallel clauses. Isa. lv., "*Seek* ye the *Lord*, while He is to be *found*, and *call* ye upon Him, while He is *near;* Let the *wicked* forsake his *way*, and the *unrighteous* man his *thoughts;* and let him return to *the Lord*, and He will have *mercy* on him, and to *our God*, for He will *abundantly pardon:*" wherein each word in the previous clause is expanded into a more forcible parallel term in the subsequent clauses.—Ed.

[2] "The turning away (*French v., the ease*) of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them" (Prov. i. 32). "Thy word is a lamp unto our feet and a light unto our paths" (Ps. cxix. 105). "The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The Lord is the strength of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?" (Ps. xxvii. 1.) "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thy heart be glad when he stumbleth" (Prov. xxiv. 17). "For He satisfieth the longing soul, and filleth the hungry soul with goodness" (Ps. cvii. 9). See also Isa. lix. 1–6.

Our modern languages are not strangers to this proceeding: *Perils and dangers; death and martyrdom; fear and trembling; use and wont; ways and means.* See, upon this characteristic of the Biblical language, Herder, *Hebr. Poesie*, vol. i., page 23, and Petavel, *La Fille de Sion*, page 76.

[3] The German has: *Schutz und Trutz; leben und weben; schalten und walten; eile mit Weite;* the French: *Ni feu ni lieu; sans foi ni loi; peu et paix.* Kempis says: *Via crucis, via lucis.* Paranomases, or assonances are common in Scripture: תהו ובהו (Genesis i. 2); כרתי ופלתי (2 Samuel viii. 18). In Greek: Romans i. 29; Hebrews v. 8. Compare Herder, *Hebraische Poesie*, vol. ii., pp. 280–287; Gesenius, *Hebraisches Lehrgebœude*, § 237; and Winer, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms*, § 62.

words of one author with those of another, but also the words of the same author with each other.] The word *faith* has not always the same signification in the same author. Sometimes it has an *abstract* sense (Heb. xi. 1), sometimes a *concrete* sense; here it has an intellectual, elsewhere a moral, sense.[1] I do not speak of the cases in which the word faith has none of these significations, but means simply *persuasion*.

That he may not fall into error regarding the external sense of the text, of which he makes use, we have said, that the preacher must consider, along with the usages and character of the language which furnishes them, the *philosophy* of the people who spoke it, their *habits of thinking*, the classification of their different notions. For all this, the *etymology* of the words will be a great assistance to him.[2] A language is the product of a multitude of things; the intimate thoughts of a people, their beliefs, their religion, their history, their social and political life, the external relations, in which they find themselves placed, are reflected in it as in a mirror. The whole of the external and internal life of a people is in their language. Let their habits of thought be deeply modified, and the language will immediately feel the effects of it. Christianity has in one sense corrupted the Latin; it has made it leave its own sphere, and obliged it to express a life, which was originally foreign to its nature.[3] In proportion as the *men* were converted, they converted their *language*. [A Roman would assuredly not find his own language in the Latin of the Church, and he could not even understand

[1] Compare 1 Corinthians xiii. 2: "Faith [*reliance on internal intimations*, divinely given, of the possession of miraculous powers] so as to remove mountains;" and James ii. 20: "Faith without works is dead;"—Philippians ii. 17: "The sacrifice of your faith;" and Colossians ii. 5: "The stedfastness of your faith;"—James i. 7: "The trial of your faith;" and 1 Thessalonians iii. 10: "That which is lacking in your faith;"—Hebrews xiii. 7: "Whose faith follow;" and James i. 6: "Let him ask in faith."

[2] It will be an *assistance*, but not a *sure rule*. For the question is, not what was the *original* use of the word, as implied in its root, but what was its use *at the existing time*, when the sacred writer used it.—Ed.

[3] "The languages of Greece and Rome might have sufficed, and did suffice, for heathenism, sensuous and finite as it was, but not for the spiritual and infinite of the New dispensation. How often had the new thoughts to weave a new garment for themselves, inasmuch as that, which they found ready made, was too narrow to wrap themselves withal; the new wine to find new vessels for itself, that both might be preserved, the old vessels being neither sufficiently strong nor expansive to hold it."—Trench *on Study of Words*.—Ed.

it, except on condition of becoming a Christian. A religion may create a philosophy of language; our modern languages are Christian.]

Unless we have performed this labour, and fixed the principles of this bringing back of Biblical language to its true original sense, we cannot be sure of having taken a text in its true sense.

The true object, in this business, is not so much to obtain *more* precision, as to guard against having *too much*. Observe that it is this precision, or this *literalism*, which has given room to the dogma of the real presence: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood." (John vi. 53.) This ill-placed rigour of interpretation has been the occasion of many heresies, which are only derived from literalism.[1] We must take care, while we exclaim against this rigour, not to fall into it.

A language less vague, expressions less uncertain, would give room, it is said, to fewer doubts and disputes. But where is this perfectly precise language? for we require nothing less, when once we lay down this rule. One wave is distinct from the wave, which follows it; but how separate them? This language has no existence; if it existed, it would not be a human language; it would only express *abstractions*. It would not express the things of the soul. It would be the most perfect of *philosophies*, the definitive philosophy, but it would not be a *speech*.

We know well the extravagances, for which the language of the Bible has been the pretext; do we know those to which a language quite different might give occasion?

Doubtless, without having the ideal precision, of which we have spoken, the language of the Bible might have been more precise. It might have been sufficiently so, to leave nothing to be done, I do not say by the reason, but by the heart and the conscience. But this is precisely that, which God has not willed.

[1] Nevertheless the stress laid by the Lord and His apostles on the letter of Scripture, often proving doctrines by the force of *one word* (see Gaussen's "It is written"), shows that even the *letter* of Scripture, *if rightly interpreted*, is expressive, and is not a meaningless *accident* of language, or a *figure* of speech. *Erroneous* meanings assigned to the letter, do not prove that it has *no* meaning at all. Coleridge says of the Lord's Supper, what may be also *mutatis mutandis* said of the letter of the Bible, "Some condense it into an *idol*, others evaporate it into a *figure*." See John vi. 53.—Ed.

"It has been made a subject of offence, that the Bible has not been written in such a manner as to render divisions impossible.[1] . . . There is no doubt, that He, who made the Bible, might have put in its place a symbol, and the most perfect of all symbols. . . . But why should He have given it? Is it in order that man might not be obliged to enter immediately, and with his whole being, into relationship with Him? Or in order that the rigorous precision, and the concentration of the ideas of religion, might dispense with his making any use of his conscience in this study? Or in order that there might be nothing, to put to the trial his rectitude and candour? Or in order that he might receive, ready-made, the true sense of the Bible, and that he might not employ himself in determining it? In one word, is it in order that he might remain *passive*, where it is most important that his activity, his liberty, should be displayed, and his responsibility brought into action? God be praised, that it is not so, and that every man is at once able, and obliged to find out, through all these phases, through all these facts, through all these personalities, of which the Bible is composed, that general and eternal truth, which is presented to him in the Bible, sometimes under the form of an application, and always mingled with some event or with some life! God be praised, that His book has not the clearness of a symbol, that we are not *forced* to rightly understand it, and that we may give several senses to His word! God be praised, for having left a part to our own activity, in the acquisition of faith, and because, willing that our belief should be an act, He has not added to the Bible, which is sufficient for sincere and simple hearts, the dangerous appendix of a symbol."[2]

Such are our sentiments, regarding the determination of the verbal sense. He, who shall have taken all these precautions, will doubtless not be disposed, after having shut one source of errors, to open another, that is to say, to fix arbitrarily the *inter-*

[1] 1 Cor. xi. 19: "There must be also heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you."—Ed.

[2] Vinet here quotes himself: See *Revue Suisse*, 1839, p. 26, etc.—Ed.

The Symbol or Creed is left for the Church to gather out of the written word. The Bible's office is to *infallibly prove;* the Church's, to *teach*,—but only what may be proved by the written word. Thus scope is given to the exercise of patient diligence in the use of the faculties given us; and room for the probation of faith.—Ed.

nal sense of the text [that is to say, the *intention* of the author]. However, it is necessary, that we should also speak of this sense.

If you take the Bible as a whole, you will find only one intention, one aim, one sense, that is *spiritual.* It is the triumph of the spirit over the flesh, the worship of God in spirit and in truth.

But as soon as you descend from this height, from the view of the whole, from the first step you take in entering the details, you meet with two orders of ideas, and two orders of texts, which correspond to them.

And first, you meet with *some things purely temporal or material, and texts relative to temporal order.*

The sense is neither uncertain, nor double. If nothing clearly indicate, or expressly reveal, an allegorical intention (symbol, type, or prefiguration), we must abide by the proper sense.

We do not condemn, on the contrary, we commend, the intention of pious men, who have turned to a more elevated sense passages relating to temporal order. This was owing to the need, they felt, of spiritualising everything. So Quesnel; when in regard to these words: "The wise men returned to their own country by another way" (Matt. ii. 12), he observes, that "we shall never return to heaven, but by another way, than that, by which we departed from it." There is, doubtless, nothing better, than that everything should serve to awaken spiritual ideas in spiritual men; but the question here is, about *interpretation* and instruction, and we can see nothing serious in an arbitrary, and loose interpretation. It would seem as if the Bible had been trifled with, in proportion as it was venerable, and that, just as God has surrendered the world to the vain disputes of men, He had surrendered His Word to the frivolity of their imaginations. No human book has been, in this respect, so tortured and jested with, as the Holy Scriptures. The preacher cannot allege as an excuse, that he does not pretend to interpret, but that he only seeks a sacred word, as a starting-point for his instructions; the excuse is worth nothing; for to announce a text is at least to say, that we are going to preach from a text; it is to say, that we shall explain it, that we shall prove the truth which is contained in it, in one word, that we shall treat it seriously. The

Roman Catholic preachers have contributed much, by the choice, or interpretation of their texts, to diminish the respect, due to the Divine Word. When we see Massillon interpret with so much levity a very clear text,[1] we need not be astonished at anything of the same kind, that has been done by less serious writers; at seeing, for example, a writer treating of the abolition of capital punishment, take for the motto of his discourse these words of St Paul: "Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest." (Romans ii. 1.)[2]

We must carefully distinguish between *extension* (catachresis), and *metaphor*. There is only simple extension of the sense, when we take these words: "Your strength is to sit still" (Isaiah xxx. 15), for the text of a sermon on the obligation to wait in peace, and without being unnecessarily anxious for the deliverance of the Almighty. But would it be equally lawful for him, who wished to preach upon the necessity of drawing near to Christ in hours of trouble and darkness, to take for his text these words: "Abide with us, for it is towards evening, and the day is far spent?" (Luke xxiv. 29.) I think not; there is here more than extension; there is metaphor, and even a play upon words.

One abuse gives the signal for another. Those, who will see realities in all images, create the opposite error, which will see *in realities nothing but images*. Idealism springs from realism. In the hands of the latter, everything has assumed a body; everything will lose body, in the hands of the other. The one has seen *types* everywhere; the other will everywhere see *myths*. When we abandon the fixed rules of common sense, everything may be called in question, and no sense be sure.

Reason has principles, which are common to all men, *imagina-*

[1] In the *Homily upon Lazarus*, John xi. 39, and in the *Sermon upon Confession*, John v. 3.

[2] Take as other instances of misapplication; "Thou God seest me," Gen. xvi. 13, used to prove the need of *watchfulness*, lest we provoke an *angry* God; whereas the words were spoken by Hagar in her exile, expressing the consolation she felt in God having visited her even in the lonely wilderness. Again, "Ephraim is joined to idols, let him alone," is used as if it meant, that God gives over to reprobation the hardened sinner; whereas it is a warning to Judah to give over connection with idolatrous Ephraim. Hos. iv. 17. Again, "I have trodden the wine-press alone," Isa. lxiii. 3, misapplied as if describing the *suffering* Messiah; whereas it describes the *glorified* and *avenging* Messiah, as the context proves. Comp. Rev. xiv. 19, xix. 15.—Ed.

tion has none; for the one has for its basis the principle of identity, the other that of analogy or similitude.

I am here speaking of fixing the sense, or the intention of a passage; for I know besides, that the germ of allegory is everywhere, and that there is no object, which may not serve for an image of some other. The Bible is susceptible of this use, just as creation is, but neither more nor less. It is in so far as the temporal things, which are found in the Bible, form part of the visible world, that I will say of the Bible, what M. de Lucy says of the world: "That it has been created, not only to manifest the power of God, but to point out invisible things in the visible." But, in this view, these things belong to the world, and not to the Bible.

The temporal texts ought, therefore, unless precisely indicating the spiritual, to remain in the temporal sense. Allegorising gives up everything to chance, and those, who make use of it, for the advantage of one tendency, favour, without knowing it, the *contrary* tendency.

Let us now pass on to *the things of the spiritual order, and to the texts, which relate to it.*—There are two kinds of them: some *purely* spiritual, the reality of which is altogether in the invisible world; others *mixed*, which are also spiritual, but which, combined with facts of the temporal order, take place in time and space.

The second are not spiritual by allegory; they are so *essentially*, or in themselves; they contain, and express the same truths as the first; but, then, they are spiritual only on *one* side, with which we must be contented. Everything accidental, which matter and time join to the spiritual fact, remains *material* and temporal. We must not wish to *spiritualise* this element. This would be to wish to set the diamond within the diamond:—without advantage; for it is not with the diamond of truth, as with other diamonds; its value does not depend upon its bulk, but upon its purity and its brilliancy. [It is therefore wrong] to say, that Jacob in crossing his arms upon two of his children, signifies that there is no blessing, but under the cross; it would follow, that the other children of Jacob were not blessed. It has been said [incorrectly also], that "when there is only *one* victim, it is to remind us that Christ is the only victim; and that when there are *two*, it is to indicate, that Christ should suffer at two

different times, in Gethsemane by night, and on Golgotha by day."[1]

The government, and education of the Jewish nation, are spiritual things. In the whole of its history, it is the most perfect image of *the individual*, and of *the Christian under the direction of God*. What we say of the whole, we can say of the grand traits. The entrance of Israel into Canaan as an armed force, is not only the image, but the *example*, of the obedience and the resolution of the Christian, called, like the Jews, to combat and to suffer.[2] Faith is the soul of both. (See Hebrews xi.)—The manna of the seventh day is an exercise of faith, and of confidence. But, if we would see, in the manna, the distribution of the Spirit of God to believers,[3] and in *each* of the enemies, whom the Jews encountered, a figure of *each* obstacle, which the soul meets with in the journey of life, we arbitrarily pass the limits, we introduce a kind of trifling regarding the most serious matters, we render everything problematical by wishing to make all certain.

It must not be objected, that there are figures and types indicated in the Bible. These indicate to me, among other things, that *all* is not type and figure; if *everything* were so, *nothing* would be so.

As to the *texts*, which are *purely spiritual*, which express some idea or some fact of the moral world, we include in their number those, which are complicated with a temporal circumstance, too insignificant to be taken into consideration.

In these texts, we must distinguish different orders, or *degrees* of spirituality. The text is more or less spiritual, according as the *idea* is more or less *distinct*, the *object* more or less *elevated*, the *sentiment* more or less *profound*.

The faith of the blind men (Matt. xx. 29–31), who cried,

[1] G. Monod, *Application de l'Ecriture*, p. 118.

Some of the "Anglo-Catholics" have, thus, found in the *two* pence, which the good Samaritan gave the host, a spiritual symbol of the two sacraments! Luke x. 35.—Ed.

[2] "To believe, to suffer, and to love, were the primitive taste."—Milner.—Ed.

[3] Jesus expressly compares Himself to the manna coming down from heaven, John vi. 31–33, 49, 50, 51, 58. It cannot be unwarranted to see in the manna the spiritual food of the soul, applied by the Holy Spirit, as He saw it. To find a spiritual counterpart now to *each particular* enemy of Israel, is mere speculation; but not so in the broad general truth, and even in many of the minor details.—Ed.

"Have mercy on us, O Lord, thou Son of David," etc., was real; but is it a *model* of the Christian faith in its ideal? There is in it indeed spirituality, but spirituality of an inferior kind. *All* that a Christian would feel with respect to Jesus Christ, is not found there.—In the hosannas of the multitude (Luke xix. 37, 38), there is, if we will, the whole of the Christian system. This multitude had the confused sentiment, that the Christ was a blessed King, and that, in His coming, there were peace for men and glory to God.[1] But that these sentiments were *clear*, *distinct*, and *complete*, is more than doubtful. There would be abuse in understanding these words, as we would have received them, if they had been pronounced by a Paul, a Peter, a John, after the effusion of the Holy Spirit.

This difference of *degree* may be found between passages of the same book; it is necessarily found between the Old and New Testaments; for, if the work which these two books together describe to us is a unique work, it is also a *progressive* work.

It is unique, since God has never willed but *one* thing, the restoration of His image in man, the formation of a people for Himself; unique, because the same principles pervade all parts of the Bible: unique in God, as realised facts, holiness and love; in man, as the law of his life, obedience and faith.

In the first point of view, you see everything, since the fall, prepared and planned for the *restoration*.

In the second point of view, you see powerfully and perpetually inculcated the *principles*, upon which the whole evangelical doctrine is built. [Christianity is more ancient than Judaism, faith, in principle, more ancient than the law. Paul makes the Hebrews go back, passing quite through the law, to the faith of Abraham.] The law is only made to "*supervene*" (Rom. v. 20).[2] To supervene is not to interrupt, but neither is it to commence.

But this unity [I have said] has the form of *progress*. We

[1] See as examples of the same kind in the Old Testament, Jeremiah xiii. 16, and xx. 7.

[2] Ὁ νόμος παρεισῆλθεν, "The law entered *incidentally*," and as it were, parenthetically between the promise by grace to faith (as exhibited in Abraham) and the Gospel similar covenant. Gal. iii. 17, "The covenant confirmed *before* of God in Christ [*i.e.* of faith and grace], the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul." It was an old axiom as to the due distinguishing of law and Gospel, "Qui scit bene distinguere inter Legem et Evangelium, Deo gratias agat, et sciat se esse theologum."—Ed.

proceed from less to more, whether in work or in principle. This progression is that of a *germ*, which does not grow by superimposition *from without*, but which produces *from within* its whole successive development.

There are, in the Old Testament, principles laid down, an expectation excited, a want created, principles to which the Gospel has given a body, an expectation which it has realised, a want which it has satisfied. This is to say beforehand, that, from the Old Testament to the New, we proceed from less to more. If we do not indeed proceed from less to more, we do not comprehend the necessity of a pause (*un temps d'arrêt*) between the two dispensations, nor the reason for there being two economies. What use for the second, if everything was found in the first?

It may be said that all the elements of the New Testament are found in the Old, but *undeveloped*, wanting in precision, in perfection, and, in short, not consecrated by facts, with so much power as in the New Testament.

But, after all,[1] they *are* consecrated in *facts*, they are presented at the very first under this form.

God consecrates by a fact in the Old Testament the idea of His *unity*, namely, by localising His presence, although His agency is represented as universal, and His nature as spiritual.

He consecrates His *providence*, by the fact of the adoption, protection, and guidance, of a particular people.

He consecrates His *sovereignty*, by making everything converge to Himself, even to the minutest detail in the government of external things. (The Theocracy, implies that God is a jealous God.)

He consecrates His *justice*, by means of punishments and rewards.

He consecrates the principle of *spiritual obedience*, or of worship in spirit and in truth (John iv. 24), by rejecting the mere

[1] The passage, which commences here and ends at next page, with the words "colour and relief are wanting," is marked in the principal manuscript of the Cours Homiletique with a sign, which is not explained, but which seems to indicate, that M. Vinet had intended to revise it. Besides, in a more recent, but much abridged, manuscript he has summed up as follows: "Everything, which is *elementary* in the truth, is expressed in the same manner, and with the same force in both Testaments; but beyond this, the difference commences, and it is considerable. We must not lend to texts of the Old Testament a *degree* of spirituality, which does not and cannot belong to them."—Ed.

external service, though it were perfectly performed. (As in the case of Cain. Comp. Gen. iv. 4, with Heb. xi. 4. Also Hos. vi. 6.)

He consecrates the principle of *justifying faith*, by attaching to it the benediction, and making the hero of faith the chief and the representative of the chosen people. "In Him shall all nations of the earth be blessed."[1]

He consecrates, by the perpetual daily sacrifice, the fact of our fall and the necessity of a restoration.—He causes a Restorer to be announced.

In fine, in the midst of a legal, He creates a spiritual people, subject to the perfect law, which is the law of liberty!

All these ideas are realised in the Old Testament; but it was necessary, that they should be *personalised*. Second degree: the *person* after the *facts*.

When the Gospel says, "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John i. 17),[2] he does not establish an opposition between *the truth* and *the law;* but he means, that the truth was not known as an entire *whole*, nor viewed distinctly, except by means of the grace which includes the whole. (Baptism of water, baptism of fire;—voice of the earth, voice of heaven; water and spirit. These respectively are presented in their *entire* spirituality in the Gospel.)

Now this grace was not revealed to the people of the Old Testament, as distinctly, as it is in Jesus Christ to that of the New. The law contains only the *shadow* of good things to come (Hebrews x. 1, viii. 5); the law is the shadow, which grace throws behind itself; every *shadow* supposes, announces, foreshows a *body;* it gives the outlines, the general form, the dark profile (*silhouette*) of it, but colour and the relief are wanting. We may say of it, as has been said of prophecy, that it is "a lamp shining in a dark place" (2 Peter i. 19), compared to "the Sun of Righteousness, that bringeth healing in His beams" ('wings,' Malachi iv. 2).

[1] Gen. xviii. 18.—*The most spiritual things are the most ancient;* they precede the law, and we cannot too often recollect, that the law only "entered," parenthetically (*supervened*, Rom. v. 20), that the offence might abound. The *end* and the *commencement* are joined together, above the Mosaic economy, that grand *episode*.

[2] "The truth" is often used in the Gospel to express the *realising antitype*, as contrasted with the legal *type*. Ex. gr. John vi. 32, "The *true* bread," contrasted with the typical manna.—Ed.

Moreover, the spiritual members of this people [the Jews], being penetrated with all the principles, which we have indicated, were virtually Christians; I mean, that each of them was such, that, if Christ had come unexpectedly and manifested Himself, none of them would have had to change his principles, in order to be an actual Christian. He *was* a Christian, because he would be so.—He was a Christian generally, not specially; —implicitly [*i.e.*, by implication], not explicitly;—virtually, not actually.—He was a Christian elementarily.

Every time he expressed these elementary convictions, which might have, for him, all their clearness and significancy without the immediate knowledge of Jesus Christ, this Christian of the Old Testament would say a thing, that is identical with that, which the same terms would express in the mouth of an "Israelite" of the New Testament;[1] and *we* may, without restriction or modification, appropriate to ourselves *his* words, though he may not have attached to them *all* such ideas, nor an idea *so precise*, so distinct and so concrete, as a Christian, who has come after Christ, would attach to them.—What a remarkable thing! an Israelite, even a spiritual one, is not identical with a spiritual Christian; but the spiritual people of the Old Testament is the perfect image of the Christian. Nothing can be more spiritual, than what is said *to* this people, and *of* this people, in the Old Testament. (Isaiah lxiii. 14, lxvi. 12; Jeremiah xxxi.)

But there are also passages, which seem intended to show the superiority of the New Testament to the Old; passages, where the idea is not only less precise, but less *perfect*;[2] passages, in which the relative defectiveness of the Old Testament appears; ideas, which require to be completed, and purified by the spirit of the New Testament.

Regarding only the spirituality of religion, as well as the obligation the preacher is under, to keep himself upon a level with the spirituality of the Gospel, and keeping in view the elementary part of revealed truth, a Christian preacher might preach for a very long time upon texts taken from the Old Testament; or at least he might, without altering the sense, and

[1] The Israel of God (Galatians vi. 16).

[2] Comp. Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19. Hezekiah's very dark views as to the hope beyond the grave.—Ed.

without remaining beneath the spirit of Christianity, preach very often upon texts, taken from this portion of the Scriptures. Let us endeavour to give the proof of this.

Condition of Man.—Ps. xxxix. 7–13: "Surely every man walketh in a vain show. . . . For I am a stranger with Thee and a sojourner, as all my fathers were."

Moral Condition.—Jer. xvii. 9: "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked."

Moral Wants of Men.—Ps. lxiii. 2: "My soul thirsteth for Thee; my flesh longeth for Thee in a dry and thirsty land."—Ps. li. 12: "Create in me a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within me."

Character of God.—Isa. lxiii. 9, 10, 14; lxvi. 15: "For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with His chariots, like a whirlwind, to render His anger with fury, and His rebuke with flames of fire."—Micah vii. 18: "Who is a God like unto Thee, that pardoneth iniquity, and passeth by the transgression of the remnant of His heritage? He retaineth not His anger for ever, because He delighteth in mercy."—Job xv. 15: "The heavens are not clean in His sight."—Hab. i. 13: "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil."—Ps. ciii. 12: "As far as the east is from the west, so far hath He removed our transgressions from us," (and the whole Psalm).—Lament. iii. 33: "For He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men."—Num. xiv. 18: "Forgiving iniquity and transgression, and by no means clearing the guilty."—Ex. xx. 5, 6: "I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love Me and keep My commandments."—Jer. iii. 14: "Turn, O backsliding children, saith the Lord." (It is He who first loved us: 1 John iv. 19.)—Ezek. xxxiii. 11: "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that he turn and live."—Isa. xlviii. 9: "For My name's sake will I defer Mine anger;" (= God is love: 1 John iv. 8.)—Ezek. xx. 22: "I withdrew Mine hand, and wrought for My name's sake."—Ps. cviii. 4: "Thy mercy is great above the heavens, and Thy truth reacheth to the clouds."

Law of God.—Gen. xvii. 1: "Walk before Me."—Deut. xxvii. 26: "Cursed is he that confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them."—Comp. 1 Sam. ii. 30: "Them that honour Me I will honour, and they that despise Me shall be lightly

esteemed."—1 Sam. ii. 25 : "If one man sin against another, the judge shall judge him ; but if a man sin against the Lord, who shall entreat for him ?"

Conditions of the Covenant.—I. Ps. cxv. 1 : "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy name give glory, for Thy mercy, and for Thy truth's sake."—Ps. xliv. 26 : "Redeem us, for Thy mercy's sake."—Jer. xiv. 7 : "O Lord, though our iniquities testify against us, do Thou it for Thy name's sake."

II. Deut. x. 16 : "Circumcise the foreskin of your heart."—Deut. xxx. 6 : "The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart."—1 Sam. xv. 22, 23 : "Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord ? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry."

Here we have some evangelical elements. These are texts, which we may place at the head of a sermon, without being obliged to adapt them to it by some violent straining, without extending them upon the bed of Procrustes. But, happy to find this unity or this identity, we must not seek it where it is not, nor fail to recognise the difference which subsists between the two economies, a difference which is a subject of edification, rather than of offence.

It will not be necessary to force the texts to be *more Christian*, than they really are, nor to oblige the personages of the old covenant, to enter into the *exact terms* of the Gospel. The following are some traits, which are proper [peculiar] to a preparatory economy :[1]—

Sentiment of Self-righteousness.—2 Sam. xxii. 21–23 (It is David who is speaking) : "The Lord rewarded me according to my righteousness : according to the cleanness of my hands hath He recompensed me. For I have kept the ways of the Lord, and have not wickedly departed from my God. For all His statutes were before me ; and as for His statutes, I did not depart from them."—Whence comes it, that there is no similar passage in the New Testament ? For what Paul says, "I feel myself

[1] In Matt. v. the Lord contrasts the Gospel new law of love and spiritual obedience, not merely with the *traditions* of the elders, but also with the external obedience of the letter of the Old Law : "Ye have heard that it was said by (or *to*) them of old time," etc. ; "but *I* say unto you," etc.—Ed.

guilty of nothing" (English version, "I know nothing by myself"), (1 Cor. iv. 4) is a different matter.[1]

Traces of Hardness.—Ps. cxxxix. 21, 22: "Do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? I hate them with a perfect hatred."—Neh. iv. 5: "Cover not their iniquity, and let not their sins be blotted out from before Thee."—Jer. xviii. 23: "Forgive not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from Thy sight."—Deut. xxiii. 6: "Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days for ever." (This is spoken concerning the Ammonite and the Moabite.)[2]

It is necessary to remark certain terms, of which the return is frequent, and the signification capital (*Saviour, Redeemer, Purchased, righteous, soul, death, wisdom, word*), and to discover what, in each of these words, agrees with the Christian idea, but not to force the remainder (*compelle intrare*) to enter into the Christian system.[3]

We read in Prov. viii. 34, 35: "Blessed is the man that heareth me, watching daily at my gates, waiting at the posts of my doors. For whoso findeth me findeth life, and shall obtain favour of the Lord." It is Wisdom who thus speaks. It is a *virtual* Christian, who makes her speak. This Wisdom is, under a notion more vague, what an actual Christian loves, what he worships in Jesus Christ, and under the name of Jesus Christ: the two worship the same object; but there is this difference, that the one knows *perfectly, what* he worships, the other does not. (John iv. 22.)

In treating of this text, let us not say, that the author saw

[1] Οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ συνοῖδα, "I am not conscious to myself of any" [wilful dereliction of duty as a steward]. But so far is he from drawing self-justification from this, he adds, "Yet I am *not hereby justified.*" There is, however, a Gospel sense, in which 2 Sam. xxi. 21–23 still holds good, first as *perfectly* true of the Son of David, of whom David is the type; secondly, of His followers, who have the witness of conscience, that though imperfect, they have a *single eye* to keep all God's commands: 2 Cor. i. 12; 1 John iii. 9. However, as used *by David*, they no doubt imply *in him* less clear views.—Ed.

[2] These passages are all *still* true of *God's* hatred of sin, and punishment of sinners. The Gospel has similar threats. The *individual* speakers, no doubt, David, Jeremiah, Nehemiah, Moses, had not the knowledge of the Gospel law of love.—Ed.

[3] Has not the word for *assembly* (cœtus) been translated *church?* [Not in the Engl. Vers. of the Old Testament. Stephen in the New Testament expressly calls the Israelite congregation "the *church* of God in the wilderness," Acts vii. 38.—Ed.]

under this name, *Wisdom*, Him, whom St John has designated by the name *Word* or *Reason*. But this wisdom of the virtual Christian *includes some* elements, which the actual Christian does not repudiate. We have distinguished, enumerated these elements; the only question is, to translate this passage into the language of the Gospel, after having discovered its primitive sense, which differs from ours, not by an essential difference, but by *less precision*.

But, it will be said, Why not draw solely and directly from the Gospel? For this end, to manifest the *unity* of the work of God and His thoughts, the unity of the two economies, the perpetuity of Christianity in two senses (in ascending to the past, as in descending to the future), the fraternity of the living members of the Church at the distance of centuries. It is equally interesting, to bring out the relations, and to bring out the differences between the Old and the New Testaments. [There are many people in our day, who know not what to make of the Old Testament, who see in it our original, and nothing more; it is a chasm in our religious life. Men will not be reconciled to the Old Testament, till they have found in it the New.[1] Preachers must make it necessary, must make their hearers taste it, and show that the prophets were a "lamp that shone in a dark place." (2 Pet. i. 19.)]

When you, Christian preacher, have a Jewish text, get out from it, but in doing so show avowedly, that you do get out of it, and, at the same time, that the Old Testament corresponds, and is connected with the New. Let us take an example among many passages relative to the righteous and the wicked: "He that walketh uprightly, walketh surely." (Prov. x. 9.) [We might say, that the *converse* is true, in the sense of the Gospel. But why change the order of the terms? He who has a good conscience, that is, who is *conscious* of *following* what are *virtually evangelical principles*, walketh surely, even when he does not see the end, for which he walks, [which was the case with Old Testament believers.] We must, therefore, treat this passage in the sense in which we find it, not in that which we may put upon it.]

[1] 2 Cor. iii. 14–17 describes the *veil* that is on the Old Testament, but which is "done away in Christ:" "The Lord is that Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty:" Where the Spirit is not, the Old Testament is but a dead letter, engendering bondage.—Ed.

While observing all these precautions, we may, nevertheless, come short of the rule, by making a *false application* of the text; for example, by taking for the text of a sermon upon the infallible connection between sin and punishment, the passage in Matt. vii. 16: "Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?"

As to the extension or catachresis of the text, the case is different; nothing, in certain conditions, is more legitimate or more necessary.

All that we have said amounts to this: that we must not raise ourselves, in point of spirituality, *above* the text. It is taken for granted, that we must not remain *below* it. But though we desire no extension, ascendent or descendent, we admit an extension, *lateral* or horizontal.

We have spoken of the *internal* sense of texts. This internal sense comprehends not only the idea, which arises immediately from the words of the text, but also such idea as is found *involved* in it, such and such consequence or application as has not been present to the mind of the writer, and perhaps, on account of the time and circumstances in which he wrote, could not have been present to him, but springs spontaneously from the principle which he has expressed.—If it be objected to us, that one might thus descend or ascend beyond the sphere of the idea, since all things are mutually dependent; we reply, that there is a simple rule to be followed, namely, to ask ourselves, *if the author would recognise his thought in the development*, which we have given to it, and would approve of our procedure. It is characteristic of the method of Jesus Christ, to make us reason from the species to the genus, in order to exercise in us the faculty of inferring moral consequences, the logic of the conscience, the spontaneity [spontaneous power of moral inference]. Matt. xix. 16–23, is an instance.

The true advantage of the usage of texts, is not so much to place before us the truth, which we wish to develop or prove, as to present it on a side *more prominent*, more pointed, more accidental, than that on which it presents itself, viewed in the *abstract*.

Thus it is advantageous to descend, in the choice of the text, from the idea of the *genus* to that of the *species*, and even of the *individual* [to bring forward in the text a *specialty* or an *individual*, when wishing to establish a *general* truth]. Here we may

apply the saying of Fontenelle (which is not absolutely true), that we must not "make the truth enter by the large end." It is a psychological observation, that may be easily verified, that a great grief, a great joy, penetrate less by their *largeness* of phase, than by some *accessory* circumstance, by some unexpected *detail*. In morality, the oblique rays appear to be the warmest.

[Let us cite some examples in support of this remark. Gen. xxix. 20: "Jacob served seven years for Rachel, and they seemed unto him but a few days, for the love he had to her." Here we have the expression of the general idea, that when one loves, sacrifices appear light and the time short; yet this *general* idea produces less impression than the *particular* idea of the text. Acts xiii. 46: "Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was necessary, that the word of God should first have been spoken to you; but *seeing you put it from you*, and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo! we turn to the Gentiles." If we wished to develop the idea, which, moreover, cannot be treated everywhere, that there is alongside of the Gospel some apocryphal gospel, some false Messiah, we might take for our text the passage, "Art Thou He that should come?" (Luke vii. 20); or, that, in the book of Acts, in which the evil spirit says to the sons of Sceva, "Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are ye?" (Acts xix. 15.) All makers of new gospels, all pretended reformers of human nature, are overthrown by these particular words.]

Summarily, to treat a text is not only to draw from it a truth, *substantially* or *formally* contained in the expressions, of which the text is composed; it is also to deduce from it such truth as the text *implies*, the starting-point or the realisation of which it offers us in an *example*, or a *consequence*, or other such natural *accessory*.[1]

To proceed with this amplitude, is the only way to be able to treat all the subjects, which deserve it; for, in following a narrower method, we should see ourselves reduced to the alternative either of sacrificing several of them, or, if we would by all means treat them, of doing cruel violence to the texts. We may excuse

[1] The doctrine of MAURY, however, is loose when he permits us to content ourselves with an *analogy* between the text and the subject. (*Essai sur l'eloquence de la chaire*, VII.)

Tillotson for having found, in 1 Cor. xi. 26–28, the subject of *frequent* communion; but how could we excuse the preacher who founded a sermon upon the reciprocal duties of landlords and tenants, on Acts xxviii. 30: "Paul dwelt two whole years in his own *hired* house?"[1]

2. *The Context.*—We cannot obtain the true sense of a text, if we have no regard to the connection or context, that is to say, to that which precedes, or which follows the text, when it forms part of a consecutive discourse, in the *place* to which the passage belongs.

There is a context of *actions*, as well as of words; the life is a book, every day of which is a page, and every hour a line. [We cannot judge each of these pages or of these lines, when *isolated*. This rule of morality, to which we feel bound to conform in our appreciation of other men's conduct, becomes here a rule of interpretation.]

There is a general context, a *place* to which all the texts belong, which is the Bible taken as a *whole*. [Let not the preacher neglect to compare his text with the *general* doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, which he is in no case permitted to leave out of view.[2] It is of much importance, that he should be on his guard against the suggestions of *party spirit*, which may easily lead astray, in such a matter, a judgment, on other things, very sound. When Jesus said, for example, "My kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36), does He not warn us, that it would be to misconceive the spirit of His instructions, to see in Matt. xx. 25, 26, "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, etc., but it shall not be so with you," a proof that democracy is preferable to the other forms of government?]

[1] It was such impertinences as these that gave occasion, a long time ago, to the saying [of the Cardinal Hippolite d'Este], cited by Balzac: *Buon per la predica! Riservate guesto per la predica!* (Good for a sermon! keep that for a sermon!)

[2] "The most forcible *matter* is enervated by an unnatural connection. The sources from which matter must be collected, are, A close analysis of every important word of the text, and of the design of the whole, illustrated by parallel references, an attentive ruminating inspection of the context, and an immediate reference to the analogy of faith." *Expository* preaching saves from building upon a text, what is not authorised by a context; though not having the unity of *Topical* preaching. Here "God speaks much, and man little." —Chrysostom, whose Homilies are models of the expository system. See Bridges' *Chr. Ministry.*—Ed.

There is a particular context, which is, for every *passage* (this word itself carries instruction) the place where it is found, the words which precede and which follow it.

For want of regard to the context, we may give to the text a sense contrary to the intention of the author, or to the general sense of revelation. The finest sense must be rejected, when the context repels it. The procedure against which we are combating would lead us too far, if applied to some passages, as Jer. ix. 4: "Take ye heed every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any brother;" and as Ps. cxvi. 11: "All men are liars," and many others.

There are texts, which, when *detached*, express some interesting truth, which we must, however, forbear to draw from them, because the context does not authorise it. Thus:—

1 John iii. 20: "God is greater than our heart." John viii. 32: "The truth shall make you free." 2 Cor. iii. 17: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."[1]

The study of the connection has not merely a negative importance. We have not simply to avoid a false sense, but to seize upon the *whole* of the *true* one. The circumstances, which surround a text or an assertion, surround it with a light, or colour it with a reflexion, which cannot be neglected. And, though that should add no shade, it would nevertheless *individualise* the truth.

What, moreover, is the idea without some connection, and without some shadow of individuality? What man does not mingle something of himself with his idea?

We do not mean by this, that an assertion, *general* in its form, ought to be confined within the sphere of the *particular* circumstances of him, who has expressed it.[2] The connection will never prevent us from generalising, from extending the idea of

[1] These texts seem to me not unwarrantably used, when taken in their detached sense, which is quite in accordance with, if not directly implied in, the context. An instance more in point is Isa. lxiv. 6: "All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags," often used as an argument against justification by works. But though this be true, it is not the thing implied *here*. The context is speaking, not of *all* men in general, but of *particular apostates* from God, the Jews; ver. 7: "There is none that calleth on Thy name:" this would not be true of many *self-righteous* men, much less of those whom ver. 5 describes: "Thou meetest him that rejoiceth and *worketh righteousness*."—Ed.

[2] Example: "I can do all things through Jesus Christ strengthening me." (Phil. iv. 13.)

the text, according to the principles which we have before laid down.

It is only necessary to ascend sufficiently high from the individual or species to the genus, to determine correctly the sense, or the intention of the words of the text. Saurin has certainly passed the just measure in his sermon on *True Liberty*.[1]

[Let us place here one more observation which is not without importance.] A text has not two senses. Should it happen to present, according to the tenor of the words of which it is composed, two different senses, and should both these senses be good, we ought to present but *one* of them to our auditory; and, above all, we ought not to lay before them the *discussion*, by which it is established.[2]

III. A text, without offering two senses, may not present a clear sense.

The obscurity may be in the idea, when the object of the text is in a region, or at a height, to which our analysis cannot reach. [Thus it is with the passage of 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28, regarding the final subjection of all things to God the Father;[3] with 1 Peter

[1] Vol. iii., p. 335, new edition.

[2] See Eph. i. 4: "Without blame before Him *in* or *by* love." John i. 9: "Every man coming into the world." [The light, which coming into the world lighteth every man.] Col. iii. 14: "The bond of perfectness." Phil. ii. 6: "Counted it not *robbery*" (French version, "did not regard it as a usurpation," or, "did not *glory* in"). Matt. v. 9: "Blessed are the peacemakers." Luke vii. 47: "*For* she loved much;" Ostervald translates, "It is *on this account* that she loved much." ["*Wherefore* she loved much."]

[3] Quesnel thus explains this passage: "In the state of innocence, God spoke and held communion with man immediately by Himself; sin has changed everything. In the state of the natural law, and of the law of Moses, this was done through angels, through men, and by divers external means. In the state of the law of grace, He does it by Jesus Christ His Son, sent to men to bring them back to obedience, and to re-establish the kingdom of His Father. In heaven, God will do all in all by Himself. Jesus Christ having finished His work, which is to gather in the elect of God, to rule them upon earth, to conduct them to His Father, there will be no more mediation or sacrifice of Jesus Christ for sin, no more ministration of angels, . . . no more ministry of men, no more need of the Scriptures, no more necessity for any external means. God, in the Trinity of His person, will reign by Himself, will make to subsist and live in Him and of Him, the whole body of the true Church, the Head and the members, will by Himself make them immortal as eternity, will enlighten them, and render them all luminous as truth, will diffuse Himself in them, and perfect them in Himself as love."—Quesnel, *Reflexions morales sur le Nouveau Testament.*

iii. 18–20, regarding the preaching to the spirits in prison; and with Rom. vii. 17: "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." The obscurity of such passages is not always invincible; they often contain high and important truths, on which we must set great value; they open a vast field for meditation; but we may say, however, in general, that it is not expedient in our choice to give the preference to such subjects, and the texts which express them.[1]]

It would be vain to apply here the saying, "These things were written for our instruction." (Rom. xv. 4.) It does not apply to every case. Instruction is a whole, which has its remote accessories. It is not upon these accessories that we must preach.

When the obscurity is in the expression, in which I comprehend all the forms of argumentation, what must be done? It is said: The minister is essentially the commentator, or interpreter, of the Word of God, and as all ought to read it, it must be made comprehensible by all. I answer, that it is not said that all Scripture is immediately addressed to all the readers of all times.[2] [The simple man, at least, will not comprehend all, and will not believe that all is addressed to him. Doubtless, the teaching of the Spirit of God considerably opens the mind; but it may well happen, nevertheless, that many passages, the form of which belongs to another period, may continue to be obscure to a great part of the readers of our day. Edification is the instruction of the soul, and it is not incompatible with that of the intellect; but if, in order to edify, we must furnish a certain aliment to the understanding, yet too great a labour is evidently injurious to edification.] It requires a very peculiar talent to continue to be edifying on such subjects. It would even require much, merely to attain that perspicuity which the pulpit demands. "Let a man examine himself." (1 Cor. xi. 28.) In

[1] Claude (in his *Essay on Compos. of Serm.*) advises the preacher, especially when preaching in a strange church, not to choose *a text leading to curious knotty questions*, lest it be said that he meant to preach himself. In his own church the preacher ought, in the case of disputed texts, to open the way to the truth by first rejecting the falsehood. However, where the difficulty arises from *the intricacy of the subject itself*, it is better to enter immediately into the explication of the matters, arranging your ideas naturally and easily: for if you do not begin right, you can do nothing to purpose; and on the contrary, if you take the right road, all will appear easy as you go on to the end.—Ed.

[2] Mark iv. 33; John xvi. 12; Heb. v. 11–14; 1 Cor. iii. 1–3.—Ed.

fine, regarding such texts as these, the whole duty of the interpreter is perhaps to show that they are obscure, and this is sometimes the best service that can be rendered to them.—Examples :—

Gal. iii. 20 : "A mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one."[1]

Rom. xii. 20 : "Thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head."

1 Tim. v. 24, 25 : "Some men's sins are open beforehand," etc.

Rom. vii. 10, 11 : "The commandment which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death," etc.

Besides, obscure texts are either very important, but may have their place supplied by others; or they are not fruitful, which is almost always the case.

[We may, then, by way of summary, propose the following rule] :—

Do not give for a text to your discourse a passage that is obscure and difficult, or the elucidation of which would demand a too lengthened preliminary discussion. This rule would admit of exception, if that text contained an important truth which was not enunciated elsewhere.

IV. Choose a fruitful text. I call a text fruitful, which, without foreign addition, without the assistance of minute details, without digression, reduced to its true terms, furnishes matter for a development, interesting in all its parts, and leaves in our hands an important result. [Every fruitful text will, at the same time, be a practical one ; for if the preacher may touch upon speculative matters, it is always in a practical interest, and not in an interest purely philosophical.]

[1] See QUESNEL upon this passage. [The syllogism seems to me to be this :—

ὁ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν·
ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν·
Therefore ὁ μεσίτης οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ Θεοῦ.

i.e. The employment of a mediator, as Moses in the giving of the law, *is not God's regular way* of dealing with men. He deals *directly* with them, as in the giving of the promise to Abraham, ver. 17, 18. If it be objected that Jesus is a Mediator in the case of the promise, 1 Tim. ii. 5, I answer, Jesus is such a Mediator, as God-man, that He is not a distinct third party, but one with both parties, God and man. The law is therefore temporary, exceptional, and parenthetical.—ED.]

It is difficult to produce examples. What is barren for some, is productive for others, and *vice versa*.

Good theological studies, meditation, a philosophical habit of mind, may discover fruitfulness where it did not appear at first. He who grasps the relations of the idea with other ideas, its affinities, its extensions,—he who can generalise, ascend to principles, see the distant consequences,—makes fruitful a soil that is barren for many others.

I suppose, besides, a textual preaching; for there would be little embarrassment if we had to treat texts only in the manner of the Roman Catholic divines.

But, it will be said, free as we are to choose our texts, why should we not go directly to those which are evidently fruitful? In the first place, this would be to discard some texts which have their peculiar merit, their peculiar character, and to reduce considerably the latitude of choice. Again, it is probable that, at this rate, very few texts will be fruitful. The richest, when all is done, are only rich for meditation. [Remark in passing, that it is very useful, in this respect particularly,] to be obliged for some time to treat texts imposed upon us, and at all times to allow them to be prescribed to us.

But it is nevertheless true, that if the appearance of barrenness imposes on the greatest number, the contrary appearance may impose on others.

Every saying that is striking, beautiful, affecting, is not fruitful. Truths which are at the farthest limit, or at the summit, are not so fruitful as those which are at the starting-point or halfway. They have nothing more to produce, than emotions.—Examples: Col. i. 16; Ps. lxxiii. 25.

Sometimes a striking or pointed idea, met with in a text, may induce a youthful imagination to discuss it: but this text presents only that idea, and all the rest is filled only with commonplace.

V. You may, according to circumstances, and with due precaution, employ in the body of your discourse passages, the terms of which have something repulsive; but you must not make them the texts of your sermons.—Example: 2 Pet. ii. 22.

To the passages presenting a repulsive image, I join those that

have something odd or too familiar;[1] but, in general, these texts relate to subjects which the preacher is not called upon to treat.

VI. There is nothing to be said regarding the dimensions or the material extent of the text. As to its logical extent, we recommend completeness and unity.

Claude has given the following rule: "It is necessary that the text contain the complete idea of the writer from whom it is taken; for it is of his language and of his sentiments that we must give an account to our hearers. For example, if you take these words, from 2 Cor. i. 3, 4: 'Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of mercies, and the God of all comfort, who comforteth us in all our tribulation, that we may be able to comfort them that are in any trouble, by the comfort wherewith we ourselves are comforted of God;'—and suppose that you stop after these words, *the God of all consolation*, you have a complete sense, but not the complete sense of the apostle. Suppose you go further on, and add, '*who comforteth us in all our tribulations*,' you have not yet the complete sense of St Paul, you do not embrace his whole thought; you must go on to the end of the fourth verse. When the idea of the sacred author is embraced, you may stop; for there are few texts of Holy Scripture which do not furnish the materials of a sermon, and it suits equally ill to take too much and to take too little; it is necessary to avoid the two extremes."[2]

I do not adopt the rule of Claude. I am, in general, content with a sense complete in itself, provided it be conformable to the sense of the sacred writer.

The rule of Claude, in its application, would go too far for its object, by leading us to embrace a sense more than complete; which happens when, in St Paul for example, several passages are linked one to another, not by their largest side, but by their extremities, by their terminal parts.[3]

[1] Avoid, says Bishop Wilson, such subjects as would divert the mind without instructing it. Never consult your own fancy in the choice of subjects, but the necessities of the flock. It was a subject of regret to Augustine, that the aim of his early ministry was, "Ut placeret, non ut doceret."—Ed.

[2] Claude, *Treatise on the Composition of a Sermon, in the first volume of his Posthumous Works.*

[3] If this rule were applied to wr ers regular in their style, the inconvenience would be nothing; but we have to o with different writers. Their periods are

Even when this is not the case, there would be considerable loss in not being able to take one of the propositions of which a period is composed, in order to consider it separately.

We easily recognise the case in which we should be incomplete and unsatisfactory by our not going on to the end of the author's phrase. To me the following passages are of this number: 1 Cor. xiii. 13, ii. 9; Phil. ii. 12, 13, iv. 6, 7.

Would it be the same with the passage quoted by Claude? Would it be the same with 1 Tim. vi. 13–16, with Eph. i. 7–10, with Heb. xii. 1, 2; or with Heb. xii. 15? This would be to place one's self at the mercy of an accident of phraseology, of a conjunction (*for*, *then*, *and*), of anything. See John xiv. 21. It would be to interdict certain texts, composed of a few words appended as a phrase, and not forming a proposition, as Eph. v. 10: "Proving what is acceptable to the Lord;" and 1 Peter v. 7: "Casting all your care upon Him."

An important idea, very suitable for a sermon, is often contained in an appendix to the phrase. Thus, 1 Tim. i. 15: "To save sinners, *of whom I am chief;*" Rom. i. 34: "Without understanding, covenant-breakers, *without natural affection*, implacable, unmerciful;" 2 Tim. iii. 3: "*Without natural affection*, truce-breakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers of those that are good."[1]

The rule of Claude appears to me vague or inapplicable. I think we find a complete sense, and consequently a text, in every series of words from which comes forth, for every attentive mind, a proposition, and which is sufficient in itself,—that is to say, which, in order to present a true sense, has no need of the words which precede or which follow.[2]

often wanting in the rhetorician's law of unity. We are so much the less afraid to acknowledge it, that we see a beauty in it, in so far as it reveals a great overflowing of heart. If Paul and Peter have fallen into this defect by negligence, yet, when we see the principle of this irregularity, we admire and are silent. In each of their thoughts, their charity would have embraced all the thoughts of Christianity, all the interests of their hearers.

[1] In this number I do not reckon the words: "A little while" (John xvi. 16-23, upon which Harms has composed a sermon of which he thus lays down the plan: "The saying, '*A little while*' (uber ein Kleines), considered in its Divine energy,—1. It cheers the afflicted. 2. It maintains joy in joyful hearts. 3. It rouses sluggishness. 4. It disturbs carelessness. 5. It sustains those who are combating. 6. It strengthens those who are dying."

[2] Still it is needful to guard against taking a few words, isolated from their

It is doubtless a duty to examine with care, if the more particular ideas, the additions which the author has connected with his principal idea, do not complete it, do not present it in its clearest light, do not remove the ambiguities or the prepossessions against it, etc.[1] We are disputing only the propriety of the rule which would make the determination of the length of the text depend on some purely accidental circumstance.

If we must not confound texts with phrases and periods, and logical with grammatical unity, neither must we suppose that the text stops where the grammatical sense stops, or even where the logical unity closes. Many logical unities may together form a greater unity, and it is impossible to say beforehand, or with absolute certainty, what are the limits of a true text. One and the same text may furnish ten; ten texts may form one. The art of cutting up a text, the art of grouping several texts so as to form only one, would deserve to be examined.

It is thus that in the passage, Matt. v. 3–10, each beatitude forms a particular text; but we can also unite them all into one text. The passage of John iv. 31–38 presents three traits of the character of Jesus Christ; a sublime preoccupation (He forgets to eat), a sublime impatience (the fields are ready), a sublime self-abnegation (one soweth and another reapeth). Of all this, we might make three distinct subjects.

Dr Busch has treated, in a sermon, the passage of Luke x. 23–37.[2] There, the first word of Jesus Christ: "Blessed are the eyes which see the things which ye see," is represented as having called forth the question of the lawyer. The error of this man is accompanied with a pure intention. Jesus Christ answers his question by asking another. To the answer of the lawyer: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," etc., Jesus replies: "Thou

connection, and from the sense of the context. Thus the words, "Hear the Church," Matt. xviii. 17, have been made the text of a sermon maintaining the Church's authority in matters of *doctrine*, whereas the context refers to the settlement, by amicable arbitration, of *quarrels* among believers. A dignitary of the Church of England, on hearing of this Procrustean curtailment of Scripture, remarked, with more wit than reverence, "A preacher might as well take for his text, 'Hang all the law and the prophets :' " Matt. xxii. 40.—Ed.

[1] See the examples cited above: 1 Cor. ii. 9, xiii. 13; Phil. ii. 12, 13, iv. 6, 7.

[2] See the collection of sermons by different authors published by Fliedner and Leipoldt, for the benefit of the Evangelical Church of Karlshuld, in the Donaumoos, under the title: *Ein Herr, ein Glaube.* Barmen, 1837, p. 352.

hast well answered" ["answered right."—Engl. Vers.]. The orator shows that the lawyer has indeed *well answered.* But in the presence and under the influence of Jesus Christ, this answer, in appearance so tranquillising, does not tranquillise him. If he has *well answered* regarding the law, he still doubts whether he has *well fulfilled* the law. Seriously desirous of being justified before God,[1] he wishes to fulfil the law of love to his neighbour, in the manner and in the sense which God requires.[2] Then comes the story of the good Samaritan. The preacher inquires what impression this history, so beautiful at all times and for all mankind, ought to have produced upon this man in these circumstances. He then passes to the answer of the lawyer, upon the expressions of which he lays great stress, since they show, according to him, that his heart was touched. His heart is open to the love of his neighbour; but this love supposes the love of God, such as is prescribed in the first commandment. As the lawyer has as yet no experience of such a love of his neighbour, our Lord shows it to him exemplified in a fact, and ends by recommending it for his imitation. Then follows an application to us, who have need that Christ should teach us in the same manner; and lastly, we have the answer to this objection: If genuine good works are impossible for us, if therefore we cannot be saved by our works, how is this to be reconciled with the answers of Jesus Christ to the Pharisee: "Thou hast answered right; go and do likewise?"

Doctor Julius Müller may be equally cited here for his sermon on Matt. xvii. 1–18. "The narrative of our text," says he, "commences with an account of one of the most sublime and most marvellous events of the life of Jesus Christ, His transfiguration upon a mountain of Galilee, and the appearance of Moses and Elias in the light of the glory which surrounded Him. This narrative then conducts us towards the three disciples who were witnesses of the event, describes to us their rapture and their fear, and gives us some idea of the holy emotion of their hearts on descending from the mountain. Lastly, we are transported into the midst of the crowd which covered the plain, and we are present at one of those sad spectacles which are presented by sin and human misery. Thus our history descends, so to speak, by

[1] But Engl. Version, "He, willing to justify himself."—Ed.
[2] As to the first commandment he makes no question. Why?

degrees, from the transplendent heights of the glory of Jesus Christ even to the dark valley of human debasement. We are going to reverse this order in our meditations of this day. Instead of descending, we shall ascend, and we shall contemplate three degrees of the Christian life: the first, that of trouble, of doubt and perplexity; the second, that of the beatific knowledge of Jesus Christ, and of sincere resignation to His will; the third, that of perfect communion with Jesus Christ."[1]

We must not, at first sight, set down texts as twofold, which, more attentively considered, will reveal the unity which cannot fail to have been in the intention of the sacred writer, who has not connected two things together without knowing why. We must seek for this unity. I have already cited 1 Thess. v. 15, and Eph. iv. 28. In 1 Tim. ii. 8, "I will, therefore, that men pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands, without wrath and doubting," [the common thought is the counsel given to the persecuted to oppose prayer to the evils which they endure. This thought is not expressed directly; but the apostle, if he had it not at the time present to his mind, has, at least, written under its influence.] Tholuck [has sought to find the apostle's unity of intention in] Heb. xii. 14, "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord." "There are," says he, "three things in our text: two exhortations, and one threatening which may be understood also as a promise (threatening for some, promise for others). . . . Certainly the apostle would not have united these two exhortations, the one to peace, the other to holiness, if he had not regarded holiness as the root of this peace which he recommends to be cultivated with all men."[2] We might find the unity of the text in another idea: peace and holiness being salvation; his idea is:

[1] *Ein Herr, ein Glaube*, Collection of Sermons by different authors, published by Fliedner and Leipoldt, p. 108.

Except in professedly expository preaching and lecturing, to take too much text seems to me undesirable. For, as Claude observes, preaching is not only intended to give the sense of Scripture, but also of theology in general, which cannot be done, if too much matter be taken. Everybody can read Scripture with comments to obtain simply the sense; but we cannot instruct, solve difficulties, unfold mysteries, comfort, correct, inflame the souls of the hearers with zeal, and powerfully incline them to piety, unless we go farther than barely enabling them to understand Scripture.—Ed.

[2] Tholuck: *Akademische Predigten*, 2d Collection.

"peace by means of holiness."—See also James i. 17 (compare 1 Cor. iv. 5).

VII. [Let us add some more rules to those which have already been given.

[It is expedient to vary the texts. We are struck with always finding again certain texts, as if the most of preachers regarded themselves bound to treat them. Some of these, doubtless, ought to draw the attention of all by their importance. There is, however, a matter of greater importance, and an importance more serious than we might imagine at first sight, and that is, not to allow a kind of traditional monotony to be introduced into the choice of texts.[1] The employment of a new text imparts novelty to the subject itself. There are usually, upon one and the same subject, texts of three sorts, amongst which we may choose], texts didactic or sententious, texts historical, and texts which may be called ejaculative. Let us cite some examples of these last:—

Psalm xlii. 3: "When shall I come and appear before God?"

Psalm lxxxiv. 4: "Thine altars, O Lord of hosts, my King and my God!"

Psalm xxiv. 7: "Be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors; and the King of glory shall come in."

Psalm vi. 4: "But thou, O Lord! how long?"

Psalm lxxiii. 19: "How are they brought into desolation as in a moment!"

Micah vi. 6: "Wherewithal shall I bow myself before the Most High God?"

Romans vii. 26: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

1 Cor. xv. 55: "O death, where is thy sting?"

Another rule, as important as it is neglected, is, that the texts be individual. All things being equal in other respects, of two texts, that which shall be most in affinity with our own individuality will be by far the best.

[1] This holds good in the case of sermons before educated congregations. Before the ignorant, it is better to choose the plainest texts, which are not trite to them. Ingenuity in twisting a far-fetched text to the purposes of a sermon is lost on the multitude; or at least, though they may admire the preacher, they go away not fed. "Choose for your pulpit subjects," says Matthew Henry, "the plainest truths, and endeavour to make them plainer."—Ed.

May one, in the sermon, invert the order of the parts of the text? [We may doubtless do so, and in certain cases we must. Preachers have often done so.] Nevertheless, invert, in your discourse, the order of the parts only in so far as this is evidently necessary. "The principle of our worship," says Bossuet, "is that we have true sentiments of God, and that we believe what He is. The consequence of this belief is, that we purify our intentions before Him, and that we dispose ourselves as He requires of us. . . . Thus the whole essence of religion is included in these two words (*in spirit and in truth*), and I pray my Saviour to pardon me if, to assist your understanding, I commence my explanation of them with that which He has been pleased to pronounce the last." [1]

Lastly, to the question, if one may put two texts at the head of a sermon, we simply reply, that, as a rule, one should preach from a single text of Scripture, but there is nothing to prevent one, when it is necessary, from uniting two. [This has sometimes been done very felicitously and seasonably.[2]]

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE HOMILY AND THE PARAPHRASE.

All that we have said heretofore appears to relate exclusively to the synthetic discourse, and even to suppose no other kind to be legitimate.

Indeed, all the rules which we have given, whether upon the subjects or upon the texts, imply the idea that the sermon turns entirely upon one single proposition.

Our business should then be, when we do not find this proposition contained by implication in the text, to collect towards one and the same point the elements more or less scattered and diver-

[1] Bossuet, *Sermon on the Worship due to God.* Œuvres, edition Lefèvre, 1836, vol. iv., p. 162.

[2] For instance, 1 Sam. xv. 24, and 2 Sam. xii. 13, in order to contrast the real difference, under the seeming similarity of the words, between Saul's sorrow for his sin, and that of David, and so to set forth the characteristics of true repentance.—Ed.

gent, to condense them until they form nothing more than this single proposition of which we have spoken.

But are not the two kinds of preaching, known under the name of paraphrase and homily, the application of the contrary method? Is not this an analysis in place of a synthesis? I answer as follows:—

It is both an analysis and a synthesis; and the union of these two methods is not exclusively peculiar to the homily.[1] Such a synthetic sermon, if we consider it closely, analyses the text, and, in this analysis, finds the whole of its division. Such was the almost constant procedure of our French Reformed preachers before Dubosc. They spelled out, if we may say so, the Biblical expression. However, as their analyses do not ordinarily bear upon very long texts, their discourses pass for sermons, and not for homilies. It may be said, at least, that they mark the transition, or that they occupy the intermediate space between the sermon and the homily. These three forms are only three degrees of the analytic method, which gets ample scope, and triumphs, in the homily.—But in all the three, analysis is only the preliminary and the means of the synthesis, with which we must always finish.

Even the paraphrase is only admissible on this condition. In the rigour of its idea, it is only a discourse parallel to that of the sacred author, a continued explanation of the text—an explanation, the extent of which has no precise limit. We find more than one example of it in Massillon.[2] I think that, if we consult the nature of the human mind, we will feel the necessity of reuniting after having analysed, and of giving a sort of bond, the bond of a common idea, to the elements which we have successively collected.—I know well that, when the bond is very loose, the unity is little more than nominal. The notion of *being* is ultimately a bond for the most opposite ideas. [But such a loose bond as this would hardly satisfy the requirements of unity, even in a paraphrase.—Ed.]

[1] Here used for a discourse of a *less connected and more expository* character than the strict "sermon." Ὁμιλία is the Greek term for a familiar discourse addressed to the ὅμιλος or *multitude*. The Latins used the term "tractatus" or *treatise*, and afterwards "sermo" or set *speech*, for a discourse in which the subject was *thoroughly discussed*. The expository system especially prevailed among the Greeks: and Chrysostom's Homilies are among the best models for it.—Ed.

[2] See, among others, vol. viii., p. 59, of the edition Méquignon in 12mo.

Leaving the paraphrase, to speak only of the homily, we say that, if it does not differ so profoundly from the ordinary sermon as is commonly supposed, it has, notwithstanding, a distinct character. This character does not come from its being most frequently connected with narratives, or from the familiarity of the style, but rather from the circumstance, that its chief design,—its principal object, is to place in relief the successive parts of a long text, subordinating itself to its contours [outlines], to its accidents, to its chances, if we may say so, more than is done in a sermon, properly so called.

There is nothing which essentially distinguishes the homily from the sermon, if it be not the relative predominance of analysis: in other words, *explanation* prevails over *system*.[1] All that we have said of the sermon applies then, generally, to the homily. The difficulty, which this species presents, never goes so far as impossibility. We do not proceed at random, when we cut out of the general text of the sacred books, the particular text of a homily. We do not fix its limits arbitrarily. Unity has been previously perceived, and has determined the limits of the text;[2] we are, therefore, very sure of finding it. The only danger is, that of letting go the unity of the subject, as the thread of a path, to bury and lose ourselves in an intricate and entangled jungle of ideas. There is doubtless an act of analysing. To analyse is not merely to examine, to disjoin; it is, at the same time, to bind; it is to preserve or mark the articulations, it is to respect the life of the text, it is to develop, rather than to decompose it. Amongst all the lines which cross, interlace, and obscure each other, in a narrative or in a parable, we must distinguish and seize upon the chief line, the mother idea. We must

[1] Bridges (*Christian Ministry*) observes, that the *topical* system of the sermon is supported by the example of our Lord in the synagogue of Nazareth. Its difficulty is, 1st, To reduce the mind of the Spirit in the text, as connected with the context, into a single and definite proposition: 2dly, To found on it such a statement of Christian truth, as naturally arises out of it, and is in accordance with it. It has the advantage of greater unity. The *expository* method, though less popular and impassioned, gives more comprehensive views of Christian truth: and by it are avoided the danger of disjointed views of truth, and of building on a partial citation of an insulated text what is not authorised by the context, and general strain of the sacred argument.—Ed.

[2] When one takes, like Luther, two narratives (Matt. viii. 1–13) merely because they follow each other, one will not find unity, because it has not been sought for.

throw aside, or banish into a secondary place, what is of less importance, and what forms an integral part of the narrative without forming an integral part of the instruction which it is intended to furnish.[1] It is also of importance to proportion the development of each trait to its importance, not to yield to the attraction, or to the frequently serious interest of such or such detail, which we might, on another occasion, take up and treat separately; we should not course two, still less three hares at once.—The more important the ideas we bring together, the more will the mind, strongly solicited by each, be fatigued and distracted.[2]

I suppose the choice of the texts free; if it were not so, and if a prescribed segment did not offer of itself a sufficient unity, I should prefer to dispense with it, rather than obtain it by force. It is seldom, however, that some common bond does not present itself.[3]

As the preacher appears more supported by his text in the homily, than in the synthetic sermon, the former of these two kinds is considered the easier. And, indeed, it is easier to make a homily than a sermon; but a good sermon is easier to make than a good homily.—Great masters in the art of preaching, Bourdaloue, for example,[4] have not succeeded in the homily.

[1] One of the greatest excellencies of a sermon, says Claude, is the harmony of its component parts: that the first leads to the second, the second serves to introduce the third; that they, which go before, excite a desire for those, which are to follow; and that the last has a special relation to all the others, in order to form a complete whole.—Ed.

[2] Ammon, *Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 107 [quotes the example of a homily on Matt. xiv. 1–10, "which loses," he says, "a part of its interest by the accumulation of the following subjects: 1st, Passage from debauchery to cruelty; 2d, The duty of openly speaking the truth; 3d, Of the passion of women for vengeance; 4th, The secret terror with which defenceless virtue inspires the powerful vicious man; 5th, The inconsistency of the vicious."—"Unity," adds Ammon, "should never be sacrificed, even in the homily; and it is wrong to wish to see, in the want of unity, the distinctive mark of this kind of preaching."]

See, as examples of Homilies: Cellerier on 1 Samuel ii. 1–7 (*Homilies*, vol. i., p. 210), and Rochat, *the Angels entertained by Abraham.* (*Discours et Méditations*, p. 223.)

[3] See example cited by Ammon, *Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 108, note 1.

[4] Example: The homily on the man born blind (vol. ii., p. 239 of the edition of Lefèvre), of which the plan is as follows: 1st, Blindness of the Pharisees; 2d, Sincere, generous, convincing testimony of the blind man. This kind of discourse is rather that of the sermon, than of the homily.

The most excellent judges of preaching have recommended the homily.

Fénelon.—" You wish that a preacher should explain continuously and literally the Holy Scriptures?—Yes, this would be admirable."[1]

Herder.—" As soon as preaching ceased to be what it was in the mouth of the apostles, a message properly so called, it became an explanation of the Word of God, of the apostolical writings, of their doctrine, and an application to the silent and collected flock, of all that had just been read by him.[2] That was called *homily*, and it was indeed neither a harangue nor a discourse. . . . . The exposition of Scripture is, in my eyes, the chief and the best mode of preaching, in our time especially; and I regard it, in particular, as the best and the safest exercise of preaching for the young."[3]

Dutoit-Membrini.—" It were very desirable that this kind of preaching were more general. Men should have the Word of God expounded continuously, and not a tissue of human reasonings, to which a text is made to bend. The homily was the kind of preaching adopted by the Fathers of the Church. . . . Homilies, composed in good taste, and by men capable of composing them, would be extremely useful. A section of Scripture is taken and expounded in its connection; the internal sense of it is developed; an infinite number of ideas enter and come, as it were, in file; a number of duties are explained in a few words.[4] This would be a mode of preaching, more full of marrow, more scriptural, more Christian. It would teach the people in what manner they ought to read the Scriptures; it explains it to them; it shows the connection between ideas which, at first sight, seem to have no relation to each other. In short, it would wander less from the true Word of God."[5]

[1] Fenelon, *Dialogues sur l'éloquence*, Dialogue iii., towards the end.

[2] Bare reading of the word, says P. Henry, is like throwing the net into the water. The expounding of it is like spreading out the net, which makes it more likely to catch fish. The wise preacher will become all things to all men, in order to win some. If some fish will only bite by day, the fishermen must fish by day: if others by moonlight, he fishes by moonlight. The topical and expository methods should be used in turns, as occasion may need.—Ed.

[3] Herder, *Briefe über das Studium der Theologie*, 43d Brief. (Vol. i., pp. 19–24, of the edition of Carlsruhe, 1829.)

[4] This is an advantage which approaches very near to an inconvenience.

[5] Dutoit-Membrini, *Philosophie chrétienne*, Discours préliminaire, p. 89. [So

Ammon.—"Homilies are suitable for making the Bible known, which is generally too little known; they facilitate the application of its principles to public and private life; the simplicity and variety which characterise them, ensure them of a more general and a more durable effect upon the majority of the hearers; in fine, they excite the preacher himself to a more continuous and profound study of man, and of the documents of our religion.—In another point of view, they have the inconvenience of restraining the free course of the preacher's thought, of dividing the attention, by proposing to him too great a diversity of objects, and of not leaving sufficient room for the development and the application of a particular truth."[1]

Scholl.—"The Word of God is more completely the basis, and directing thread of it (the homily). This kind of preaching has recourse naturally, and without effort, to a greater variety of modes of instruction, and hence it is better adapted to the diversified wants of souls. It combats that uniformity in the choice of their subjects, and those exclusive tendencies, by which preachers are only too much influenced. It is more suitable for communicating the knowledge of Holy Scripture as a whole, and in its details, for inspiring with a taste for meditation on the Divine Word, and for teaching those who study it, to read it with understanding, and with reflection, and to make continually a direct and personal application of it to themselves."[2]

Summary.—This method has not all the advantages of the synthetic method, and it is susceptible of an abuse more or less injurious. Ammon has just shown us, what this is; but the absence of certain advantages, and the possibility of certain abuses, are not defects. The other method, also, has not all the advantages which we might imagine, neither is it secure from all the abuses which we might fear. What may be said in favour of this method is: 1st, That it makes known and reinstates in

St Chrysostom says of this mode, "In it God speaks much, and man little." We escape the trammels of a mere system of divinity, which, however needful to us as men, cannot comprehend within itself the infinite vastness of the Word of God. Many subjects, as, for instance, sins against the seventh commandment, come to be discussed in the regular course of exposition, which would not be so suitable for a set sermon. Above all, the people are shown how to read the Holy Scriptures with profit.—Ed.]

[1] Ammon: *Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 111.

[2] Scholl, *Sermons*, London, 1836, Preface, pp. 16, 17.

honour the Holy Scriptures; 2d, That it is accessible to a greater number of intellects, and pleases all of them, by replacing with the most lively colours the sombre hue of abstraction; 3d, That it opposes the exclusive tendencies, by which preachers are only too much influenced; 4th, That it ensures to preaching more variety, than the synthetic kind.

SECTION SECOND.

MATTER OF THE DISCOURSE FROM THE PULPIT.

THE chapter of our course, upon the text, may be considered as a simple appendix to the preceding one, upon the subject. Hitherto, then, we have only treated of the subject of the sermon. Now we commence to treat of the matter of the sermon.

The matter is to the subject what the edifice is to the foundation.

The subject is the proposition; the matter is the development of it,—the very substance of the discourse,—the pulp of the fruit.

The order which we follow in our course, is not necessarily that which the thought of the preacher has followed. We proceed from the subject to the matter. In the preparation of his discourse, he may have proceeded from the matter to the subject; that is to say, he may have been led to the invention of his subject by the invention of the principal ideas of his sermon; his subject is the summary of it, the conclusion; and, in this case, it might appear, that his discourse ought to consist in giving us an account of the manner in which he arrived at this conclusion.

It is possible that, in certain cases, this form might be the happiest and the most persuasive.—This is the form of some pieces of Pascal.

We should, nevertheless, be mistaken, if we thought that the sermon might be, ordinarily, a confession, or a disquisition.—The path by which the preacher has arrived at his personal conviction, is not necessarily that by which he will conduct his hearers.

Let us place ourselves in the reality; let us take what is, upon the whole, the position of the minister in the generality of cases; he has before his eyes a truth which is certain for him, and which he has a commission to unfold and prove to others; in one word, just as we are doing in our course, he proceeds not from the matter to the subject, but from the subject to the matter.

For this purpose, he may not only proceed by a different route, but employ different means from those, by which he himself has been led to understand and believe it.—[The journey which leads us to faith is providential. God makes use of means which we should often have disdained. Arrived at the end, shall we oblige others to make all the turnings and windings, which God has caused us to make?[1] As preachers, we ought to place ourselves in a more general point of view. We ought to see what, in our own experience, is human. We ought to employ means which are within reach of the largest number, even means which have produced no effect upon ourselves. The definitive secret of the mode of conversion will always escape us. It is often by that which was weakest, that a man is converted. It is impossible that there should not be something common in the means, by which two men are converted; but there may be also great diversity in these.]

When we speak of explaining and proving, it is not that we suppose, that there are sermons of explanation, where we do not prove, and sermons of proving, in which we do not explain.

Any sermon whatsoever, always resolves itself into demonstration, and a demonstration never takes place without explanation, formal or indirect, expressed or understood; I mean that every demonstration rests upon a previous explanation.

To make men know,—to make them believe, this is in general the twofold task of the preacher, in every sermon.

I say more; it is not always easy to distinguish, or to separate,

[1] Yet, how frequently Paul narrated his own experience, and the circumstances of his conversion, as the most affecting argument which he could use, in urging the need of conversion upon others! 1 Tim. i. 12–16; Acts xxii.-xxvi. Bridges illustrates the difference between addresses containing one's actual experience, and those of cold speculation. "The difference is that of the way-post, which directs the traveller, whilst itself remains unmoved; and the living guide, who becomes a companion to sympathise with, enliven, and uphold his fellow."—Ed.

the one of these things from the other. To make men know, is to make them believe; to explain is to prove; to show is to demonstrate.

The formal demonstration has been the most prevalent,—the demonstration which takes advantage of one of our admissions, in order to wrest from us another: the preacher neglects to represent to us the truth as a thing which we can recognise at first sight, and to which the better parts of our nature subscribe without effort; he does not address himself to that spirit, of which it is said that it is "willing" (Matt. xxvi. 41); he does not try upon us, as much as he ought, the intrinsic force of truth.[1]

Demonstration itself, when he chooses this way, has a true force of persuasion only in proportion as, while he demonstrates, he exhibits, the truth. The lively representation of the objects is the principal force,—the life of eloquence.

It is necessary, then, that the two elements be fused into one another. But, in our course, we are expected to distinguish them; so much the more, as the preacher is essentially expositor, interpreter, announcer, and as this is a distinct and principal part of his mission.

Let us then distinguish, in the sermon, the *explanation* and the *proof*.

And, in each of these things, let us make a further distinction.

For explanation comprehends *facts* and *ideas*.—The facts are either successive, and they are related (*narration*), or simultaneous, and then they are described (*description*).—Ideas are defined,—explained.

So much for what concerns explanation. As to the *proof*, it embraces truths *speculative*, and truths *practical* (*dogmas* and *duties*). In the first case it employs *reasons;* in the second, *motives*.

Such are all the elements of the sermon. We make here a sort of chemical decomposition of the discourse. Afterwards, under the head of *arrangement*, while treating of the parts of the

[1] In the case of truths which the moral nature and conscience of the hearers will at once recognise, it is only needful to present the truth vividly before them, as being a more effective mode than any formal demonstration. But in articles which are disputed, or likely to be controverted, proofs must be particularly pressed See CLAUDE, *Essay*, § "Evidence."—ED.

discourse which are in juxtaposition, or follow each other in succession, we shall proceed to its physical decomposition, in which we speak of the combined parts or elements, none of which finds itself assigned to a particular place of the discourse, any more than there are in the human body, one place for the blood, and another place for the flesh.

CHAPTER I.

OF EXPLANATION.

§ I.—Explanation of Facts.

Previously to the two kinds of explanation which I have indicated, *narration* and *description*, there is another peculiar to the pulpit discourse, namely, *exegesis*, or verbal explanation of the text, with the necessary historical illustrations.

In certain cases, a sermon might be only an exegesis, filled with affectionate sentiments, and practical applications. But, in restoring the word to its usual signification, what place may exegesis hold in the instruction of the pulpit? A more limited use than that which Saurin employed, but perhaps more extensive than it, in general, receives in actual preaching.—If discussions of this kind are little suited to the pulpit, certain results may be there indicated; and there would be no harm if preaching should give to believers, by little and little, the necessary information for reading the Bible with profit.[1]

With regard to *explanation*, we comprehend in it, not only the

[1] See Saurin, *Sermon on Transient Devotional Feelings*, vol. ii., p. 110, new edition.

Take care, says Claude, not to make of grammatical matters a principal part, but only treat of them as previously necessary for understanding the text. The results should be briefly given in the pulpit of the preacher's critical and exegetical labours in the study, but not details of the process by which he has arrived at them. Solomon's temple was built of "stones made ready, before they were brought thither, so that there was neither hammer, nor axe, nor any tool of iron heard in the house, while it was building." At the same time, no man ought to be so rash as to begin to discuss a text, before he understands it; a man who needs to be told so, in Claude's words, "ought at the same time to be informed, that he is fitter for any other profession, than that of a minister."—Ed.

analysis of the facts, or the enumeration of their parts, whether in time or in space, but also the indication of the relations which connect together these different parts, the *why* with the *how*. By this, I grant, we touch upon the proof, or rather the proof enters into the explanation; but the explanation always remains the end. We have to make known what has been, what is, or what shall be.—Under the name of facts, we understand everything which takes a determinate place in time and in space, the facts of moral order, as well as others.

Let us begin with *narration*.—It forms an essential part of the discourse at the bar.[1] The advocate must first state the facts, and this is a part of his office into which he may throw the most art, and display the most ability. He states the facts, either little known or ill known, and which, at all events, have not yet been related. The preacher is wise in reasoning upon facts that are known.

Nevertheless, the narration may become an integral and even a considerable part of the discourse. See the discourses of Stephen, and of the first apostles. (So a Funeral Oration.—Or a Picture of an epoch of the Church.)

With regard to the representation of simultaneous facts [see the close of Section II.], otherwise *description*, it is more rarely the object of the sermon, than it is the form of certain ideas which form part of the sermon. It has sometimes, however, its necessary place in the discourse from the pulpit, as when, in depicting the manners and customs of a certain epoch, or in representing a certain situation of man and of society, the narrative becomes stationary.

Besides, even in places where the narration and the description form integral parts of the discourse, and belong to the subject, they very frequently play only a subordinate part in the discourse. Ideas are the ground of the pulpit discourse. We relate, and describe contingent facts, only to establish immutable truths. This cannot be said absolutely of history. Without applying to it, as has been done by M. de Barante, the saying of Quintilian: *Scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum*,[2] we may, however, say, that in history the narrative is first in order, that the historian writes in the first place, *ad narrandum*. It is

[1] See the Plaidoyers de Cochin, de Loyseau, de Mauléon.

[2] Quintilian, lib. x., cap. i.

not so with the orator; he writes only to prove.[1] This leads us to make a remark at present which will afterwards present itself in another aspect, and that is, that the extent of the narration and of the description is limited, and their form modified by the aim and general character of the sermon. The oratorical impulse is continued through all the incidents of the matter, and the narration or the description is usually only an incident. This first *datum* governs the whole. To form an idea of it, we may see how the masters of the art have narrated and described.[2]

The narration and the description may be fused the one into the other, but the second often takes the form of the first, which is the more oratorical.[3]

Narration and description have their respective advantages. The one has more vivacity and animation; the other forms a body of all the homogeneous elements.

We cannot be ignorant that narration and description, in the evangelical discourse, are in general auxiliary or subsidiary. They are only indirectly the matter of the sermon. They are elements, and materials for the demonstration.

§ II.—Explanation of Ideas.

Let us be understood regarding the sense which we attach to the word *idea*.

An idea, in general, is a *view* taken by the mind, the view of a very particular fact, as well as of anything else. It is the fact reflected in the mind, the object in the subject. In this respect, it is found, that we have already spoken of ideas in the preceding paragraph, in so far as narration and description endeavour to give an idea of facts.

But at present we take the word idea in a different sense. The question for us no longer concerns the intellectual view of concrete facts, but the purely intellectual elements by means of

[1] Aristotle, Rhet. II., defines Rhetoric as "the faculty of seeing all the possible means of persuasion on every subject," *δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.*

[2] See Saurin, *On the Misfortunes of Europe*, vol. viii., pp. 332, 335, new edition; Massillon upon the *Universal Judgment*, vol. i., p. 33, edition Lefèvre, 1823;—upon the *Truth of Religion*, vol. i., p. 145;—upon the *Temptations of the Great*, from "Sa gloire, Sire. . . . ," vol. i., p. 565.

[3] See Massillon on the *Divinity of Jesus Christ*, vol. i., p. 95, edition Lefèvre.

which we form for ourselves this idea or obtain this view, and without which we could not obtain it.

The idea, in this sense, relates to no determinate point of time and space, although it may have been disengaged, by abstraction,[1] from a multitude of similar facts that have been accomplished in time and in space; it is their common law, it is a generic fact; it is, in every proposition (for the idea does not exist apart from the proposition), the separate attribute of every subject, the attribute made substantive: "The world is great," —"greatness." Time and space are no longer regarded.

In order to say: The world is great, or to apply the epithet *great* to the substantive *world*, was it not necessary to have previously the idea of *greatness?* Doubtless. It is true, that it may be said, that this idea was not born before the objects, or before the impression they produced upon us. Without these objects, without the impression that we have received, it could not have been produced any more than the idea of any quality. The quality,—the manner of being, presupposes being. But, on another side, we may defy the objects and the sensations to produce in the human mind any general idea, if there is not in the human mind something anterior, which we will not call *idea*, but *form* or *category*, which the external impressions do not create, but which they make us discover. Whatever may be the case with these anterior forms, it remains certain that, in whatever manner we have acquired general ideas, it is impossible for us, without these ideas, or without ideas, to make anything of facts either for the thought or for the life. It is with ideas that we judge, measure, and make use of facts. A fact never has a form, a name, except by means of an idea previously acquired. The idea is the light, in which we must of necessity see the facts; and the more general and high it is, the more light it throws upon them; the great ideas are the most suitable for illuminating, or delineating plainly, the facts, upon the shade of our ignorance. Besides, the design of the facts and their use is, to conduct us towards the ideas,—to raise our minds to them; all our dignity lies in that: and the more general these ideas are,

[1] Locke, in his *Essay on Hum. Underst.*, defines abstraction as "The considering of ideas as they are in the mind, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas."—Ed.

that is to say, the more numerous the groups of facts they embrace, the higher we rise. The idea of God is the highest and noblest, because it embraces everything, and there is nothing beyond it.[1]

Thus the idea appears by turns as the means, and the end. The idea is, in one view, the condition, or the means of the knowledge of the facts,—the lever, by the aid of which we raise and detach them from the ground; or, if we will, the light in which we discern them and measure them. It is, in another view, the end itself of the knowledge of the facts. Through the facts, we endeavour to arrive at the ideas which are not only the representation of them, but their law; and which are, in God, the true facts, the supreme facts, of which the facts properly so called are only the expression, or the symbol.

That ideas play an important part in religion, and in preaching, is evident. Religion, founded on facts, resolves itself into ideas.

Preaching occupies itself especially with the ideas of religion.

The facts, we have seen, are related or described.—The idea, as idea, is defined, in other words, is classified.

Definition is defined by the etymology of the word. It marks the *limits* [fines] of the idea. To define positively the definition, let us say, that it teaches, of what elements the whole idea is composed. It consists in the bringing together of several general ideas, of which the one is limited by the others. When the idea is, so to speak, fortified, and entrenched, in such a manner,

[1] Instead of this paragraph, we read, in an older edition, the following piece, which we think it useful to reproduce:—

"Remark here the importance of ideas. Philosophy has discovered that, in the absolute sense, the idea precedes the fact. The human mind, before all experience, presents, in its interior, a certain number of moulds or of matrices, without which the facts could not penetrate it, or would remain without form, which is the same thing. On the other hand, without the facts these moulds or matrices would remain for ever unproductive. These moulds or matrices are the primary ideas, the primary and fundamental attributes, of which all the others are composed. These attributes or predicates only wait, so to speak, for subjects; but no *proposition*, no judgment can, without them, be hatched in the human mind.

"Now, what we say of primitive and perfectly simple ideas, we say, in like manner, and proportion being kept, of everything that may be called *idea*, that is to say, of every attribute separated from every subject and substantified. These secondary ideas are not born without the assistance or the concurrence of facts; but once born, they become the rule and the measure of other facts. A fact never has a form, a name, except by means of an idea previously acquired." Here the two manuscripts again coincide.—*Editors.*

that on all sides it repulses the ideas which would mingle with it, the object is defined.[1]

We must not confound definition with judgment.

Definition does nothing but verify the identity; judgment expresses a relation.—The definition is an analytic proposition; the judgment is a synthetic proposition. Definition does nothing but decompose the object; judgment composes, or adds to, the notion of the object, taken in the totality of its constituent elements, that of any quality whatsoever.

Definition would make us know; judgment would make us appreciate.—Nevertheless, very often definition makes us appreciate, and implies judgment; and judgment is equivalent to a partial definition.—We must not, however, confound with definition those judgments which bring out strongly one of the characteristics of an object, and are only intended to excite, in regard to it, such or such a sentiment.—Examples :

— "The existence of man is the dream of a shadow."

— "The history of the Church is the history of truth."

— "Rivers are roads which move, and which carry us where we wish to go."

— "The beautiful is the splendour of the true."

— "Hypocrisy is a homage which vice renders to virtue."

— "Envy is an awkward homage which mediocrity renders to merit."

— "Man is only a reed, the feeblest by nature; but he is a thinking reed."

— "Life is a combat, the prize of which is in the heavens."

— "Raillery is a discourse in favour of our wit, against our good nature."

— "Time is the treasure of the poor."

— "A courtier is a man who has neither honour, nor humour."

— "Time, that changeable image of an unchangeable eternity."

— "A tomb is a monument placed upon the boundary of two worlds."

[1] Watts states the rules of good definition: 1. It must be universal and adequate; 2. Proper and peculiar to the thing defined, and must agree to it alone; 3. Clear and plain; 4. Short, and without superfluous words; 5. Neither the thing defined, nor a mere synonym, should make any part of the definition.—*Logic*, i. 6, 5.—Ed.

— "Nature is the external throne of the magnificence of God."

— "Love is the fulfilling of the law."

— "Vice may be defined, the sacrifice of the future to the present."

— "*Historia testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriæ, magistra vitæ, nuntia vetustatis.*"[1]—CICERO.

When the notion of the attribute does not exhaust that of the subject, and when we cannot, indifferently, put the one for the other, this is not definition, it is judgment.—Satire also defines in this manner.—Thus Rochefoucauld has defined moderation, "a fear of falling into the envy and the contempt which those deserve who are intoxicated with their good fortune."—And La Bruyère has defined gravity, "a mystery of the body intended to conceal the weakness of the mind."—According to Diderot, "religious liberty is the right of every one to persecute in his turn."—It is evident that the question here is, concerning false moderation, false gravity, and false liberty.

A definition is certainly a judgment, but a judgment which includes, or which engenders, all the judgments, which, at any moment whatever, may be pronounced upon an object. And reciprocally, in reuniting all the judgments which, at any moment whatever, may be pronounced upon an object, we have the definition.

We may give this name to the following propositions:—

— "Dexterity is the just distribution of the forces which we have." (*Montesquieu.*)

— "Uprightness is a purity of motive, and of intention, which gives form and perfection to virtue, and which attaches the soul to what is good, for the sake of goodness itself." (*Fléchier.*)

— "An army is a more or less considerable number of men, armed and assembled under a chief to defend their country, or in its interest to attack a foreign country."

— "Gratitude is the memory of the heart (the permanent sense of benefits received)."[2]

— "The universe is a sphere of which the centre is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere."

— "Faith is a lively representation [ὑπόστασις, "the sub-

[1] "History is the witness of times, the light of truth, the life of memory, the mistress of life, the messenger of antiquity."—ED.

[2] On the other hand, contrast with this the *partial* definition given by a wit. "Gratitude is a lively sense of favours to come;" viz. *false* gratitude.—ED.

stance"] of things hoped for, and a demonstration [ἔλεγχος] of those that are not seen." (Heb. xi. 1.)[1]

A definition may be involved in a judgment, or include an explicit judgment: "Death is the end of *that troubled dream which we call life.*"

Every discourse commences, or is thought to commence, with the definition of the object, unless it be very well known. It is almost never so. And when it is known, it is not distinctly present to the mind of the most of the hearers.[2]

[Cicero rejects formal definition, as presenting some danger by the strictness which it requires, and as savouring too much of the school; in a word, as entering with difficulty into the mind of the hearer, who has no time to pause.[3] Besides, says Marmontel, all kinds of eloquence do not require the same precautions as the forensic, in which the plaintiff and defendant must be continually on their guard, and strike and parry almost at the same time. Thus, definition . . . is less critical and less dangerous in the eulogistic, or in the deliberative kind of oratory.[4]]

But it is always necessary that the orator define the object distinctly to himself.

Definition is not only a means of clearness, an element of instruction, and the basis of argumentation: it is often also a commencement of the proof.[5] At least, the demonstration is firm and certain, in proportion as the definition has been exact and clear. Thus, the definition of the word *good*, in Rom. viii. 28: "All things work together for *good* to them that love God."

Definition is *direct*, or *indirect: direct*, when it goes straight to the idea; *indirect*, when it arrives at it by a circuit.

Direct definition may be strict, or it may be developed. In the first case, which is that of definition properly so called, it is reduced to the indispensable, care being taken that nothing is omitted. In the second, we repeat, under different forms, the

[1] See the examples of definition taken from Cicero in a note of Rollin on definition, vol. i., p. 340, from QUINTILIAN, book v., ch. x., *de Locis argumentorum.*

[2] But, says Claude, when texts are clear of themselves, and the matter well known to the hearers, it would be trifling to amuse the people with *explication.* In such cases only *observations* should be made on them.—ED.

[3] CICERO, *De Oratore*, ii. 25.

[4] MARMONTEL, *Elements de Literature*, vol. ii., article *Definition.*

[5] See QUINTILIAN, book v., ch. x.

very terms of which the definition is composed,[1] or we define them; or further, we divide the matter of each of these terms, which is just to enumerate the parts.[2]

Direct definition is sometimes *simple*, sometimes *combined*. It is combined, when it involves itself with another definition, by the bringing in combination with the subject an idea either different, or opposed, or similar, or akin, or more particular, or more general,[3] etc.[4]

Direct definition may, in fine, be descendent or ascendent. The descendent form is the more common. The ascendent, or retrogressive form, consists in constructing the idea, or, if we prefer the expression, in describing the genesis of it.

These different forms may still be combined.[5]

The following are some rules for the employment of direct definition :—

1. Do not devote to definition too much space,[6] lest you break the flow of the discourse.

[1] Example: "The world; it is the creation taken by itself, it is all that is passing, it is all that is not God."

[2] See BOURDALOUE, *Sermon upon the recompense of the Saints*, the commencement of the second part. (Edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 5.)

[3] Combined definition has the form—

a) Either of a *distinction*.—A thing is this, and not that. Thus, the world, in the sense of 1 John ii. 15, is not the whole of humanity, nor the order of the creation, nor the bustle of society. (See the definition of "courage" in the *Funeral Oration on Turenne* by FLECHIER.)

b) Or, of *exclusion*.—We define true zeal, to the exclusion of characteristics of the false. (See LE TARTUFFE, act I., scene 6.)

c) Or, of *comparison—with the like* (*assimilation*).—Remorse, repentance.

d) Or, of the *difference between the species, and the genus*.—Republic, democracy;—self-love, vanity;—justice, equity.

e) Or, of the *proof* itself of the existence of the object.

[4] See CLAUDE'S Essay, ch. vi. Texts to be discussed by way of observations: "Rise from species to genus: Remark the divers characters of a vice or a virtue: Observe the relations of one subject to another: Compare words and actions with similar words and actions: Distinguish a thing in different points of view," etc.—ED.

[5] See REINHARD, on *Perplexity* (*Sermons for* 1792), sermon ii., and MASSILLON, *Carême*, sermon on the *Immutability of the Law of God*, the commencement of the second part. (Vol. i., p. 459, edition Lefèvre.)

[6] In explaining figurative words, says Claude, give the meaning in a few words; without stopping long upon the figure, pass to the thing itself. In general, never insist long on a simple term, unless it be absolutely necessary; for to aim at saying all that can be said on a single word, is imprudent in the preacher, especially where there are many important matters in the text to be explained.

2. Avoid too subtile distinctions and classifications, which suppose in the hearer a great habit of abstraction and a delicate knowledge of language.

3. Do not have recourse, without necessity, to formal definition;[1] give it as much as possible the form of the construction or of the discussion.[2]

4. Do not seek to define everything, such as :—

a) What is well-known, and present to the mind of all.

b) Ideas which are too simple, because they are the very substance which serve for a comman basis to all our ideas, the organic molecules of thought and of discourse, something which cannot be defined, since it cannot be decomposed, and which is defined by the very *view* of the object or of the fact, not by the words.

c) Ideas which at once escape and refuse definition, on account of the elevated, or wholly moral sphere, to which they belong. Their nature is rather felt, than conceived. We define them by renewing the impression they have produced. We know them,—we see them, when we feel them.[3]—In the Bible, little is formally defined. Some ideas which are above the region of physical or moral observation, take, by analogy, the name of the relations of the visible and human world : God is the *Father* of spirits; Jesus Christ is the *Spouse* of the Church.[4] Metaphor furnishes the only name of these things.

In fine, though ideas might suffice for making us understand

Observations should not be proposed in scholastic style, nor in commonplace guise, but seasoned with a sweet urbanity, accommodated to the capacities of the people. Reduce obscure matters to a natural, popular, modern air, remote from everything forced and far-fetched. All long trains of arguments, all embarrassments of divisions and subdivisions, all metaphysical investigations, like cities in the clouds, mere creatures of fancy, are to be avoided.—Ed.

[1] If we examine the works of the masters of eloquence, we shall find that the formal definition is rarely that which they prefer. As they prove in defining, they define in proving. Their definitions rarely stop the flow of the discourse; we do not hear them say, like the defendant in the *Pleaders*,—

> ". . . Since then you permit us to take breath," etc.

[2] See Chrysostom on *Vain Glory*.

[3] The vast and philosophical sense of the word *know*, which is found in the Bible.

[4] See note 2, p. 144. "Beware of pressing metaphorical terms too far. If possible, keep to general considerations, and explain the metaphorical terms in few words, and afterwards cleave entirely to the thing itself."—Claude.—Ed.

ideas, this would not produce that lively intuition of the things, that is necessary for the great majority of minds. In that case, it is necessary to replace or complete the *direct* method, of which we have shown the different forms, by the *indirect* method, which consists in translating the idea into the facts, in such a manner that we can state or describe the idea, as we state or describe the fact. Let us only remark that this, properly speaking, does not take the place of definition, but supplements it or leads to it. On the subject of ideas, it is only the abstract terms that can be exact. We may define the idea :—

1. By its external symptoms or its manifestations.[1]

2. By individualization or concrete form (personification), shunning, however, the abuse of representation.[2]

3. By historical examples ;— *Via brevis per exempla.* None of them, perhaps, correspond, line for line, to the idea ; but by taking, in each of the facts, what they have in common, and leaving the rest, we form the idea. It is not even necessary to cite many of them.[3] But the fact cited must define, and the essential elements of the idea must distinctly appear in it.[4]

4. By recalling a situation, or an experience of the hearers themselves, definition becomes dramatic.[5]

5. By bringing the orator himself into the scene, who places himself in the situation, of which he wishes to give an idea :— " I know not," says Pascal, " who has sent me into the world,

[1] See the description of *pride* in BOURDALOUE, *Thoughts on divers subjects of Religion and Morality.* Edition Lefèvre, vol. iii., p. 416.

[2] See the description of the penitent, by MASSILLON, *Carême, Sermon on the small number of the Elect.* Edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 302.

[3] Abraham and Lot. Alexander and his physician, [greatness of soul.] So the anecdote related by Diderot, of a curate who, having been very urgent with an officer, to engage him to contribute to a collection for the poor of his parish, received a box on the ear, and insisted anew, by saying, "That is for me ; now for my poor ?"

[So the sentiment of the negro, who, being interrogated as to the motives which induced him to bestow his cares upon an old man, replied :] " Massa, he is my enemy." See Heb. xi. 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29.

[4] The majority are more affected by truths set forth in living examples, than in the abstract. So Holy Scripture proposes to our faith not merely doctrine, but a Person who is the object of faith, and the embodiment, in Himself and His offices, of all saving truth.—ED.

[5] See BOSSUET, *First Sermon for the Feast of All Saints* (*Sermons choisis*, p. 493); and GERMOND, in the *Collection of Sermons by divers evangelical Ministers of the Canton de Vaud*, p. 246.

nor what the world is, nor what I myself am. I am in awful ignorance of all things. I know not what my body is, what my senses, or my soul; this very part of me which thinks what I speak, which reflects upon everything and upon itself, knows itself as little as the rest of me. I behold these frightful spaces of the universe which surround me, and I find myself chained to a corner of this vast extent, without knowing why I am placed here, rather than elsewhere, nor why the little time that is given me to live has been assigned to me at this point, rather than at another, of the whole eternity which precedes me, and of that which is to come after me. I see nothing but infinities on all sides, which enclose me as an atom, and as a shadow which only endureth for a little, and then is gone for ever. All I know is, that I must shortly die; but that of which I am most ignorant is this very death, which I cannot escape."[1]

6. By a parable. [Jesus Christ often employed this form of instruction, and it would seem to be one of the best for us also, if we could resist the desire to employ wit in it. Moreover, the parable is only a prolongation of the metaphor, which we must always make use of, in explaining great matters. If the literal expression is finite, the metaphor is infinite. There are things which we cannot comprehend, except by the excitement of the imagination.[2]]

We avoid the formal definition, but we do not suppress, nor mutilate, the definition; often, all this is only to introduce it: and whatever be done, at the very time that the preacher seems least occupied with the care of defining, he uses all his efforts to

[1] Pascal, *Thoughts*, part ii., article ii. of the old editions; vol. ii., p. 9, edition Faugére.

Witsius, *Devero Theologo*, says, When the preacher has not only heard something, but seen, and handled, and tasted of the word of life, and has been taught, not by mere speculation, but by actual experience, what he has thus found out, he can apply to every case from his own knowledge of what is suitable to each: Isa. l. 4. So Paul happily refers to his own experience, Rom. vii.; Phil. iii.; 1 Tim. i. 12–15. Such addresses touch a responsive chord in the hearts of the hearers. So also sketches of different classes drawn from the results of observation in our pastoral ministry are peculiarly effective; this style of preaching enables us to apply appropriate remedies to the several individual cases.—Ed.

[2] Parable of Ephraim Syrus.—Bridaine, quoted by Maury, *Eloquence of the Pulpit*, xx. See also, in the *Discourses on some Religious Subjects*, the discourse entitled, *The Three Awakenings*.

give directly or indirectly, a distinct notion, a vivid intuition of the idea.

As far as it is possible, the definition should awaken, and set in motion, all the free and lively energies of the soul. The perfect definition would be that which should make the hearer at once know, comprehend, feel, and believe.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PROOF.

We have defined, we have not yet *judged;* for the definition adds nothing to the object, it only names it. We must proceed to consider the judgment.

Every judgment which is not a pure and immediate intuition of the mind, presupposes or demands a proof.

The proof, as an act, consists in reconciling the judgment, which is in question, with another judgment already pronounced, —already obtained to our conviction; the one of these judgments implies the other; this is common to every species of demonstration.

But although every judgment supposes, and ought to be in readiness to produce its proof, may not the preacher enunciate judgments without producing the proofs for them? May he not, in certain cases, confine himself to the simple and direct affirmation? Doubtless; and he must even frequently speak thus to his auditory, the proof being understood. But, at present, we have nothing to say regarding those judgments which are not preceded by explicit proof. With respect to the form, it is sufficient to apply to them what we have already said of the forms of definition.

It is then less of the judgment, than of the proof, that we have to speak.

The proof is the intellectual act, by which the fact of certainty is established in our minds.

The definition destroys relative ignorance; the proof puts an end to doubt. By the first, we know; by the second, we believe.

It is necessary to distinguish two orders of truths: the *speculative*, and the *practical*. But both orders are alike established by proof.

The proof, in regard to both of these, produces conviction, which is that state, in which we cannot any longer deny either the fact, or the right, without in a manner denying ourselves. For the proof consists in opposing, as it were, to the hearer his own signature,[1] that is to say, his concession of some truth, more general or previously proved, in which the truth to be proved is found included, or from which it necessarily flows.

If the thing to be proved is a matter of fact, the arguments (means, instruments of proof) are called *reasons;* if it is a matter of right or of duty, they are *motives*. To acknowledge the fact, or the right, is to confess that the one and the other are conformable to the idea of the true which is in us, or that they are implied in a truth, which we already hold as certain and indisputable. This is what the preacher, in the first place, wishes to effect, not only in regard to the fact, but in regard to the right. This is the result which, in both cases, is called *conviction*.

Persuasion, which comes afterwards, or the inclination of the will towards such or such an act, is necessary, but neither more nor less so than conviction; and if the preacher does not think he has attained his object, unless conviction result in persuasion, no more does he imagine that he has attained it, if he has persuaded without convincing.

Let us look first only at the means of producing conviction; but let us remark, that what we here separate, the orator does not usually separate,[2] and that he endeavours to produce at once conviction and persuasion.

§ I.—Proof properly so called, or Reasons.

Whether it has to be proved that a thing is, or to prove that a thing ought to be, there are three ways of arriving at certainty: immediate *experience; testimony*, which is the experience of others,

[1] Comp. John iii. 33, v. 39, 46.—Ed.

[2] The preacher has this peculiar difficulty to contend with, that he may convince the understanding, and yet not persuade the will, which is the ultimate end aimed at. Demonstrations as irrefragable as those in Euclid, even if attainable, would fail to give saving knowledge, whilst the will is opposed to the truth: John vii. 17. The *will to do* is the preliminary condition of *knowing* in this case.—Ed.

and which is called authority, when the credibility of the witness is beyond doubt; lastly, *reasoning*, which is the testimony of the reason (of our reason), not of the senses, and which connects together the truths acquired by means of experience, or of authority, and makes them fruitful through their mutual relations.[1]

The first rank, in preaching, seems to belong to *authority*, or to testimony that is worthy of belief; though these words, "worthy of belief," presuppose the employment of experience, and even of reasoning. What gives the first rank to authority is, that the doctrine which the preacher teaches is a revealed doctrine.[2]

Nevertheless, if authority, in matters of preaching, were all, or next to all, preaching would be reduced to nothing, or next to nothing.

Experience and reasoning are joined to authority in the pulpit, not to prove the authenticity of the document, which is no part of the question, nor to supplement it, since the certainty which springs from this testimony is not a half-certainty; but because, subjectively, and regard being had to the ultimate end proposed, no proof is sufficient in this sphere, unless the internal testimony is joined to it,[3] and because the declarations of the Bible are often only starting-points for the reason.

It is necessary that our vanquished foes [our hearers, heretofore in the ranks of the prince of this world] should become our allies; short of this, we have gained nothing.

Experience and reasoning have therefore much to do here.

The pulpit does not produce experiences; but it renews them, by recalling them.[4]

The object of proof by *experience*, or by facts, is, 1st, to prove contingent facts; which takes place either by means of anterior facts (*à priori*), or by means of posterior facts (*à posteriori*); 2d, to prove general or generic facts; which takes place by means of individual facts, more or less numerous, belonging to the genus or species in question; 3d, to prove a principle or an idea (the idea is the law of the facts); which takes place when, by means of an action, a personal being, invested with authority in our

[1] See BOURDALOUE, vol. i., p. 149, old edition.

[2] John v. 32, 36, 43.—ED.

[3] John iv. 42.—ED.

[4] 1 Cor. xiv. 24, 25, "Thus are the secrets of his heart made manifest," etc.—ED.

eyes, has sanctioned the principle (this returns to testimony), or when the facts, without being actions, reveal an idea; but this supposes the conviction, previously established, of the unity of truth, or of the unity of the thought which has created the universe.

The proof by *experience* is the most accessible,—the most popular, but it is that, the abuse of which is the most frequent, and the most to be dreaded.[1] When we have said: "This is a fact," we think we have said everything; this cuts short; what can be replied to a fact? Two things: 1. It is not true;—2. It is not conclusive.

The prejudice in favour of proof by experience, may end in making the testimony of reason, and of conscience, to be undervalued. On the other hand, we no longer believe the truth, when we no longer believe the external facts.

Here is mooted the perpetual controversy between men of theory and men of practice, [a controversy in which, taking it in its extreme terms,] there is error on both sides. It would be equally unjust, not to be willing to descend to facts, and not to be willing to ascend to principles. What is a principle, but a primordial, elementary fact, or it may be a truth of conscience? I would distrust facts, as much as ideas.

We have spoken of the principal uses of experience in the proof. It remains for us to make some citations, to show under what principal forms the proof by experience is presented.

Massillon, wishing to prove, that the life men commonly live cannot be a Christian life, says that the saints have in all ages been singular persons.[2] Here experience proves a principle.

Saurin wishes to prove to his hearers, that they give very little. He reminds them of what was done by the Jews, and the first

[1] For instance, Hume's notorious antithesis, "That it is contrary to experience that miracles should be true, but it is not contrary to experience that testimony should be false." The word *experience* is here ambiguous. It is intended to be understood of *universal* experience: but in this sense, it is begging the question at issue, which is, whether a miracle was *ever* experienced. The Christian admits that it is not a matter of *general* experience, for then it would cease to be a miracle; but he maintains, that this *want* of general experience is not inconsistent with the reality of miracles when performed for an adequate end and attested by adequate testimony. See Paley, *Evid.*, Beginning. One-sided facts, and the losing sight of *all* the facts of a case, lead to most erroneous conclusions, under the plausible plea of experience.—Ed.

[2] Massillon, *Carême, Sermon on the small number of the Elect*, vol. i., p. 306, edition Lefèvre. [See 1 Pet. ii. 9, iv. 4.]

Christians.[1] This is proving directly a general fact, and, by means of this general fact, a principle.

The proof by experience may be found by turns in what is remote from, or in what is near to the hearer, in facts that are foreign, or in facts that are personal to him,[2] in Biblical or in profane history; in what is known, and what is unknown to him.[3] In fine, sometimes it is better to multiply the examples, to call forth "a cloud of witnesses" (which Massillon and Saurin are fond of doing); sometimes it is better to confine ourselves to one only, which we develop, and which we thoroughly examine.

[As to the first point, it might seem, that there was no room for hesitation, and that the preacher must always take his examples in what is near to his hearer, rather than fetch them from a distance. This principle, however, is not absolutely true, and the one or the other procedure is advantageous, according to the circumstances, according to the auditory, and according to the object which we have in view. If the facts that are passing near the hearer touch him particularly, remote facts may, however, strike him more forcibly, by making him see that a truth remains the same in all ages, in all places, and perhaps in all conditions. Besides, though religion has not for its object to extend our ideas, it nevertheless tends to it, and it is a tendency which we must not neglect. The narrowness, or the falsehood, of the opinions of many persons arises from the want of terms of comparison, especially among the less refined class. Add to this, that the facts which are taken as examples, too near the hearer, are rarely seen in a proper light; the contemplative faculty requires a calm, which is frequently disturbed when it fixes upon objects too near. Contemporary literature belongs only to real life, not to pure literature; it will do so afterwards. In the mean time, he who wishes to give himself a literary culture, must have recourse to

[1] SAURIN, *Sermon on Alms*, vol. ii., p. 27, new edition.

[2] [SAURIN, in the sermon on the *Harmony between Religion and Politics*, vol. viii., p. 24, new edition, takes an example in the facts which are near to his hearers. In the third sermon on the *Deferring of Conversion*, vol. i., p. 109, new edition, he commences with scriptural examples, in order to arrive in this way at personal examples.]

[3] Before the unlearned, it is better to take one's illustrations and proofs from what is known to them, or at least to introduce sparingly what is unknown. CLAUDE observes, Reasoning may be overstrained by heaping great numbers of proofs; which are intolerable, except in a principal matter, likely to be controverted: Take care not to charge your sermon with too much matter.—ED.

ancient literature. In the same manner, ancient history, precisely because it is ancient, is more instructive than contemporary history.[1] The same observations may be applied to examples drawn from facts that are more or less personal to the hearers. Here, the danger consists in occupying the hearer with himself, with his own personality, or with some other thing which is brought upon the stage. This danger should not make us renounce evident advantages; but the preacher requires great circumspection in a case of this kind, and much tact and gravity in treating of such delicate matters. As to examples drawn from profane history, we do not see why they should be banished from preaching. The men only are profane, the facts are not; and the example of Regulus might certainly be usefully quoted for Christian instruction.[2]]

Reasoning.—The proof by authority, or by experience, verifies a fact, and adheres to it. This fact, in regard to the proof by reasoning, is only a starting-point. By reason, we discover another fact, involved in this first fact. The knowledge obtained by reasoning is not without relation to faith; it, at least, rests upon faith in the principles of reason.

Pure reasoning deals with ideas, and not with facts. It is a kind of geometry of intellectual space. This geometry, however, is less sure than the other, the value of the signs which it employs being less unalterable. It is, for this reason, that it is necessary not to perform the whole journey across the void, but to descend frequently to the earth, to set the foot upon facts.

[1] Viz., owing to the reader's greater freedom from passion and prejudice in the case of ancient, than in that of contemporaneous history. "History is philosophy teaching by examples." Livy, *Pref.*, says, Hoc illud est præcipuè in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in illustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuæque reipublicæ, quod imitere, capias; inde fædum inceptu, fædum exitu, quod vites.—Ed.

[2] Fertur pudicæ conjugis osculum,
Parvosque natos, ut capitis minor,
Ab se removisse, et virilem
Torvus humi posuisse vultum:
Donec labantes consilio patres
Firmaret auctor nunquam aliàs dato,
Interque mærentes amicos
Egregius properaret exul.
Atqui sciebat, quæ sibi barbarus
Tortor pararet, etc.—Horace, *Carm.*, iii. 5.—Ed.

Otherwise, we are in danger of proving too much, and of losing at length the feeling of reality. At the end of the strictest reasonings, when the reason of the hearer appears vanquished, something with which he is more intimate than logic, rises within him, and protests against your conclusions.

[There are some intellects that logic renders ferocious; they are no longer souls, they are dialectical machines. Thought also may be rendered brutish, being separated from sentiment, from conscience, and from testimony. This is the impression which is sometimes produced upon us, by the contemplation of those powerful logicians whom we admire with terror. Believe neither the senses nor the intellect, believe the soul.[1]

[To return to the preacher, he also runs into dangers in this quarter: he may arrive by dialectics at impossible, even absurd results. Bourdaloue, in his admirable sermon upon *Impurity*, has gone too far, in wishing to establish, that the voluptuous man is more covered with darkness, than the devils; he might have simply said that, having his eyes opened in hell, the sinner will suffer more. In the same manner, a modern professor, very distinguished in other respects, has passed the bounds of moderation, when, after having shown that all sins are equal, he tries to prove besides, that little sins are even greater than great ones. —There is a great difference between logical dexterity and the feeling of reality. We may be rigorously dialectic, and yet wanting in good sense, and Pascal was right in distinguishing, as he does, in two places, betwixt the method of the geometricians, and common sense.]

Even though we should run no risk of being deceived, still our entire object would not be attained. On one side, we should have obtained the submission, rather than the adherence of the hearer: we should not have made of the vanquished an ally, which is the true victory;—on the other side, the truth which ought to unite itself to man by its very substance,—to become consubstantial with him,—would remain without him.

Besides, if reasoning is too much prolonged,—too dialectic,—

[1] One is reminded of the poor old woman's answer to an infidel, You have been trying to persuade me, that the Bible is a bad book. All your reasonings are clever, I dare say: but if you were to try ever so cleverly to persuade me, that *honey is not sweet*, I should not believe you. The Spirit within appreciates the spiritual food given from above: Ps. xix. 10, cxix. 103.—Ed.

it wearies the attention, and goes beyond the bounds of that measure of it, which may be commonly obtained.[1]

However, the domain of reasoning is very extensive, first, because there are many things, which we only arrive at the knowledge of in this way; secondly, because we must prove what is known and believed, not precisely in order to make it known and believed, but in order to render the proofs of the truth more present to the mind. Even in the case, in which argument seems superfluous, it may be of great advantage, since it has not so much for its object to prove a thing which we do not yet believe, as to fill the mind with its evidence, and to add, so to speak, to the clearness of it.[2]

It is necessary, therefore, to reason, and even to reason much. But this, true as it is, does not destroy the following rules:—

1. Prefer the shortest road in each of the arguments you employ.
2. Employ, in preference, the most popular arguments.[3]
3. Avoid a too formal argumentation.

[1] "Ne quid nimis," should be the rule.—Ed.

[2] "Let a man, alive to eloquence, and accustomed to the genius of Demosthenes, read over the fourteenth Provincial, the famous letter upon homicide. Pascal first shuts up his adversaries between corrupted religion and outraged humanity: he then advances against them by a progression slow and inevitable, always descending from the highest principles, supporting himself upon all the sacred authorities, and carrying the scruples of the most rigorous logic into the demonstration of the most manifest truths. He employs, so to speak, for the defeat of his enemies, a superabundance of force, and we see him retain them so long under the sword of his eloquence, less for the purpose of refuting, than of making them a kind of living sermon. Every time he finishes an argument, the cause is gained; but he recommences, in order to drag his vanquished adversaries through all the humiliations of their error."—Villemain.

[3] "What is the true ground of eloquence, if it is not *common* place? When eloquence is combined with the highest philosophical considerations, such as modern ages furnish us with examples of, we are at first tempted to attribute to philosophy the impression we have just received: but eloquence is something more popular; . . . it is the power of making to vibrate within us the primitive chords of the soul; whatever it has that is more simply human, lies in this, and in no other thing, that we recognise the orator."—Vinet, *Chrestomathie française*, vol. iii., Reflections occasioned by the *Discours de Royer Collard sur le projet de loi relatif au sacrilége.*

Avoid philosophical and historical observations, and all such as belong to rhetoric, or if you do use them, do not insist on them, and choose only those, which either give some light to the text, or heighten its pathos and beauty; all others must be rejected.—Claude, *Essay.*—Ed.

Argumentation may be affirmative or negative, simple or complex, direct or indirect.

I. *Argumentation affirmative and negative.*—Affirmative argumentation proves the truth; negative argumentation refutes error.

Refutation, in general, is not sufficient without the proof, and does not stand for the proof. [We are more ready to refute, than to prove, to destroy than to build up. The former is more easy, more flattering to our self-love, more in accordance with our natural passions. Every person is eloquent when he is angry, few are so in their love, or when they are tranquil. For the pulpit, affirmative argumentation is of incomparable value. In morality and religion, the certainty of truth is much more important, than the refutation of error. Whence arises the hatred of evil in the Christian soul?—from the affirmation of the good, as every one knows who has enjoyed the experience of Divine grace.[1] This ought to be realised in preaching: it is not enough to clear the ground of error; for the Christian life is not a *vacuum*, but a *plenum*.] What Quintilian says of the greater difficulty of refutation, *Difficilius est defendere quam accusare*,[2] is true of the pleading, not of the sermon. [Nevertheless, it is necessary to abound in the proof; when we have proved, the refutation is already far advanced. The proof should absorb the error. Even in Christian conversations we must rather seek to absorb error, than to refute it, and endeavour to conquer, without being obliged to pursue the fugitives. Taking things strictly, he who has proved has finished; he is not obliged to refute the objections. He may claim this right, *summum jus*, but not avail himself of it. The light alone can swallow up the darkness; we should "overcome evil with good." (Rom. xii. 21.) Yes; but we must condescend to the weaknesses, and the necessities of our brethren, which are also our weaknesses and our necessities. God, in order to bring us back to truth, has been obliged to overturn within us many of the idols of our heart and of our understanding; He has destroyed much, and refuted much, before proving; He has disabused us of our prejudices, before showing us His glory; many souls have been brought to a relish for the truth, by being disgusted with earthly things.[3] What God has done, we ought to do.] The proof has

[1] Rom. xii. 9; Ps. cxix. 103, 104.—Ed.

[2] Quintilian, book v., cap. xiii.

[3] Hos. ii. 6, 7; Luke xv. 17, 18.—Ed.

often need of refutation as a kind of supplement, and even a kind of complement. [It often happens that a simple refutation becomes a proof in the mind of the hearer.] There are even cases in which the refutation suffices, without the proof, when the subject admits of its being understood. Some have composed very seasonable discourses, consisting wholly of refutation.[1]

We recommend before everything, in the refutation, a perfect honesty.[2] [This is a rule of morality, of prudence, and of art. The surprise, and the species of terror, which will be felt on hearing the objection, will turn to joy after the refutation. Confidence in the orator will be augmented by it. In this respect, Saurin is a model. There is with him a courage in the statement of objections which must produce a powerful effect.[3]]

Next to this, it is of importance to determine accurately the sense, and the extent of the objection. [We are not so rigorous towards ourselves in the pulpit as we ought to be. We are in danger of taking, at an abatement, certain rules which the other kinds of eloquence do not permit to be transgressed. The pulpit enjoys a privilege as injurious, as it is advantageous; it is that there are no debates, no reply possible or admitted, and such as we are, we have need of them. Having none to contradict us in the temple [house of God], we ought to prescribe to ourselves so much the greater strictness in our argumentation. Saurin is an excellent model in this respect. We might even imagine sometimes, that he carries strictness to excess.]

In all cases in which this appears necessary we must divide the difficulty. Usually, the refutation gains by the division of the objection. [It rarely happens that a single reply can crush

[1] This is the case with the sermon of Massillon on *Fasting*, and with his conference on *Zeal for the Salvation of Souls*. We might find as many beautiful examples in Bourdaloue, and in Saurin.

[2] Comp. Job xiii. 7, "Will ye speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for Him?"—Ed.

[3] See the first part of his second sermon on the *Delay of Conversion*, vol. i., new edition. [So of modern divines Archbishop Whately may be referred to as one who states an adversary's argument with the greatest fairness, and in its fullest force. Claude says, Objections must be proposed without rhetorical exaggerations, yet not unadorned or unaffecting: Also, after stating them, never defer the answers to them till another opportunity: answer them directly, forcibly, and fully.—Ed.]

at once and directly all the parts of error. Orators such as Bourdaloue and Massillon,[1] have perhaps carried this too far; but when this proceeding is employed with moderation, the refutation gains much by it. The hearer sees you conqueror several times in succession; he perceives, that there were several errors on the other side, and several truths on yours. If we ignore the contradictor that exists in the minds of the hearers, we shall always be feeble: in a sermon there is need of a discussion.[2]]

In fine, we must be able to assume the offensive, and to turn, if possible, the objection into a proof. [The defensive, when prolonged, enfeebles us, and to defend ourselves with advantage, we must become the assailants. The great preachers have never neglected this rule. In the error which we analyse, or attack, we ought to find the very germs of the truth.[3]]

II. *Argumentation simple, and complex (or graduated).*—Here we do not distinguish between the mere external forms of reasoning, or the figures of logic, such as the syllogism, the enthymeme, and the dilemma: the syllogism, an ideal form which is very rarely brought forward; the enthymeme, which is the most frequent; the dilemma, a truly oratorical form. The forms which we have in view are less external, and affect rather the very foundation of the thought. This being granted, we distinguish:—

1. The proof *à priori*, or descendent, which, from the given principle, descends to the consequence, which proves the fact by its cause, or by its nature; and *à posteriori*, or ascendent, which, from the known consequence, endeavours to rise towards the principle,—which proves the theory by its effects. I prove *à priori*, that lying is hateful to God, because He is a God of truth; I prove it *à posteriori*, by the manifestations which God has given of His abhorrence of lying. I prove *à priori*, that

[1] Bourdaloue, second part of the sermon on *Alms* (edition Lefèvre, vol. ii., page 80); and Massillon, sermon on the *Truth of a Future State* (edition Lefèvre, vol. i., page 167).

[2] Every article of religion has been disputed. He, who determines to teach nothing but what is uncontroverted, will teach nothing at all. But the wise preacher will refute, not all possible objections, but only such as are likely to exist in the minds of his particular hearers. He will, moreover, "speak the truth in love." To win souls to Christ will be his ruling motive.—Ed.

[3] See the sermon of Saurin on *Alms* and the *Conferences* of Massillon.

avarice is idolatry, by the very nature of avarice; and I prove it *à posteriori*, by its effects, which are the same as those of idolatry, properly so called. I prove *à priori*, that bad company is destructive, because everything belonging to it leads to evil; and I prove it *à posteriori*, by examples. "He has been aided by God, for he had sought His aid;" or again: "He has been aided by God, for he has done what cannot be done without God."[1]]

2. *Analytic* argumentation, and *synthetic* argumentation. According to the first form, I enunciate the truth which I wish to prove; and in decomposing it, whether into its parts, or into its effects, I prove it: according to the other method, I gradually construct this truth out of the elements which enter into its composition.

The last procedure is not very suitable for the pulpit. It is certain that, when we have to exercise over the intelligence a species of constraint,—when we have no other object than to reduce an adversary to silence,—this method, to which Socrates has left his name, may be employed very advantageously. We meet with it in several of the discourses of our Lord; but it is interesting to remark, that He makes use of it to confound His dishonest adversaries, rather than to instruct well-disposed hearers.[2] Whatever captiousness or insidiousness[3] belongs to it, is perfectly adapted to the dispositions of a mind destitute of benevolence and sincerity, that would not fail to harden itself against the truth, if presented to it at the outset. In this respect, such a method is not necessary to the preacher. He cannot consider his adversaries as dishonest hearers, as enemies whom he has to entangle in his skilfully prepared nets. Their presence in the place of worship discovers, in the most of them, something different from malevolent dispositions; those who might have such dispositions, as they cannot be distinguished in the assembly, nor personally assailed, cannot be confounded, since they have not attacked; nor reduced to silence, since they have not broken it. Besides, the design of the preacher is revealed or betrayed by his text. And, in fine, this is not the best means of disarm-

[1] The former an instance of the *à priori* method: the latter, *à posteriori*. Comp. the instance, John viii. 47.—Ed.

[2] See Matt. xxi. 23–25, xxii. 15–21, 42–45.—Ed.

[3] This is not the case for saying: *Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat?*—Virgil, *Æneid*, ii. 390.

ing malevolence. It is necessary to testify confidence even in those who do not deserve it. Let us add, that this method almost necessarily excludes eloquence.

Under these different forms, argumentation is simple, or elementary, when, with more or less force, it confines itself to proving the truth of one proposition, or the falsehood of another. The different sentiments or moral effects, which may result from the proof, namely, indignation, joy, courage, do not thus come into consideration. But when the proof becomes complicated, or is reinforced by another element; when the proof accentuates itself, so to speak,—becomes more subtle or sharp-edged; when the truth, or the error, impersonal in their nature, becomes a personal fact; when the adversary finds himself placed less betwixt truth and error, than betwixt error and the first principles of good sense or of instinct,—then argumentation, elementary as it was, becomes *complex* or *graduated;* it includes an element, which it cannot include, without ceasing to be complete. Perhaps there is but one of its essential elements, to which we give prominence, or place in relief, as a stone cut to increase its brilliancy.

The first of the forms of combined argumentation is the *reductio ad absurdum*, the reduction either to the contradictory, or to the odious.

All reasoning is, by implication, a *reductio ad absurdum*, since, if it is just, it ought always to reduce the hearer to the alternative, either to accept the conclusions, or to deny some truth of evidence, or of common sense. It is always to this, that the reasoner endeavours to bring us; it is to this extremity that he would drive us. The *reductio ad absurdum*, therefore, only becomes a particular of argumentation, when, adopting by supposition the thesis which we deny, we deduce from it everything which it contains, that is to say, its very object, or its principle, or its consequences. This is to force error to refute itself. It is to employ the swan to hatch the eggs of the vulture, or of the raven. It is to let the weeds grow until the harvest, in order that we may see from the ear of what kind was the seed sown.

A very simple and short method of reducing to the absurd is, to bring the idea to its most naked expression, discarding the illusion of words, to call the object by its true name: but what is its true name? Upon this we may not be agreed, and the abuse

of the means employed for the purpose may be very great. "What is a throne?" said Napoleon; "a piece of velvet stretched upon four pieces of wood." The periphrasis, which we oppose to the true name, is frequently the true name. Voltaire makes a Quaker say: "Our God, who has commanded us to love our enemies and to suffer without murmuring, does not wish, doubtless, that we should cross the sea to murder our brothers, because murderers clad in scarlet, with a cap two feet high, enlist citizens by making a noise on an ass's skin well stretched."

The whole artifice of the *Persanes Lettres* consists in making things to be named and described by people, who know not the conventional names and the current notions of them; [the Pope appears there under the denomination of mufti, the monk under that of dervish.]

We conceive that this method is not very suitable for the pulpit.[1]

The most regular and least suspected form consists in showing the characteristics of the object, its principles, and its consequences. Diogenes made a *reductio ad absurdum* in action, when he threw before Plato a plucked cock. It is not often necessary to pluck the cock, that is, to strip the object of all the adventitious ideas which have been gradually joined to it by the influence of time; to translate a case with which habit has familiarized us into another, upon which habit has not yet exercised this influence; to show the perfect identity of that which we reject, with that which we receive.[2]

[The second form of complex or graduated argumentation, is the argument *ad hominem*.]—We might also say, that all argu-

[1] Jests and quaint comparisons are kindred evils to this; all alike being inconsistent with the grave and earnest dignity which becomes the pulpit.—Ed.

[2] Examples of *reductio ad absurdum*:—

a) By the *characteristics of the object:* The discourse of Mirabeau on *Bankruptcy*, vol. i. 399.

b) By *the principles* or *the consequences:*

Cicero, *For Milo*, vii.

Massillon, Sermon on the *Truth of a Future State*, edition Méquignon, vol. ii., p. 249.

Massillon, Sermon on *Human Respect*, vol. iii., p. 199.

Bourdaloue, *Carême*, i., old edition, p. 149.

Pascal, *Thoughts*, part ii. article ii., small edition of Bure, vol. ii., p. 17.

Lammenais, *Importance of Religion with respect to God.* (*Chrestomathie*, vol iii., p. 178, third edition.)

ments are *ad hominem*, or that the argument *ad hominem* is comprehended in every argument, in this sense, that we avail ourselves, against the hearer, of that in which he agrees with us, at least tacitly.

But what especially constitutes the argument *ad hominem* is, the appealing to everything that has been done, or said, out of the discussion, by the person whom we wish to convince, or refute.

The name, argument *ad hominem*, is commonly given to several things, which must be distinguished from it. Thus: to make a reference to a personal remembrance of the hearers;[1]—to create in the hearer an interest agreeable to the sense of our conclusion;[2]—to argue from the morals of an adversary against his doctrine, to oppose his opinion to his character. This brings us to a general and delicate question. Is a doctrine responsible for the character of those who profess and maintain it? It would be foolish to say, in every case and absolutely: "This man is dishonest, therefore his opinions are false." Though it might be true, that truth itself is adulterated and corrupted in depraved hearts, it would not be the less contrary to all good logic, to condemn an opinion or a principle, on account of the not very honourable or trustworthy character of him who professes it. We must, on the contrary, separate these things. We must, indeed, say: *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes;* but we must view apart, the one and the other, the idea and the man.[3] I would willingly say with Mirabeau: "It has been proposed to you to decide the question, by the comparison of those who maintain the affirmative with those who maintain the negative. . . . I shall not follow this example."[4]

However, when we are convinced that a doctrine is false, we are fully permitted to judge of the tree by its fruits, and to make it to be previously suspected by the life which flows from

[1] See 2 Cor. vii. 9–11.

[2] The "sans dot" of Harpagon.

[3] Yet Christ saith, "Beware of false prophets—Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" etc. Matt. vii. 15–18. This argument may be lawfully used, if not made too universal in its application. A man may hold true opinions, and yet not follow them in practice. Or he may maintain them, as a hypocrite: as some who preach, Do as I say, not as I do.—Ed.

[4] Mirabeau, *Discourse on the right of Peace and of War.*

it, or to confirm the evil which we have said of it, by the evil which it produces.

All this, however, is not the argument *ad hominem*. The following are two things to which I give this name:—

1st, To place the adversary in direct contradiction with the words which he has pronounced, or the acts which he has performed.—Let us be well understood. This method would be dishonest, if it were abused. It does not follow that, because a man has not always believed a thing, he is wrong in believing it now. To reproach a man with a change of opinion, is very often to reproach him with making progress. If he has not dissembled this change, we cannot employ it against him.—But we may represent to a man his speeches and acts, as a testimony which he has given, in other circumstances, to the truth which he now rejects,—while we suppose that then he was better informed, less prejudiced, and in better circumstances to form a right judgment. Thus we often recall to him an honourable recollection, which exhorts and reproves, without humiliating him.[1]

2d, To show to the hearer, that the opinion which he has, necessarily contains in it that which he has not; thus to seize upon, in order to turn against him, a weapon which he has unconsciously or involuntarily furnished.[2] But may we do so, whether we do, or do not, share in this opinion? whether we do, or do not, take it in the sense in which the hearer takes it?

If, while not sharing it, the use that we made of it would imply that we do share it, we should certainly be wrong.—But you will say, what can we make, in an argumentation, of an opinion which we neither hold, nor represent, as true? This we can do: we can show the dishonesty of our opponent, who ought to have been led by his opinion, whether true or false, to the conclusion to which we are drawing him, but who does not carry out his

[1] Examples: Iphigénie to Agamemnon: "Mon père," etc.—Racine, *Iphigénie*, act iv., scene iv.

Burrhus to Nero: "Ah! de vos premiers ans," etc.—Racine, *Britannicus*, act iv., scene iii.

Cicero, *pro Ligario*, chap. xi.

Flavien to Theodosius: "Mais est-il besoin de rappeler," etc.—See Villemain, *Mélanges*, vol. iii.

Pélisson to Louis XIV.—Peroration of the second discourse to the king for M. Fouquet.—(See the fragment in the *Chrestomathie Française*, vol. ii., p. 254, third edition.)

[2] "Tuo gladio te jugulo."—Terence.—Ed.

principle to all its consequences, or who applies it in a contrary sense, or who has not seriously formed his opinion and allowed it to engender its consequences.[1]

It will be remarked, with regard to the employment of this method in the pulpit, that a church possesses but few facts, or speeches, which are distinctly peculiar to it, and which can be urged against it: the adversary to be confounded is human nature.

In the second place, the use of this method, dangerous everywhere, would be especially so in the pulpit.

The parable may be regarded as a form of argument *ad hominem*.[2]

III. *Direct and indirect Argumentation.*—Argumentation is direct, when we draw the proof either from the nature of the object, from its causes, from its effects, or, in fine, from experience and from authority. Hitherto we have viewed it only in this light.—It is indirect or lateral, when we proceed to seek some fact which is neither the object itself, nor the cause, nor the effect, but which, nevertheless, cannot be admitted without admitting also the fact which is in question.

The human mind is so formed, that it often prefers the reflection of the light to the light itself, the echo of the voice to the voice. If we examine ourselves, we shall see that, in almost all discussions, we are carried rapidly, and without our perceiving it, towards the indirect proof. In every kind of discussion, man submits the most readily to indirect constraint; the final judgment, which results from a syllogism, is a kind of judgment by constraint; I do not think that it is necessary to indulge this inclination without reserve, as it is not always exempt from weakness: I think, minds must be accustomed to look the truth in the face, to seek the truth on its own ground, and not on that of a third party: but it is also of importance, that we should see (and this is the property of indirect or lateral argumentation) from how many sides at once the light comes, that all things

[1] Thus may be explained: Matt. xii. 27, "If I, by Beelzebub," etc.;—Luke xix. 22, "Thou wicked servant," etc.;—1 Cor. xv. 29, "Else what shall they do that are baptized for the dead," etc.;—Acts xvii. 23, "For as I passed by," etc.; ver. 28, 29, "For in Him we live," etc.; John vii. 22, 23, "Moses gave unto you circumcision," etc.

[2] Beautiful example furnished by Bridaine, after the example of the prophet Nathan.—See MAURY, *Eloquence de la chaire*, xx.

concur in proving what is true, that truth is related to everything, that "all things answer to each other." (Prov. xvi. 4.)[1] It is to this, as to the impression from surprise, that the special virtue of indirect argumentation is owing.

Let us add, that there are subjects in which direct argumentation is almost impossible, whether on account of the evidence of the object, or on account of its too great simplicity; that there are others, on the contrary, in which it is very possible, and very appropriate.[2]

If we wish to see how much, in certain subjects, the indirect proof is superior to the other, we may compare the two sermons, of Saurin, and of Massillon, on *The Divinity of Jesus Christ.* In the discourse of Massillon, the proof of the dogma is drawn from the *splendour* of the ministry of Jesus Christ, and from the *spirit* of this ministry, in this sense, that all this splendour is a meaningless thing and a contradiction, and that all this spirit belies itself, if Jesus Christ is not God. The plan of Saurin is as follows: I. Jesus Christ supremely adorable, and supremely adored, according to the Scripture. II. Contradiction between this fact and the idea that Jesus Christ is not God, since there is none but God, to whom all that precedes is suitable. (This should not be a second part, but the conclusion, of the first; Saurin also has completed it only by an incidental discussion.) III. Our ideas on this point are perfectly conformable to those of the times, the orthodoxy of which is least to be suspected.

For the reasons I have stated, I think indirect argumentation more oratorical, and more popular, than the other; and for that reason, he who excels in direct argumentation appears to me the greater genius. In certain cases, no other argumentation is so easy as indirect argumentation, and this consideration enhances, in my eyes, the merit of orators who excel in direct argumentation, which is that in which we should especially endeavour to become powerful. Bourdaloue is remarkable in this kind for a *virtuosité*,—for a courage which nothing intimidates.

1. At the head of the forms of indirect argumentation is placed the argumentation *apagogic*, or by *ablation.* It is the proof of a truth by the inverse way, or that of retrenchment, in

[1] In Engl. Vers. "The Lord hath made all things for Himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." See Eccles. iii. 11, vii. 14.—Ed.

[2] As in the subject of the saints' reward.—Bourdaloue.

which the orator endeavours to show the nature of a thing by the nature of its opposite, or by the effects of its absence: as, for instance, the utility of knowledge by the consequences of ignorance, the beauty of virtue by the hideousness of vice, the tranquillity of faith by the uneasiness of unbelief. It is thus, that we might measure the capacity of a vase alike by filling it and by emptying it, and that we prove addition by subtraction. This method is very natural to the human mind, and is very acceptable to the hearers, to whom very often the nature of a thing is above all made known by the effects of its absence.[1] And perhaps, in particular, it may be truly said, that nothing renders palpable to the most of men, the goodness of a line of conduct conformable to rule, as the sight of that which is diametrically opposed to it. It was doubtless this which induced Massillon, when preaching to ecclesiastics on the necessity of these showing a good example, to insist chiefly on the consequences of bad example. He shows in this discourse, that without good example all the functions of the priest are useless, and are even an occasion of stumbling and scandal to the people whom God has entrusted to him.[2] Good example has, doubtless, positive and appreciable advantages which Massillon might have enumerated; but he judged, justly as we think, that his auditory would be more struck with the pernicious consequences of bad example, which are more evident, and, so to speak, more palpable. It is certain that the good, or conformity to rule, and happiness, or conformity with interest, being precisely only what things ought to be, and what order demands, present fewer prominent points than their contraries; and they are very often in our eyes only the simple absence of evil and of misfortune, so that what is essentially positive, *the good*, appears to us negative; and what is essentially negative, *the evil*, appears to us positive.

2. As a sequel to the argument apagogic, or by ablation, we may name the *refutation*, which we have before considered in another point of view. It is indeed, also, a form of indirect argumentation, either, because, by removing all the objections, it constrains the mind, as in despair of its cause, to embrace the

[1] See Luke xvii. 22, with which comp. Amos viii. 11, 12.—Ed.

[2] Massillon, *Conferences*. Edition Mequignon, vol. xiii., p. 2. [See 2 Sam. xii. 14; Tit. i. 16.—Ed.]

truth, even without knowing it;[1] or, because the refutation, when it is everything that it can be, becomes a proof, which perhaps ought always to happen, when the principle which is brought forward is true. We cannot combat the offence of the cross, without raising the glory of the cross. Where no medium is possible between two opposite propositions, the exclusion of the one establishes the other, and even brings it forth to the view.[2]

3. We mention here the argument, *ex adverso*, which consists in opposing to one fact another fact quite contrary, which happened in circumstances precisely similar. This is not so much an argument, as the means of rendering an argument more poignant. *Quædam argumenta*, says Quintilian, *ponere satis non est, adjuvanda sunt.*[3] This means is one of the most energetic, when the circumstances are quite parallel, and when, consequently, the bringing them together is legitimate. The fine contrast which Pascal makes between the maxims of the Jesuits regarding homicide, and the rules which legal justice follows,[4] supposes the previous demonstration of a truth; this opposition in itself alone proves nothing.

It is the same with this passage of Bourdaloue's sermon on *The Offence of the Cross*:—"Consider the marvellous fruits of grace, which this thought has produced in the saints, the miracles of virtue, the heroic conversions, the renunciations of the world, the fervours of penitence, the noble readiness to suffer martyrdom. What produced all this? The view of a God-man, and of a God sacrificed for the salvation of man. This it was that gained their hearts, that ravished them, that filled them with transport; and it is found, Christians, that it is this which occasions an offence to us,—an offence which keeps us in a slothful, impure, disorderly life, that is to say, in a life in which we do nothing for God, and in which we keep ourselves constantly estranged from God. . . ."[5]

[1] As examples we cite the plan of MASSILLON'S *Sermon on the Pardon of Offences* (edition Lefèvre, i. 146), and his *Sermon on Prayer* (ib. i. 98).

[2] See REGIUS, ii. 119, *On the Support of our Neighbour*;—and BOURDALOUE, i. 560, edition Lefèvre, *On the Offence of the Cross*;—MANUEL, Sermons, i. *Paul before Festus*; Saurin, vol. i. 39, and 107, same subject.

[3] QUINTILIAN, book v., ch. xii. [4] PASCAL, *Fourteenth Provincial.*

[5] BOURDALOUE, edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 563, col. 1. See also MASSILLON, *Advent*, sermon on *the Divinity of Jesus Christ*, first part: "But here, my brethren," etc.—(Edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 89.) [See Gal. vi. 12, 14.—ED.]

Let us also hear Voltaire, who makes the president Potier say in *the Henriade*:—"Unfaithful pastors, unworthy citizens, how ill do you resemble those first Christians, who, braving all the gods of metal or of stone, marched without murmuring under an idolatrous master, expired without complaining; and upon the scaffold, bleeding, and pierced with wounds, blessed their executioners! They alone were Christians; I recognise no other. They for their kings, died; yours, you massacre. And God, whom you describe as implacable and jealous, if He delights to be avenged, barbarians! 'tis on you."[1]

The contrast is a complete argument when, of the two facts which are opposed, one is authoritative, and, to cite it, is to cite the rule.

To *contrast*, let us join *difference*. When the hearer would be tempted to apply to one case the rules of another; when an accidental or accessory resemblance would hinder him from seeing an essential or principal difference, and from deciding according to this difference, it is useful, for the benefit of the proof, to make the difference very prominent.

"The splendour of His ministry," says Massillon, in the sermon upon the divinity of Jesus Christ, "is the most stable foundation of our faith; the spirit of His ministry, the only rule of our manners. Now, if He was only a man sent from God, the splendour of His ministry would become the inevitable occasion of our superstition and idolatry; the spirit of His ministry would be the fatal snare of our innocence. Thus, whether we consider the splendour or the spirit of His ministry, the glory of His divinity remains equally and invariably established."[2] It is precisely the same with *resemblance*, where *we* should only see difference. Thus, Bourdaloue:—

"Ah! Christians, permit me to make here a reflection very mournful both for you and for me, but which will appear to you very touching, and very edifying. We deplore the fate of the Jews, who, in spite of the advantage they enjoyed of seeing Jesus Christ born in the midst of them, and for them, had nevertheless the misfortune to lose all the fruits of this inestimable benefit,

[1] VOLTAIRE, *The Henriade*, canto vi.

[2] Edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 88, col. 1.—See also the sermon on *Unworthy Communions* (Méquignon edition), vol. vi., p. 255; and SAURIN, vol. ii., pp. 384, 385, new edition.

and to be the very persons, who, of all the nations of the earth, have profited least by this happy birth. We pity them, and while pitying them we condemn them; but we do not observe, that in that very circumstance their condition, or rather their misery, and ours are very nearly equal. For in what does the reprobation of the Jews consist? In this, that, instead of the true Messiah whom God had appointed for them, and who was so necessary for them, they have imagined for themselves another, according to their gross ideas, and according to the desires of their heart: in their having made no account of Him who should have been the deliverer of their souls, and in having only thought of one through whom they promised themselves the imaginary re-establishment of their earthly good, and their fortunes; in their having confounded these two kinds of salvation, or, to speak more correctly, in their having rejected the one, and uselessly flattered themselves with the vain hope of the other, so that they have thus been at once disappointed of both, and there has been for them no redemption. Here, says St Augustine, is the source from which their loss flowed: *Temporalia amittere metuerunt, et æterna non cogitaverunt, ac sic utrumque amiserunt.* Now, my dear hearers, is it not the same thing that still destroys us every day? For although we no longer expect, like the Jews, another Messiah; though we adhere to Him whom Heaven has sent us, is it not true (let us confess it and blush for it) that, to judge from our conduct, we are, with respect to the Saviour sent from God, in the same blindness in which the Jews were, and in which we still find them with respect to the Messiah whom they look for, and in whom they hope?"[1]

To conclude, let us remark in general, that most people judge only by comparison, or by the help of comparisons. How far may we accommodate ourselves to this disposition?

4. With this order of arguments is connected that which is called *à fortiori*, or *à majori ad minus* (progressive argument). It consists in proving that, a thing being true on certain conditions, it is much more so on others which operate in the same way as the first, and increase their force. This is, to strengthen the conclusion, by strengthening the premises:—

[1] Bourdaloue, edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 122, col. 2, on the *Nativity of Jesus Christ.* See also the sermon on the *Resurrection of Jesus Christ.* Edition Lefèvre, vol. i., p. 453. "For to develop . . . etc."

1. The true Christian is wise;
2. Now, wisdom includes prudence, or prudence is a part of wisdom;
3. Now, the whole implies the part;
4. Therefore, Christians are prudent.

There is in this argument a surplus, a superabundance; it is in the statement that it consists; it establishes, as it were, a more than complete proof, by bringing from a distance, or from near at hand, a fact calculated to bring out clearly this superabundance. It is founded on this simple idea, that the more implies the less.

This argument has much force, on condition that the distance between the two cases be quite real, and that we cannot take advantage of an essential difference between them, which may have power to invalidate or weaken the conclusion. The orator must also vigorously exhibit the difference which exists in the sense of his conclusion. The two cases ought to be similar, and unequal.

The argument, *à fortiori* is, perhaps, of all arguments, the most relished by orators. Cicero makes a frequent and able use of it. Thus in the oration *Pro lege Manilia*:—

"More than once, to avenge petty merchants and masters of small vessels, who had been slightly injured, your ancestors undertook wars; and you, when you are informed that so many thousands of Romans, upon a single order, and at the same instant, have been massacred, what will then be your sentiments? For a little too much haughtiness shown by words to their ambassadors, your fathers decided that Corinth, the glory of all Greece, should perish; and you,—will you leave a prince unpunished, who has loaded with irons, and scourged with rods, a deputy of the Roman people, formerly a consul, and has put him to death? They, for their part, would not suffer the least blow to be dealt to the liberty of Roman citizens; and you,—when they have taken away their life, will you make little account of it? They demanded satisfaction for the right of ambassadors, violated only by words; and you,—when your ambassador perishes under tortures, will you remain indifferent? Beware lest, as it was noble in them to have left you so glorious an empire, it should be your disgrace, that, having received it at their hands, you have not been able to preserve and defend it."[1]

[1] CICERO, ch. v.

And, in the first oration, against Cataline :—

"It is long, Cataline, since the consul ought to have had you dragged to punishment. It is long since the storm, with which we are threatened, ought to have burst upon you. For if the illustrious Scipio, when sovereign pontiff, put to death by his own private authority one of the Gracchi, for trifling enterprises against the republic, shall we, the consuls, endure Cataline, whose projects are to fill the world with fire and bloodshed ?"[1]

Let us also hear Mirabeau, in his discourse on the plan of M. Necker :—"Well! gentlemen, I am reminded of a ridiculous movement of the Palais-Royal, of a laughable insurrection, which never had any importance, except in the feeble imaginations, or perverse designs of some men of dishonest minds. You have, not long since, heard these furious words: Cataline is at the gates of Rome, and we deliberate. And assuredly there was around us neither Cataline, nor designs, nor factions, nor Rome. . . . But now bankruptcy, hideous bankruptcy is here; it threatens to consume you, yourselves, your properties, your honour,—and you deliberate !"[2]

No form of argumentation is more frequent in the gospels. "If God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall He not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith ?" (Matt. vi. 30.) "If they have called the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of His household?" (Matt. x. 25.) "For if they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry ?" (Luke xxiii. 31.) "For the time is come that judgment must begin at the house of God; and if it begin at us, what shall the end be of them that obey not the Gospel of God ? And if the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear ?" (1 Peter iv. 17, 18.) "If the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward; how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him ?" (Heb. ii. 2, 3.) "For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the

[1] Cicero, ch. i.

[2] Other examples; Saurin, vol. ii., p. 26, and vol. i., p. 89, new edition;—Bossuet, *Choix de Sermons*, p. 348;—Bourdaloue, sermon, *The Last Judgment*, vol. i., p. 13, col. 2, edition Lefèvre;—Massillon, vol. i., p. 417; vol. iv., p. 255; vol. xii., p. 244, old edition.

ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" (Heb. ix. 13, 14.) "See that ye refuse not Him that speaketh; for if they escaped not who refused Him that spake on earth, much more shall not we escape, if we turn away from Him that speaketh from heaven." (Heb. xii. 25.) "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things?" (Rom. viii. 32.)

5. Argument by *analogy*.—"We reason by analogy," says Condillac, "when we judge of the relation, or resemblance, which ought to be between the effects, by that which exists between the causes; or when we judge of the relation, or resemblance, that ought to be between the causes, by that which exists between the effects."[1]

The reasoning by analogy is as good, and as rigorous as any other, when the relation between the effects, or between the causes, is real,—when there is identity and not merely similitude. The resemblance between the two terms, of which a metaphor is composed, cannot be the basis of a conclusion. This is, however, what is current in the world and in the pulpit,[2] and perhaps more so in the pulpit than in the world, under the usurped name of argument by analogy. The real similitude, or the essential identity, is in itself so difficult to ascertain, that the argument by analogy is almost doubtful; but it is not only doubtful, it is altogether illusory, when it rests upon a metaphorical resemblance, which is only an apparent resemblance. The people themselves have already testified their distrust of it by the well-known proverb: "Comparison is not reason;" and yet how many persons,

[1] Condillac. *Art of Reasoning*, book iv., chap. iii.

[2] All analogies, according to Mill, are inconclusive presumptions, not necessarily true: the presumption being, that what is true in a certain case, is true in another case known to be somewhat similar. Their value depends on the amount of ascertained resemblance, compared, first, with the amount of ascertained difference; and next, with the extent of the unexplored region of unascertained properties: where the ascertained region of resemblance bears a very small proportion to the ascertained differences, and to the region which is unascertained altogether, the analogy is utterly worthless.—Ed. "*Buon per. la predica!*" (See p. 111.)

and how many preachers act, as if a comparison were a reason! How often is a fortuitous coincidence adduced as a proof, and received as such! Nothing is more to the taste and the fancy of orators who have no logic, or no conscience; it is their principal resource; wanting these external resemblances, they would be reduced to nothing. "If the thunderbolt," says Pascal, "fell upon the low places,[1] poets, and those who can only reason upon things of this nature, would want proofs."[2] Nothing, also, is more suitable for seducing minds little exercised, or little attentive, than these familiar similitudes which express a prominent resemblance, and which conceal a greater unlikeness. This is the favourite weapon of sophists, the snare oftenest laid for credulity, the argument most frequently employed for obtaining the assent of ignorant and simple men.[3]

One of two things is the case: either the resemblance is only apparent,—in that case make use of it to illustrate, and not to prove—this is the natural use of most of the parables of the Gospel; or the resemblance between two objects, otherwise different, is real.[4]—Conclude accordingly. It is very necessary to employ this argument. We cannot do without it. In certain cases it is almost the only one.[5] The whole form of the exposition of our religion is an analogy. The physical world, as a whole, is an analogy of the moral world. Without the aid of analogy we could express nothing, and even comprehend nothing. But it is of importance to ascertain well the real resemblances.

The following is an argument by analogy (combined with that *à fortiori*) which we find in the discourses of Jesus Christ:

[1] Decidunt turres: feriuntque summos Fulgura montes."—HORACE, Carm. ii. 10.—ED.

[2] PASCAL'S *Thoughts*, Part I., art. x., § 18.

[3] Locke well defines judgment, as the faculty of finding real differences amidst many seeming resemblances: whereas wit finds seeming resemblances in things really different.—ED.

[4] So in the parables of the New Testament, there is generally one chief point of resemblance: to seek for correspondence in the minor and subsidiary details is mere trifling.—ED.

[5] For instance, as it is used by Bishop Butler, to answer objections against revealed religion, by showing analogously that the same difficulties stand in the way of natural religion. If, notwithstanding the difficulties, we acknowledge God as the Author of the latter, we ought also to acknowledge Him as the Author of the former, notwithstanding the difficulties: because in both cases the positive proofs outweigh the difficulties.—ED.

"What man is there of you, whom, if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone? or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?" (Matt. vii. 9–11. See also Mal. i. 6–8.)

St Paul, we conceive, reasons by analogy, when, after reminding the Corinthians of the precept of the ancient law: "Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn," he adds: "Doth God take care for oxen? (absolute for relative;) or saith He it altogether for our sakes?" 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10. [The argument is *à fortiori*. Does God care for oxen? He does. Much more will He care for His ministers.]

The following is another example of it, taken from Pascal: "A man in a dungeon, who knows not, if sentence of death is passed upon him, and who is allowed but one hour to ascertain, and that one hour sufficient, in case it is passed, to obtain its reversal, would act contrary to nature, should he employ this hour, not in procuring the information, but in vain amusement. And yet such is the condition of the persons whom we are now describing; with this difference, that the evils, with which they are threatened, are infinitely worse than the bare loss of life, and the transient punishment of the prisoner. Yet they run thoughtlessly towards the precipice, after having cast a veil over their eyes, to prevent their seeing it, and ridicule those who warn them of their danger."[1] We distinguish, in this example, the two elements of similitude, and identity.

6. Let us, in concluding, speak of the argument which may be called the argument by *supposition* or *construction*, another form of indirect argumentation.[2] We create, with the consent of the hearer, a fact without the sphere of the known and real facts; we make what is called in geometry a *construction;* and we make use of the dotted line, which we will shortly efface, to ascertain the regularity of the figure which we first traced. We have to show, that there is the same relation between the sup-

[1] Pascal, *Pensées*, Part II., art. ii. See also the eleventh *Provincial* (p. 263 of Didot's edition, 1822); Saurin, vol. i., pp. 56 and 90, new edit.; Massillon, vol. xii., p. 388, edit. Méquignon.

[2] Suppositions, says Claude, are principally useful in controversy, to show the palpably wrong consequences, which would follow, if the adversary's doctrine were true. Also in morality, to illustrate and give weight to exhortations.—Ed.

posed fact and the conclusion we draw from it, as between the premises of the reasoning we propose, and the conclusions from those premises. The conclusion, which we accept, implies that which we reject.

There is always an identical element,—a common point between the supposed fact and the real fact. If the identity is not perfect, the argument is null.

There are some beautiful examples of it in Cicero: "Wherefore I say, that if Annius, with a bloody sword in his hand, exclaimed: Approach, citizens, and listen to me; I have slain Clodius!—his criminal fury which no law, no judgment could have repressed, I have been able, with this sword,—with this hand, to avert from your heads; so that, thanks to me alone, right, equity, the laws, liberty, modesty, chastity, have still an asylum within your walls. If he spake thus, would he be anxious about the manner in which the city received his words? Who, then, in the existing circumstances, would not approve of what he had done,—would not commend him? Who would not say, and would not think, that no one in the memory of man has done more eminent service to the commonwealth—that none has given so great cause of joy to the Roman people, to the whole of Italy, and to all nations? What and how great may have been the joy of the Roman people on other occasions, I have no wish to determine; but what I can say is, that our epoch itself has seen brilliant victories obtained by noble and illustrious men, and that none of them has afforded cause for so great and so lasting joy."[1]

"Make a supposition, for thought is free. . . . . Represent to yourselves, that I have come to procure the acquittal of Milo, but in no other way than by restoring Clodius to life. Why this terror on your countenance? What impression would he produce upon you if he were alive, since, now that he is dead, the very thought of this man can disturb you to such a degree? What shall I say? If Pompey, who is enabled by his fortune, and his valour, to do what would be impossible for any other person—if Pompey, who might demand an account of the death of Clodius, could also bring him up from his tomb, do you think he could resolve to do so? No; although from friendship he

[1] Cicero, *Pro Milone*, chap. xxviii.

might wish to recall him from the tomb, he would not do it for the sake of the commonwealth. You are then assembled here to avenge the death of a man whom you would not, though you could, restore to life, and you demand an account of his death, in the name of a law which, if it could restore him to life, as well as it can avenge him, would never have been enacted."[1]

We find the same reasoning in these lines of Voltaire :—

CASSIUS.

Listen: thou knowest with what fury Cataline formerly menaced his country?

BRUTUS.

Yes.

CASSIUS.

If, on the same day on which this great criminal was to have dealt the mortal blow to liberty; if, when the senate had condemned this traitor, Cataline had wished to acknowledge you as his son; forced to decide between us and this monster—speak; what would you have done?

BRUTUS.

Can you ask? Think you that, giving the lie for an instant to my virtue, I would have put a man in the same balance with my country?

CASSIUS.

Brutus, this speech has dictated your duty."[2]

The supposition, or construction, which we here present as a means of argumentation, becomes also an oratorical figure, even one of the boldest.[3]

We have enumerated, if not all the forms which argumentation assumes, at least the chief of them. Besides experience and authority, which in certain circumstances dispense with argumentation, or are added to it, or form a prelude to it, there are in argumentation, properly so called, the proof, and the refutation; in both, the simple argument analytic, and synthetic (the latter too sophistical), and the argument complex or accumulated, which occurs when we introduce the personal element, or when we reduce to the absurd, or the odious, the opponent whom we were not satisfied with convincing; and each of these kinds

[1] Cicero, *Pro Milone*, chap. xxix.

[2] Voltaire, *The Death of Cæsar*, act iii., scene ii. See also Saurin, *On the Value of the Soul*, vol. ii., page 383, new edition; Bourdaloue, *On the Nativity of Jesus Christ*, vol. 1., page 124, col. 1, edition Lefèvre; Manuel, *On the Resurrection of the Widow's Son*, col. 1; and upon *Lydia*, col. 2, page 114.

[3] See Massillon, *Carême, On the Small Number of the Elect;* and the Abbe Poulle, sermon on *Alms*, vol. i., p. 159.

has still to choose between the direct form, and the indirect means. These last are numerous. We may proceed by way of subtraction, of refutation, of opposition, of comparison, of analogy, of supposition, of progression, and each of these forms makes use of some fact, taken apart from the proper matter of the reasoning, from the subject of the argumentation. We may by turns make use of each of these weapons, which altogether form the complete armour, the *panoply* of the orator; but we may also accumulate them in one and the same subject. It is of importance to attack on several sides, and with several different weapons,

Le fer, l'onde, le feu, lui déclarent la guerre,

in order to reach the different classes of the auditory, and the different parts of the intellectual man, and to show how numerous are the resources of truth.

There is sometimes advantage in collecting together several different arguments.[1] Only we must not imagine that the number makes up for the quality. Twenty half-proofs do not make ten proofs: they make together only one half-proof. One weak and doubtful reason does more harm, perhaps, than two valid proofs do good.[2]

The saying of Quintilian: *Firmissimis argumentorum singulis instandum; infirmiora congreganda sunt*,[3] is quite in the dishonest spirit of the rhetoric of the ancients (Aruspices).

Let us not confound the half-proofs, that is to say, the bad proofs, with the *probable evidences*. Though we had only probable evidences to bring forward upon a question, this would already be something; we might thereby at least repress the temerity of negations.

When we have proofs, the probable evidences or presumptions form a good preparation for the proofs; and often, by a kind of retro-active effect, the proof adduced gives to the presumptions a value which they did not appear to have.[4]

[1] See MASSILLON, vol. iv., pp. 24, 25, edition Méquignon.

[2] Because they create suspicion as to the validity of the really sound arguments. Πλέον ἥμισυ παντός holds good in this, as in other cases.—ED.

[3] "If our proofs are strong, we must propose them separately and insist upon each; if they are feeble, we must group them."—QUINTILIAN, book v., chap. 12.

[4] See SAURIN, book iii., p. 265, new edition. A fine example of a close and urgent argumentation is found in the sermon of Bourdaloue on *The Last Judgment*.

§ II.—Motives.

The ultimate object of argumentation is action, or the determination of the will. Now, the will is only determined by the affections. "All our reasoning," says Pascal, "is reducible to yielding to sentiment."[1] We will, only what we love, or, at least, we only will, because we love.

Wherever our object is to determine the will, we must do one of two things: either address ourselves to an affection already existing, appeal to it, and excite it by presenting to it the objects with which it is maintained; or create affections in regard to the end we have in view.

But the second case never occurs, at least in an absolute sense. We can awaken the affections; we cannot create them. I say this of moral good, as well as of moral evil. The inclination (for this name suits better than affection)—the inclination, or the want, exists; if it did not exist, in vain should we evoke it. It is a germ, buried perhaps, but not dead. A villain is often concealed in an honest man; and often this man only requires to be placed in certain circumstances to become a criminal. Something more than circumstances is necessary, for the natural man to become a saint. He requires a principle of renovation, which is out of, and above, natural order. But this extraordinary principle of renovation must have whereon to rest. There must be in the human mind a soil to receive it. If the *death*, of which St Paul speaks (Eph. ii. 1, 5), was the annihilation of all the sentiments, and of all the ideas, which are related to the good, it would be all over with man for ever. The germ is suppressed, not annihilated.

The business, then, in all cases, is to present to the soul what is capable of attracting it.[2] This is what is called *touching*. So long as you have done nothing but prove,—so long as your proof reaches nothing in the man but his intellect,—the hearer has not been touched,—he remains *intact*.

Instead of *touching*, we also say *moving* (putting in motion). Mere conviction of the mind puts nothing in motion; the soul remains immovable:[3] the mind, it is true, has undergone an impression,—has received an imprint; but the man, taken as a

[1] Pascal, *Pensées*, part i., art. x., § 4.

[2] John xii. 32; 2 Cor. iii. 18; Zech. xii. 10.—Ed.

[3] Rom. x. 10.—Ed.

whole, remains where he was; and the question properly was, to make him change his place. All that which, in this sense, is fitted for making him change his place, is called *motive*.

Since man follows his inclination (*trahit sua quemque cupido*), and since, in our actual state, the inclination for sensible and transient things is strong and vivid, whilst the inclination for the invisible is dormant and requires to be awakened, the result has been, and the result every day is, that the will of man is determined by the inclination for sensible things, and in the direction of these things.[1] Man, then, is no longer free, not, however, owing to the fact that he undergoes an attraction, since it is decidedly necessary that he should undergo one; but because he undergoes it from below, instead of undergoing it from above; because he is not attracted on the side of his better, but on the side of his worse nature; because he obeys an attraction in the contrary direction to the law of Him who is God: now, conformity to the law is, for him, liberty.[2]

The liberty of man, which is a relative thing, cannot consist in acting without motives; it must consist in acting from good motives. We desire to present to him none but such as are good, but such we shall present to him.

It is a remarkable fact, and one that shows that all light is not extinguished in man,[3] that though he be determined by bad motives, he finds it however necessary to disguise them: he dares not mention them to himself, still less would he dare to allege them to others; and above all, he would not dare directly to propose what was evil to assemblies of men, or, to express it more distinctly, to set before them the mere simple gratification of a lust as a motive of action. Eloquence would not be eloquence, if it did not feign a wish for what is good, if it did not give the appearance of good, to the evil which it counsels. It is, therefore, indissolubly connected with the idea of moral goodness. Eloquence is detached from its only roots, when it is separated from justice, and from truth. Marat himself was obliged to pretend, that he was defending principles, and not interests. Evil is, as it were, an azote in which eloquence expires, just as it expires, so to speak, in the too pure or too subtle atmosphere of speculation.

[1] Contrast with this downward attraction to sensible things, the upward attraction to things unseen, in the converted man: 2 Cor. iv. 18, v. 7.—Ed.

[2] John viii. 32, 36; Rom. vi. 14, 18, 22, viii. 2; James i. 25, ii. 12.—Ed.

[3] Rom. ii. 15.—Ed.

Motive, inclination, or *affection*, the name is of little consequence—this is what is necessary for the determination of the will, and, consequently, essential to eloquence.

Let us then see, what parts we can touch; we shall afterwards see how we ought to touch them. All the motives, of which we can make levers, may be reduced to these two—*moral good*, and *happiness*. Our reasons for not excluding this second motive will appear afterwards.

In the first motive I distinguish moral good as good, from the author of moral good, or of the law. Moral good, under these different aspects, corresponds to our nature; it is a want belonging to it, and it may become an attraction for it, insufficient in the absence of certain conditions, but all-powerful when these conditions are fulfilled.

Nevertheless, we cannot absolutely distinguish and separate the author of the law from the law itself. The law cannot be sincerely and fully loved by one, who does not love its author.[1] This author of the law is also the object of it; He is, it may be said, the law itself: He is *the* good. Duty is properly towards God. The love of God is the moral truth itself, and the very principle of life;[2] and the whole Gospel is calculated to render the sentiment possible. Gratitude towards God is the meaning, and the summary of the Gospel:[3] "Knowest thou not that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?" (Rom. ii. 4.)—Nevertheless, we do not wish to deny, and we do not wish it to be forgotten, that moral good has reasons in itself, and that if it is frail, incomplete, and, up to a certain point, irrational, in the absence of the love of God, it is not, however, in this isolated state, chimerical and without foundation.

The sentiment of the good to which we appeal, or which we endeavour to excite, has two forms, as an axis has two poles. We distinguish in it, as two correlatives, sympathy and antipathy, love and hatred; for to every love corresponds a hate; to the love of a thing, the hate of its contrary; to the love of the good, the hatred of the evil.

These are two sources, or two characters of eloquence. Though we cannot absolutely suppose the one of these sentiments, without the other, any more than we can suppose a positive pole

[1] 1 John ii. 5.—Ed.

[2] 1 John iv. 16, v. 3.—Ed.

[3] 1 John iv. 19; Rom. xiii. 10.—Ed.

without the negative pole, the one may predominate in one man, or upon one occasion, the other in another man, or upon another occasion. The bitter and morose eloquence of Rousseau corresponds to the one of these sentiments; the happy and triumphal eloquence of Bossuet rather corresponds to the other. Indignation[1] is an ingredient, with which the eloquence of the pulpit cannot dispense. "To be mild to the wicked is to be wicked." —"O Lord, do not I hate them that hate Thee?" (Ps. cxxxiv. 21.) But it would be a sad thing to have no other love of goodness, than the hatred of evil. Neither must we suffer indignation to fill our whole heart; how easily might it not become wrath![2] Now, neither in the pulpit, nor anywhere else, does "the wrath of man work out the righteousness of God." (James i. 20.)

I have mentioned, first, *moral good*, or duty. I have then mentioned *happiness*.

This last motive may be presented by the preacher.

1st, It is the only side on which certain souls are easily accessible, and even the side on which all souls are most easily so.

2d, It is essential to human nature; it is a constitutive part of it; it is not vicious in itself; if it is the starting-point of egotism, it is also the condition of devotedness and of self-sacrifice; it occupies a place in our most disinterested and most generous sentiments.

3d, It abounds in that Revelation, in the name of which we speak:[3] "I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." (Deut. xxx. 19.)—"And why will ye die, O house of Israel?" (Ez. xviii. 31.)—The first word in the public preaching of Jesus Christ is the word *blessed* or *happy*. (Matt. v. 3.)—It may be said that it is the first word of His religion, which is a doctrine of happiness and of salvation, as much as of perfection, and the special property of which is to identify happiness with perfection.[4] —There is a point in which the two motives, that we have distinguished, are only one.

[1] Sanctioned by the Lord Jesus Himself, Mark iii. 5, "When He had looked round about on them *with anger*, being grieved for the hardness of their hearts." —Ed.

[2] *i.e.*, Passion, bitterness of personal anger.—Ed.

[3] Isa. lv. 1, 2; Jer. ii. 13; Prov. iii. 13, 17.—Ed.

[4] Matt. xi. 29; James i. 25.—Ed.

Happiness, in general, may therefore be presented as a motive. But the Christian preacher will observe the following rules :—

1. He will give the chief place to the highest of our interests,[1] and will employ the others only as subsidiaries. I call that *high* which is *invisible*, which is *eternal*. "If we were called upon," said a preacher, "to occupy ourselves with your temporal interests,[2] we might show you how beneficial is the institution of the Sabbath."[3]

2. When he shall present motives of a less elevated order—of temporal interest, it will be under the highest point of view, less as motives, than as signs of the good, or of the evil, which is in an action.[4]

3. The Christian preacher will only employ the motive of interest, according to its nature. Interest is a motive, not an argument; it may lead one to act, not to believe.—On this point we shall cite Pascal: "I shall blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; and he who takes *cross*, and he who takes *pile*,[5] are both wrong: the right way is not to wager at all." —"Yes, but it is necessary to wager;[6] you are embarked, and not to wager that there is a God, is to wager that there is none. Which will you choose then? Let us see what interests you the least," etc.—And further: "What evil will happen to you from taking this side? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, beneficent, sincere, and true. In truth, you will not be immersed in infected pleasures, in glory, or in delights. But will you have no others? I tell you, that you will gain in this life; and that every step which you take in this road, you will see so much certainty of gain, and so much nothingness in what you hazard, that you will at last acknowledge that you have wagered for a thing certain and infinite, and that you have given away nothing in

[1] See Massillon, *Petit Carême*, sermon on the *Humanity of the Great towards the People*.

[2] We have this vocation no more than Jesus Christ had that of interfering in the differences of His countrymen.—(Luke xii. 14.)

[3] See Massillon, *Petit Carême*, sermon on the *Respect due to Religion*. "But, Sire, when these motives," etc. . . .

[4] See the sermon of Bourdaloue on *Impurity*, vol. i., p. 287, col. 1, edition Lefèvre: "En effet, s'il cesse," etc. The whole of the first part of this discourse realises our idea, by presenting impurity, not yet as the ground of reprobation (this is the subject of the second part), but as the sign of reprobation.

[5] *Croix et pile* is equivalent to the English phrase, *heads* or *tails*.—*Translator*.

[6] Matt. xxv. 24-30.—Ed.

order to obtain it."[1]—Hear also La Bruyère: "Religion is true, or it is false:—if it is only a vain fiction, in that case, if you will, it is just sixty years lost to the virtuous man, to the Carthusian or the recluse; they run no other risk: but if it is founded on truth itself, it is then a dreadful misfortune for the vicious man; the mere idea of the evils he is preparing for himself, disturbs my imagination; thought is too feeble to conceive them, and words are too empty to express them. Truly, even while supposing that there is in the world less certainty, than there is in reality found, in regard to the truth of religion, there is no better part for man to choose than virtue,"[2] or rather: than to live as if religion were true.—Pascal alone is complete.

4. Give to hope, and to fear, a share of attention; but not to the one, at the expense of the other.—These are the two poles of interest, just as love and hatred are the two poles of moral affection. We cannot dispense with the employment of fear (imagine the terrible state of the man, who no longer feared); but it is not necessary that it should be employed exclusively; just as we cannot dispense with the moving of hatred, while this must not be done at the expense of love. Whatever be the practical advantage of fear over hope (fear acts more immediately, and more universally), hope is, nevertheless, superior to it; it is a principle of action, and of development: it dilates the soul, which fear rather contracts. The Gospel has not said, "These three things abide, faith, *fear*, and charity." (See 1 Cor. xiii. 13.) Fear is not a virtue, since perfect love is destined "to cast it out." (1 John iv. 18.) It might be said that all our courage is fear; but this is not true of Christian courage; it is a hope.

When we employ fear, we must give it as moral, and as generous a character as possible.[3] [But we are much deceived regarding human nature, when we employ terror, under the name of fear. Terror has nothing moral or noble, it is an altogether egotistical sentiment. It is not the same with fear. The evils which we fear may be of such a nature, that the impression

[1] Pascal, *Pensées*, part ii., act iii., § 5.—[Comp. Phil. iii. 8; 1 Tim. iv. 8.—Ed.]

[2] La Bruyere, *Caractères*, ch. xvi., *Of strong minds.*—See also Massillon, sermon upon the *Truth a Futurity*, vol. i., p. 171, edition Lefèvre.

[The Christian may say to the unbeliever, "I lose nothing, even if it were possible, which it is not, that you are right; but if I am right, you lose your soul!"—Ed.]

[3] Ps. cxi. 10.—Ed.

we experience at the thought of them, is more fitted to ennoble, than to degrade the soul. The fear, which the preacher brings into play, is that of hell, and of the second death. But, under this name of hell, can we not conceive of some other thing than those material sufferings,—those terrible and yet vulgar sufferings, namely, the presentiment of eternal separation from God? We produce terror in our hearers by this mysterious future; but can we not bring the perspective near, and make them see and taste hell from the present instant? This hell we carry within us, and we find it there.] With the judgments of God, we must declare our own judgments.[1] [That God can pardon us, we believe upon the assurance of the Gospel. Otherwise we should not believe it, for] our conscience is more implacable than God: it cannot pardon us. [Yes, though the eyes of God are pure, and ours are impure, yet the pardon that is most difficult to be obtained, is our own,[2] and this is, to many, a source of unbelief. The great orators have shown us how the element of fear may be elevated.] It is the fear of being separated from God. [But as long as the condemnation, proclaimed from without, is not re-echoed within, as long as the conscience does not sanction it, we are not in the condition which is necessary, according to the Gospel, for receiving grace. We must combine fear with the sentiments which open and soften the soul. Observe how Bossuet can at once alarm, and melt the soul, in his sermon upon *Final Impenitence*:—

"Ah! God is just, and equitable. You, O rich man without compassion, shall yourself come to days of want, and of anguish. Do not think, I threaten you with the change of your fortune; what may befall it, is fortuitous; but what I wish to speak of, is not doubtful. It will come at the appointed day, that last sickness, in which, among an infinite number of friends, of physicians, and of servants, you will remain helpless, more forsaken, and more abandoned, than that poor man who is dying upon his bed of straw, and who has not a cloth for his burial: for in that fatal sickness, what shall these friends avail, but to afflict you by their presence; what these physicians, but to torment you; what these

[1] John iii. 18. Comp. the poet's description of the ungodly,—

"Within him hell he brings, and round about him,
Nor from hell, no more than from himself, can fly
By change."—Ed.

[2] 1 John iii. 20.—Ed.

servants, but to run up and down in your house with a vain eagerness? You have need of other friends, and other servants; these poor persons, whom you have despised, are the only persons capable of assisting you. How have you not thought in good time of making to yourself such friends, such as would now stretch forth their arms to you, to receive you into the everlasting habitations?[1] Ah! if you had alleviated their evils, if you had had pity on their despair, if you had only listened to their complaints, the mercy you had shown would beseech God for you; the benedictions they would have given you, when you consoled them in their afflictions, would now cause to drop on you a refreshing dew; their clothed sides, says the holy prophet (Job xxxi. 20), their refreshed bowels, their satisfied hunger, would have blessed you; their holy angels would have watched around your bed as dutiful friends, and these spiritual physicians would consult together night and day, to find remedies for you. But you have alienated their mind; and the prophet Jeremiah represents them to me as themselves condemning you without mercy.

"Here, sirs, is a grand spectacle; come and behold the holy angels in the chamber of a wicked rich man on his deathbed. Yes, whilst the physicians consult about the state of his disease, and his trembling family await the result of the conference, these invisible physicians consult about a far more dangerous evil; '*we would have healed this Babylon, but she is not healed.*' (Jer. li. 9.) We have diligently treated this cruel rich man; what mollifying oils, what mild fomentations have we applied to this heart! and it has not been softened, and its hardness has not been subdued; everything has turned out contrary to our thoughts, and the sick man has been made worse by our remedies. *Let us leave him*, say they, *and let us begone, every one to his own country.* (Jer. li. 9.) Do you not see upon his forehead the character of a reprobate? The hardness of his heart has hardened against him the heart of God; the poor have accused him at the Divine tribunal; an action is entered against him at the court of heaven; and though in dying he should make presents of the goods he can no longer retain, the heaven is iron to his prayers, and there is no longer mercy for him: '*For his judgment reacheth unto*

[1] Luke xvi. 9.—Ed.

heaven, and is lifted up even unto the skies.' (Jer. li. 9.) Consider, Christians, if you wish to die in this abandonment, and if this condition fills you with horror, that you may escape the cries of reproach which the poor will utter against you, listen to the cries of the miserable."[1]

Such are the only motives, which we permit to be used in the pulpit; and we have been careful to restrict the use of the second. We do not, like the ancient rhetoricians, give free scope to all the passions; we do not say with Quintilian: "Hæc pars (πάθος) circa iram, odium, metum, invidiam, miserationem, fere tota versatur;"[2] but in the train of the generous motives, the employment of which we have authorised, we indicate some moral elements which enter into the one or other of the two great motives indicated, or perhaps into both at once. We name them separately, either because they have something special, *sui generis*, or because it is not easy to say—at least of some of them—to which of these principles they are related.

Self-love.—We cannot be decided for truth, and for duty, by self-love, or by vanity; but we cannot but see, that truth is agreeable, and error contrary, to the dignity of human nature. Here, contrary to what we said above on the preference to be given to the positive above the negative, it is the negative that we prefer. We would rather be excited to what is good by the disgrace which there is in departing from it, than by the honour there is in performing it. When a preacher shows (and the most Christians may do so) how such an action, such conduct, and even such an opinion, is disgraceful, what else does he do but rely upon the felt necessity of esteeming, or, at least, of not despising ourselves?[3] It is true, that even under this form the apostles seldom appeal to the sentiment of human or personal dignity.[4] It is not so much ourselves that they call upon to respect, as God in us: "Your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost," says St Paul, 1 Cor. vi. 19.

[1] Bossuet: *Eleventh Sermon for the Fast of the Eleventh Week of Lent.*

[2] Quintilian, book vi., chap. ii.

[3] See Massillon, sermon on the *Truth of a Future State*, book i., p. 170, edition Lefèvre; and book ii., p. 239, edition Méquignon: "Mais je vais encore plus loin," etc.

[4] And therefore we too, in preaching, ought to recognise no other "dignity of human nature," save that, the ideal of which was realised in our Representative-Head, Jesus Christ.—Ed.

Ridicule.—The difficulty is not to excite it, but to avoid exciting it; for ridicule is found almost wherever there is absurdity *(déraison)*. "In truth," says Pascal, "it is the glory of religion to have as its enemies men so unreasonable."[1] "It must be confessed," says Boileau, "that God has stupid enemies." But it is necessary to avoid exciting ridicule, for this impression is one of those which shut the soul against religious emotions.[2] We must beware of raising the dread of ridicule into a motive, for, then, men will no longer shun evil as evil, but as ridiculous; they repent no more of a sin, when that sin is at the same time a folly. We must be on our guard against it, for ridicule attaches itself almost as easily to good, as to evil. [The employment of ridicule is the invocation of the respect for man's opinion[3]—nothing else. Besides, ridicule may make a man shun an action, but it does not amend the heart. This shows how vain is the pretension to correct the morals, *castigare mores*, by means of comedy. If the employment of ridicule may be admitted into private conversation, or into a book, it is inadmissible before an assembly, when grave subjects are in question. Men assembled together are susceptible of very different impressions, which a man, when alone, does not feel in the same degree. When we employ the *reductio ad absurdum*, we must, therefore, take care not to go too far.]

Sentiment of the beautiful.—What is the beautiful in such matters as those of preaching? Is it nothing else than the good? Can we, at least, distinguish it from the good? The good is its basis, and there are certain conditions under which the good becomes beautiful. Analysis can discern these conditions, which are, harmony, unity, grandeur. When we make these characters prominent, we give to the good the form of the beautiful. The preacher has it in his power to do so; we do not see, why he should deprive the truth, and the good, of a single one of their advantages; but he cannot present the beautiful as a motive, purely in itself, and on its own account. The evident relation of the good to the beautiful has led to great errors, to the idea of the æsthetic culture of the soul, to the idea

[1] Pascal, *Pensées*, part ii., art. ii.

[2] "The pulpit is the seat of good natural sense; and the good sense of good men."—Claude.—Ed.

[3] See John v. 44; xii. 43.—Ed.

that the development of the taste is the best preparation for virtue. Far from that, a literary education, ill directed, will have the effect of sophisticating the soul, of giving to it a wrong twist, and a factitious culture. Literary talent is a very great snare; in sinful man it easily becomes unjust riches. The preacher ought not to contemplate the matters with which he is occupied from a point of view essentially æsthetical; this would not be without danger.

Sympathetic Affections.—The sympathetic affections, which, abstracted from the reflex idea of duty, and the intention to obey, connect our existence with the existence of others, whether individuals or the community, and which for the moment, dispossess us of ourselves, coincide with the spirit and the thought of the Gospel, and bear testimony to it. [God, who has put these affections within us, cannot condemn them; they are a law of our nature.[1]] We may take advantage of them, appeal to them, [excite the family affections, the love of country, friendship, admiration, gratitude,] but, at the same time, preserving to them a subordinate interest and importance. All the good that remains to us since the fall, we must bring together to do homage to God. Let us cast all into the treasury of God, that all may be lost in the ocean of His love. While exercising ourselves in the pure love of His creatures, we exercise ourselves in loving Himself.

Emotion.—The employment of all these motives or means of impulsion being admitted, another question presents itself: Is it permitted to excite emotion? And I, for my part, ask if it is possible not to excite emotion, when, otherwise, we think we can make use of all the motive powers which we have been discussing. The distinction which we would make between moving and exciting, between movement and emotion—is it, after all, a real one?

What is an affection, but a prolonged emotion, and emotion extended over the whole life? What is an emotion, but an affection instantaneously excited? If, in a given case, we can

[1] The defect in many English preachers is, that they seek rather to *convince*, than to *persuade* and to *move*. Their sermons are rather essays about religion, and *about* men in general, than addresses, instinct with religious fire, and directly *to* their hearers. "Nothing," says Baxter, "is more indecent than a dead preacher speaking to dead sinners the living truth of the living God."—Ed.

determine men to the performance of an action, without exciting an emotion actually sensible, we could only obtain the mastery of a life by exciting an affection, which is, to the emotion, what a whole is to its parts, a tree to its branches, any fact whatever to its various moments. It is impossible for affection not to have its distinct moments, which are the emotions.

The affection is at rest, without sleeping and without languishing, till the moment in which something external, a fact or a word, touches and excites it; but this fact, or word, in some way rouses it; a particular movement takes place in the general movement; this particular movement is the emotion.

There is, moreover, a distinction to be made between the emotions. Some, by their very nature, or by the nature of the part affected, are more lively, and others are less so; but I say of the one class as of the other, that the distinct moment, in which we appeal to them, is the moment of an emotion.

It will be said: Exhibit to this affection the objects that correspond to it, but do nothing more; give nourishment to this flame, but do not blow it up besides. These distinctions, which appear real at the first view, vanish at the second. What is it, then, that produces emotion, if it is not the act of bringing together the affection and the objects which correspond to it? And when you say: "It is one thing to nourish the flame, and it is another to blow it up," the image you employ deceives you, or rather, it does not deceive you: this human breath is also an aliment for the flame. This breath is something; there is more than a mere shaking or displacing of the air; this breath, in eloquence, is facts, and reasons. You cannot, without some such thing, instantaneously render more lively the sentiment of the present affection; just as you cannot present to the affection the facts, or the ideas, that correspond to it, without exciting more or less emotion.

On certain subjects we are not complete if we are not touching. When we have not touched, we have not said everything. We may appear complete, we are so in a sense, because the reason has been convinced, and the conscience enlightened; but if only the speculative parts of the soul have been reached; if we have not approached the objects of the most sensible parts, as much as might be; if, in one word, we have not touched, we have stopped at the half-way. Will the hearers do the rest alone? Would

it not be to form a false idea of the generality of the hearers, to believe that they would apply to themselves the discourse which we have not applied to them?[1] Is it a way to touch them, not to appear touched?[2] For, in fact, what we have not been willing to do, it will be thus necessary that they should do: it will be necessary, that they should make the arrows penetrate their own hearts which we have launched at the right place, but with too little force.[3]

If it were not permitted us to touch, what an example would have been given us by the writers of the Bible, the most pathetic of all writers, those for whom it is not enough that Jesus Christ should be preached, if He is not, moreover, so "evidently set forth"[4] that He seems to be a second time crucified before our eyes. (Gal. iii. 1.)

Is not the Gospel in itself, independently of the language of the writers, touching, from this very circumstance, that, in place of abstract ideas, it presents to us and brings near to our hearts, facts, and living beings?

We may, then, nay, we should be touching, but that not without rule or measure. Our rhetoric differs from that of the ancients. One might say: *Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat?*"[5]

It is remarkable, that the Athenians made a distinction in this

[1] Archbishop Secker remarks, "We are not merely saying good things in the presence of our hearers, but directing what we say to them personally, as a matter which concerns them beyond expression. More general discourses they often want skill to take home to themselves, and oftener yet, inclination." Hildersham, on John iv., says, "Our doctrine must be as a garment fitted for the body it is made for: a garment that is fitted for everybody, is fit for nobody."—Ed.

[2] "Ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent
Humani vultûs: si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primùm ipsi tibi: tunc tua me infortunia lædent."
—Horace, *Epist. ad Pis.*—Ed.

[3] A bishop asked an actor, "How is it, that you, who present nothing but fiction to your hearers, can affect them to tears; whereas we, who present to them the most solemn truths, produce no effect whatever?" "Because," replied the actor, "you deliver your truths, as if they were fictions; but we deliver our fictions, as if they were truth."—Ed.

[4] Cicero, *de Orat.*, calls this lively representation *evidence* (evidentia),—"the orator not seeming so much to speak, as to show the very things themselves, as if they were before the eyes."—Ed.

[5] Virgil, *Æneid*, ii. 390.

respect between the bar and the tribune. It was not permitted to touch the feelings of the judges of the Areopagus, or in other words, to present them with any other motive than *the* motive, always equable, of justice and of truth. I know not if the Athenians did not forget, that the mind also has its illusions, and that "the heart is the dupe of the mind, as the mind is the dupe of the heart."[1] But be that as it may, the Athenians, when out of the Areopagus, indemnified themselves beyond measure for this restriction, which they would not have imposed upon themselves in their judicial affairs, if they had not felt how much in general it was contrary to their nature. Passion overflowed in their political eloquence, in which the law being no longer, as Bossuet says, the reason recognised by all the people, but in which the will of the people being the law itself and the reason, the eloquence which, by any means whatsoever, took possession of the popular will, was always right.

This did not prevent the Greeks from proclaiming, in theory, the obligation to employ eloquence in the service of truth, and even the essential union of eloquence with the truth; but in practice, they did not show themselves hard to please about the choice of means. The practice of the Romans was the same, and their theory was in accordance with their practice. Their rhetoricians have plainly pointed out all that is fitted to surprise the minds of the hearers, and to rule them *per fas et nefas*. Their rhetoric bears no small resemblance to the politics of the *Prince* (of Machiavel).[2]

For ourselves, who do not think it either necessary, or possible, to interdict emotion, we give other rules. We are not jealous of a triumph obtained by surprise, or by violence.

We maintain that emotion should not supersede, nor take precedence of, the proof. [The road would doubtless be shorter, for imagery is more powerful with the people, than an idea. Passion is more suitable than reason, for deciding great questions.]

We must neither multiply, nor prolong, the shocks, especially

[1] Louis XIV. and M. Desèze.

[2] Dishonest arms.

—Ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo
Promptus, et Isæo torrentior.

—Juvenal, Satire iii.

if they are strong. *Crebris commotionibus mens obrigescit, et est contra naturam, ut quæ summa sunt, diutina sint.*[1]

Then, we wish indeed to touch, and even to agitate; but we do not wish to disturb. It is necessary that the thought should be able to react, that its action should not be suspended. It is necessary to husband the space for contemplation. A clear idea, a precise notion, ought to make its way through the emotion. Without this, emotion is not legitimate. It does not respect our liberty; it is passion.

Nothing is lasting in the soul, except what has for its internal support the idea. Nothing is lasting that is merely passive. *Nil citius arescit lacrymâ.*—The idea preserves, renews the emotion, which, abandoned to itself, is dissipated. This consideration is of especial importance in pulpit eloquence, of which the day of settlement is after a long term.

We should also be deceived if we thought that the affection would correspond to the appeal, in proportion as it is more lively and more vehement. God is not always in the tempest (1 Kings xix. 11, 12): [He is often in the "still small voice."]

> Si vis me flere, dolendum est
> Primum ipsi tibi.[2]

[The poet does not say *flendum est*, but *dolendum est.*] Moderation has great force. In the figurative, and sometimes in the proper sense, this saying is true: "The more noise you make, the more you will be heard." It is much better, for the sake of the effect we wish to produce, to have the appearance of feeling more than we express, than of expressing more than we feel; [and the hearer will more readily share in our emotion, when he perceives that we have to repress some part of it.[3]]

Moderation has, besides, something masculine and dignified. The eloquence of the apostles and prophets, though full of abandonment, is not, however, an eloquence of desperation and convulsion.[4] Let us add, that nothing approaches nearer to the

[1] Erasmus, *Ecclesiastes*, book iii. chap. lix.

[2] Horace, *Ars poetica*, 102. [*Flere* implies the outward manifestation of sorrow, as well as the inward feeling of it: *Dolere*, the feeling of grief or pain, only.—Ed.]

[3] It is well said of some preachers, "They mistake *perspiration* for *inspiration*." They imitate the contortions of the Sibyl, without her true afflatus.—Ed.

[4] No more striking example of dignified eloquence can be given than that of Luther at the Diet of Worms, standing alone, with the truth as his only sup-

ridiculous, than the attempt to excite emotion, when it has been at once violent, and unsuccessful. It may be said :—

Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem ;[1]

but our business is not to *irritate* minds.

We might apply to the pathetic, or to passion, what has been said of ridicule :—

Ridiculum acri
Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res ;[2]

but the business is not *secare*, to cut the knot ; it is to untie it. To reason otherwise is to imitate that modern bad art of poetry, condemned by Aristotle a thousand years ago, which requires that we should strike strongly, rather than justly, and overpower the senses, rather than touch the heart, and which applauds such coarseness, and exclaims that art is in good condition.

It will be said that zeal cannot preserve this moderation, that those whom the voice of the preacher converts are brands plucked out of the fire, that his discourse is a cry of alarm, and that it is as unreasonable to wish to stifle the vehemence of it, as it is to prescribe a certain accent, and to reduce to a certain volume of voice, the man who, on seeing a house in flames, cries, Fire, fire ! Well and good ; but this religion which God has made according to His will, is a religion of thought, and a religion of persuasion ; it does not renounce these characters without changing its nature, for they are essential to it ; one is not a Christian if he does not think his religion,—if he is not persuaded of his religion : now, *both* of these are incompatible with this violent and stormy eloquence.

Preachers of the first order[3] are quoted, whose discourses excited beyond measure thousands of hearers, crowding around them under the vault of heaven, and filled a vast plain with groans and sobbings. I answer, that the truth, according to times and per-

port against the Pope, Emperor, Princes, Cardinals, Bishops, and Priests, all infuriated against him : "Here I stand. I can do no other. May God help me !"—Ed.

[1] Horace, *Ars Poet.*, 180. [2] Ibid., Satire x., lines 14, 15.

[3] Wesley, Whitefield. [John the Baptist was "a burning and a shining light :" John v. 35. So ministers must at once kindle warmth in the affections and enlighten the understandings of their hearers. As in a different case, so in this,—

"Alterius sic
Altera poscit opem res, et conjurat amicè." Hor., *Ep. ad Pis.*—Ed.]

sons, has in it something that overpowers. I answer, that it is not certain that the most numerous, and the most certain conquests of those preachers, were made among the souls that were most overpowered.[1] I answer, in fine, that the preacher has not to be solicitous about symptoms, provided he can bear testimony to himself that he has preached, not to the nerves of his hearers, exercising upon them a physical violence, but to their reason, to their conscience, and to their heart. Further, let us lay down no absolute rules; let us condemn nothing beforehand, nor attempt to regulate the gift of emotion. It is sufficient that the exercise of thought be not interrupted, that internal liberty be not violated.[2]

As examples of what may be done, without the assistance of reason, by an image, a remembrance, a gesture, anything, in a word, that excites suddenly and unexpectedly the imagination or the senses, we shall cite Mark Antony uncovering and counting the wounds of Cæsar, and the English soldier mutilated by the Spaniards [whose words are thus introduced by Mirabeau]: "It is always under the influence of the passions, that political assemblies have decreed war. You are all acquainted with the striking saying of that sailor, who, in 1740, made England resolve upon war against Spain: '*When the Spaniards, after having mutilated me, set death before me, I recommended my soul to God, and my revenge to my country.*' This sailor was a very eloquent man; but the war which he kindled was neither just, nor politic; neither the king of England, nor his ministers, wished it."[3]

Mirabeau, on a proposal to decree that the Roman Catholic religion should be for ever the religion of the state, had himself recourse to an expedient of this kind: "I would observe to him who spoke before me, that there is no doubt that, under a reign signalised by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, all kinds of intolerance were consecrated. I will observe further, that the remembrance of what despots have done, cannot serve as a model for what ought to be done by the representatives of a people, who wish to be free. But since we are permitted to make historical

[1] A blaze in straw soon goes out. Those sown on stony ground "received the word anon with *joy*; yet had no root in themselves."—Ed.

[2] "So long as our zeal takes not its colour from human infirmities and passions, but is regulated by the Word of God,—so long as we tread in the steps of those who 'did all things decently and in order;'—we act unworthily of our cause, if we possess it not."—Dealtry, *Gosp. Mess.*, p. 21.—Ed.

[3] Mirabeau, *Discourse sur le droit de la guerre.*

citations upon the subject which now occupies us, I shall make only one.—Recollect, Gentlemen, that from this place, from this very tribunal in which I am speaking, I see the window of the palace in which factious men, uniting temporal interests with the most sacred interests of religion, sent away from the feeble hand of a king of the French, the fatal arquebus which gave the signal for the massacre of Saint Bartholomew."[1]

We shall mention further the example of Gerbier, placing before the audience the orphans, for whom he was pleading.

Without condemning, which would be absurd and barbarous, any of the grand effects of eloquence, we think we may in general prefer to hasty effects, an effect that is continued, more profound than violent, an eloquence little indebted to accidental circumstances, but penetrating.

Let us add this last rule; that we must, in preference, call forth the emotion that springs from the most elevated affections. We may make one weep with a blow of the fist. There are generous tears, and there are some tears that are too easily made to flow. It is, doubtless, superfluous to say that the orator must not speak of his own emotion.

I have stated what sentiments a preacher should seek to excite in his auditory. This is to state, what sentiments he ought to have himself.[2] Nevertheless, something remains to be said on the general and characteristic spirit of a Christian discourse. It is summed up in *unction* and *authority*.

§ III.—Of Unction.[3]

This word, taken according to its etymology and primitive acceptation, designates no special quality of preaching, but rather the grace and the efficacy that are joined to it by the Spirit of God, a kind of seal and sanction which is verified, less by exter-

[1] Mirabeau, vol. ii., p. 305.

[2] A quaint speaker once gave this rule, "Get the subject into yourself, and yourself into your subject, and then get both into the hearts of your hearers."—Ed.

[3] The remarks upon unction announced in the preceding paragraph, are not found in the manuscripts of M. Vinet relating to *Homiletics*. To fill up this deficiency, we reproduce here the chapter of the *Pastoral Theology* (pages 191–195 of translation) on unction. We think we are the more authorised to do this, inasmuch as a very short summary of several of the ideas of this chapter, in one of the note-books of the author, seems to indicate, that, being called to occupy himself with this subject, he has made use of the same notes for the two courses.—Ed.

nal signs, than by the impression which is made upon the souls of men. But as, in tracing this effect to its cause, we may particularly distinguish certain characteristics, it is to the union of these characteristics that we have given the name of unction. Unction appears to me to be the general characteristic of the Gospel, recognisable, doubtless, in each of its parts, but especially observable in it as a whole: it is the general savour of Christianity; it is a gravity accompanied with tenderness, a severity tempered with mildness, majesty united with familiarity; it is the true temper of the Christian dispensation in which, according to the expression of the Psalmist: "Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." (Ps. lxxxv. 10.) So much is it a thing peculiar to Christianity and to Christian things, that we seldom think of transferring this term to other spheres, and that, when we meet with it applied to other things than Christian discourses or Christian actions, we are astonished, and can see in it only an analogy or a metaphor.

[From the fact that the modern world has been thoroughly pervaded by Christianity], many modern works which are neither Christian, nor even religious, have a character which cannot be otherwise designated than by the word *unction*, while no work of antiquity awakens this idea.

The idea which Maury[1] gives of unction is no other than that of Christian pathos. Blair's definition is more distinctly identical with our own. "Gravity and warmth united," according to this author, "form that characteristic of preaching which the French call *onction*, the affecting, penetrating, interesting manner, flowing from a strong sensibility of heart in the preacher to the importance of the truths which he delivers, and an earnest desire that they should make a full impression on the hearts of his hearers."[2]

M. Dutoit-Membrini thinks, that in order to define unction, an inward and mysterious quality, we must avoid formal definition and analysis. It is by the effects of unction, and by analogies,

[1] Maury, *Essai sur l'éloquence de la Chaire*, lxxiii. *De l'onction.*

[2] Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-lettres*, lecture xxix. *Eloquence of the Pulpit.* [He adds, "The serious nature of the subjects belonging to the pulpit requires *gravity*; their importance to mankind requires *warmth*." There needs to be added to this definition the element mentioned by Vinet, "the general savour of Christianity." It is a holy, Spirit-taught tenderness, gravity, and warmth.—Ed.]

that he endeavours to make us acquainted with it, or, to express it better, to make us taste it:—

"Unction is a gentle warmth, which makes itself felt in the powers of the soul. It produces in the spiritual the same effects, as the sun in the physical world. It enlightens, and it warms. It gives light to the soul, and warmth to the heart. It makes us know and love,—it interests."

I would willingly say, that it is a light which warms, and a heat which illuminates. And I would recall to your recollection, on this subject, the words of St John:—"The anointing (unction) which ye have received of Him abideth in you, and ye need not that any man teach you. The same anointing teacheth you of all things." (1 John ii. 27.)

M. Dutoit-Membrini continues thus:—

"Its only source is the spirit of regeneration, and of grace. It is a gift which is spent and lost, unless we renew this sacred fire, which must always be kept burning: and that which preserves it, is the cross within the soul, self-denial, prayer, and penitence.

"Unction in religious subjects is that which, in poets, is called *enthusiasm*. Thus unction exists, when the heart and the powers of the soul are nourished, and inflamed, by the gentle influences of grace. It is a sentiment, mild, delicious, lively, heartfelt, profound, and mellifluous.

"Unction, then, will be this rich, gentle, nourishing, and, at the same time, luminous warmth which enlightens the mind, penetrates, interests, and transports the heart, and which he, on whom it is bestowed, communicates to the souls destined to receive it.

"Unction is felt, and known by experience; it cannot be analysed. It produces its impression secretly, and without the aid of reflection. It is communicated in simplicity, and received in the same manner by the heart, into which the warmth of the preacher passes. Ordinarily, it produces its effect without awakening our consciousness of its presence, and without our being able to render a reason to ourselves of the impression which it has produced upon us. We feel,—we experience,—we are moved,—we can hardly assign a reason, why.

"We may apply to him who has received this gift these words of the prophet Isaiah:—'Behold, I will make thee a new sharp

threshing instrument (French version, *a harrow*) having teeth.' (Isaiah xli. 15.) This breaks up the fallow ground of the heart."[1]

From all that has been said, we must not conclude that unction, which has much the same origin as piety, is exactly proportionate to piety. The unction of tried preachers equal in piety may be very unequal, but it is so intimately united to Christianity, that it cannot be absolutely wanting in a truly Christian discourse.

Certain obstacles, some natural, others arising from error or habit, may injure unction, and obstruct, so to speak, the passage of this gentle and holy oil, which ought to flow everywhere, to lubricate all the articulations of thought, to make all the movements of a discourse easy and just, to penetrate and nourish the words of the preacher. There are no artificial means of acquiring unction: oil flows of itself from the olive; the most violent pressure cannot extract a drop from the earth or the flint:[2] but there are means, if I may say so, of being not unctuous, even with a precious basis of piety; or of not letting be seen the unction that is in us, and of hindering it from flowing outwards. There are things incompatible with unction, such as, wit,[3] too rigorous analysis, a too dogmatic tone, too formal dialectics, irony, the employment of a secular, or too abstract, vocabulary, a too literary form, in fine, a too close and compact style,—for unction supposes abundance, outpouring, fluency, pliancy.

The idea of unction is rather exerted by its absence, than by its presence. It is its contraries which make the notion of it distinct, though it is not a negative quality, but, on the contrary, the most positive; but positive in the same sense that an odour, a colour, or a taste is positive.[4]

But let us not narrow the idea of unction by reducing it to a soft gentleness, an eloquent abundance, a tearful pathos. Let

[1] Dutoit-Membrini, *La Philosophie Chretienne.* Lausanne, 1800, vol. i., pp. 92, and following.

Comp. Jer. xxiii. 29, "Is not My word like a fire, saith the Lord; and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?" See also xx. 9.—Ed.

[2] A painted fire may glare, but it will not warm. Violent agitation, without corresponding tenderness of feeling, will disgust, instead of arresting the mind. —Ed.

[3] However, St Bernard and Augustine have both wit and unction.

[4] Real, but not to be defined. Too fine and delicate to admit of its being grasped, and embodied in a description.—Ed.

us be on our guard against thinking, that we can only be unctuous, on condition of renouncing rigour, and consecutiveness in reasoning, and that confidence of tone, that holy vehemence, which certain subjects demand, and without which, when we treat them, we shall do them injustice.

In the opinion of Maury, Massillon is unctuous in a piece that is full of reproaches.[1] [We may also cite, as an example, Bossuet in the end of his sermon on *final impenitence.*]

§ IV.—Of Authority.

Authority is, in general, the right to be believed, or to be obeyed, the right to exact credence or obedience. But the word *authority* also designates the consciousness, and the manifestation, of this right; and it is in this sense, that we can make authority one of the conditions of preaching, and one of the qualities of the preacher. To say how it manifests itself is not easy; it makes itself felt indeed—its absence is felt still more; but it does not allow itself to be discomposed into distinct and tangible elements. We can do little more than define, and recommend the sentiment itself, which may communicate authority to our language, and to the tone of our delivery; but when this sentiment exists, authority does not fail to impress itself on the whole of the discourse, and to set off, so to speak, its minutest details.

We cannot say that authority belongs exclusively to the discourse from the pulpit. We look for it, we are pleased when we find it, in all public discourses. The orator's confidence in his own utterances inspires confidence into the auditory. We love that a man should feel what the strength of his conviction, and the seriousness of his object, deserve on the part of others. Truth has its rights, which pass to its representative, who is its organ. The most modest man ought to be able to sacrifice his

[1] Maury, *Eloquence de la Chaire*, lxxii. *De l'onction.* See Massillon, the end of the first part of the sermon on *Alms.*

So Paul, Phil. iii. 18, 19, "Many walk, of whom I have told you often, and now tell you even *weeping*, that they are the enemies of the cross of Christ: whose end is destruction," etc.

Herbert (Country Parson, vii.) speaks of the people as "thick and heavy, and needing a mountain of fire to kindle them." Therefore we ought to "dip and season all our words and sentences in our hearts, before they come into our mouths,—so that our auditors may plainly perceive, that every word is heart-deep."—Ed.

modesty to the dignity of truth, and boldness is becoming in him, when he speaks for it. But authority is much more essential to Christian preaching, since it speaks on the part of God Himself, and declares the oracles of God.[1] It would be to injure simple souls, not to put this seal upon our discourses; it would even be to astonish those, who do not believe in our Gospel. They do not regard it from our point of view, but they know well what it ought to be: if they allow that we are convinced of the truth of our cause, they allow us by that very circumstance to speak with authority; and if we assumed in their presence another tone than that of authority, we should only succeed in scandalising them, and in estranging them still more.

We speak of true authority, that which rests wholly on conviction and zeal, and through which, as through a pure and transparent medium, shine humility and charity. It is easily distinguished by every one from that magisterial dignity, that studied importance, to which a position officially guaranteed, and the habit of speaking without contradiction or interruption, necessarily expose the ministers who have more of the spirit of their order, than of the spirit of the Gospel. If the Prince de Vendome had heard only ministers of this kind, we might excuse him for having replied to Louis XIV., when he urged him to go to Church: "Sire, I cannot go to hear a man who says whatever he pleases, without any person having the liberty of replying to him." For this circumstance of being the only speaker, and of speaking without having to fear a reply, hurts only when the preacher makes it hurtful. In itself, it is very well received; but it must be confessed, that arrogance is doubly shocking in the man, who knows too well, that none will reply to him.

The tone of true authority, on the contrary, is welcome to almost all men. Favour is assured beforehand to the men, who, in this world of inconstancy and perplexity, express themselves on a grave subject with conviction, and authority. This is even the first thing that strikes in an orator, and conciliates attention to him, especially when we see that he draws all his authority from his message, and not from himself, and that he is as modest

[1] "A pastor should act with the dignity of a man, who acts by the authority of God."—*Sacra Privata* of Bishop Wilson. Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 4.

"The moment we permit ourselves to think lightly of the Christian ministry, our right arm is withered; nothing but imbecility remains."—Hall *on the Discouragements, etc., of the Ministry.*—Ed.

as he is convinced. What was it that astonished the Jewish people in the doctrine of Jesus Christ? was it this doctrine itself? It was especially the authority, with which Jesus Christ professed it: "For He taught," says St Matthew (vii. 28, 29), "as one having authority, and not as the scribes."

Doubtless, authority was becoming in Jesus Christ; but it also becomes the truth: authority is inherent in the truth; and those who come to declare to the world, on the part of Jesus Christ, that truth which regenerates and saves, have a right, or rather are under an obligation, to declare it in the same tone as Himself. If the servants are not greater than their Master, in a certain sense, they are not less than their Master; the truth which they bring to the world is not less truth in their mouth, than in His. It does not become them to speak as the scribes; for it is not their own inventions, that they would make to penetrate into the minds of men, by a thousand subtle devices; it is a sovereign message which they deliver, it is as ambassadors of a king that they present themselves.[1] Their person is nothing, their message is everything; it is also not for their own person, but for their message, that they demand respect; but they would be as culpable in not claiming that respect for the Divine thought, of which they are the depositaries, as they would be foolish and ridiculous in demanding it for their own thoughts.[2]

St Paul, also, is not afraid to recommend to Titus, and, doubtless, to all the ministers of the Gospel, "to exhort and rebuke with all authority" (Titus ii. 15); a remarkable injunction, when we think that it comes from him who, of all men perhaps, had the greatest respect for the liberty of the human conscience, who most severely restricted himself from lording it over the faith of his disciples, who most carefully abstained from raising his counsels into orders, and who insisted the most, that the obedience of believers should be a reasonable, or reasoned, obedience. There is no contradiction in this: it is the duty of the one, to examine before believing; it is the duty of the others, to assert with energy the object of their faith. This energy, this insisting, this gravity, in a word, this authority, does not inflict the slightest

[1] 2 Cor. v. 20, vi. 1–10.—Ed.

[2] See 2 Cor. iv. 5, 7, "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord. We have this treasure in earthly vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God, and not of us."—Ed.

blow upon liberty; they only warn the conscience and awaken it; and preaching only wrongs liberty, when it disturbs the mind, and overpowers it by illusions, and when, favoured by the noise and tumult which it excites, it wrings from us an assent, which our mind, when attentive, and calm though touched, would never have given to it.

We are obliged to confess, that the tone of authority is somewhat defective in the preaching of our days, and that, on comparing together the preachers of the same time, the Roman Catholic appear, with respect to the subject under consideration, to have the advantage. Attending first to the second point, we will grant that the claim to authority, in a particular sense, being the true idea and fundamental characteristic of the Roman Catholic institution, it is not astonishing that it should reproduce itself everywhere, and that the minister, having not merely individual faith in the religion which he preaches, but forming a part of a body of men who regard themselves as the interpreters of revelation, and, to say all in one word, the perpetuators of it, should speak, in a sense, from a higher vantage-ground to his auditory, than a Protestant preacher can do.[1] It is true that he preaches, and that in doing so he reasons, he discusses, he examines, just as the Protestant minister does; but amongst all those acts which avowedly imply a similar position, we see the sentiment break through of a sovereignty in matters of faith, which belongs to no other system. The subjects themselves, the form, the tone of discussion, announce the Roman Catholic priest; and though the priest and the minister maintain the same cause, the one pleads as an advocate, and the other as attorney-general.

However, without going out of the Reformed Church, if we in-

[1] Once grant the foundation on which the lever may rest,—the δὸς ποῦ στῶ—and the whole system of Romanism is complete and consistent. But there is no real fulcrum on which Rome's claim of infallible authority can be supported, and so the whole superstructure is unreal. The Protestant minister claims infallibility, not for himself, but for Scripture. "God," as Calvin says, "has not called His ministers into the function of teaching, that, after they have brought the Church under, they may usurp to themselves the government, but that He may use their faithful diligence to associate the same to Himself."—Calvin on John iii. 29. See 1 Pet. v. 3. Their dignity lies in this, "quod, cum per se agere possit Deus, nos homunciones tanquam adjutores adsciscat, et tanquam organis utatur."—Calvin, 1 Cor. iii. 9. Their authority in preaching will manifest itself, not to exalt self, but to promote the glory of God, in proportion as they spiritually realise the momentous character of the message, and of the ministry, with which they are entrusted. "Non magisterium, sed ministerium."—Ed.

quire what difference there may be, with respect to authority, between our own and more ancient times, it is not explained by the consideration of a weakness of conviction in the ministers, but by a circumstance of a different nature; and, perhaps, on looking closely into it, we shall find that authority appears to have fallen, only because it has been exaggerated, or that the chords, if we may say so, only appear relaxed at present, from their having formerly been drawn too tight. With the authority of conviction, and of internal vocation, which is everything, was mingled, without its being perceived, the authority of position, or of external vocation; and, perhaps, this had too great a share in the assurance, and loftiness, of the tone of preaching. There were not, then, more true faith, and less real unbelief, than there are in our days; but unbelief less declared itself, and even less knew itself; unbelief had not yet been driven by circumstances to the necessity of declaring, nor even of examining, itself; among those who, on this point, were honest with themselves, and were no longer under an illusion, the most, whether from prudence or policy, were silent: those who published their unbelief were few in number, and were even blamed by those who shared their opinions. The legal fiction, or to speak more properly, the common prejudice was, that every person believed. The flocks still appeared entire and compact; the Church, very much incorporated with the political constitution; faith, always, and for wise reasons, taken for granted; the clergy, tranquil possessors of a strong position, and of privileges, for the defence of which the one class had made, I believe, few sacrifices, and against which, also, the other had made few efforts. I seriously believe, that the change which has come over them, and which many people deplore, is a blessing from God; and if the unbelief, which was formerly ignorant of itself, knows itself now, if the opposition, which was concealed, now discovers and declares itself, there is here only progress. At first sight there appears an increase of unbelief; a more attentive examination sees in what is passing, only an augmentation of candour and sincerity; those who consider themselves believers, and pass for such by the aid of a vagueness carefully preserved, and of discussions carefully shunned, have been compelled to give an account of the state of their minds to themselves, and to give an account of it also to others. And, on the other hand, those who have con-

tinued to believe and to profess the faith, believe in good earnest, and do not profess without accepting the consequences. There is, whatever we may do, or whatever we may say, a sort of disbanding of that compact majority, which was called the Church: all sorts of things have concurred to produce this state of things, which will become, from day to day, more evident and more palpable. It is long since ministers might have seen, that their task was approaching more and more to that of missionaries; and that, nominally at the head of the Church, they are little more than the *nucleus;* and that their real vocation is to convoke, and to constitute a Church. This state of things is essentially the same as that under which they have long lived, without being well aware of it: their real task was formerly, what it appears, in the present day, to have become: the difference lies in the ever-increasing evidence of their positions, and relations. But what ought to be the result with respect to authority? If we speak of true authority, nothing, or, rather, a real advantage. *Conventional* authority is gone; we must throw ourselves upon the other, which may be displayed by every interpreter of the truth, who is convinced of the truth. It is true the preacher can no longer count upon the implicit and silent assent of a flock, that is to say, he has one illusion less; but he can always count upon the force of truth, and upon the promises of God.[1] It is true, that it is no longer the sheep who come to him, but it is he who goes to the sheep, and who even runs after them. But did the apostles, who professed that their ministry was to beseech men to be reconciled to God (2 Cor. v. 20), the less exhort them with full authority? (Tit. ii. 15.) Is the pastor less a pastor when he runs after the sheep, than when he feeds it with his hand in the fold, from which it never thinks of departing? This pursuit of strayed sheep,[2] which ought always to be the principal duty of our ministry, is more evidently so in the present day than ever; and if, in this pursuit, of which the direction, the windings, and

[1] See 1 Thess. i. 5; Acts iv. 8–13. Bacon says, The Saviour makes it an ill note to have outward "peace," Luke xi. 21. It is the Church's appointed lot to be ever under trials of two kinds—one of persecution, the other of contention: when the one ceaseth, the other succeedeth. Paul censures such unnecessary schisms. But remember, it is easy in times of ignorance, and *implied belief*, to agree; just as all colours agree in the dark. Or if a country sink into practical Atheism, controversies are rare, because men do not think religion worth falling out for.—Ed.

[2] See Ezek. xxxiv. 11–16.—Ed.

the length, seem to be determined by the sheep itself, we appear to be dependent upon it, if over mountains and valleys, through briers and ravines, that is to say, by all the paths in which passion and prejudice, knowledge and ignorance, giddiness or sophisms, may make a soul to wander, that flies from truth, we are obliged to pant after it, and pliantly to regulate our course by its irregular wanderings; if every epoch, in renewing the forms of error, compels us to renew the forms of truth—what can such charitable condescension take from the character of authority, with which preaching ought always to be impressed? What! would love take away anything from authority? Should authority manifest itself in the obstinate determination to speak always the same language, and to preserve the same formulas? —and have the infinite condescensions of Divine love ever degraded the Deity? have they not rather adorned, and tempered, the holy majesty of God, which the Bible makes known to us?

It must, nevertheless, be granted that preaching, in becoming more distinctly a beseeching, or a contest, has lost, with some, a part of that character of calm and serene majesty which, in the apostles, and especially in their Master, is so admirably united to the holy vehemence of love. It may be, also, that dogmatism, and the too minute attention to shades of doctrine, are injurious to that simplicity and grandeur, which are the traits under which authority loves to be produced. We must get rid of these obstacles, and, without affectation, and without research, but by the mere feeling of our vocation, recover that tone which encourages while it overawes, and which all our hearers, without exception, have need of finding in our preaching.

I think that, in general, we remain, with respect to authority, below what is legitimate, possible, and necessary. The boldness and the freedom of the prophets does not make itself sufficiently felt in our discourses.[1] In one word, we do not rebuke sufficiently. We contend, with arms of courtesy, as in a tournament; we forget that a serious combat requires sharp weapons, and that a semblance of a combat results only in the semblance of a victory. A more lively compassion for our people, a deeper sentiment of our responsibility—in fine, a more elevated and

[1] Eph. vi. 19: "That utterance may be given me, that I may *open my mouth boldly*, to make known the mystery of the Gospel." Comp. Acts ix. 27, 29, xiv. 3, xix. 8.—Ed.

more solemn ideal of our position, ought to place us above vain considerations, and certain notions of propriety, with which, in truth, we have nothing to do.[1] That this is not the idea which is generally formed of the ministry in the present day, I grant; but is it for us to conform to that idea, or is it our part to reform it? If the maxims of the world upon this subject are the measure of our liberty, there is no reason, why we should not descend still lower in complaisance; if, on the contrary, we award to ourselves all the liberty which we may, upon Christian principles, award to ourselves; if, far from suffering our ministry to be encroached upon, we vindicate for it all the authority which belongs to it, there are all sorts of reasons for believing that the world, though astonished at first, will consent and accustom itself to it. The world loves courage and independence; it is only strong against the weak; and it is our timidity which causes its boldness. Everywhere, and on all occasions, provided we follow the truth with love,[2] our ministry will be that which we shall wish it to be. Besides, accepted or not accepted, it is essential that it be what it ought to be.

Character and position may do something. One orator has naturally more authority than another. One church encourages more the tone of authority, than another. But, before everything, is this tone essential to the preaching of the Gospel? We must not confound, in their principle, apostolical authority with a certain natural boldness, which, moreover, is not injurious to it, and is a fitting addition to it. A great humility, and even a great internal humiliation, a great sadness of heart, do not hinder one from speaking with authority, nor that authority from making itself felt. He who trembles before God is none the less bold before men; and his confusion in the closet even gives glory to God in public. I believe that, with every natural character, and in every external position,—with little or much talent,—little or much wit,—a minister may preach with much

[1] Contrast Luther and Erasmus: the latter, with all his splendid talents, and his real convictions, produced little effect in the Reformation, from his want of that holy boldness in stating the truth at all costs, which was the secret of Luther's success.—Ed.

[2] In rebuking, Bridges well says, "It should be aimed at the sin, rather than at the sinner himself. There was no need for the apostle to make any personal allusion to Felix. Conscience told the trembling sinner, 'Thou art the man.'" —Ed.

authority, on certain conditions which we proceed to enumerate :—

1. If he speaks in the name of God, and wishes to know nothing about the things of God, but what he has learned from God Himself. The principle of our authority is in our submission, and the greater the authority of the Divine word over ourselves, the greater is our authority over others; we weigh upon them, if I may say so, with all the weight with which the truth weighs upon us. Here is shown, at once, the apparent disadvantage, and the real advantage, of the position of the preacher, if we compare it with that of any other orator.

The profane orator is master of his thought, he only modifies it by itself. Let us place him, in order the better to bring out the contrast, upon the same ground as the evangelical preacher, upon the ground of morality and religion; he draws his principles from his own resources—that is to say, from his reason and his moral sense; he connects with them, agreeably to the laws of logic, consequences and applications; no foreign force breaks under his feet the first step of the ladder, nor takes away the last; he runs freely over the whole ladder, equally master of the point from which he sets out, and of his conclusions. Reason and conscience, it is true, may well pass for authorities, but they are authorities which we love to recognise; which, born and developed with us, are a part of us,—are ourselves; to which we adhere at once, by the single fact, that we have recognised their existence; and which, by their very nature, are perfectly exempt from the character of arbitrariness, more or less inherent in every other authority. Identical, at least we think so, in all thinking persons, they ought to conciliate, or subject them to us; and as all the means, drawn from this source, have the appearance of being ours, at the same time that they are every person's —we have the satisfaction, in case of victory, of feeling ourselves personally conquerors, without those whom we have persuaded feeling themselves on that account personally conquered: an agreeable position for both parties, and very different from that in which evangelical eloquence places, respectively, the preacher and his auditory. Doubtless, the Christian minister has much to do with reason and conscience; aided by them, he shuts all the outlets, by which souls would wander from the circle, within which he professes to bring them; then, when he has shut them

in, it is with reason, and with conscience, that he retains them, —that he fixes them,—that he establishes them,—that he makes them at last say, "It is good for us to be here, let us build here our tabernacle" (Matt. xvii. 4); so that he does absolutely nothing without the conscience and the reason. But these faculties receive the truth, and do not create it; the truth is given,—given as a sovereign fact, as a divine thought,—not as a deduction from our intelligence; given as a fact which our faculties must elaborate, cultivate, but which they would never have discovered. In one word, reason and conscience are the touchstones of the truth,[1] and not, as in other spheres, the very source of the truth.

Is it not a cramping thing for the preacher to be obliged always to recognise an external authority, an authority which is not his own, which is not himself? Yes, very cramping, so long as he would stand haggling with this authority, would bend it, the inflexible! would corrupt it, the incorruptible! very cramping, so long as he is anxious to make it say what every person would wish to hear[2]—to naturalise the supernatural, to translate the untranslatable. But from the moment he has surrendered himself, that he has decided on believing in the fallibility of the human reason, and in the infallibility of the Divine reason, then, walking no longer with one foot on the sand, and the other on the rock, planting both his feet on the true foundation—what before appeared to him a disadvantage now becomes an advantage and a force. Then, as an imitator of Jesus Christ, he teaches with authority, and not as the scribes (Matt. vii. 29); he no more appeals to himself but to God; he no more opposes man to man, but the majesty of Divine wisdom to the endless vacillations of human wisdom: stripped of all personal authority, he assumes a higher authority; and the more he is abased as man, the more he is elevated as a minister. But what is important to be observed, he speaks with faith. Consider it well. The advocate, the panegyrist, the tribune, may speak with faith; a firm assurance, a lively conviction, is not naturally beyond their

[1] See 2 Cor. iv. 2: "By manifestation of the truth, commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." Also, ch. v. 11.—Ed.

[2] That is to say, "Handling the word of God deceitfully:" 2 Cor. iv. 2, ii. 17; "speaking smooth things:" Isa. xxx. 10; avoiding doctrines which would offend polite ears; or apologising for the occasional mention of them. Contrast Jer. i. 17–19; Ezek. ii. 6–8.—Ed.

reach: but for him who speaks on morality and religion, faith is hardly possible in ordinary and natural circumstances;[1] in this order of ideas, there are only a few things which we can maintain with a certain firmness, and teach with a sufficient authority; the spirit of analysis of the age has pulverised so many opinions, and left standing so few beliefs! There is so little advantage to be drawn from pure reasoning, for reconstructing the moral world and natural religion! Happy then is he, who has received from the hands of God the solution which this earth is impotent to give! an arbitrary solution, but which must be arbitrary, since it has been proved by the fact, that reason cannot find a natural one. Happy he who has found it! he has something to impart to souls;[2] and, in his humble dependence on revealed truth, he is in reality much more independent, he has much more influence, than the preacher who would only believe himself, and who is every moment surprised, that he does not believe himself.

We cannot dispense with adding, that the privilege, exclusively secured to the preacher, of alone addressing the auditory, of having to combat only silent adversaries, would be an exorbitant and absurd privilege, if the preacher were not understood to speak in the name of God, and to repeat, while developing and applying *them*, the oracles of inspired wisdom.

2. [The preacher can preach with much authority,] if he join to the authority which results from the testimony of God, that which springs from experience; since in the plan of Christianity, the external truth is destined to become an internal truth, the revelation, to become an experience; and since, in a certain sense, every man who proclaims the Gospel ought to be able to say, like the apostles, "That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life. . . That

[1] *i.e.*, If he speaks on morality and religion, merely with the kind and degree of faith, which reasoning affords, as distinguished from inspiration.—Ed.

[2] "There stands the messenger of truth; there stands
The legate of the skies! His theme divine,
His office sacred, his credentials clear.
By him the violated law speaks out
Its thunders; and by him, in strains as sweet
As angels use, the Gospel whispers peace."—Cowper, *Task*, ii.—Ed.

which we have seen and heard declare we unto you." (1 John i. 1–3.)[1]

3. [Third condition of preaching with authority]: if the external life of the preacher be so conformable to his preaching, that his words are not put to shame by his actions, and that no person has grounds for drawing a contrast betwixt his preaching and himself. [In that case] his character sanctions it.[2]

4. [Fourth condition]: if, in proportion as he feels the high dignity of his mission, he feels the more his own unworthiness; if we see him the first to bend under the burden which he imposes on others; if he conceal himself behind his mission; if he only bring himself upon the stage, when this becomes indispensable, and if he only show himself, in order to join himself distinctly with his hearers in humiliation; if he separate himself from them neither in thought, nor in word, and if the persuasion of his being himself the chief of sinners, is re-echoed in all his discourses; in one word, if the authority which he displays, be stripped of all personal character; if it be all relative to the object of his mission, all penetrated, and all imprinted with the sentiment which made St Paul say: "Woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel!" (1 Cor. ix. 16.)

5. [Fifth condition]: if, in the pulpit, God give him grace to forget himself, and free him from the miserable disquietudes of vanity.[3] For if, from being the servant of the Most High, he

[1] Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 13: "We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written, I believed, and therefore have I spoken; we also believe, and therefore speak."—Ed.

[2] Cecil says, "People judge what we mean in the pulpit, by what they see we are out of the pulpit."

The body of Engl. Eccles. Law, compiled in the reign of Edw. VI., 1571 A.D., says of ministers, "Non sint compotores, non aleatores, non aucupes, non venatores, non sycophantæ, non otiosi aut supini; sed sacrarum literarum studiis, et prædicationi verbi, et orationibus pro ecclesiâ ad Dominum diligenter incumbant." Piety alone can insure utility.—Ed.

[3] Cowper describes the minister, according to the characteristics given by Paul,

"Simple, grave, sincere,
In doctrine uncorrupt; in language plain,
And plain in manner; decent, solemn, chaste,
And natural in gesture; much impressed
Himself, as conscious of his awful charge,
And anxious mainly that the flock he feeds
May feel it too; affectionate in look,
And tender in address, as well becomes
A messenger of grace to guilty men."—*Task*, ii.—Ed.

should become, through vanity, the servant of men,—if the desire of their suffrages should pre-occupy him, at the very moment that he declares to them the counsel of God,—if he should have sought solidity, pathos, unction, authority itself, from the secret desire of causing it to be *said*, that he preached in a solid, pathetic, unctuous manner, and with authority,—then, descending from the tribunal to the bar, and altogether a stranger to that noble independence which made St Paul say: "It is a very small thing that I should be judged of you" (1 Cor. iv. 3), he would in vain affect the tone of authority, he would not find it. The man whom men overawe, is not fitted to overawe them; he who trembles before them, will never make them tremble; and if Peter, on delivering his first sermon—his trial sermon if you will—had been pre-occupied with his own part, and with the judgment of his auditory, he would not have heard the multitude, touched by compunction, exclaim at the end of his discourse: "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" (Acts ii. 37.)

6. In fine, [to preach with authority, the preacher ought] to make it felt, that he loves those whom his discourse commands.

Reproof.—St Paul willed that Timothy should not only exhort, but that he should also *rebuke* with all authority. We do not speak here of individual or private rebuke, but of that which is exercised in public preaching. More easy in certain respects than the first; in other respects it is less so. If rebuke from the pulpit is more easy, because, addressing all together, and leaving it to every one to take his own share of it, it does not irritate too keenly any individual susceptibility; in another view, the publicity, the solemnity, the small space that is at his disposal, render this part of the preacher's task delicate and dangerous. He has not, as in a private conversation, the resource of mutual explanation, which might enable him to know and to measure the impressions he produces, and might put it in his power to modify, to explain, and to colour his thoughts, as he feels it to be necessary; in one word, to adapt his discourse, not only to the individual character of the person he is addressing, but to all the successive movements of his soul. Collective rebuke, being always applied to a certain mean which is true, only on condition of its not representing the personal state of any of the members

of the assembly, is always in danger of being either feeble, or exaggerated, and only, with difficulty, escapes being vague and arbitrary. And yet we cannot dispense with it in the preacher; and we cannot permit him to decline the thorny part of this task, rebuking the same vices, or the same defects, which are found in all other parishes, and which are chargeable upon the whole of humanity. A true pastor knows his flock, and cannot keep silence in regard to the evils, peculiar to that flock. We do not see why the man who is authorised to mount the pulpit of a certain locality, which is still called a parish,—the man appointed to the moral guardianship of a people,—might not do what is done, with full right, by a private person,—what is done every day by writers and orators, whose zeal holds with them the place of a commission. I believe, at all events, that independently of that which Christianity counsels and suggests concerning prudence and policy, the solemnity of the houses of worship, the very authority with which the pastor is invested, his official position, his privilege, in a word, of speaking without being contradicted or interrupted, enjoin upon him the severest watchfulness over his words. What is public preaching, if it is not the crowning act of individual preaching, the only preaching that is quite direct and penetrating? What would public preaching serve, if it could not individualise itself, up to a certain point, for every one of those who hear it? And why not avail ourselves of all the means which we may have of rendering it direct, by attacking facts less general, than those which are presented by the observation of general humanity?[1]

While admitting that a good Christian discourse should be such as to be useful, and applicable out of the parish for which it was composed, since the principal object of all preaching is related to the fundamental traits of human nature, I think we might require, that the preaching of each pastor should bear the undeniable impress of the place, and of the circumstances, in

[1] Individuality of application was the nerve of the Lord's preaching, and of that of His apostles. Comp. the different modes used in different cases, Matt. xxii., xxiii., xix. 16–22; John iv. 7–26. Contrast Paul speaking at philosophical Athens, Acts xvii.; in idolatrous Lystra, xiv.; before Agrippa, conversant with Jewish ideas and usages, xxvi.; and before Felix, whose guilty conscience needed to be awakened, faithfully yet judiciously. Vague generalities, addressed to all alike, would not have produced the desired effect on individuals, severally needing a distinct treatment. Job. vi. 25.—Ed.

which he exercises his ministry.[1] It is true that this local character, and this species of individuality of preaching, do not reside solely in the part of our discourses devoted to reproof, and that the parish is reflected in all the parts of the preaching of an attentive and observing minister; but if he has understood, and accepted the whole of his position, if his parish is in his eyes a family, of which he is the spiritual father, if he knows what may be called the divine right of the ministry, he will, with a generous freedom, reprove that parish for the particular evil which it entertains, which it favours, or which it tolerates. The question is not, to know if this liberty will be viewed with a favourable eye, if it will astonish, or if it will seem exorbitant. Is it so?—that is the question. The ministry is perhaps not well understood in this sense by the public; but it is perhaps our own fault; and let us depend upon it, what is just, what is in the nature of things, always ends in being accepted. People refuse us little, except what we refuse to ourselves; they give to him who hath; and most frequently we are wrong in complaining of not being free, since, in order to be free, we must wish to be so. The barriers which we see around us, are very often the effect of an optical illusion. Let us advance as if there were none, and we shall find that there are none. All depends upon the point of view, from which we contemplate the ministry. The form of it is not given; the spirit of it alone is unchangeable, and it is of this spirit, that we must form a just and complete idea.

There is a singular fact to which it is necessary to advert; the people find it good, because such is the custom, that once a-year, at least, we should give them a detailed account of their ways, and should tell them the proper name of their sins.[2] On this day ministers have freedom of speech, and they take advantage of it; but candidly, is what is good to be told, not good to be

[1] Our spirit in preaching ought to be, "I have a message unto *thee*:" Judg. iii. 20. Bridges well says, A good sermon, like a good portrait, has the property of looking directly at all, though placed in different situations. "As he that cries out 'fire!' doth stir up people, and inspireth them with a hovering tendency every way, yet no man thence to purpose moveth, until he be distinctly informed where the mischief is; so, till we particularly discern where our offences lie, and the heinous nature and mischievous consequences of them, we scarce will apply ourselves effectually to correct them."—Barrow, *Serm.*—Ed.

[2] Allusion is here made to the character which preaching assumes, on the annual Fast-day which is celebrated in the churches of Switzerland.

repeated? and if it concerns each individual to be truly brought to repentance, to know his particular sins, or the individual form of his misery, is it no advantage to a congregation, that we should also tell them of their sin, in order that they may know, where their evil lies, where are their dangers, and on which side especially they must turn their efforts at amendment.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of direct rebuke, we could not take it upon us, to interdict the use of it to the preacher. We think, that it forms a part of his office. But we cannot permit it, or recommend it, except on the following conditions :—

That the preacher, before exercising it, be well acquainted with his people, and that they be well acquainted with him.

That he feel himself in possession of the esteem, of the affection, and of the confidence of his people.

That the evil be proved, general, serious, and requiring to be promptly repressed.

I will add in general, but not in an absolute sense, that this office will be more suitably exercised by a preacher, who joins the authority of age to that which is conferred upon him by his knowledge, his conviction, his exemplary life, and even by his mission.

The following are some rules which I think the preacher should carefully observe in his censures: First, Let him shun every species, and every appearance of personality. I do not say, let him shun every intention of this kind; this is too well understood to need to be stated: I do not even say, let him shun giving occasion to his hearers to make some personal, or malignant application of his words; to say so would be labour lost: I say, let him do it in such a manner, that we cannot, with any appearance of reason, accuse him of having had in view any person either in his auditory, or out of it. It will be necessary, in consequence, that he should try to be incisive and penetrating, without having recourse to the convenient and satirical form of the portrait. The latter, the negative part of the rule, is practicable; but the former, the positive part of the rule, is not so easily followed as we imagine, even though we should have the greatest innocence of intention. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, not to look around us for some living type of the vice which we wish to paint, or to censure. The most ideal creations of painting have had for their starting-point, or their point of suggestion,

some individual model. It is singular, that even in painting after the individual, we give a good representation of the species, or the genus. There is perhaps no preacher who, while engaged in describing some one of the moral miseries of humanity, has not seen placed before him, during the whole continuance of his work, some figure well known to him. Some one, without his own consciousness, some individual, always stands before his view, as the visible representative of the species; some one whom we do not name, of whom we perhaps no more think than of any other, has been the scape-goat of the rebuke.[1] If it has been so, let us carefully efface marks too recognisable; let us conceal the vicious man, the sinner, and let the vice alone, the sin alone, remain.[2]

The censure of certain classes, or of certain orders of society, is perhaps a species of personality. Our ministry, which should always tend to conciliate and to unite, ought to guard against marking out one class to the hatred, or contempt, of the other classes. There may have been times, and circumstances, in which this rule ought to have been departed from. Thus, St James might reproach certain Christians with their worldly complaisance, and their obsequiousness to the rich who oppressed them. I even grant that, since certain vices spring from certain positions in life, it is impossible to speak of these vices, without speaking of the positions which gave birth to them—impossible to speak of the injustice of some persons, without speaking of the sufferings of others. But Christian ministers have been able admirably to reconcile freedom with prudence, aided by the example and the inspirations of their adorable Master, who did not hesitate to address the classes publicly and by name,[3] and raised them up, not one against another, but all together against Himself. The Christian spirit, in its austere freedom, has never propagated hatred, or kindled resentments. Simplicity

[1] Lavater's practice was to fix on certain persons in his congregation, as representatives of the different classes of his hearers, and to mould his subjects so as to meet their respective cases.—Ed.

[2] As to individual rebuke, when occasion requires, it is to be *public* (1 Tim. v. 20), "that others may fear;" *sharp* (Tit. i. 13), to bring the offender back to soundness; *with authority* (Tit. ii. 15), for the honour of God; and *in love*, to lead him to repentance (2 Tim. ii. 24, 25).—Ed.

[3] For instance, Luke vi. 20, "Blessed be ye poor:" 24, "Woe unto you that are rich."—Ed.

very often holds with it the place of prudence; but this spirit is also far from despising prudence.[1] I think that it would only be at the last extremity, and sustained by the most powerful motives, that a Christian minister would permit, or rather command himself to speak, as Father Bredaine has done in the celebrated, and so often cited exordium:—

"At the sight of an auditory so new to me, it might seem, my brethren, that I ought only to open my mouth to ask your pardon in favour of a poor missionary, destitute of all the talents which you require of him, who comes to speak to you of your salvation. I experience, however, at present a very different sentiment; and if I feel humbled, beware of thinking that I abase myself to the miserable disquietudes of vanity, as if I were accustomed to preach myself. Would to God that a minister of heaven may never think, that he needs excuse from you! For, whoever you may be, you are, like myself, only sinners in the judgment of God. It is, therefore, only before your God and mine, that I feel constrained at present to strike upon my breast. Hitherto, I have proclaimed the judgments of the Most High in temples covered with thatch. I have preached the severities of penitence to unfortunate persons, who were in want of bread! I have announced to the good inhabitants of the country the most terrible truths of my religion. What have I done? Wretch that I am! I have grieved the poor, the best friends of my God! I have brought terror, and sorrow, into those simple and faithful souls, whom I ought to have pitied, and consoled! It is here, where my looks fall only upon the great, upon the rich, upon the oppressors of suffering humanity, or upon daring and hardened sinners; ah! it is here alone, in the midst of so many scandals, that I must make the Word of God resound in all the force of its thunder, and place with me, in this pulpit, on one side, the death which threatens you, and, on the other, my great God who is to judge you all. Already, at this moment, I hold your sentence in my hand. Tremble, then, before me, ye proud and scornful men who listen to me. The ungrateful abuse of all the kinds of grace, the necessity of salvation, the certainty of death, the uncertainty of this hour so terrible for you, final impenitence, the last judgment, the small number of the elect, and, above all,

[1] Matt. x. 16: "Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless (Marg. *simple*) as doves." —Ed.

eternity—eternity!—these are the subjects on which I come to discourse to you, and which, without doubt, I ought to have reserved for you alone. Say, what need have I of *your* suffrages, who would perhaps condemn me, without saving yourselves? God is about to move you, while His unworthy servant speaks to you; for I have had a long experience of His mercies. It is Himself, it is He alone, who is going to stir the depths of your consciences. Struck immediately with terror, penetrated with horror at your past iniquities, you will come to throw yourselves into the arms of my charity, shedding tears of compunction, and repentance; and by the intensity of your remorse, you will know the power of my eloquence."

I should like, in the second place, that reproof, whether from the pulpit or in private, should be frank and direct, never in the form of a distant allusion. An allusion is understood, or it is not. In the second case, the end is not gained; in the first, we discover at once the intention of the preacher, and his timidity; we ask, why he was afraid of being clear. If we find, that it was not worth his while to be afraid, we respect him less; if the censure, thus veiled, is of a serious nature, it appears still more serious, and we exaggerate its intention, when we see, what care the preacher has thought himself bound to take in only blunting the point of it; we are equally pleased at what he has said, and what he has not dared to say; we are more vividly touched, I grant, but we draw out, and we throw far from us, the dart launched by fear. You understand, besides, that here I by no means disapprove of attention to propriety, nor the precautions and stratagems of charity. The rudest in an auditory will easily be able to distinguish delicacy from timidity.

Lastly, I should desire that the preacher, when he thinks himself called upon to censure the morals of his flock, should well remember that "the wrath of man worketh not out the righteousness of God" (James i. 20), and that "the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace" (James iii. 18). This deserves all the attention of the young preacher. Without any doubt, the legitimate lot of sin, and even its earthly inheritance, are hatred and ridicule; and it is impossible to love good, without hating evil; but it is very possible, and too common, to hate evil, without loving good. Without doubt, this hatred, separated from the love, has not the characteristics of that "perfect hatred," which the royal prophet

had vowed against the enemies of his God; there are mingled with it impure elements: but, nevertheless, we cannot say that it is not the hatred of evil; for evil is hateful to such a degree, and in so many ways, and is so contrary to our nature, that the sinner himself hates it.[1] But it is necessary, that this hatred should have been sanctified, and, so to speak, steeped in love, to be worthy of Christianity, to be worthy of the pulpit.[2] We may easily mistake for zeal the impatience, and the contempt, which we feel at the sight of sin; we may mistake for a holy sorrow the wicked joy, which we feel in censuring, and condemning; and more than one preacher would have been a satirical poet, if he had not been a preacher. The pleasure of censuring is great, and the profession, which seems to make to us a duty of this pleasure, has wherewith to tempt minds naturally severe, and atrabilious. Let the minister be on his guard against this temptation; let him dread the exaggeration, and the declamatory emphasis, into which orators are accustomed to be thrown by subjects of this kind; let him, while he censures with full authority, do so, less according to his own impressions, than according to the counsels, and the inspirations of the Word of God.[3] Above all, let him be on his guard against irony: irony in the pulpit, as in private conversation, most frequently mortifies, without producing any advantage, and nothing is more opposed to unction. Not that I would absolutely interdict it; it is sometimes inevitable; it chastises vigorously, and it is very necessary, that preaching, amongst its other functions, should chastise. When our Lord said to the Jews, when they were ready to stone Him,

[1] See Jer. ii. 19; Prov. i. 31.—Ed.

[2] See 1 Cor. xiii. 1. Calvin on 2 Cor. ii. 4 says, "Sunt multi clamosi reprehensores, qui in vitia declamitando, vel potius fulminando, mirum zeli ardorem præ se ferunt; interea securo sunt animo, ut videantur per lusum guttur et latera exercere velle. At pii pastoris est, flere secum, priusquam alios ad fletum provocet, et plus retinere apud se doloris, quam aliis faciat."—Ed.

[3] The minister ought, on the one hand, to try, by home-thrusts to the conscience, to lead each hearer to "mourn apart" (Zech. xii. 12), and, on the other hand, in exhorting, to exhort "with all long-suffering" (2 Tim. iv. 2). In "reasoning of judgment to come," he ought to do so with judgment: in speaking of hell to his hearers, which the faithful minister will not shrink from, he must do so with "compassion" (Jude 22, 23), blended "with fear, pulling them out of the fire;" feeling some of the tenderness with which the Lord wept over Jerusalem: Matt. xxiii. 23-27. As Fenelon says, He ought to combine the zeal of a friend, with the generous energy of a father, and *the exuberant affection of a mother*.—Ed.

"Many good works have I showed you from My Father, for which of these do ye stone Me?" (John x. 32)—this was irony; but how seasonable! how noble and worthy of Him! The famous irony of Boileau, in his imitation of the tenth Provincial, is only the natural form of a *reductio ad absurdum*, which, on such a subject, and against such errors, was almost the only possible kind of argument:—

"On the subject of a paper which one had just read to us, one of them insulted me, because I dared to say that, in order to be absolved from a crime by confession, it was necessary to have at least begun to love God." "This doctrine," said he, "is pure Calvinism.—O heavens! Here am I then involved in error, in schism, and consequently reproved! But," I then continued, "when God shall come to judge the quick and the dead, and shall separate the sinful flock of goats from the humble sheep, the objects of His tenderness, He will tell us all, with severity or with grace, what makes us impure or Righteous in His sight. According to you, then, He will say to me, reprobate, infamous goat!—go, burn in everlasting flames, wretch! who didst hold that man ought to love Me, and who, too ready to declaim on this subject, didst maintain that it was necessary, in order to escape My justice, that the sinner, filled with horror of his crime, should feel some movements of affection towards Me; and should keep the first of My commandments. God, if I may believe you, will hold this language to me. But to you, tender lamb, His dearest heritage, orthodox enemy of a dogma so censurable, He will say, Come, my well-beloved! you who, in the labyrinths of your subtle reasonings, perplexing the words of the holiest of councils, have delivered man, O useful doctor! from the heavy burden of loving his Maker, enter into heaven, loaded with My praises—come, convince the angels, that they have no need of loving God. To such words, if God could pronounce them, I might answer for myself, I believe, without offending Him: Oh! how has not my heart, less hard and severe, spoken for Thee, Lord, as my mouth!"[1]

This passage, which would not be unbecoming in the pulpit, in case the preacher had to treat of the subject of the tenth Provincial—this passage, I say, and perhaps others which the pulpit itself might furnish, do not prevent us from thinking that irony,

[1] Boileau, Epitre xii., *Sur l'amour de Dieu*, at the end.

in general, is foreign to the character of evangelical eloquence; in my opinion we must leave it, as well as invective, to, I will not say, profane, but pagan eloquence, seeing that an advocate, or a Christian lecturer, on public law, will not follow in this case any other maxims than the preacher.

But, after all, let us be permitted to say, a holy vehemence takes its place among the most legitimate forms of religious eloquence. Indignation, that anger of the conscience, is as worthy of the Christian, as (carnal) anger[1] is unworthy of him. The love of good, we have said, implies the hatred of evil; and if love has its overflowings, and its transports, why should not hatred have similar outbreaks? How should we excite it, if we dared not express it? The prophets, the apostles, Jesus Christ Himself—did they not give free scope to the grief, and to the pious anger with which their souls were filled? It is with godly anger, as with lightning flashing in an *azure* sky; this anger neither interrupts, nor disturbs the serenity of the soul; it is not opposed to charity; it would be, on the contrary, to be wanting in charity, not to feel it, and not to show it: "Faithful are the wounds of a friend." (Prov. xxvii. 6.) Recollect well that people will never understand your reprobation of evil, and of sin, so long as you do not appear moved by it; and they will no more believe in your hatred, calmly stated, than in your love coldly expressed.[2] You are not, you cannot be, on terms of politeness with sin. St Paul, as it appears to me, did not understand it so: his apostrophes of this kind might cause the man who should repeat them to be called, by certain people, rash and insolent; but it is necessary, though never meriting such a reproach, not to be afraid of incurring it. The Lord, who will guard the opening of our lips, will

[1] Not anger of a righteous kind, such as Jesus felt, Mark iii. 5, but irritation, into which self and the flesh enter; ὀργὴ, "*anger*," *may* be lawful, παροργισμὸς, *exasperation*, never can: Eph. iv 26 (see the Greek): As Trench well paraphrases it (*Syn. N. T.*), "Be ye angry, yet in this anger of yours suffer no sinful element to mingle:" not, as commonly, "Your anger shall not be imputed to you as sin, if you put it away before nightfall."—Ed.

[2] Gregory of Nyssa says, "Anger is a good beast of burden (*i.e.* servant), when it is under the yoke of reason." So Augustine (*De civ. D.* ix. 5), "In our Christian system the question is not so much, whether a pious mind is angry, but *why* it is angry." "Anger," says Fuller (*Holy State*, iii. 8), "is one of the sinews of the soul; he that wants it hath a maimed mind, and with Jacob, sinew-shrunk in the hollow of his thigh, must needs halt. Nor is it good to converse with such as cannot be angry."—Ed.

doubtless allow the truth to pass. Now, the truth consists of sentiments, as well as of thoughts; truth is love; truth is, therefore, also hatred, and even anger when necessary. But, O Lord and Saviour! give to us to love as Thou lovest, to hate as Thou hatest, to correct as Thou correctest!

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PART.

ARRIVED at the end of the first part of this course, I should wish, gentlemen, to measure with you the space we have gone over, to take the sum of the knowledge we have collected, and of the convictions which we have attained. We shall, afterwards, have occasion, in the sequel of this course, to show you that the mind receives, from an exact and concise summary, the same assistance that the reaper receives, in carrying his sheaf, from the osier band which surrounds and binds it. Let us apply, in the outset, what we shall afterwards inculcate. We too, I hope, have a sheaf to carry: let us bind it, as well as we can.

The Christian religion has the form of a word. The Divine Being, who has founded this religion upon the earth, and in our hearts, is the Word itself; and here the vocable, Word, signifies thought, reason, the truth conceived, as well as the truth expressed.[1] It is the Word, which has made the visible world; it is the Word which creates the spiritual world,—with this difference, that the Word acts from without upon the visible world, and that it is from within that it produces the spiritual world.[2] With regard to the visible world, God speaks *of* it, but He speaks *to* the spiritual world;[3] nay, more: the Word creates the visible world, which does not speak; the Word creates the spiritual world, by making it speak; I say speak internally, that is, think; and think externally, that is, speak. Christianity is a religion which is spoken, and which should be thought.

To *think*, and not to muse or dream—to think with the heart, the conscience, and the understanding—to think, that is, know and believe—to think, that is, act and live, consequently, *speak*, and not stammer,[4] as all human religions have done,—this is

[1] Both λόγος and λογισμός, *ratio* and *oratio*.—ED.

[2] See 2 Cor. iv. 6; Ps. xix. 1, 2, 7, etc.; Gal. i. 16.—ED.

[3] See Heb. i. 1, 2.—ED.

[4] See Isa. xxviii. 11, xxxii. 4, xxxiii. 19.—ED.

one of the characteristics, and one of the titles of honour, and of Christianity. The minister of this religion is, therefore, the communicator, and the interpreter of a thought; whatever be the speciality, and the form of his ministry, he is the minister of a word. This minister speaks, that is to say, he thinks. The minister is a man who thinks Christianity, and who applies himself to make others think it; for, once more, Christianity wishes to be thought. And it is for this, among other reasons, that among all religions, that of Jesus Christ alone has founded a Church,—the idea of the Church, and that of the Word,[1] are corroboratives.

This word, of which the starting-point is divine, of which the materials are divine, is a human word. It is subjected to the same laws, as every other word. It receives particular laws, it is true, from its own particular object; but, even in this, it obeys the general rules of eloquence. These particular rules can no more place it out of the common domain of eloquence, than the tribune and the bar are excluded from it by the special nature of their object. Homiletics is only rhetoric applied to sacred discourse.

In Homiletics, as in rhetoric, it is necessary to set out from a just notion of eloquence. This notion appears to us to include two elements,—the one subjective, which is no other than the power of persuading—the other objective, which is moral truth or the good. It is not we, in the main, who are eloquent—it is the truth; to be eloquent is not to add anything to the truth, it is to restore to it what belongs to it, to put it in possession of all its natural advantages, it is to let fall the veils which cover it; it is to suffer nothing to remain any longer between man and the truth. One may be eloquent in a bad cause, but this will only be by giving to evil the appearance of good. Eloquence dies in an infected air.

But eloquence leaves pure speculation to philosophy, pure contemplation to poetry; it strengthens, and adorns itself, in profitable free commerce with them, but its tendency is to action. Action is its very essence. Eloquence does not imitate, it acts. The drama of the poets is only the representation of the thousands of dramas, of which life is formed; public discourse is a

[1] Eph. v. 25, 26: "Christ loved the *Church*, that He might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the *word*."—Ed.

real drama, which has its plot, its turns of fortune, and its catastrophe [*dénouement*]. This catastrophe is the determination, or the change of the will. Poetry, even when it simulates action, moves in the region of ideas; eloquence has life for its matter, and life for its object. It dies, we have said, in a corrupted atmosphere, but it also dies in air that is too subtle.

This characteristic, however, and, consequently, the oratorical element, is less prominent in the pulpit, in which instruction occupies more space than elsewhere. Instruction is the primary object of ecclesiastical discourse. The eloquence of the pulpit is called preaching, that is to say, *public instruction.* To force preaching to be oratorical to the same degree, and in the same manner, as discourse from the tribune [*i.e.*, in the senate], would be to alter its character and to change the very nature of the pastor's mission. But this instruction, doubtless, may be eloquent, and ought to be so.

This art itself of instructing eloquently, is it a thing which may be taught? Some are opposed to this idea, from reasons drawn from religion. But, if eloquence essentially consists in placing truth in its fairest light; if art and artifice are not one and the same thing; if art stands to nature, in the same relation that civilisation does;[1] if in instinct itself, to which the objectors would reduce themselves, there is a commencement of art; if art is only this instinct itself, perfected, and developed by reflection; in fine, if it is as legitimate, or rather as obligatory, to watch over, and to regulate our words[2] (which are actions), as to watch over, and to regulate our actions properly so called—our design is found to be fully justified, and there is only one thing that cannot be so, which is to give to truth the strange advice, to lay aside her arms, while error and sin continue ready-armed for war. Now, as for the arms which we have in view, it is necessary to know them,—it is necessary to teach their use,—it is necessary that he who is to carry them should be accustomed to them. This is the object of Homiletics. Take care that the scruples of conscience do not become the pretexts of indolence, and the excuses of levity.

[1] See Archb. Whately's *Lecture on Civilisation,* in which he shows that savages live and dress in a much more artificial, and civilised nations, in a more natural manner. In so far as the latter deviate from nature, in its true idea, they proportionally deviate from the ideal of civilisation.—Ed.

[2] See Eccles. v. 2; Job xxiii. 4, xxxvii. 19.—Ed.

But, doubtless, if Homiletics is something, Homiletics is not everything; it neither supplies the place of conviction, nor of enthusiasm, nor of talent, nor of knowledge, nor does it dispense with the study of models. Hearing a course of Homiletics, is not to have done with Homiletics; up to a certain point, every one must teach it to himself; we know nothing well, but what we have learned by ourselves. A course given, is not necessarily a course received; to learn, is an act of the will; to learn, is to lay hold of, it is even to create.

To invent, to arrange, and to express, this is the whole of the art, say the ancient rhetoricians; it is the whole of the art, the moderns have repeated. We do not pretend to give a better definition. These three operations comprise the whole of the art, and they are indeed three operations. If we borrowed our expressions from the art of architecture, and said: the materials, the structure, and the style, we would not desire to be better understood.

Invention is the only object of this first part.

The act of invention, which is common to all the moments of the art (for we invent our plan, we invent our style), is, in the main, a great mystery. Invention is talent itself. We do not impart talent by instruction; we do not give to him who has not, but we give to him who has. For the inventive mind (and what is mind, if absolutely destitute of invention?), there are means of inventing more, and inventing better. The chief point is to *know*. If knowledge does not impart originality, it augments, and fosters it. Seek to know, therefore, man, human life, the Divine Word, know yourselves[1]—know everything you can; all truth tends towards the supreme truth; all truth may serve for the proof, or the elucidation of it. In the second place, unite yourselves to your subject, by close meditation;[2] warm it with your own heat, warm yourselves with its heat; let your subject be to you a reality, and the preparation of this discourse an epoch in your history; do not think merely—live; try upon your own souls those same ideas, by means of which you wish to act upon the souls of others. Do still another thing; analyse, according to the laws of a sound logic, the matter which is presented to you.

[1] It was well said, There are three books every minister ought to study: the *book of nature*, *the book of revelation*, and *the book of the human heart*.—Ed.

[2] 1 Tim. iv. 15: "Meditate on these things, give thyself wholly to them" (literally, *be in them*, i.e., identify your being with them); ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι.—Ed.

After having, by meditation, put yourselves in contact with the things themselves, put yourselves, by analysis, in contact with the idea of them; after having applied to this study the logic of the heart, apply to it that of the intellect. To invent, is to find; that same faculty of reasoning, which you will afterwards employ to prove—employ it first to find. Such are the instruments of invention—make a frequent use of them—study, meditate, analyse much, sharpen by repeated exercise this edge of invention, which, without this, would be soon destroyed by rust; be in no haste to have recourse to that bank to which superficial minds run, those commonplace books, which are not to be despised, and which have rendered service to every person, but the indiscreet use of which makes talent neglect its own resources. Have method, rather than a method.

Under the head of invention, what we found in the first part of our course, is essentially directions in regard to the choice of materials. But here two characteristics of the eloquence of the pulpit become apparent. The first is this: although as a whole, preaching is a pleading of a cause, each sermon is not one; preaching is not *actual* (*actuelle*), in the same sense as the discourse from the bar or the tribune; it does not arise out of an accidental fact; it is quite spontaneous; that is to say, it chooses its subjects. The other characteristic is this: not only does preaching connect itself with a document (which is also done by forensic eloquence in invoking the law, and by political eloquence in appealing to the constitution of the country), but it essentially consists in developing this document, it flows from it as from its source: this document is its object: hence has resulted, not necessarily, but naturally, the custom of preaching from a text.[1] Before, therefore, approaching the matter itself or the substance of the discourse, Homiletics will treat of the choice of subjects and of the choice of texts.

Will it be necessary to make an exclusive choice between subjects and texts? Because the sermon is connected with a text, shall the preacher, on that account, be restricted to discussing the subject contained in the text? and shall there be, for him, no

[1] The custom probably arose in the time of Ezra, who read in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading: Neh. viii. 6, 7. So the Lord Jesus first read Isa. lxi. 1, 2, and then preached from it in the synagogue of Nazareth: Luke iv. 16. See also Acts xviii. 4, xiii. 15.—Ed.

more subjects, properly so called? This would lead to the examination of the usage that has become law, which requires that every sermon turn upon a passage of Scripture. While maintaining, by reasons seriously discussed, the usage or the law, we have not determined, that the maintenance of it implied the absolute exclusion of subjects as subjects. For this reason, first setting aside the text, we spoke of the subject, the choice of which we subjected to two rules: that of unity, and that of interest. After having determined the idea, and set forth the importance of unity, after reducing every discourse to the terms of a simple imperative proposition, we enumerated the different forms under which this unity is produced, or under which it is sometimes disguised. With regard to the interest of the subjects, we determined, that it should be at once human, and Christian; and we desired to give a sure direction to preaching, by insisting that the proper fact of the Gospel, the fact which preaching reproduces and seeks to realise, is to graft divine sentiments on a human nature.[1] We saw that in this sphere, as in life itself, liberty is in proportion to submission;[2] and that it is to a preacher truly Christian, as to a Christian truly spiritual, that it is said, "All things are yours, inasmuch as ye are Christ's, and Christ Himself is God's." (1 Cor. iii. 22.) But inexperience may be mistaken as to this liberty: the narrow way is suitable for youth, and we ought at no age to mount the pulpit to speak, in a Christian manner, of all things whatsoever, but to speak of Christianity.

The text then presented itself to our consideration. Before everything, we said, let it be taken from the Word of God; which moreover signifies, let it be taken in the sense, in which that Word has taken it. The application of this great rule occupied us for a considerable time. The laws of a candid and sound interpretation successively invited our attention. From the verbal or external sense, which is only preliminary, we proceeded to the real or internal sense, which is definitive; from the interpretation of texts of the spiritual order, to that of texts of the temporal order; and, further, to that of texts of a mixed nature, in which the elements of the present passing, and of the eternal world, are combined together. It was only after having elu-

[1] So our Lord's Sermon on the Mount appropriately ends with the parable of the houses built on sand and rock respectively, in order to inculcate, that doing is the end of all preaching.—Ed.

[2] Rom. viii. 2; 2 Pet. ii. 19.—Ed.

cidated these grave distinctions, after having given an account of the relations, and differences, that exist between the languages, between the times, between the economies of which the Divine book is composed, that we entered into the enclosure common to all the kinds of eloquence, when treating of the matter itself, or of the contents of the sermon. Let us further recollect, that the question of texts conducted us to that of the homily, or the analytic sermon, and that we sought to find the means of reducing this beautiful species of preaching to the universal and inflexible law of unity.

To know in order to believe, to believe in order to know; consequently to know and believe, and both of these in order to act[1]—this is the whole of religion,—this is also the whole of preaching. With regard to knowledge, it embraces *facts;* that is to say, what appears in space and in time; and *ideas* which have a reality independent of space and of time. Facts are described, or they are related. Ideas are defined. It was necessary to define definition, to establish the necessity of it, to distinguish the various modes of it, and to show by what involuntary inclination, or by what necessity it came under the laws of time, and of space, in returning towards narration or description, in such a manner that ideas, without date and without place, are related and described like facts.

Belief, which stands to knowledge in the twofold relation of end, and of means, since by turns it is necessary to know in order to believe,[2] and to believe in order to know;[3] belief, I say, by which we understand the twofold assent of the reason and the will, in its turn calls for the attention of Homiletics. We thus proceed from the explanation to the proof, which makes use of *reasons*, if our object be to reach the understanding; and of *motives*, if our object be to determine the will.

The intellectual decision, different from the practical decision, has a threefold source: *experience*, *authority*, and *reasoning*. Each of these means implies the employment of the two others; but they are not, therefore, the less distinct. To appreciate their respective importance, to show the insufficiency of each apart from the others, ought to be our first care. Considering

[1] So our Lord's sermon on the Mount appropriately ends with the parable of the houses built on sand and rock respectively, in order to inculcate, that doing is the end of all preaching.—Ed.

[2] Rom. x. 14.—Ed. [3] Hos. vi. 3.—Ed.

next the two first (that is, *experience* and *authority*) as furnishing the materials of reasoning, and the *reasoning* itself as the principal substance of the discourse, we applied ourselves to distinguish the different forms of argumentation in the oratorical discourse, and specially in sacred eloquence, the requirements, predilections, and repugnances of which we carefully had regard to. To the reasons which produce certainty in the mind, succeeded the motives which determine the will. This distinction is well founded. Between the conviction and the action, there would be a breaking of continuity without affection; affection throws over this chasm a bridge, which connects the truth and the volition: let us rather say, the truth becomes the very object of the volition. All the motives are reduced to two: moral good, and happiness. In the first of these motives, or of these objects presented to affection, we distinguished, then reunited, *moral good* in *itself*, and *the Author of moral good;* we further distinguished in them the two correlative sentiments of love, and of hatred, and the two kinds of eloquence which correspond to them. The appeal which the Gospel plainly makes to the love of happiness, might have made us dispense with justifying the employment of this motive, for it is in answering this imperious want of all life, that God opens our hearts to the love of moral goodness:[1] we have, without hesitation, restored to the hands of the preacher this honourable, and necessary weapon. This motive from happiness, the axis of human life, presented us at its two poles, hope and fear: fear which contracts the heart, and hope which dilates it; fear which is only a passion, hope which may become a virtue. Around these two great objects, moral good and happiness, are grouped as satellites, some secondary motives of which we pointed out the use.

If it is true that we cannot determine the will without appealing to an affection, it follows that eloquence could not attain its object, without exciting emotion; for emotion is only the affection itself in a state of action, or of temporary excitement. But there is an economy of emotion. We defended against its excesses the moral liberty of the hearer, and eloquence itself. We also directed that it should be excited, not in the lower, but in the higher parts of the soul; we demanded of eloquence all those moral and spiritual emotions which rouse within us, not the

[1] Ps. iv. 6, lxxiii. 25, 26.—Ed.

natural man, but the new man. Proceeding, lastly, from the dispositions which are common to the orator and his auditory, since the latter receives them from the former, to those which belong exclusively to the orator as such, we singled out unction and authority, as two values which are measured by their effects alone; as two elements of a complex and mysterious nature, without which preaching falls to the level of ordinary eloquence, and even below eloquence.

This first part of our course includes, if you will allow me the expression, the chemistry of oratorical discourse; for we distinguished not the masses, or the successive moments, but the substances, or the ingredients, of which the religious discourse is composed. The second part, which will treat of arrangement, will present, in a manner, the mechanism of eloquence; but we may easily see how closely these two parts are related to each other, and in how many points they are blended together.

I hope, gentlemen, that *this table of subjects* (for it is little else) has presented with clearness a series of ideas, which, separated from each other by the interval of the lectures, and, perhaps, not inserting themselves into each other with sufficient distinctness, may have concealed their order and their connection, even from attentive minds.

PART SECOND.

ARRANGEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

OF ARRANGEMENT IN GENERAL.

§ I.—Idea and Importance of Arrangement.

I am reminded, in commencing this second part, that, in the first, we have not treated of invention properly so called; that is to say, of the faculty, or the art of inventing, but rather of the nature, and of the choice of the materials which enter into the composition of the sermon. Invention governs the whole art, and finds a place for its application in all the most different moments of the work of the orator. He always invents; invention is talent itself; or, if we will, the whole of talent is invention. We all acknowledge, I am sure, that to arrange well, and to write well, are still to invent. If we have said anything upon the sources and the means of invention, it has been by the way, and in a general manner, without anticipating the more numerous and more particular details which we will have to give in the fourth part of this course, the title of which, *Method of Labour*, clearly enough determines the special object."[1]

It is, therefore, properly and exclusively, with the rules to be observed in the choice of subjects,—with the text and the materials,—that we have been hitherto occupied. This was in a manner treating of the chemistry of oratorical discourse, since it had to do with elements, or ingredients, which reciprocally penetrate each other; the *arrangement* with which we are now to be

[1] This fourth part does not exist.—*Editors.*

occupied, more resembles the physics, or the mechanics of discourse, since it has for its object moments which succeed each other, or parts which are placed in juxtaposition. I would not say, however, that it should entirely omit the particular nature of the materials: it could not do so.

Still more than in the first part, we shall have in view the synthetic discourse, or the sermon properly so called, not as if it were, in our opinion, the only normal form of the pulpit discourse; we have made our reserves in favour of the homily; but the homily itself aspires to synthesis; analysis is only a way to arrive at it,—a way, the length and windings of which are only determined by the nature, or the form of the text: in one word, every homily tends towards the sermon, every homily ends in being a sermon; in every case the synthesis is the end, the summit, the very essence of the oratorical discourse: it was therefore useful, it was even necessary, in our course of instruction, to set out from the synthesis, and not from its opposite. Now, this was, in other words, to treat of the sermon, and to draw tight a knot which might afterwards, according to convenience, be gradually relaxed; this is much better, than to relax it at first, while recommending to tighten it according as it might be required. Obedience first, liberty afterwards, this is the order. In this spirit, we treat of the sermon, as if it was the only form of evangelical eloquence.

The object is to arrange the materials which we have obtained by previous labour; in other words, we have to construct the discourse. Whether you do, or do not, announce your design beforehand, you have always a proposition to establish, a conviction to send home to the souls of your hearers. I admit that all the ideas, all the facts which you have collected, incline or tend towards this conclusion; I admit that the opinions (not to say the convictions) which are formed in the world are, to every one, the result of a certain number of observations, experiences, reflections, which have not been presented to the mind in a regular order, and which, in forming his opinion, he has not applied himself to arrange. Such, if I may so speak, is the confused and spontaneous rhetoric of life. But you do not mount the pulpit to produce nothing better than this. It is with the orator, as with the dramatic poet. The latter finds in real life no dramas entirely such, as those he prepares for the theatre. To cite only one particular, the reasons for the entrances and exits are not

made palpable in life, as they ought to be on the stage. The poet submits to this rule; he observes many others. Just so the orator; he does not throw at random the materials of the proof, even when they appear to be thrown at random in life. His chance, besides, would very badly imitate the other. When, without the direct action of eloquence, a conviction comes to be formed in an individual, or in several at once, it is not said that the order in which the elements of the proof are presented, grouped, and co-ordinated, has been a matter of indifference for obtaining the result; their apparent disorder was probably order in the given case: this chance corresponded to that case. But chance, in the composition which we have supposed, corresponds to nothing; this disorder is a pure disorder. Besides the element of time, that of repetition after long intervals ought to be counted for something; these are advantages which may compensate for the want of order: the oratorical discourse, confined within the limits of an hour or two, is altogether deprived of them. It must therefore redeem these inconveniences, which are inherent in it, by advantages which are peculiar to it: it is only by order that these can be insured to it. Order is the characteristic of a true discourse, it is only a discourse in virtue of it; without it, we know not what name to give it. It is arrangement,—it is order which constitutes the discourse.

The difference between a middling orator, and an eloquent man, often lies wholly in this. Arrangement alone can be eloquent; and, if we look closely into it, we often see that invention, taken by itself, and viewed as much as possible apart from arrangement, is of small account in respect to intellectual power. "Good thoughts abound," as Pascal says.[1] The art of organising them is perhaps more rare.[2] To find the relations, and the respective places of these organic molecules, frequently supposes a greater capacity. Is not a relation also an idea, and an idea of very great importance? There lies, therefore, invention within it, and La Bruyère, who has said "that the *choice* of thoughts is invention,"[3] might have said the same thing of the *order* of the thoughts.

I would not go so far as to say, that a discourse without order

[1] See, for the development of this idea, Pascal, *Pensées*, part i., art. iii., "Nothing is more common," etc.

[2] Organisation constitutes the whole difference between an army and a mob. A speech without order is rather a mob of words, than an oration.—Ed.

[3] La Bruyere, *Les Caracteres*, chap. i., *Des ouvrages de l'esprit.*

is incapable of producing any effect; for I would not say, that an undisciplined force is absolutely null. We may have seen discourses, very defective in this respect, produce very great effects. But we may affirm, in general, that the force of a discourse, all other things being equal, is in proportion to the order which reigns in it, and that a discourse without order (provided order is of more than one species) is comparatively feeble. A discourse has all the force of which it is susceptible, only when the parts, proceeding from one and the same design, are intimately united and exactly adjusted, when they mutually aid and sustain each other, like the stones of a vault. *Tantum series juncturaque pollet.*[1] This is so true, and is so much felt, that a total disorder is almost impossible for even the most negligent mind. The more the end we wish to attain is important, or difficult to reach, the more the necessity of order is felt. That a discourse, absolutely destitute of order, is equally fitted to persuade, and, above all, to instruct, is, I think, not more commonly believed, than that a multitude is a nation, that a crowd of men clad with iron is an enemy, or that the confused masses which Darius dragged after him could have made head against the Macedonian phalanx.[2]

Perhaps it would not be going too far to say, that arrangement is not of a more secondary interest in a discourse, than is the mode of aggregation of the molecules in a physical substance: this mode constitutes, in great part, the nature of the body.

The oratorical discourse, and especially that of the pulpit, has a twofold end: to instruct, and to persuade. To consider only the first of these two objects, we comprehend all the importance of order: we have been instructed, only in so far as we have

[1] Horace, *Ars Poet.*, verse 242.

[2] It is essential that a man should not begin writing, until he has distinctly set before his mind the point he aims at—the *quorsum tendit oratio*, and till he has, with a view to that, selected and combined his leading thoughts with a certain general idea of the manner in which they are to be filled up. The leading thoughts ought to be, 1. *few*; 2. *distinct*; 3. *connected*. The divisions ought not to be merely artificial, for convenience of arrangement: nor merely plain restatements of a text in a bisected, or trisected form. They ought to have a mutual relation to one another, and all converge towards the *one* main end or idea pervading the whole. The same quantity of luminous matter may be either loosely diffused in a faint nebular appearance, or condensed and orbed into a sun. So with thouhgt.—Abridged from the *Christian Observer* of April 1857.—Ed.

understood, and have retained in the memory; now, we understand and we retain easily and surely, only in proportion as the matters on which we have to exercise our intelligence, and our memory, have been consecutive, and mutually connected. A course of instruction in which order is wanting, hardly deserves the name of instruction; all that it can do, is to furnish information of more or less utility. And the inconvenience of disorder, in this respect, is not even purely negative. If it is painful not to comprehend, it is much more so to misapprehend. Now, this is the danger to which a negligent arrangement exposes our hearer; sometimes we teach him nothing,—what is worse, sometimes we teach him error; for, the truth which is not seen in its proper light, in its proper place, is, in most minds, transformed into error, and often into pernicious error.

So much for what concerns instruction, or acting upon the understanding: it is impossible that it should not be the same with persuasion, or acting upon the will. A discourse, ill-arranged, is obscure; and that which is obscure is feeble. What bears the trembling impress of indecision, cannot bring decision into the soul of any one. Imagine a discourse, in which the principal laws of order are violated, in which the orator quits an idea before he has fully explained it, save to return to it afterwards, by cutting, perhaps, the thread of another idea; in which, what is accessory occupies as much space as the principal, or even more; in which he passes from the stronger to the weaker, instead of passing from the weaker to the stronger; in which nothing is grouped, nothing is formed into a mass; in which everything is scattered, wandering, and incoherent: such a discourse is contrary to the nature of the human mind, to its most legitimate expectations, and to its wants: in the soul of the hearer, as in the discourse that is addressed to him, everything is commenced, and nothing is finished; the elements which, united, should have composed a solid mass (I mean the analogous thoughts, the homogeneous sentiments), are kept separate and at a distance; instead of a flame that lightens and warms, you have a vortex of sparks: there are, perhaps, some lively strokes, but transient and soon effaced; and though, perhaps, none of the materials, of which an excellent discourse might be composed, are wanting, there can be no comparison, in respect both of conviction and of persuasion, between the work we have

described, and another, in which there are not more—where, perhaps, there are fewer, ideas, but in which order has given to everything its due value. We have had, in the intellectual world, the spectacle of a great fortune badly administered,—of a useless waste,—of a dissipation.

Our object may appear too serious for our being permitted to invoke here the idea of the beautiful; but it is, perhaps, not without interest to observe, that nowhere are the beautiful, and the useful, so closely united, and so nearly being confounded. The same thing is, at once, *force* and *grace :*

> Ordinis hæc *virtus* erit et *venus*, aut ego fallor,
> Ut jam nunc dicat, jam nunc debentia dici,[1]
> Pleraque differat, et præsens in tempus omittat.

Order is beautiful in itself, and everything beautiful in itself is more beautiful, when seen in its own place.[2] Disorder, on the contrary, diminishes, discolours, and degrades everything. Quintilian was therefore right in attaching to order the two attributes of beauty and strength, when he represents, with poetic eloquence, the inconvenience of disorder in discourse. Hear this excellent master: "It is not without reason that we make the rules of arrangement succeed the rules of invention, since, without the former of these parts, the latter is nothing. Transfer from one place to another any part of the human body, or of that of an animal, although not one be awanting, you have produced a monster. However little you displace a member, you take from it its strength with its use: an army in disorder forms an obstacle to itself. Those do not seem to me to be mistaken, who maintain, that the arrangement of the parts of an object constitutes the very nature of that object; that arrangement being altered, everything goes to ruin. A discourse, devoid of this quality, is violently, tumultuously, agitated, bubbles up without flowing over,—has no consistency. As a man who wanders during the night in unknown places, it repeats many things, it omits many others; and having determined neither the point from which it sets out, nor the end at which it would arrive, it follows, not a design, but a chance."[3]

The work of arrangement is of very great importance, since it

[1] Horace, *Ars Poet.*, ver. 42, 43.

[2] See Eccles. iii. 11, with which comp. the previous verses.—Ed.

[3] Quintilian, book vii., Preface.

may be said to complete and perfect the work of invention. We have made invention a part *sui generis*, and independent. It is not in reality so. We know well our materials—we measure them—we appreciate them only after, and by means of, this second work, which is often simultaneous with the first. It has, indeed, the three following results :—

1st, It determines and reduces to a rigorous unity[1] the sense of the proposition. For, to arrange is to decompose; these two words are almost synonymous; or, at least, in order to arrange, it is necessary, first, to decompose. While proceeding in it according to the laws of a sound logic, it is impossible that we should not consider more attentively the very object of which we wish to treat, that we should not discern better what is peculiar and what is foreign to it, and that we should not reduce it, with more certainty, within its just limits. How many orators or writers have become acquainted with the true nature of their subject, only by proceeding to the arrangement of its parts!

2dly, Not only is that which wanders from the unity of the subject excluded and thrown aside, but the work of arrangement, resting upon a methodical analysis, assists in finding everything which is included in the subject. Many things which we had not seen are then discovered; many lines of thought are finished, many intervals are filled up. It is the same with order in the management of a subject, as with economy in that of a fortune: it enriches.

3dly, In fine, arrangement gives, or restores, to each of the elements, of which the subject is composed, its real importance. Sometimes, in separating ideas which were, at first view, confounded together—sometimes in grouping what appeared separate, in managing contrasts, relations, subjects of comparison, and luminous reflections of one idea upon another, we give to each of these ideas a new and unforeseen value.

The little effect produced by a discourse in which the great law of order has been neglected, is further illustrated, we think, in another manner. It is necessary, we grant, that the orator should have himself experienced the effect which he wishes to

[1] "Denique sit quod vis, simplex duntaxat et unum"—
Also, "Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum."
—Horace, *Ars. Poet.* 23, 152.—Ed.

produce: this is what is called inspiration.[1] Now, without a plan, and without a plan strongly conceived, whether it has been arrived at by protracted meditation, or found almost as soon as sought, we cannot write with a true inspiration. Be pleased to conceive yourselves in the situation which I suppose. You proceed at random, and groping your way in the dark, advancing and receding by turns; the thread which you hold in your hands is broken at every instant, and continually requires to be repaired. Instead of effecting your object, at a first stroke, with an idea, after having once presented it imperfectly, you present it a second time imperfectly still; these are several *almosts*, several fractions of which remain to be summed up. You have skirmished successively on all sides of the place—made false attacks, which end in nothing. One idea does not press forward another; one idea does not engender another; in what you hold, you have no pledge for what is to follow; the passages (very ill-named, in truth!) succeed each other without connection; like prodigals who live for the day, you write for the phrase, not more sure of the second after the first, than they are sure of the provision of the morrow. Sometimes you have accumulated in one paragraph sufficient matter for a discourse; sometimes the feeling of having, at a former time, missed your aim, brings you back to an idea with which you ought to have nothing more to do; and you seek to conceal these repetitions, these returns, these double uses, these digressions, by artifices of logic, subtle distinctions, turns of expression, and plays upon words. This uncertain, hesitating, panting march, is most contrary to inspiration,—to that continuous movement, which ought to be like one continued expiration of a powerful chest. Regret for having so ill improved, and so poorly demonstrated, the riches of one's subject, and of one's thought, stifles talent—if that be true talent which is deficient in the power of organisation; the discourse, like a steed out of breath, and jerked with the reins, betrays from the commencement fatigue, and difficulty. The orator is, as it were, oppressed by the painful feeling of never having but in part, reached his end, and expressed his thought; of having

[1] We find here, within parentheses in the original manuscripts, the words, "define, distinguish," which appear to have been simply intended, by M. Vinet, to remind himself of some more particular explanation, which he judged it useful to give.—*Editors.*

produced only half-impressions, which he seeks in vain to complete, by means of other half-impressions. This lost discourse, this combat terminated by a defeat, weighs beforehand upon his spirit—he feels himself vanquished before the end of the combat.

Buffon has perfectly described the two opposite situations, of the man who works without a plan, and of the man who has formed one:—

"It is for want of a plan, it is from not having sufficiently reflected upon his subject, that a man of genius finds himself embarrassed, and knows not where to begin to write; he perceives at once a great number of ideas, and, as he has neither compared nor classified them, nothing determines him to prefer one to another. He remains, therefore, in this perplexity; but when he has formed for himself a plan, when once he shall have collected, and put in order all the thoughts essential to his subject, he will easily perceive the instant at which he ought to take up the pen, he will perceive the point of time when the production of his mind is matured, he will be eager to hatch it, he will even feel nothing but pleasure in writing; ideas will easily succeed each other, and the style will be natural and easy; warmth will spring from this pleasure, will diffuse itself over all, and will give life to every expression; everything will become more and more animated, the tone will be elevated, the objects will receive colouring; and the sentiment, joining itself to the light, will augment it,—will carry it further,—will make it pass from what we are saying to what we are going to say, and the style will become interesting and luminous."[1]

Cardinal Maury is also well worth hearing upon the same subject: "Why," says this writer, "do we discern nothing at certain times? Because we really know neither where we wish to go, nor what we are in search of. There is in this, a poetic art of experience, which we learn every day in the art and habit of writing. We think ourselves in a lethargy of barrenness: we are merely in the midst of a desert, and of a mist."[2]

[1] Buffon, *Discours sur le Style.* See *Chrestomathie Francaise*, vol. iii., p. 142, third edition.

[2] Maury, *Essai sur l'Eloquence de la Chaire*, xxxvi.

It has been quaintly, but truly said, Unless the speaker arranges and divides, he never gets into his subject; and unless he divides aright, he never gets out of it. "Nequidquam cœno cupiens evellere plantam."—Ed.

Let us say, therefore, to sum up the preceding, that order is essential to the very idea of a discourse; that it is necessary for instruction and conviction; that it is the condition of invention itself; in fine, that it is the condition of inspiration.

All that we have just seen has prepared us to hear without astonishment the saying of Herder: "I easily pardon all defects, except those in arrangement." Herder, doubtless, does not put into the number of the defects which he pardons, false ideas or bad doctrines; but we may comprehend how all the rest, in the oratorical point of view, appeared to him more venial, than defects of arrangement, since it is the arrangement which properly constitutes the discourse, and since it is in that especially that the orator discovers himself.

But where is the principle of this order which we recommend? Might it not be as much in the passion, as in the reason? I know that nothing is in its manner so logical as passion, and that we may rely upon it for the order of a discourse, of which it is the principal inspiration. We may be assured that it will commence well, and that this commencement will lead to all the rest. It will repeat itself, it will retrace its steps, it will wander, but it will do all this with the grace, and the felicity, which are never wanting to it; and it would be less true, and consequently less eloquent, if it were more logical, in the ordinary sense of the word. It naturally finds the order that is suited to it, and it finds it precisely on condition of not seeking for it. The rapid propagation of ideas, their concatenation by means of transitions full of life, which themselves constitute the movement of the discourse,—this suffices for the eloquence of passion.[1] When Racine makes Hermione speak in the *Andromaque*,[2] it is evident that the disorder of this speech is one part of its truth, a true order, and that this perfect logic of passion is a marvel in an imitated discourse. If there were more logical order, the discourse would be less perfect.

But this is not sufficient for the discourse intended for instruction, in which the disorder would not be an order *sui generis*, because it would not be true; it would have no grace, having no truth; and it would be merely disorder and perplexity.

[1] See the *Paysan du Danube* of La Fontaine, the prayer of *Philoctètes to Pyrrhus* in Sophocles, *Pauline to Polyeucte* in Corneille.

[2] Act v., scene v.: "Je ne t'ai point aimé," etc.

In taking logic, and not passion, for the principle of order, we see the difficulties increase.

Logic, it would appear, has its inclination, as well as passion; but it is far from constituting an instinct as sure and as infallible as passion, in respect to the sequence, and concatenation of the ideas. The logical sentiment, if we may be allowed the expression, comes far short of having the vivacity of the sentiments, properly so called. Ideas are objects, logic is therefore objective; thought cannot, like passion, employ rule and measure at its own pleasure. It has its rule in the laws of thought, which are constant, immutable, and independent of the momentary state of the soul; and though these laws, taken abstractly, are the necessary forms of the human mind, and, as it were, the instincts of intelligence, they do not preserve their character of instinct in the application, and their operations may indeed be sure, but they are never carried on without reflection. Exercise, and regular culture, contribute much to the right use of them; and though all minds acknowledge the same primitive laws, and present the same forms, all minds are far from being equally well constituted, and equally logical.

The preacher, no doubt, is interested at heart in his subject; but he is not impassioned, and he ought not to be so; the affection which he feels is profound and serious, but it leaves him calm: neither does he speak under the excitement of a situation, immediately dangerous; he is not personally compromised; in fine, he is called essentially to instruct. He is able, therefore, and ought, to command his emotion; he ought not to commence where it would commence, nor to follow the course which it would make him follow, if it were his master.

Doubtless, in order to be moved by his subject, he does not wait till he has explained the nature, set forth the proofs, and developed the consequences of it to his auditory; he is touched by it before commencing all this labour, and it is just because he has been touched, that he commences it; but there is nothing contrary to sincerity, in delaying the expression of his emotion, till the moment when it can be advantageously expressed, and communicated to others, because the object in question has been already well understood, and appreciated.

What we here say of the discourse for instruction, has an application more extensive than this word perhaps indicates. Every

time one has wished to instruct and persuade, not only in the pulpit or in the tribune, but in conversation, he has been obliged to care for the economy of his discourse, to form for himself a plan and follow it, because it was not enough to leave in the mind a general impression;[1] a distinct conclusion, founded on motives equally distinct, was also required. In this respect, certain speeches of Racine in his tragedies are, essentially, as much conformed to the rules of oratorical arrangement, as the discourses of the ablest orators can be.[2] Read, also, the speech of Phœnix to Achilles, in the ninth book of the Iliad, and that of Pacuvius in Livy (book xxiii. ch. ix.). It is useful to study eloquence in these models, in order that we may not take species for the genus.

Discourse from the pulpit is *didactic*, and *oratorical*. The arrangement ought to correspond to these two characteristics. This divides into two parts the study on which we are about to enter. We will treat of arrangement, first, in a logical, and then, in an oratorical point of view.

§ II.—Of Arrangement in a Logical Point of View.[3]

(*Decomposition.—Grouping or Classification.—Progress.*)

We are obliged to suppose that, in the composition of a discourse, things always go on in the same manner. This supposition, which simplifies our task, is not at all injurious to the truth. What, in certain cases, may be found anterior in the order of time, may indeed be posterior in the order of the thought.

Though we have spoken first of invention, and then of arrangement, we know well that the arrangement is sometimes made at the same time as the invention, and that sometimes even the *main proposition*[4] comes after all the rest.

Thus, I first see the Gospel to be *great in what it demands*, and then I see it *great in what it gives;* these two ideas which have successively struck me, are united and concentrated in the

[1] M. Vinet adds here the German word *Gesammteindruck*, doubtless as better expressing his idea, than the French words with which he approximates to it.

[2] See the speech of Agrippa in the *Britannicus*, and that of Pyrrhus in the *Andromaque*.

[3] Rev. C. Simeon lays down three requisites, as indispensable in every discourse: 1. Unity of design; 2. Perspicuity in arrangement; 3. Simplicity in diction.—Ed.

[4] In German, *Der Hauptsatz*.

general idea: *the Gospel is great*, which is to form my theme. It is the same with these two ideas: *the Gospel has liberty for its end;—the Gospel has liberty for its means*,—which are united in this proposition: *the Gospel is a law of liberty*. Only we must be well assured that the word liberty has the same sense in the two particular propositions.

But commonly, and too commonly, perhaps, the thing does not go on in this manner. A proposition, either suggested by a text, or furnished by our system of theology, or, in fine, previously adopted by our minds, presents itself to us completely formed, before we have actually in our thoughts all the ideas of which it is composed, or all the proofs by which it is established. We suppose, in our present subject of consideration, that it is always thus.

What happens then?

The theme is found. The idea of it, we will suppose, is apprehended, and well defined, in the mind of the orator. Now, whether the business is to develop it, or to prove it, it is necessary to decompose it, to take it to pieces, so to speak, as we do with a piece of furniture, or a machine, that is too large for a doorway to admit.

This is the moment of meditation.[1] Meditation is a slow and assiduous incubation on the subject, which, being in a manner rendered fruitful by the natural heat of the orator, by the interest with which he unites himself personally with his subject, at length hatches, and brings to light in succession a crowd of particular ideas, a species of pell-mell or tumultuous crowd (*cohue*), molecules which whirl in the air, but which seek to form themselves into groups and masses, and do not rest till they have found their place and their relations.[2]

[1] Lectio inquirit—oratio postulat—meditatio invenit—contemplatio disgustat. —Augustine. Without the two latter mental processes, the ideas resulting from study will be like undigested food, which, instead of nourishing, clog the stomach.—Ed.

[2] The human mind, naturally loving order, will much more easily retain a division in which there appears a connection. Therefore connect the parts of your division together, either by way of opposition, or of cause and effect, or of action and end, or action and motive. As to subdivisions, it is always necessary to make them; for they assist composition and diffuse perspicuity, but it is not always needful to *mention* them, because it would load the hearer's mind with a multitude of particulars. The number of parts in division ought to be small: four or five at the most: the most admired sermons have only two or three.—Claude.—Ed.

For if our sole object is to divide, it is certain that the subject divides or parcels out itself into a number of parts which have no limits, but the impossibility of dividing farther. But this pulverisation of the subject is not the true division. While supposing, what we do not believe, that simple meditation found out all these molecules, it would only have accomplished a part of the task im posed on the orator. This total of ideas forms a massive concretion, and not an organism. It is necessary to arrive at all these ideas; but the path cannot be traced by chance: it is a natural path, a psychological path, like that of the sap to the mother branches, then to the boughs, then to the leaves.

Thus, just as we but now set aside a considerable number of cases, in which the invention of the subject itself, of the main proposition, comes late, and perhaps the last, so here we set aside this work of meditation, this fermentation of the mind: this is a secret of the inner man, which for the present does not concern us; and though the orator may have often proceeded from the branches to the trunk, or from high to low, we, for our part, shall proceed from the trunk to the branches, or from low to high.

We must therefore proceed from the trunk, which is the main proposition, to the mother branches; we must distinguish and lay hold of them, that is to say, make a general division of the subject. It will sometimes be found, that the subject (the proposition) has a necessary division, and admits of no other. This first decomposition of the subject cannot be a great mystery; the division of a proposition between the explanation of the precept and its motives, between the explanation of a truth and its practical consequences, is as easy to an ordinary, as it is to an able man; and it is beyond this first distribution, that the difficulty and the labour of talent, the true decomposition, may be said to commence.

We set aside those divisions which are almost inevitable, and in which invention almost goes for nothing; and bringing our thoughts to bear upon the others, we think we may say that, on this first decomposition of the subject, depends, in a great measure, the force and the effect of the discourse.

There are rich and vigorous plans which, applying the lever as deeply as possible, raise the entire mass of the subject; there are others which the most profound divisions of the matter escape, and which raise, so to speak, only a layer of the subject.

It is here especially, it is in the conception of the plans, that we can recognise the orators who are capable of the good, and those who are capable of the better,—of that better, which, truly speaking, bears the stamp of talent or of labour. We might apply here the well-known verses:—

Savoir la marche est chose très unie ;
Savoir le jeu, c'est le fruit du génie ;

and these other verses which are not less so:—

Le Mieux, dit-on, est l'ennemi du Bien :[1]
Jamais le goût n'admit ce faux proverbe ;
C'était le Mieux qu'osa tenter Malherbe ;
Maynard fit bien et Maynard ne fit rien.
Gloire à ce Mieux, noble but du génie !
Il enflammait l'auteur d'Iphigénie,
Boileau, Poussin, Phidias, Raphaël.
Le Bien, timide, est le Mieux du vulgaire.
A feu la Harpe il ne profita guère ;
Il en est mort : le Mieux est immortel.

It is necessary, at least, that each, according to his abilities, should tend towards this *better*, and not be content with the first plan that presents itself to his thoughts, unless, after having thoroughly examined it, he find it sufficient for his design, calculated to exhaust the subject, and to bring out the force of it, unless, in one word, he see nothing beyond it.

Several plans may present themselves upon the same subject. If I have to prove, that the thought of death is useful, I might establish successively:—

That it governs the imagination, regulates the affections, keeps the conscience awake ;

That it keeps back, and that it incites ;

That it is the best introduction to the knowledge of man and to that of God ;

That it makes us at once to despise, and to value life ;

That it represses our ambition, our sensuality, our hatreds ;

That it places us at the point of view of the truth : with regard to life, to ourselves, to our neighbours, and to God ;

That it makes us timid with regard to evil, courageous towards every other thing.

In fact, under different forms and names, the same matter will

[1] Our motto in everything should be, "Excelsior." Phil. iii. 13.—Ed.

be found in sermons, constructed upon these different plans. But which of these plans will present the truth under the most striking aspects, with the greatest riches of details, and with the happiest details: this is what we shall have to examine. It is very probable, that to all these plans will be preferred that of Bourdaloue on the same subject:—

"... I advance three propositions, which I beseech you to understand well, because they will form the division of this discourse. I say that the thought of death is the most sovereign remedy for extinguishing the fire of our passions: this is the first part. I say that the thought of death is the most infallible rule for coming to a sure conclusion in our deliberations: this is the second. Lastly, I say that the thought of death is the most efficacious means of inspiring us with a holy fervour in our actions: this is the last."[1]

It is important to remark, that to choose a plan is very often to find a subject in the subject itself. It is to choose, among the different points of view which the main proposition unites, that to which we would call the attention. In the example which I have just now given, all the proposed plans relate to one and the same point of view; but just as the proposition is here divided into its proofs, it may be decomposed into its parts, into its species, and into its relations. I take this passage: "Perfect love banishes fear." (1 John iv. 18.) According as I attach myself to one word or to another, I shall have three plans, which will be three subjects:—

Love.—It banishes fear, because it is full of devotedness, of hope, of happiness.

Banishes.—Love banishes fear; for we cannot fear when we love, we have nothing to fear when we love.

Fear.—Love banishes the fear of the anger of God, of bad success, of human judgments, and of ingratitude.

So this proposition, "Righteousness exalteth a nation" (Proverbs xiv. 34), is susceptible of different divisions, according as we would develop the idea by the modes of the fact, by its parts, by a comparison, affirmatively or negatively:—

1. In prosperity,—in adversity;
2. Internally,—externally;

[1] Bourdaloue, First Sermon of Lent, vol. i., p. 131, edition Lefèvre.

3. Without danger to itself,—without prejudice to others,—without envy on their part;

4. More than arms,—riches,—science.

Thus, when Homiletics gives you rules or directions with regard to the conception of plans, what it then teaches you is still properly invention. But, be that as it may, when it proposes to you different principles of division of the matter, it is not that you may cast lots among these different divisions, but that you may decide amongst them, according to the end which you desire to attain. This is, therefore, once more to choose your subject, or, rather, it is to make an end of choosing it.

The following are the principles of division laid down by Dr Ammon:[1] We may, says he,

I. Decompose the whole subject into its notions, and particular propositions. Example: *On the pernicious influence of ambition on human happiness.*

1. What is ambition?

2. Its disastrous influence on temporal happiness:

a. It makes us habitually discontented with ourselves.

b. It excites others to resist us.

c. It does not assure us of the esteem of other men; and

d. Still less of their love.

3. Its disastrous influence on spiritual good.

a. It hinders the knowledge of ourselves.

b. It hinders justice towards others.

c. It hinders love towards others.

II. We may decompose the genus into its species.[2] Example: *Veracity of the Divine promises.*

1. Of the general promises: "He wills that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth." (1 Tim. ii. 4.)

2. Of the particular promises which He has made:

a. To certain nations (to the Jews);

b. To certain families (Abraham);

c. To certain men (David, Jesus).

III. We may consider the principal thought in its different relations. Example: *The advantages of genuine culture.*[3]

[1] Ammon, *Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 254, edit. 1842.

[2] And *vice versâ*, we may rise from species to genus: Matt. v. 39–42: rise from the particular precept to the general truth implied, a yielding, giving, forgiving spirit.—Ed.

[3] In German, *Aufklærung.*

1. For man, as a rational being;
2. For man, in so far as he is a member of society:
a. As a citizen,
b. As a husband, and father,
c. As a friend,
d. As a teacher (Lehrer).

IV. We may decompose a general precept of the moral law into several subordinate precepts. I substitute here a different example from that proposed by the author: *Respect for the reputation of another.*

1. Not to attack him.
2. Not to give, by our conduct, occasion for believing that we do not esteem him.
3. To defend him, when he is attacked.
4. To warn him, when his conduct may cause him to be misjudged; to have a care of his reputation, when he himself has none.

V. We may decompose a theme into its various motives, or into its various proofs. Example: *The divine truth of the doctrine of Jesus.* It results,

1. From its accordance with the laws of our reason;
2. From its divine effects upon our hearts;
3. From the marvellous events, which accompanied its introduction, and its establishment.

VI. We may lastly decompose the proposition into its subordinate parts, following a gradation. Example (substituted for that of Dr Ammon): *Indolence.*

1. It renders us useless to ourselves;
2. It renders us useless to others;
3. It renders us injurious to others and to ourselves.

Moreover, whatever may be the system of decomposition which we adopt, and whether we are more or less felicitous in the invention of our plan or of the principal divisions, it is necessary to observe the following rules:[1]

[1] In giving these rules, we sufficiently indicate the principal difficulty, or the principal stumbling-block, which arrangement presents to young orators, and even to orators of much experience. The ideas of the mind are not individuals, but the parts of that continuous and perpetual line which connects all the objects in our mind, as they are connected in the universe. No idea separates itself spontaneously from other ideas. This is the business of logic, the indispensable instrument of order, exactness, and perspicuity. It is logic which

1st, Do not co-ordinate that which is subordinate; do not subordinate that which is co-ordinate. I call that subordinate, in regard to an idea, which is comprehended in the sphere, or in the domain of that idea; I call that co-ordinate which, along with that idea, forms part of a more general idea. The defect, opposed to this rule, consists in presenting, as distinct and separate, two ideas which enter into each other, of which the one forms part of the other.[1]

Thus, of the two ideas of *love* and *indulgence*, the second is subordinate to the first; and the two ideas of *obligingness* (*prévenance*) and of *indulgence* are co-ordinate to each other.

2d, Do not present as two ideas, or as two distinct motives, two points of view of one and the same idea, or of one and the same motive, that is to say, the same motive or the same idea taken in a particular relation which makes no essential change in it. These ideas resemble vases, which only differ from each other in the handle. The most different words do not always convey ideas essentially different, as they do in this division: "The Christian faith is such that it *incites*, *guides*, *sustains*." But, for example, to prove successively, that a thing is contrary to good sense, and that it is contrary to our interests, is to condemn ourselves to have nothing to prove, after the first part. This plan is admissible in the following instance: "Intolerance is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, and testifies a great ignorance of ourselves." We cannot be sure of our plan, until we have penetrated, rapidly perhaps, but thoroughly, the ideas of which it is composed; otherwise, with the deceptive expectation of our having a subject clear and copious, we enter upon one that is confused and barren.

I would extend this rule farther; I would say: that we must not distinguish ideas that border too closely upon one another, and are not liable to be confounded, and which, without being identical, imply each other. (For instance: *Gentle*, *easy to be entreated*, in James iii. 17; or, again, *peace*, *serenity*. Enumera-

individualises the ideas. This it is which brings each of them within certain well-defined limits, which are artificial at bottom, but without which no accurate reasoning could have place. This caution, or this art, involves the whole secret of arrangement.

[1] See HÜFFELL, *Uber das Wesen und den Beruf des evangelisch-christlichen Geistlichen*. 3d edit., 1835, vol. i., p. 277.

tions are not rhetorically systematic in some passages of the Bible.)

3d, Beware of suffering yourself to be carried away by the affinity, or the contiguity of ideas, so as to put into one part of the discourse what belongs to another part, either anterior or posterior.

4th, You must not treat of an idea before that one, which should serve for its elucidation or proof. This rule condemns not only gross *petitiones principii*, but also every distribution which might have the effect of making that, which would have prepared for the understanding of an idea, arrive too late.[1] To prove first that a thing will conciliate for us the esteem of good men, to prove in the next place that it is just, is to fall into the error we have been pointing out.[2]

Such are the fundamental rules, all of them negative, to which the plan is subject, those, without the observation of which, a plan is decidedly vicious. It is no doubt less so, but it is still vicious, when the system of decomposition is conventional, arbitrary, and when symmetry is preferred to natural order. This is what happens, when the division anticipates profound meditation on the subject. We can doubtless form a plan artificially which does not infringe the laws of logic, and which pleases the eye by its regularity; but this external regularity does violence, notwithstanding, to the peculiar nature of the matter; it separates, and keeps at a distance, what requires to be united; the divisions of the matter become separations, not articulations [successive joints of an organic whole]; the discourse is really interrupted at every turn; the artifice of oratorical transitions does not make up for the force of those natural and lively transitions, or, rather, of that perpetual engendering of one idea by another, which characterises true order; the discourse is not compact, and has not flowed as a fountain; the memory which we pretended to aid by symmetry, would have been much more and much better assisted by a natural order. The greatest

[1] In explication of texts, where you have to explain some one important article consisting of many branches; for example, predestination and converting grace, Phil. ii. 12, 13; place the most general propositions first, and follow the order of our knowledge, so that the first proposition may serve as steps to the second, the second to the third, and so of the rest.—Claude.—Ed.

[2] For had it first been proved to be *just*, the inference would easily follow, that it would conciliate for us the esteem of good men.—Ed.

talents of the pulpit have, I know, accepted these shackles, and their success has been the misfortune of the pulpit.

All that we have said of the general arrangement, or of the plan of the discourse, is doubtless applicable to each of the parts, which, united, compose the general plan, and have only to be transferred to them. We think it will be useful, however, to give some advice in regard to the plan of the parts of the discourse. We lay down three rules relative to the ideas, of which each of these parts is composed: *Unity of tendency* or of *direction*, *Generalisation*, *Subdivision (le dédoublement)*.

1st, If the manner of proceeding in the decomposition of the theme of each part was necessarily the same in all, if all descended from the general to the particular, we should have nothing to add to what we have said; but in this case, more than in the general conception of the discourse, the mind willingly takes the particular for its starting-point, and we cannot blame it. If the other method has great logical advantages, this has substantial ones, in so far as it arrives on the same floor at the ideas, and not by the stairs of analysis. But it must be confessed that in this latter case, the starting-point, or the general idea, not having been determined beforehand, we run the risk of not adhering, in this particular idea, to the point of view which corresponds to that of the general idea. We have collected fractions which perhaps have not the same common denominator. The idea which it is our business to find, and to adapt to the general design, is there found indeed in substance, but bending towards a different object from the general object of the discourse, or of the part of the discourse in which it is found. The same idea may present itself under the aspect of means, in place of presenting itself under the aspect of encouragement. I say the same of ideas of utility and of aim, of reproach and of exhortation, of usages and of rules, of duty and of beauty, of means and of manner, of source and of condition, of object and of aim, of illusion and of pretext, of characteristic and of rules, of shades and of degrees, of motives and of consequences, of proofs and of motives, of effects and of symptoms. This shows the danger of writing passages beforehand, without having in view the whole. We cannot make them enter into the body of the discourse without modifying them; and from regret to see them melt away in our hands, especially when they have some

beauty, we do violence to the natural sequence of the discourse, and to the laws of proportion, in order to find employment for them, and we attain this object by artifices of logic which are never successful, the false never being able to supply the place of the true.[1]

2d, It is not only necessary that the particular ideas should have a unity of intention and of direction, we must form them into particular groups in the principal group, give a common centre to those which are susceptible of being united under one and the same head, and aim at generalising. This does not signify that we must confine ourselves to general ideas, and suppress the details; but [that we must] strengthen the particular ideas by giving them a centre, and by gathering them around it. If we confined ourselves to general ideas, we should make each discourse a summary of several discourses, a broth too strong for weak stomachs; we should deprive ourselves of that multitude of aspects, and of applications, which are the most affecting parts of eloquence; we should thus not much instruct, and should little affect our hearers. Those discourses in which the substance of a whole discourse is compressed into one paragraph, remind us, in a certain sense, of this verse of Boileau:—

"Souvent trop d'abondance appauvrit la matière."[2]

The rule, therefore, which we give, is purely one of arrangement.

In fact, those sermons wholly formed of general ideas, which consume on a single occasion, what ought to form the matter of a series of discourses—are they not in general a sign of poverty rather than of riches? and if the orator has seen only one subject where others would have seen several, is it not for want of meditation, and thorough examination?

3d, The restriction on the explanation of this second rule conducts us to a third rule. It is necessary to know how to sub-

[1] "Those who are afraid of losing isolated thoughts, and who write at different times detached pieces, never unite them without forced transitions."—Buffon.

Again we may quote Horace, *Ars Poet.*: "Denique sit quod vis, simplex duntaxat et *unum*." Cecil well says, "It requires as much judgment to know what is not to be put into a sermon, as what is.—*Remains.* So Bowles' Pastor, ii. 10: "Maxima pars vulgi, quâ est ingenii hebetudine, multitudine rerum, varii generis, potius obruitur, quam instruitur." It is only the food which is digested that nourishes.—Ed.

[2] "Too much abundance often impoverishes the matter."—Boileau, *L'Art Poètique*, chant iii.

divide, that is to say, decompose the principal ideas into as many parts, or points of view, as we can, without arriving at that tenuity, or that subtlety, in which the attention is wearied, and the interest is destroyed. It is necessary to know how to do in the oratorical discourse, what Corneille has done in the tragedy of *Horace*, the subject of which, as it is given in history, would not have been sufficient for a tragedy, if the poet had not known, how to place the incidents at proper distances. *Divide et impera.* —It may seem useless and puerile to decompose certain ideas, but if it is sometimes of advantage to leap over the intermediate ones, it is sometimes of advantage also to mark them one by one, and only to arrive step by step at the catastrophe. Consider that in this business, the road, or journey, is important in itself, and that it is not the same with the discourse, as with a stair, the steps of which we may descend, or mount, taking three at a time; it is of importance in this stair of the discourse, that each step should be touched.—As I speak here of arrangement only in the logical point of view, that is to say, in so far as it concerns the understanding and the judgment, I will not stop to show that the impression we receive from the truth, is in proportion, not merely to the consciousness of the end at which we have arrived, but to the feeling of the journey we have made, to arrive at it. Every person may have felt what is the oratorical force of this slowness[1]—very different from that slowness, which results from halts and windings; for here the march is without intermission; the step is short, but firm and quick. Confining myself to the logical point of view, I will say, that, if the mind is sometimes pleased with great steps, and to pass over a large space in a short time, as Bossuet makes it do in his *Funeral Orations*, subdivision has two advantages:—1st, It multiplies the feeling of the evidence; it multiplies, so to speak, the truth (not the words, for certainly we do not wish to teach the art of lengthening). 2d, It makes the discourse easy to be understood by the weakest intellect, by dividing the divi-

[1] It is always needful to make subdivisions, but seldom desirable to mention them. Nevertheless, when subdivisions can be made agreeable, either on account of the excellence of the matter, or when it will raise the hearers' attention, or when the parts by their justness harmonise agreeably one with another, you may formally mention them: but this must be done seldom, for the hearers would be presently tired of such a method, and by that means cloyed of the whole.—Claude.—Ed.

sion, and carrying the attention each time only for a limited space.[1]

§ III.—Of Arrangement in an Oratorical Point of View.

We have distinguished the logical or didactical arrangement, which only concerns itself with the understanding and the judgment, from the oratorical arrangement, which is solicitous about the effect to be produced upon the heart, and by the heart upon the will. But these things are not distinct to such a degree, that arrangement which was not logical, might be oratorical. Far from it, logical arrangement is the basis of oratorical arrangement, just as reason is the basis of eloquence. Nay, more, a discourse, logically arranged, is by that very circumstance oratorical to a certain degree. It is evident that a fault in the logical arrangement, in weakening the proof, would so far weaken the impression, if we grant that the soul is struck, or penetrated with a truth, in proportion as that truth is more certain or more clear; and for the same reason it is evident that all progress of the proof, is a progress in persuasion, and even an instantaneous progress, since in matters such as that of sacred discourse, it is hardly possible that what speaks to the mind, should not speak to the heart. The effect of argumentation, in a discourse on religion and morality, is always a mixed effect.[2] For when we speak of oratorical arrangements, we suppose that the materials which have to be arranged, are themselves oratorical; and the arrangement can do no other thing than confirm this characteristic, or strengthen it.

But if there is already something oratorical in a logical arrangement of such a discourse, there are means of rendering it oratorical, which, founded on logic, or conformable to logic, are not suggested by it, and the non-employment of which would not make the discourse cease to be perfectly logical. They correspond to a logic

[1] Resuming the comparison, which he has several times made use of in this chapter, M. Vinet adds: "The steps of the stair are less high, in proportion as they are more numerous."—Ed.—See also Bourdaloue on the *Thought of Death*, second part, vol. i., p. 135, edition Lefèvre; Massillon on *Salvation*, first part, vol. i., p. 473, edition Lefèvre, and on the *Passion of Jesus Christ*, third part, vol. i., p. 531, same edition.

[2] Reinhard (cited by Huffel, *Uber das Wesen und den Beruf des Geistlichen*, vol. i., p. 266, at the bottom), *Uber die Wichtigkeit des Sinnes für Hœuslichket:* says, "1. Die Natur *bereitet* ihn vor; 2. Die Klugheit *ræth* ihn an; 3. Die Pflicht *gebietet* ihn; 4. Die Religion *heiligt* ihn."

which we might call the logic of the soul, and we might in consequence call it *psychological.*

The peculiarity of the soul,—its first want, in default of action, or in waiting for action, is movement. And because eloquence is the language which the soul wishes to hear, the characteristic of eloquence, or of the oratorical discourse, is movement. *Eloquentia nihil est nisi motus animæ continuus.*[1]

The business of the orator, therefore, is to communicate to the soul the movement which it demands, a movement towards a certain object.

But in what does this movement consist? It consists, for him who listens, in proceeding from indecision, from indifference, or from languor of the will, to full determination, which takes place in proportion as the soul comes into closer union with the truth which is set before it.

The movement in question is, according to the expression of Cicero which we have quoted, a perpetual or continuous movement.

We may, by a word or by an isolated act, communicate a movement to the soul, incline it instantaneously towards a certain object, make it perform an act of the will; but this movement is only a jolt. We may, by the same means, repeat, and multiply these jolts. These are fractions of eloquence, eloquent moments; they are not eloquence, they are neither the art, nor the genius of oratory. Eloquence consists in maintaining the movement in the development of a thought, or of a proof,—that is to say, in perpetuating it, according to Cicero's expression.

To perpetuate this movement, is not an artifice unworthy of the candour of truth, as if our business was to prevent the hearer from drawing breath, or pausing, and recollecting himself. The first infraction of the law of candour would be in the choice of the elements; if it is not permitted to arrange them oratorically, it was ill done, in the first instance, to choose such as are oratorical in themselves. The first wrong would consist in not solely addressing the reason: we have already examined this question, and do not return to it. If, in proportion as you stir the soul, you enlighten the reason; if the light goes on increasing with the heat; if, at some place at which the hearer pauses, he can give an account to himself of the journey he has made, and

[1] "Quid aliud est eloquentia nisi motus animæ continuus?"—Cicero.

justify to his reason the emotion of his soul, what is there to find fault with, with respect to uprightness, in the procedure of the orator? The truth is made to excite emotion in the soul, the soul is made to be moved by the truth; can we say that the truth has been received, when it has not been loved,—the truth which is supremely worthy of love? It is within its bosom, that the contemplative faculty of the soul harmonizes, and blends itself with the faculty of affection or emotion.

The first rule of oratorical movement, is, as we have seen, continuity. This rule is negative. We have only not to interrupt the movement; and, indeed, why should we interrupt it?

It is necessary that the movement be continuous, because everything which interrupts it, not merely interrupts it, but reacts perniciously upon the effect already produced.

In order that it may be continuous, it is necessary that what follows an argument or an idea, while it is quite different from the preceding argument or idea, should be suited to preserve the hearer in the disposition, into which he has been brought by what went before, and should not turn him away from it, so as to give to his soul a quite different direction. Thus, after having interested the soul, to address the reason, and then to return to the soul, is to break the continuity. This is what is done by every digression, every rambling away from the subject, which makes the design of the orator be forgotten. And, in this case, so far is the interesting nature of what is introduced from serving as a satisfactory excuse for the orator, that it makes his error, on the contrary, more sensibly felt.[1]

Though none of these defects should be found in the discourse, another thing might still injure the continuity of the movement,

[1] For, in proportion to the interesting nature of the digression, is the degree in which the hearer's mind is drawn off from the main aim of the sermon. Comp., on the contrary, Horace's description of the genius-taught skill of Homer:—

"Non fumum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem
Cogitat. . . .
Semper ad eventum festinat . . . et quæ
Desperat tractata nitescere posse, relinquit,
. . . . . .
Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum."

The dissection of the subject should be on the principle rather of logical, than of verbal analysis; for which reason Bridges advises that the sermon be not planned, till the subject is digested.—Ed.

viz., multiplied subdivisions. This is the case with those symmetrical plans, which have only too much invaded the pulpit. I know not if the traditional structure of sermons, that stiff and frigid formalism, has been as profitable for instruction, as it has been injurious to eloquence. Therefore we owe, in the name of the latter, thanks to those who have brought the homily into repute, in which there is always a species of continuity produced, according to the nature of the text, by the concatenation of the ideas, or the sequence of the facts. Fenelon, in his second *Dialogue on Eloquence*,[1] absolutely opposes divisions, as producing only an apparent order, as withering and cramping the discourse, as dividing it into three or four discourses. The great orators of antiquity and the Fathers of the Church did not divide their discourses; in which, however, they distinguish what ought to be distinguished, and in which, also, we observe a law of progression.

[Let us explain, however.] We must not confound two things that are different: the division in itself, and the enunciations which make it perceptible. It is evident, that we speak here only of the first of these two things: the division in itself. Now, does the division interrupt the continuity of the movement? This cannot be understood of every species of division; for in that case it would be necessary to renounce movement, every discourse being necessarily divided into parts, more or less distinct, and every arrangement implying a decomposition. To what does Fénelon oppose himself? It cannot be to division in the general sense; it must be, on the one hand, to the formal division, announced beforehand, and, on the other, to a decomposition too artificial, and carried too far. I believe that he opposes, in particular, a subdivision founded on distinctions of little importance, that perpetual splitting (*refente*), which is every moment suspending the march of the discourse, and is every moment commanding unseasonable halts; [a method which we must always suspect, because it is too convenient. In a certain measure it may be necessary; but, carried to excess, it becomes a pillow of indolence, a dispensation from meditating. It is indeed, then, that we have, in place of one consecutive discourse, a series of little discourses. It is not a beautiful well-veined marble, but a stiffly-formed mosaic.—Fénelon spoke of this so much the more

[1] *Dialogue* ii., towards the end: "N'en doutez pas," etc.

seasonably, as this method was in high repute. In Massillon's most beautiful sermons, the flesh of the discourse being removed, we would see underneath little freshness of invention: all the charm lies in this superficial carving.]

In like manner, as we have said, that arrangement, in so far as it is logical, is already oratorical, so we say that the movement, in so far as it is continuous, is already progressive. It is the same as in the fall of heavy bodies, with this difference, that it is not of the acceleration of the movement, but of its intensity of which we speak.[1] The movement which is uninterrupted is always the stronger. But the progress in the movement has also something peculiar and special, as might be said of a body which, independently of the first impulsion, and of the inclination which maintains and, so to speak, renews it, should incessantly receive an additional impulse.

In like manner, as progress in physical movement consists in always displaying larger masses, in overcoming greater resistances, and in augmenting intensity: so oratorical progress consists in the soul's being always more strongly affected, and more deeply penetrated.

The law of the oratorical discourse is, in this respect, the same as that of the drama. Have always before your eyes the drama, with its plot always thickening, its turns of fortune and its catastrophe. *Omnia festinent ad eventum.*[2]

1. But from the general idea of oratorical progress, we pass to its different forms, and discover, first, that there is progress, when we pass from what essentially touches only the intelligence, to that which acts upon the will. Not that each of these faculties is, in its sphere, as perfect as the other; but in life it is not intelligence which completes the will; it is the will that completes the intelligence; thought in general, if not each thought in particular, would resolve itself into action; man tends, with all his

[1] Every real movement has its quantity. It is not the extent, nor the rapidity alone; it is the degree itself of its reality, of which the rapidity and the extent are only the result and the sign: it is the intensity. Now, the intensity, which is the degree of the reality, has its direct measure only in the energy of the cause, that is to say, in the force. On the other hand, if the force is for itself its measure, it proportions itself also,—it proportions at least its actual energy, to the resistance which it must overcome. The movement is the result of the excess of the power above the resistance.—RAVAISSON, *De l'Habitude*, p. 18.

[2] "Semper ad eventum festinat."—HORACE, *Ars Poetica*, ver. 148.

faculties, towards action. [*Facultas* comes from *facere;* it is the power of *doing.*]

There is, therefore, in every discourse, a strict progress: it is from theory to practice,—from the idea to the action. We should transgress this rule, if we gave an explanation of *the duty*, after having presented *the motives* of it. Here is shown the difference between the logical arrangement and the oratorical arrangement. The two orders indicated above are equally logical. And even in life, the explanation of a duty, or some direction on the manner of fulfilling it, comes very naturally after the instances. But this would be dangerous in a public discourse. The optics of a public and solemn discourse are not the same as that of a conversation.

2. Even in a series of ideas, all relative to the intelligence, there is progress from the abstract to the concrete, from the *à priori* to the *à posteriori*, because the realised ideas, or the facts, without being intrinsically better as proofs, act more directly upon man, and the sentiment lies nearer to the will, than the intelligence.

3. Among the arguments of one and the same nature, whether they are addressed to the intelligence or the will, we must proceed from the weaker to the stronger. But what is the weaker, and the stronger? If the question is of proofs for the intellect, the more simple, and the more evident are the stronger, and the probabilities are less strong than the proofs.[1] If the question is of facts, the progress is from the less to the more important. If the business is with motives, the question is difficult. Which are the weakest, which are the strongest? Are the most elevated the strongest? In this case, Bourdaloue, treating of impurity, and considering it first as the sign, then as a cause of reprobation, would have been wrong.

[1] The advice of Cicero is singular, viz., to throw into the middle of the discourse the arguments on which we least depend, as if they were to pass fraudulently along with the others. *Ergo in oratione firmissimum quodque sit primum: dum illud tamen teneatur, ut ea quæ excellant serventur etiam ad perorandum; si quæ erunt mediocria (nam vitiosis nusquam esse oportet locum), in mediam turbam atque in gregem conjiciantur.—De Oratore*, book ii., chap. lxxvii.

The arguments he alludes to are those which, though true and valid, are less striking. The more effective are to be ranged in the beginning, because it is desirable to give the hearers a prepossession in favour of your cause, at the outset; and the most effective of all, in the peroration; for, as Sallust says, "Mortales semper postrema meminere."—Ed.

A question presents itself. When a motive, or an argument, is incomparably stronger than all the others, when it is capital and decisive, why pass across several others to arrive at that? Is this what is done in occasional, and accidental discourses?

Perhaps not, ordinarily; but perhaps it would be done, if those discourses were ever so little prepared, and not fortuitous; and, in the most of cases, we doubt not that this method would be justified by the result.

There are cases, doubtless, in which the public discourse itself will be more graceful, by mentioning the secondary arguments only under the form of pretermission,[1] or even by not mentioning them at all. But, in general, and especially so far as the pulpit is concerned, the point of view is not the same as for the accidental, or occasional discourse of common life. The situation of the orator and his hearers is a tranquil situation; the subject is not an interest of the moment, a question suddenly raised, or a measure to be taken instantaneously. Neither is there a passion excited, with which the orator must put himself in unison.

Without wishing to maintain, that the oratorical discourse is a poetic representation of the active discourse (any more than a letter is an imitation of familiar talk, or of conversation), we may say, however, that there is in it something ideal. It is indeed reality, but an extraordinary reality; a point of view not met with, but given. His auditory is not a known individual; it is a collection of individualities, the mean of which we must calculate, a new being, a being *sui generis*. It is not a fortuitous meeting, but a solemn rendezvous. In fine, the question is of an act isolated, and accounted single, in which it is necessary to have everything said, in order to return to it no more.

We say, that there is in general only one reason that decides. It is true, that, when a man gives an account of an action he has done, or of an action he is going to do, we may rest assured that one of the reasons which he gives, is that which has determined him; it is that which he has given to himself, the others are for other people to whom he wishes to justify the resolution he has taken. Why not mention it first? or rather, why not mention only the former, since it is very certain that if we begin

[1] With the formula, "Not to mention," etc., etc.; "That I may not dwell on the argument that," etc., etc.—Ed.

with the strongest argument, the remainder will not be felt, nor even listened to?

But the orator ought to give all the reasons:—first, because he knows not which is the one that is decisive, and because, ordinarily, it is not the same one that decides every person, nor every person at all times; secondly, because truth ought to make use of all its means; and lastly, because it is useful for the mind to see the light arrive from all points of the horizon, for it is not with the truth, as with the sun in this respect. We do not, however, entertain this mistaken idea, that the quantity in this kind of discourse can supplement the quality; we do not consider conviction a species of oppression of the mind, in which it is overwhelmed by the mass of the arguments, and by the quantity of words.

In fine, the more an argument is touching, and intended to give to the soul a lively impulse, the more it requires to be introduced with preparatory arguments. The soul, taken by surprise, is disconcerted by these vehement, and blunt summonses; it is overwhelmed, rather than vanquished; it has no means of reaction, unless what precedes has put it in a suitable frame.

4. Conformably to this rule of progress, or of the ascending movement, where shall we place the solution of doubts, and the answer to difficulties? Shall it be before, or after, the positive arguments? We cannot give to this question one and the same reply; only we hold it for certain beforehand, that what logic shall counsel, psychology will approve, and reciprocally. I think there is one distinction to be made. We may place before the positive proof the examination of the prejudices, the prepossessions, the equivocal terms, the confusions, and the logomachies which obscure the question. It is, so to speak, to clear the ground on which we wish to build. Quite a different thing is the refutation of objections, properly so called. Either it constitutes the entire discourse, or it comes after the proof. But it is necessary that it should be clear, lively, and rapid; that it should be turned into a proof, and that it should be an application of the positive arguments which we first presented.[1]

[1] Claude's rules as to objections are, They must be natural and popular, not far-fetched, nor too philosophical—such as it is absolutely necessary to refute: they must be proposed in a clear, simple style, without rhetorical exaggerations; yet not unadorned nor unaffecting. Never state the objections, and

In discourses composed of parallel parts, there may be progression, provided these parts follow each other in the order of their importance ; but this progress cannot be compared to that of a discourse, in which, in place of two or three collateral parts, all is successive,—in which there is not, in a manner, two or three discourses, but one only, one single train of ideas, of which the first engenders the second, this the third, and so on to the end ; so that the last pages are strong with the force of all that preceded, and the whole discourse weighs upon the last paragraph. It is the accelerated fall of heavy bodies ; it is, in place of an arithmetical, a geometrical progression.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE EXORDIUM.

We meet with, in the discourses of experienced preachers, only a few examples of exordiums positively defective; we find few good ones in the discourses of preachers, who are just commencing. Hence it is natural to conclude, that this part of the discourse has something more delicate than the others, but nothing which demands peculiar abilities. It is with the exordium, as with the fine and precise operations of mechanics, in which every workman ends with succeeding, but only after having broken, more than once, the instruments employed in them. We shall be able to judge of it from what we have to say of the object, and the nature of the exordium.

Is the exordium necessary, natural? Or is it only a factitious, and conventional ornament?

I remark, that nature herself teaches us the art of preparations, and of gradations. We love them in everything, and we

then defer the answers to another opportunity ; answer them directly, forcibly, and fully. If three or four objections regard only *one* part of the text, and each may be answered in a few words, propose these objections all together, distinguishing them, however, by first—second—third. But if the objections regard different parts of the text, or different matters, and require to be stated at length, and if it would take some time to answer them, they must be proposed and answered apart.—Ed.

attach to them the idea of beauty. [The absence of the twilight, and of the dawn, would take away from the beauty of the heavens.] *Sic omnia quæ fiunt, quæque aguntur acerrime, leniorибus principiis natura ipsa prætexuit.*[1]

I remark, in the second place, that no person commences *ex abrupto*, when he is free to do otherwise, even in accidental conversation. If we commence *ex abrupto*, if we rush into the midst of the subject (*rapit in medias res*), if we make our entry into the apartment by the window, it is when some circumstance, or some word pronounced by another, has placed the auditory at the desired point of view; this itself is an exordium, and the exception confirms the rule. But, besides this case in which the preparation is given, every one, without stating it to himself, feels the necessity of preparing his auditory.

There is one case, in which we do state to ourselves this necessity; it is when some explanation is necessary for understanding the subject; when the words of Scripture, for example, on which we would speak, derive their perspicuity from their connection[2] with the words that precede.

But independently, or in the absence of this motive, there are others.

First, there is a certain degree of gravity in the single fact of placing an exordium at the head of the discourse. We seem to show more respect to our subject, when we do not enter upon it immediately, and bluntly.

It is useful to collect for a moment the thoughts of the hearer, in order that he may not enter upon the subject with a distracted mind: now, we can only collect his thoughts by means of ideas that lie near to the subject; otherwise, his attention would be distracted.

But, commonly, we have need of something more. We wish

[1] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book ii., chap. lxxviii.

[2] The connection is the relation of your text to the context. To find this, consider the scope of the discourse, consult commentators, and above all, as commentators often give far-fetched connections, exercise your own good sense, and choose what seems the most natural connection. In texts, the connection of which is difficult to perceive, the best way will be to let the passage alone, if you can find none likely. The connection is a part which must be little dwelt on, because the hearers always pass it over, and receive but little instruction from it. If it furnish agreeable illustrations of the text, they must be put in the discussion. Sometimes also you may draw thence an exordium.—Claude.—Ed.

to put the hearer, with respect to the subject, in a disposition similar to that in which we are ourselves. It is with the orator and the hearer, as with instruments which are tuned before a concert.

"The exordium," says Quintilian, "has no other end, than to dispose the mind of the hearer, to listen attentively to the sequel of the discourse. It is, in general, agreed that it is necessary, in order to this, to render him *well-disposed*, *attentive*, and *docile;* not that we ought to neglect these means at any part of the pleading, but because they are specially necessary for us at the commencement, in order to insinuate ourselves into the mind of the judge, and, once admitted, to penetrate farther."[1]

The exordium[2] is, therefore, a discourse before the principal discourse, a discourse the object of which is, in all cases, to make our hearers well-disposed, attentive, and docile, by which I mean, disposed to receive instruction, and, in certain cases, to prepare them to understand rightly, what we have afterwards to say to them.

Let us remark, that here we have not to do with the personal interest of the orator, but rather with that of the hearer. And, in this respect, the word *well-disposed* [*benevolent*] might be replaced by some other.

But in no case is the choice of the idea of the exordium arbitrary; it is still less so, than a prelude or an overture in music, not more so, than a preface at the beginning of a book. What we wish, under the name of exordium, is not a delay, or an interval more or less well filled up, but an introduction,—a preparation,—the excitement of an expectation, as distinct and lively as possible. In our opinion, the truest exordium is that which has conducted the orator himself to his subject, or it is in fact the eminence to which the orator, when his subject has been discussed, ascends in order to contemplate it as a whole.

[1] Quintilian, book iv., chap. i.

[2] The exordium is that part, in which the minds of the hearers are prepared, and a natural and easy way opened to the discussion. Hearers are now so habituated to an exordium, that if they heard a preacher enter abruptly into his matter, they would imagine the man was aiming to do with them what the angel did with Habakkuk, when he took him by the hair of the head, and transported him in an instant from Judea to Babylon (Bel and Dragon, ver. 36). Some time ought to be employed gently to lead the hearer to the subject. You are not to suppose, that he is thinking on what you have been meditating, nor that he can apply it instantly, without preparation.—Claude.—Ed.

After what we have said, the rules of the exordium are not difficult to find. And if we dwell long on a part that is in itself so inconsiderable, it is because there is none more difficult, or in which there is more danger of erring.

I. The first [rule for the exordium] lies so near to it, as to be confounded with the definition itself.

When the exordium is neither furnished, nor has its place supplied, by an explanation of the text or of the context, it should be drawn from an idea which immediately touches the subject, without forming part of it.

These two things are understood of themselves. If the idea form part of the subject, it is no longer an introduction or an exordium. If the idea has no relation to the subject, it is no longer an exordium, it is a ridiculous digression. But if the first part of the rule will pass without any explanation, it is not so with the second. It is not to an idea, lying near to that of the discourse that it refers, but to an idea which immediately touches it, between which and that of the discourse there is no room for another idea, so that the first step we take out of this idea brings us into our subject. To decline this condition, is to allow ourselves, under the name of exordium, all sorts of rambling, and to assume the right of beginning with a digression. We may rely upon it, the exordium is not good, if it does not appear necessary, if it does not appear, along with the discourse, to form a body, if it gives the idea of a strange discourse, sewed more or less ingeniously to the principal discourse, if it leaves to the hearer the liberty of imagining some other exordium, either preferable, or even as good. The exordium is good only, in so far as it has been suggested by the subject, as it has been born of it, and as it is united to it, as intimately as a flower is united to its stalk: *Penitus ex ea causa, quæ tum agatur, efflоruisse.*[1] Gaichiès says: "The exordium would be a digression, if we could cut it off without injuring the discourse."[2]

The rule, taken in all its rigour, would be, that the exordium should be incommutable, that is to say, that it should be suitable to only one subject: for, whenever it is not incommutable, there seems to be room, between this exordium and the discourse, for an intermediate idea. It is, at least, necessary to observe it as

[1] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book ii., chap. lxxviii.

[2] Gaichies, *Maximes sur le ministère*, 2d part, iii. 6.

constantly, and to abide by it as closely as possible. But it is certain that it is not absolute, and, if your exordium stand the proof I have indicated, if it appear necessary, if the idea of another exordium is not suggested, any more than that of another discourse as the sequel of this exordium, we ought to have no scruples, nor to fear reproach. Who would condemn the exordium which Saurin has put at the head of his sermon on *Devotion to the Divine laws?*[1] But it is doubtless very useful not to allow ourselves any latitude, unless it be in the way of exceptions to such exordiums. Otherwise we shall fall into the vague and the trivial, and we shall make introductions which do not introduce.

The orators of antiquity, pre-occupied especially by the point of view of personal interest in the exordium, and for whom, consequently, it was less united to the subject, and formed less an integral part of the discourse, were less afraid of commutable exordiums. Cicero, and Demosthenes himself, had exordiums that were transferable. We require, in general, exordiums more closely united to our subject and to our design.

Though the rule we have given should reduce the number of the subjects or aims of exordium, it would not be the less good; but, far from reducing their number, it multiplies them. By neglecting it, we think we give ourselves more scope; but, on the contrary, we confine ourselves within narrower limits. We perhaps more easily find an introduction, but the choice of subjects is less varied. It is nearest the subject of discourse, that the subjects are most numerous.

We shall be able to judge, by the following indication of several aims of exordium, that the materials of the exordium are easily attainable by an attentive mind.[2] But let us remark, however, that in indicating here several of the principal sources of exordiums, we do not pretend to give a list of commonplaces, from which we might take at random. There is always one exordium which is much better than another, and it is commonly that on which the true orator first falls. There is, therefore:

a. The idea of the genus, of which the subject is a species. It is, in a manner, to put the subject in its own place, or to mark

[1] Saurin, vol. iii., p. 125, new edition.

[2] Cf. Huffell, *Der Evangelische Geistliche*, vol. i., p. 286. Ammon, *Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 271.

the place of the subject. This species is the most common.[1] Often the text may furnish us with an exordium in which we proceed from the idea of the species to that of the genus.

b. The reconciliation between the subject [treated] and another, [to show] the resemblance or the difference.[2]

c. Opposition between the idea of the subject and some opinion or maxim spread abroad in the world.[3]

d. Recommendation of the subject, that is, showing the importance and the beauty of it, the reasons for which it has been chosen, sometimes even making an apology for the subject. *Vestibula nimirum honesta, aditusque ad causam faciet illustres.*[4]

e. Reviving the memory of a fact, in which the idea of the subject is individualised, or from which that idea results.[5] This is a favourite method of Saurin.[6]

f. Relation of the subject to the circumstances of the time, and the place.

g. [Relation to] the circumstances of the orator himself. [This is more delicate; it is an exception. In freedoms of this sort, the execution is the solution of the knot.[7]]

h. Sometimes the exordium has received the form of a prayer; but this is the form, and not the aim or idea of exordium; in the essential point of the ideas, this prayer must enter into some one of the categories which we have just indicated.

i. Lastly, there are the text and the context; that is to say, the explanation, either of the very words of the text, or of the connection of these words with those which precede. Theremin is of opinion, that the text presents matter for an exordium quite at hand, and always suitable; we have only to extract from the

[1] See Reinhard, *Sermons for the year* 1797, Serm. xvii., upon the proposition: "That nothing is more easily corrupted in the hands of man than religion." See also the exordium of my sermon on *Sanctification* (*Meditations Evangéliques*).

[2] See Saurin on the *Song of Simeon*, vol. iv., p. 29, new edition.

[3] See Massillon, the first of his sermons, on the *Happiness of the Righteous*. Bourdaloue, on the *Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, vol. ii., p. 315, edition Lefèvre.

[4] Cicero, *Orator*, chap. xv. See Chrysostom, *First Homily to the People of Antioch*.

[5] See Theremin, *Sermon on Preaching* (*Das Kreuz Christi*).

[6] See the *Sermon on the Campaign of* 1706, vol. viii., p. 93, new edition.

[7] See Claus Harms (*Predigten ueber das heilige Abendmahl*), first sermon on the *Holy Supper*; and Saurin, on the *Last Discourses of Jesus Christ*, vol. iv., p. 55, new edition.

text the idea of the subject, adding to it a short explanation of the circumstances in which the words of the text were pronounced, and which give to it a particular intention.[1]

Without wishing to reduce the preacher to this single species of exordium, we also think that the text, and the context (otherwise the connection), always offer the materials of a good exordium,—of an exordium with which we may be always satisfied.—It only remains for us to say, that we must not create the connection, that we must not attach ourselves to a problematical connection,[2] nor ascend too high, or too laboriously, or with too short steps, the banks of that stream of discourse, of which our text forms, so to speak, one of the waves.

II. Our second rule was comprised in the first, since we said, that the exordium ought to be drawn from an idea lying near to the subject. It is necessary, indeed, that it should be *one* idea, a single idea. There are two ways of transgressing this rule; the one consists in descending from a more remote idea towards that which is in immediate contact with that of the subject; the other, in making two exordiums that are in a manner parallel, that is to say, an exordium composed of two ideas, of which the one is not derived from the other.

There was a time when the exordium was constantly twofold. "It was formerly usual," says Gaichiès, "to make two exordiums, the one to lead to the invocation, the other to prepare for the division." I add, that the first seemed to be only intended to get rid of the text.[3]

III. The exordium may have unity, and yet not be simple. It is necessary that it should be *simple;* that it do not reason or

[1] [We cannot, says Claude, approve of the custom of the English preachers, who enter immediately into the literal explication of the text, and make it serve for an exordium, after which they divide their discourses into several parts, which they discuss as they go on. Surely the hearer is not suddenly able to comprehend their explications, having yet neither emotions nor preparation. Methinks it would be better gently to move them by something which gives no trouble, than to load them on a sudden with an explication, which they can neither clearly comprehend, nor distinctly hear.—Ed.] *Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend*, p. 77.

[2] See note above, p. 260.—Ed.

[3] See Bourdaloue. [But Claude says, The best exordiums are those composed of two propositions, the first of which is naturally and immediately connected with the second, and the second with the text. Those are to be condemned, who conduct to the text by many long circuits, *i.e.*, many propositions chained together, which can only fatigue the hearer.—Ed.]

prove too much; that it confine itself to recalling a known truth; that it refer to that which the hearer already knows, or with which he agrees. Everything should be easy in the first steps towards the subject.[1]

IV. For the same reason, it is necessary that the idea of the exordium should receive no very extensive development. It is to give the people just cause of impatience, to detain them a long time on the threshold of a house into which we have promised them entrance.[2]

The following are some other rules, relative, not as before, to the contents of the exordium, or to its substance, but to its own character.

I. The exordium, being intended to prepare, to dispose the hearers, supposes them not prepared and disposed. We cannot, therefore, in general, appeal in the exordium to forces which we have not yet awakened. Vehemence, splendour of style, solemnity, are not yet seasonable, and we must not exhaust ourselves at the commencement. Nevertheless, this rule is not absolute. 1st, In certain cases the preacher finds the hearers already excited, and it is not necessary that he himself should descend beneath their level. It is then that he must dare. Flechier is judiciously bold in the famous exordium of his funeral oration for Turrenne; Blessig, in that for Marechal de Saxe,[3] and Bridaine at St Sulpice. 2d, It is also a way of preparing the hearer, to

[1] Exordium of the sermon of BOURDALOUE, on the *Temptations* (*Carême*), vol. i., p. 175, edition Lefèvre. We find in it the plan of three or four sermons, and three of these, at least, after the author has already enunciated the design and the division of his own. [An exordium must be *clear*, and therefore disengaged from all abstruse thoughts; natural and popular in terms, and not overcharged with matter. You must not expect of your hearers at first a great degree of penetration and elevation. Therefore avoid in it all that can give pain to the mind, such as long trains of reasoning.—CLAUDE.—ED.]

[2] An old woman, in criticising the long introductions of a Puritan preacher, said, "You see, Sir, he is so long about spreading the cloth, that one doubts if the table will ever be laid." The longest exordium, according to Claude, may have ten or twelve periods, and the shortest six or seven, provided they be not too long. If the exordium were too short, it would oblige the hearer to enter too soon into the matter, without sufficient preparation; and excessive length would weary him, for it is with an auditor as with a man who visits a palace, he does not like to stay too long in the court or first avenues; he would only view them transiently, without stopping, and proceed as soon as possible to gratify his principal curiosity.—ED.

[3] See the *Correspondence de Grimm.*

strike him with the solemnity, the grandeur of the subject. It may also be of importance, in certain subjects, to remove the supposed authority of the trivial, or worldly ideas which the subject may suggest.[1]

To know how to close seasonably, and seasonably to abstain, is the property of talent, and the fruit of experience: instruction, properly so called, cannot supply the want of talent, nor anticipate experience.

II. A rule which seems implied in the preceding, is *modesty*. The ancient rhetoricians insist upon it; they even wish timidity. We find in Cicero a passage which plainly shows the humble position, which the ancient orator assumed in front of his auditory:—

"You wish to know the bottom of my thought; I may declare to friends such as you, what I have never yet told to any person. The most able orator, he who expresses himself with the greatest elegance and facility, is in my eyes only an impudent person, if he does not tremble on mounting the tribune, if he does not still tremble during his exordium. . . . Indeed, the more able an orator is, the more he knows the difficulties of the art, the more he dreads the uncertainty of success, and the more he is afraid of not fulfilling the expectation of his hearers. As for those who experience no embarrassment, and this is what I see in the great majority, not only do I blame their assurance, but I should wish that it were punished. I have often remarked in you an impression, which I myself also experience in pronouncing my exordium. I feel that I turn pale, my ideas become confused, and I tremble in all my members. One day, even, when I appeared as accuser in my early youth, I was so disconcerted in commencing my dis-

[1] This I have tried to do in my discourse on *Equality* (*Meditations Evangeliques*). A remarkable example is the exordium of the sermon of Bossuet, for the taking of the nun's habit by Madame de Vallière. (Cf. Maury, *Essai* x., *De l' Exorde.*)

Claude, however, disapproves of enthusiasm, poetical raptures, and impetuous emotions, in the exordium, since the hearers are neither yet in heaven, nor in the air, nor at all elevated in their way thither, but on earth, and in a place of worship; therefore the exordium must be *cool* and *grave*, but, at the same time, *engaging* and *agreeable*. Insensibly prepare and conduct your hearer to the subject-matter: If it be a sad subject, aim at imparting such a tone; if a profound mystery, try to diffuse elevation; if some terrible example of God's justice, endeavour to stir up fear. In a word, the exordium must always participate in the spirit of the subject, so as to dispose your hearers to it.—Ed.

course, that Q. Maximus, perceiving my confusion, deferred the cause to another day, and this service I shall never forget."[1]

We, too, lay down the same rule, but not as a rule of art. Outdoing Cicero, who would doubtless counsel to be modest through the whole of the discourse (*Quæ enim præcepta principiorum esse voluerunt, ea in totis orationibus sunt conservanda*),[2] we require, not that the exordium, but that the orator be modest; we even find it good that he should be timid; but with this distinction of Marmontel, that he must be timid in himself, bold in his cause.[3] The first kind of timidity is graceful, the second deprives the orator of respect, and destroys beforehand the effect of his arguments. Now, as we cannot be at once timid and bold, it is necessary that the boldness of the convinced Christian, should at least overcome the timidity of the man.[4]

III. Lastly, I demand for the exordium, perspicuity, precision, accuracy, purity of language and of style. I might say, in one word, perfection. The exordium, indeed, cannot be too unexceptionable with respect to the ideas, and the style. That is a dangerous moment for the orator, in which the hearer, not being yet interested in a lively manner, is master of the whole of his attention for the details, in which the orator has as yet done nothing, to entitle him to pardon for the slightest defects. "No part of a discourse," says Gaichiès, "demands so much precision, or so much polish as the exordium, none being listened to with greater coolness, or being more criticised." Be well assured, that the attentive hearer will not pardon you in the exordium, what he will pardon you in the body of the discourse, when once you shall have imparted to him your own warmth. Incorrectness, redundancy, exaggeration, want of precision, obscurity,—he will

[1] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book i., chap. xxvi.

[2] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book ii., chap. xix.

[3] Marmontel, *Eléments de Littérature*, vol. iii., p. 323.

[4] You must not compliment the people, praise yourself, nor indeed speak of yourself in any manner of way. Some interlard their exordiums with commonplace saws—the pleasure it gives them to be called to that pulpit—or an affectation of self-contempt—a confession of their weakness—or something of this kind. These are pedantic arts, bad in their effect, and contrary to the gravity of the pulpit, and the decency of a modest man. I do not disapprove of your asking for attention, either on account of the importance of the matter, the solemnity of the day, or the state of the church: but it must not be done often, for then it would never be minded; and when it is done, the fewer words the better.—Claude.—Ed.

remark all of them, and pardon none. Now, the first impression is often decisive, and always important. "The success of a discourse," says Gaichiès again, "often depends on the commencement; we do not easily recover from first impressions, whether good or bad." It is much more important to purge it from defects, than to adorn it with beauties.

Boileau has said: "that a faultless sonnet is worth a long poem."[1] We should be tempted to say as much of a faultless exordium.[2] But, nevertheless, we would not add that "this happy phœnix has yet to be found." There are exordiums which are at once beautiful, and unexceptionable.

The importance, and the difficulty of the exordium have made some persons think that it would be well, not to occupy themselves with this part of the composition, till after having written all the rest. This would not be our opinion. This procedure is not very natural. A good exordium prepares the orator, as well as the hearer. It is not with it, as with a preface, which adheres less intimately to the book, since it may very well exist, without a preface. We should rather adopt the idea of Cicero: "When I have thus taken all my measures," says he, "I set myself to seek, in the last place, what must, notwithstanding, commence my discourse, that is to say, my exordium; for, whenever I have wished to commence by studying it, I have found nothing but what is feeble, insignificant, common, and vulgar." In the following passage, Cicero tells us, on what his procedure was founded: "The orator must not seek the exordium in strange, or remote circumstances, but draw it from the very entrails of the cause. Let him, therefore, commence by sounding the cause, by examining it in all its extent, by finding and preparing all the topics he would make use of: he will then never think of the choice of an exordium, it will present itself of its own accord."[3]

[1] Boileau, *L'Art Poétique*, chant ii.

[2] It should be *simple*, not pompous, or high-flown; and yet not commonplace and trivial; nor arbitrarily introduced, but connected, not merely with a part, but with the *whole* matter of the text. Study and practice alone will teach how best to invent it.—See Claude *on Exordium*.—Ed.

[3] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book ii., chap. lxxvii. and lxxviii.

CHAPTER III.

DECLARATION OF THE DESIGN, AND ENUNCIATION OF THE PLAN.

After having founded the utility of the exordium upon the necessity of preparing the minds of the hearers, and of favourably disposing them for the special subject which we have in view, it is unnecessary to prove, that the subject ought to be announced. Let us only say, that it ought to be so in a precise manner, so that the mind may direct itself immediately, and without hesitation, towards a determinate point. We cannot, in this enunciation of the subject, make use of language too clear, and of terms too proper. This moment of the discourse admits neither periphrases, nor figures. We must, besides, restrict ourselves to a small number of words carefully chosen.

Is it necessary, besides, to enunciate the plan of the discourse? On this point, opinions are divided. Some would have us even not announce the general division.

[" An order is necessary," says Fénelon; " but such an order as is not promised, and disclosed, from the commencement of the discourse. Cicero says that it is almost always best to conceal it, and to lead the hearer to it imperceptibly. He even says in formal terms, for I remember them, that the orator ought to conceal even the number of his proofs, so that we cannot count them, though they are distinct in themselves, and that there ought to be no division of the discourse clearly marked out. But the rudeness of the last ages has gone so far, as not to know the order of a discourse unless he who delivers it gives notice of it from the commencement, and pauses at every point."[1]

" The harangues of these great men (Demosthenes and Cicero)," says the same author, " are not divided like the sermons of the present day. . . The Fathers of the Church knew not this rule. . . The practice of dividing sermons did not take place till a long time after; and it is a very modern invention which has come to us from the schools."[2]]

[Gaichiès, without being so absolute, inclines to the same

[1] Fénelon, *Dialogues sur l'Eloquence*, second dialogue. [2] *Ibid.*

opinion. "Cannot the preacher," says he, "free himself from the slavery of divisions? Is it necessary, that he always promise everything which he intends to give? The Fathers were not under this bondage. They proposed their subjects, and conducted their discourses to the end, without distinguishing their several parts."[1]]

[But the majority of the masters, several of whom are also models, and have experience on their side, incline to, or even declare themselves for the contrary procedure; they admit only as an exception that, which Fénelon would willingly make the rule.]

Hüffell, setting out from the fact, according to him, very general and well ascertained, that half the hearers, especially in the country, mistake the very subject of the discourse they hear, and only carry away from it accidental, and particular points of view, insists upon a procedure, the object of which is to keep them from the commencement in a certain line, to make them anticipate from one part to another what is to follow, and to prevent them from mistaking the cross-roads for the grand route.[2]

[Théremin expresses himself thus: "We may, at the end of the exordium, announce two or three parts[3] which include the whole development of the subject; for why should we not take advantage of this, as of every other occasion, to come to the aid of the hearer's attention, and to facilitate to him the conception of the whole? If his attention is called upon to make too great efforts, it either becomes altogether relaxed, or the only effect produced is upon the intelligence, and not upon the will, which is as unsatisfactory as if no effect had been produced at all. If

[1] Gaichiès, *Maximes sur le Ministère de la Chaire*, book ii., chap. v.

[2] Hüffell, *Uber das Wesen und den Beruf des evangelische-christlichen Geistlichen*, vol. i., p. 294.

[3] The parts of a sermon are generally *five*: 1. The exordium; 2. the connection or relation of your text to the foregoing or following verses; 3. the division; 4. the discussion; 5. the application; but as connection and division are parts which ought to be very short, there are properly but *three* parts, *the exordium*, *discussion*, and *application*. In the division there ought to be but a small number of parts, four or five at the most; it is better to have only two or three.—Claude.

There is no doubt that, in *composing* a sermon, there ought to be a distinction of parts. But in the *delivery* of a sermon, it is not always necessary formally to mention them. In most cases, perhaps, it is better to do so easily and naturally.—Ed.

this usage is not observed by the ancients, if they do not in general announce the division of their discourses, this may proceed from two causes. First, their course was more or less prescribed to them by the very occasion of their discourses, a state of things which seldom exists in the case of the pulpit orator; and as this course was almost the same in all causes, it seemed useless to announce it. In the second place, and this reason appears to me of capital importance, such a declaration of the plan which the orator proposed to follow, would have betrayed study and preparation, of which they avoided the appearance with as much care, as they took pains to give themselves the appearance of speaking extempore; for they had to do with a suspicious public, who would have attributed a preparation of this kind to an intention to deceive them. It is otherwise with the Christian orator, who may always suffer his honest design to be penetrated, from the discovery of which there can arise nothing in the mind of the hearer, but the expectation of instruction, so much the more profound. The pulpit orator may, nevertheless, in certain cases, have his reasons for not mentioning his plan. Let him, in that case, withhold it freely; for, doubtless, it is always necessary to *arrange* his thoughts in the manner that is most luminous, and most suitable to his object, but it is not always necessary to *declare* how we have arranged them."[1]]

Let us hear Ammon: "After the exordium comes the enunciation of the proposition and its principal parts. This is what is called the *partition*.[2] This rule admits of some restriction in analytical sermons. . . But in synthetical sermons, we must not depart from it: first, because the partition determines the point of view, from which the orator proposes to consider the proposition; secondly, because it is the best way of verifying the justness of the division; lastly, because, by help of the division, the hearer, being in possession of a view of the whole, more easily follows the development of the ideas, and more speedily finds again the thread of the discourse, when a moment of distraction has made him lose it. The orator who enunciates with

[1] Theremin, *Die Beredsamkeit ein Tugend*, p. 78.

[2] After the exordium follows the discussion, the clearness of which will much depend on "having no more heads than can be sufficiently amplified within the bounds of the discourse, so as to be rendered sensible to the hearers They should be quite distinct from one another, at the same time that they all concentre on the main point."—Fordyce, *Eloq. Pulp.*—Ed.

clearness and precision the theme of his discourse; who, at the head of each of the parts, further enunciates the secondary propositions which he wishes to bring out of it; who then develops them with care, and gives to each its due emphasis; this orator will be sure of being perfectly clear to his auditory, without marking, as some do, the number of each section of his discourse."[1]

We shall endeavour to sum up the discussion, while completing it by some considerations which are not found indicated in the passages we have quoted.

It is alleged in favour of partition: 1st, That the attention, and the interest of the hearer are more vividly excited, than by the simple enunciation of the subject (the partition is the complement of it: the plan is sometimes the true subject);—2d, That he is in less danger of misapprehending the subject, or of wavering between the principal idea, and the ideas that are accidental, or of simple development; 3d, That it assists the hearer to follow the train of the discourse, and to find it again, if a moment of distraction has made him wander from it; 4th, That it assists his memory, and helps him to retain the whole and the principal parts of the discourse.

It is affirmed on the other side:—

1st, That the partition is a modern invention; that the ancients did not practise it; that the fathers themselves made no use of it; that it comes to us from the schools.

This first consideration has, perhaps, more show than force: *a*. The ancients are not free from having sometimes practised, and recommended it.[2] *b*. If they have practised it less than

[1] Ammon, *Handbuch der Einleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit*, p. 273.

[2] "Recte habita in causa partitio illustrem et perspicuam totam efficit orationem. . . Ex qua conficitur, ut certas animo res teneat auditor, quibus dictis intelligat fore peroratum."—Cicero, *De Inventione*, book i., ch. xxii.

Quintilian only suppresses the partition for the cases in which the orator desires to take the judge by surprise, or unprepared; this suppression is, therefore, for him, only a stratagem. *Interim etiam fallendus est judex, ut aliud agi quam quod petimus, putet.* But this is only the exception:

"Opportune adhibita, partitio plurimum orationi lucis et gratiæ confert. Neque enim solum id efficit, ut clariora fiant quæ dicuntur, rebus velut ex turba extractis, et in conspectu judicum positis; sed reficit quoque audientem certo singularum partium fine, non aliter quam facientibus iter, multum detrahunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia. Nam et exhausti laboris nosse mensuram voluptati est, et hortatur ad reliqua fortius exsequenda, scire quantum supersit; nihil enim longum videri necesse est, in quo, quid ultimum sit, certum est."—Quintilian, book iv., ch. v.

pulpit orators have done, there are the reasons for it which Theremin indicates.

Let us, then, leave this first argument and consider the others.

2d, The other kinds of eloquence make no use of partition.

This is not absolutely true; but though it were, it might be replied: *a.* that, in general, they have to do with the most practised hearers; *b.* that the plan is most frequently ruled by the subject; *c.* that the didactic kind, which is that of the pulpit, may have rules peculiar to itself.

We will not, therefore, insist upon this second reason, which is only a presumption.

3d, The proofs ought to be distinct in themselves.[1] The articulations, well marked, are sufficient.

4th, We take away something from their force in announcing them, unless this announcement be as vague, as it is unnecessary. What would it serve to announce, that we are going to explain a duty, and to state its motives, or to set forth a truth, and state its consequences?

5th, In easing the memory, we connive at the indolence of the mind.—Would it not be much better to put the division at the end of the discourse, by way of recapitulation?

6th, In order to ease the memory, we commence by burdening it.

7th, In order to ease it, we are led to make symmetrical, artificial divisions, and to prefer external to internal order. It is the symmetry which fixes the division in the memory. If, on the contrary, we made no partition, we should be in a position that would oblige us to make greater efforts to give to the discourse sequence and cohesion. Would not the best ease for the memory be precisely that order, and that cohesion, in such a concatenation, that, the first link being lifted, the whole chain is lifted?[2]

[1] Take care of putting anything in the first part, which supposes the understanding of the second, or which obliges you to treat of the second, to make the first understood; for thus you will throw yourself into great confusion, and be obliged to use tedious repetitions. When your parts are too closely connected with each other, place the most detached first, and make that serve for a foundation to the explication of the second, and the second to the third; so that at the end the hearer may with a glance perceive, as it were, a finished building. —Claude.—Ed.

[2] We may very well retain the division, and not be much more advanced by it. "If the people," says Fénelon, "retain the division better than the rest, it

8th, What gives room for our thinking so, is the very argument of Hüffell in favour of partition. He speaks of the strange manner in which sermons are understood, especially in the country; but he forgets that these sermons, so ill-understood, are sermons properly and duly divided; for no others are preached.

9th, Some would confine themselves to announcing the general division of the discourse;[1] but in Hüffell's point of view, this is not sufficient; it is necessary to divide, also, each of the great parts. And this is, indeed, what Ammon demands.[2]

It appears to me that, in granting to these considerations all the weight that is due to them, they do not go so far as absolutely to command the suppression of the partition. The partition cannot supply the want of internal order, and the exact concatenation of the parts; but it may, in certain cases, aid the effect which is expected from a good construction of the oratorical discourse. I think this practice not so directly prejudicial to the hearer, as it is dangerous to the orator himself. I should wish that, while preserving it, he should do everything in his power to be enabled to do without it, and that the construction of his discourses should make it appear unnecessary. Besides, as to the employment of the partition, let him make a distinction between different subjects, and between different auditories. And, perhaps, he should not seek to get free from this form, till age and experience have matured his powers.

It is, without doubt, remarked, that since the time of Fénelon, and in spite of him, almost all orators have preserved the partition.

When we make a partition, I think that it must be confined to the enunciation of the general plan, rejecting a more detailed programme.

I would demand that this partition be clear,[3] and simple in the

is because that has been oftener repeated. Generally speaking, sensible and practical things are those which they retain best."—*Dialogues sur l'Eloquence*, 2d dialogue.

[1] See HÜFFELL, vol. i., p. 296.

[2] See the passage quoted, p. 272.

[3] To render a division agreeable, and easy to be remembered by the hearers, *reduce it to simple terms*. By a simple term I mean a *single word*. When the parts of a discourse are expressed in abundance of words, they are not only embarrassing, but also useless to the hearers, for they cannot retain them. As often as possible, *connect the parts of your division together*. As to subdivisions, it is necessary to *make* them; for they assist composition, and promote perspicuity; but it is not needful always to *mention* them.—CLAUDE.—ED.

expression. It may be useful to present, under several successive forms, the articles of the division; but there would be a mere puerility in multiplying, without necessity, these variations of one and the same idea.[1]

CHAPTER IV.

OF TRANSITIONS.

JUST as punctuation, in written discourses, serves at once to mark the intervals, and the relations of the thoughts to each other, transitions have two opposite ends—the one, to distinguish; the other, to unite. They are a kind of punctuation on a large scale.

The ideal of a well-constructed discourse might be found in the human body, in which the articulations are only a flexion of the members, and occupy no space except as a turning-joint, or a hinge. A discourse would correspond to its ideal, though the paragraphs should issue from one another by a true necessity, by the procedure of a true generation, so that each paragraph contained the germ or the reason of the following. The conclusion of one paragraph might be the exordium of that which followed, whilst there would be nothing between the two, just as there would be nothing between the stones of a wall, cut in such a manner, as exactly to fit when placed one above another. "Stones well cut," says Gaichiès, "are united without cement." This image is from Cicero.

But this is the ideal, and, consequently, the exception. We know, almost, no oratorical masterpiece, and, least of all, in pulpit eloquence, which absolutely realises this idea. The cement is often necessary. We must often, if the discourse is to have continuity, throw in, between two ideas, an intermediate idea,—I mean, an idea common to the antecedent and to the subsequent. It is those intermediate ideas that we call *ideas of transition*, or, simply, *transitions*.

It is, certainly, much better to make use of them, than to leave

[1] See the partition of Bourdaloue's sermon on the *Fausse conscience*, criticised by ROQUES, in the *Pasteur Evangélique*, p. 406.

between two ideas a chasm which, it is almost certain, the hearer will not fill up.

The transitions have the advantage of preserving the continuity of the movement, and of suppressing those irksome moments in which the mind, not knowing what to do, is distracted, and dissipated.

When they are good, they aid the memory in retaining the sequence of the discourse. The striking manner in which two ideas have sometimes been connected, is itself an idea which conveys and represents the two others.

Such are the advantages of transitions. But the art of transition—an art almost imperceptible—is not an art without difficulty. *In tenui labor.* Boileau knew it well, when he said that La Bruyère had avoided the greatest difficulty, in sparing himself the trouble of the transitions. It is this art of transitions which connoisseurs admire in the *Histoire des Variations.*[1] A transitional idea of any sort is not difficult to find; but a transition of any sort, is not much better than a chasm, or a breaking of continuity. A good transition combines several qualities.

It should be as simple, and as short as possible, having nothing harsh and abrupt. It is, as it were, a turn of a wall or stream, not an angle, and an elbow; but this turn should not be a winding. It is not a discourse inserted within the discourse. The subsidiary idea must not efface the principal ones.

It would still efface them, whatever might be its brevity, if the idea which serves as a connection, was as marked as each of the ideas which it is intended to connect; if the thread of the discourse at this place was as strong, and as thick, as before and after. It is then no longer a transition, but a digression.

It is, nevertheless, necessary that the transitions should be interesting, strong, and free: *interesting*, in presenting an idea or a relation which is in itself worthy of attention;—*strong*, in connecting one passage with another, not by an accident of the discourse, by a chance of the language, or by a word; it may connect them, I grant, by the extremity of the idea, but not by the extremity of the sentence; not by a narrow side of the antecedent idea, but by one of its largest fronts; the full face, and

[1] Transitions of Delille, the *buts* (*mais*), and *howevers* (*cependants*); are not much better than the *ands*, that is, mere numbers. There are in the *Pitié*, it is said, seventy-six transitions affected by the word *mais*.

not the profile; *free*, consequently; and not, as in Bourdaloue, and in Massillon, due to something arranged by chance. Demosthenes rather dispenses with transition.[1]

When we can, we must effect the transition by means of an idea, which is a sentiment or emotion of the soul.[2]

Transitions are the more graceful, the more they appear to be sincere; and they doubtless appear to be more sincere, the more they are really so. Shall we go further, and say that they ought not merely to be sincere, but natural *(naïve)*, that is to say, involuntary and purely objective? We will not go so far, we will only demand that the connection between the two ideas, or the two arguments, shall have been created without effort, and without artifice, and have sprung from attentive consideration of the ideas which require to be connected. In reality, the great masters make only natural transitions, or they make none.

It is needless to add, that transition may in no case be employed to give the appearance of order to disorder.[3]

[In indicating the sources, or aims of transition, we do not forget that we are speaking of ideas which do not engender one another; this is the transition *par excellence*, or that which dispenses with all transition. These aims may consist in the heightening of the idea, or the indication of a new degree of intensity, or of an extension of the idea;—in the confirmation of the preceding idea by that which follows;—in the distinction, the opposition, or the subordination of two ideas:—in an objection;—or, in fine, in the confession of the insufficiency of the argument in a given case.]

[1] See the oration *Pro Corona;* see, also, the manner in which he passes from the defence of his conduct, to a series of recriminations against Æschines.

[2] See Bossuet, in the *Oraison Funèbre de la Duchesse d'Orleans:* "*La grandeur et la gloire!* . . . ."

[3] [Maury, in his *Eloquence de la Chaire*, gives very good precepts, and very bad examples, on transitions.]

CHAPTER V.

OF THE PERORATION.

The peroration, whatever may be the form of it, is a discourse added to the end of the discourse, as the exordium is to the commencement,—and drawn, just as the exordium, from an idea lying near to the subject, in such a manner that the peroration has its place after the subject has been completely discussed, in the same manner as the exordium has its place before the subject has been entered upon. Hence we understand that a portion of what we have said of the exordium, is of itself applicable to the peroration; we also understand that the peroration being, in some sort, from the place which it occupies, the reverse of the exordium, we must, in order to treat it properly, adopt rules which, in certain respects, are the reverse of those of the exordium.—If I wished, according to the custom of intelligent men, to include the whole theory of the peroration in a few words, I would cite those of Quintilian; whoever shall comprehend them, will know perfectly what is a peroration: *Quæ plerumque sunt proœmio similia, sed liberiora, plenioraque.*[1]

Let us not confine ourselves to the comparison just indicated, but let us consider the peroration in itself.

All the discourses from the pulpit may be referred to two kinds; the doctrinal discourse, and the moral discourse, the fact and the law.

All have the common characteristic of impelling to action.

The moral discourse impels to it immediately. It is its very end, and this end appears from the first. It establishes, or supposes the necessity of an action. It treats of this very action, and of nothing else.

The doctrinal discourse likewise impels to it, but not immediately; and it does so in a manner so distinct from that of the moral discourse, that the orator cannot dispense with the necessity of pressing the consequences of the truths which he has just expounded.

Everything being well considered, these two kinds enter into

[1] Quintilian, book vi., chap. i.

each other, and only differ in the proportion of the two elements; we always ascend from law to fact, or descend from fact to law: otherwise the discourse is not complete.

If, after having completed your design, you feel no necessity of adding anything more, add nothing: it is probable you have made a peroration without suspecting it. Massillon has shown both judgment and taste in reducing to a very simple conclusion, of only a few lines, the peroration of his discourse on *The Death of the Sinner and the Death of the Righteous.*[1] In certain cases the peroration may very properly not be distinct from the discourse. It is the last inference in the doctrinal discourse; in the moral discourse, the last argument, or the last means.

With Reinhard, the last article of the division usually furnishes the peroration. Let us cite an example of it. The subject is curiosity; the discourse treats of the inconveniences of that disposition, and the means of combating it. The first of these means is an activity inspired and regulated by duty; the second, the constant endeavour after the best possible accomplishment of the duty which is laid upon us; the third consists in cherishing daily within us the thoughts, the resolutions, and the expectations which we ought to have as Christians. Approaching this last idea, the orator exclaims: "No, our mind cannot degrade itself to the miserable pre-occupations of curiosity, if it nourish itself every day with the sublime contemplations of which Christianity furnishes the subject, if every day it revive them within itself, and cultivate the remembrance of God, and of Jesus Christ. Our heart cannot debase itself in the contemptible enjoyments of curiosity, if every day it recollect, to what it has been called in Jesus Christ, how sublime, how sacred are the duties it has to fulfil, and all that it must become here below, in order to be glorified in the image of God, and of Jesus Christ. Our spirit cannot forget itself, beside the perishable objects of mundane curiosity, if it daily recollect that it is on the road to eternity, that it requires many things to be ready to appear on the threshold of this dreadful eternity, and that it is perhaps nearer to it than it thinks,—that eternity is perhaps just about to open for it. Oh! in this respect, also, my brethren, may God make us feel the power of the Gospel of Jesus; may He, by this Gospel, purify, strengthen, elevate your mind, and

[1] Vol. i., p. 22, edition Lefèvre.

give you that seriousness, that wisdom, and that dignity which should distinguish the disciples of His Son! To Him, as well as to His Son and Holy Spirit, be honour to all eternity. Amen."[1]

In this manner, the last article of the sermon, that is to say, a passage which forms an integral part of the discourse, may hold the place of a peroration. But this, far from excluding the peroration, implies the idea of it, supposes the necessity of it. When we say that something may perform the office of a peroration, we even thereby affirm, that the peroration should not be wanting to an oratorical discourse, and the question is only of the form.

The custom of terminating the discourse by a peroration, has therefore some grounds on which it is founded. Let us ascertain what they are.

The first reason is, that we may not finish abruptly, just as the reason for the exordium is, that we may not commence abruptly; just as, before entering upon the subject, we felt the necessity of recollecting ourselves, we feel this necessity in finishing. Now, to recollect ourselves, is to pause over the whole of the impression produced by the discourse, or over an idea as general as that of the discourse, or more general, instead of resting upon the particular idea with which the orator finished. It is a height to which we ascend, in order to embrace from thence the whole of the work.

Another want which we feel, is that of bringing together the different instructions we have received, of combining them within a smaller space, so that they may present themselves, as a whole, to the thought.

Another want still, is that of rising with all the thoughts of the discourse, as with one single thought, towards Him who is the first and the last object of this and of all preaching, either in supplication or in thanksgiving.[2]

These different wants, unless they have been satisfied in the last lines which have exhausted the matter of the exposition or discussion, secretly excite uneasiness in the mind of the hearer, in proportion to the interest he has felt in the discourse. But

[1] See *Sermons pour l'année* 1769, sermon xviii., p. 372.

[2] Care is needed lest our minds be so taken up with the mechanism of the sermon, as to forget that which alone can infuse life into it. We may produce a skeleton clothed with flesh, and exhibiting the most exact proportion of parts; yet still it may be without the quickening breath of heaven. Spirituality of mind will be most helpful both in the composition and delivery of our discourses.—Bridges, *Chr. Min.*—Ed.

whether he feel it or not, the orator should desire to leave the hearer under the impression most favourable for the cause he has been defending, and what he shall add with this view, will no more be a digression, than the exordium. Now, in indicating the different wants which the hearer may feel at the end of the discourse, properly so called, we have already indicated the different forms of peroration.

There is the summary, which reduces to a small number of ideas, or even to a single one, the ideas of which the discourse is composed. It is, as it were, a burning focus into which all the rays are concentrated. All the ideas of the discourse may also be summed up in a sentiment.—It may be further an idea more general than that of the discourse, an idea which enlarges the horizon, without losing sight of the object, but, on the contrary, always recalling it. In fine, it may be a new argument which presents the truth in a form lively, concise, and unexpected.[1]

There is the recapitulation,[2] a species of partition after all is done, the parts of which, being already known, no longer present themselves, as in the division properly so called, under an abstract, vague, and incorporeal form. These elements have taken body in the discourse, and having been brought together, and compressed in the peroration, forming a bundle, clothed as much as possible in new expressions, presenting themselves with the calm and confident attitude of proved truths, which have only to be exhibited, they may form a peroration not only useful, but much more oratorical than Maury supposes.[3]

There is the application or practical conclusion. It appears strange to make this a form of the peroration, since a discourse is only oratorical and Christian, in so far as it is applicative. But one understands, that, even after a discourse of this character, there is something more to be done, in order to adapt to the hearers, in a more sensible and direct manner, the truths they have just heard. This may be done by an interrogation of the conscience, by reproaches, or by exhortations, by promises, or by

[1] See the peroration of the *Plaidoyer pour Louis XVI.*, by LALLY-TOLLENDAL. (*Chefs-d'œuvre de l'Eloquence Francaise.* BARREAU, p. 200.)

[2] "It is often appropriate to make at the end a recapitulation, which collects in a few words all the force of the orator, and which sets before the eyes of the hearer, all the most persuasive things he has uttered."—FENELON, *Dialogues sur l'Eloquence*, second dialogue.

[3] MAURY, *Essai sur l'Eloquence de la Chaire*, lxxvi., *De la Péroraison.*

threatenings. I should wish that the application did something more than reproduce identically the idea of the sermon; that it should present it under a new form, a new aspect, in such a manner that this species of peroration should blend itself with the first species of which I have spoken.

Besides, if you look closely into it, you will see that every peroration is an application,[1] and that you cannot even conceive a peroration which is not an application, I mean, one in which you do not come close to the hearer, to make him lay more deeply to heart the truths which he has just heard.

The application may, from being general, become special, that is, refer to actual circumstances, or divide itself among different classes of hearers, to each of whom it accommodates the truths or the principal truth of the discourse; the rich and the poor, the young and the old, the converted and the unconverted. There are preachers in whose discourses this last distinction is never wanting. In reality, it is inevitable, and it has a place, by implication at least, in all sermons.[2] The edge of evangelical truth, would, of itself alone, make this division, though we wished to avoid making it. The Gospel separates the man into two men, the life into two lives, the mutual limits of which are marked by conversion. The pulpit instructs the one in certain principles,

[1] "We must preach *to* our people, as well as *before* them."—Bridges. "The doctrine of the sermon requires wisdom—the application, earnestness. The one needs a clear head—the other a warm heart. The discussion of our subjects must be in a straight line. Considerable latitude is allowed in the application. Here is afforded the opportunity of bringing home to the conscience many things which, in the progress of the sermon, were perhaps delivered in the abstract."—Blair, *Lect.* Alleine, in the close of his applicatory part, according to Burnet, with much holy-taking rhetoric, used to expostulate the case with impenitent sinners, vehemently urging them to come to some good resolve before he and they parted, and to make their choice, either for life or death.—Ed.

[2] "The conscience of the audience should feel the hand of the preacher searching it, and every individual know where to class himself."—Hall, *Serm.* "An undistinguishing way of preaching is 'casting that which is holy to the dogs:' it tends most directly to stupify the consciences of the ungodly, and 'strengthen their hands that they should not return from their evil way;' and, in proporvion, it discourages the heart of the humble believer."—Scott. Comp. Jer. xxiii. 14, with Ezek. xiii. 22. "Labour to distinguish clearly upon experiences and affections in religion, that you may make a difference between the gold and the shining dross, if you would be an useful minister of Christ."—Brainerd. "Animorum morbos, et diversam auditorum rationem, ut nosse difficile est; ita convenientia omnibus et singulis remedia ex verbi Divini Pharmacopolio depromere, eaque feliciter applicare, quanti laboris, quantæ spiritualis prudentiæ res est!"—Zepper. See Matt. xxiv. 45.—Ed.

and demands from the other the consequences of those principles which they have already adopted. It would fail of its object, it would not fulfil its commission, if it should not bring out forcibly this capital difference in all its instructions, and if it should have the appearance of wishing to gather something better than wild fruits from the tree which has not been grafted. For the act of the Gospel, its distinctive feature, is that it engrafts Divine sentiments on a human nature. This implies much; but it is in general much better to oblige the hearers to class themselves, than to enunciate this classification. Besides, though one can only be without or within, and though it would be disastrous to make people dream of I know not what chimerical intermediate state, we must not pretend not to know that there are shades, and degrees; that among those that are without, some are more, others less eager for salvation, and that among those who are within, some are more, some less faithful to the grace they have received. Let us not lightly say on what conditions one is within or without, or rather, by what signs a man may know if another man is within or without. But the form cannot take away the substance, nor the abuse condemn the use. The application of the sermon may therefore be subdivided or divided; but if we think it necessary, ordinarily, to introduce into the application the classification in question, I should wish that the variety of the form should render the return of it less monotonous, or should even disguise it.

Lastly, there is prayer, which is not so much a species as a form of peroration, or even, if we may so express it, the peroration of the peroration, the conclusion of the conclusion. At all events, it is very necessary that we should finish with a prayer, or a devout wish.

Such peroration may present at once all these characters, recapitulation, summary, prayer, and application; as that of the sermon *Consummatum est* of Massillon.[1]

In whatever manner we finish, it is a difficult thing to finish well, and more rare, I think, than to commence well. We naturally bestow more care and attention in order to make a good commencement. Some idea suitable for an exordium presents itself to every preacher; the subject, the text furnishes it. It is more difficult to conclude well, when it seems, on the one hand,

[1] Vol. i., p. 532, edition Lefèvre.

that we have said everything, that we find ourselves, so to speak, with nothing before us, and that, notwithstanding, we feel the necessity of saying something more. We are fatigued, exhausted; we dread a new effort, and we get off from the peroration by some hackneyed phrases in the shape of exhortation or of wishes, by some exclamations, by some passages of Scripture put one after another. To finish well, is, however, an essential part of the art; it is at least of as much importance to make sure of the last impressions as of the first,[1] to which the hearer may return; the conqueror is he who remains master of the field of battle. I shall not here apply the proverb: "All is well that ends well," for a fine peroration cannot compensate for a bad discourse. The loss is irreparable, and the peroration drawing its force and its beauty from its connection with the discourse, we cannot conceive it either beautiful or good apart from this connection; but supposing the discourse such as it ought to be, it is of importance that the end should correspond to it, and consolidate the effect which has already been produced. In order to this, in the peroration:—

1st, We must not introduce a new subject. I say a *subject*, and I do not call a new subject, the general idea into which the particular idea or subject of the discourse is expanded and magnified—the new idea in which that particular idea is renovated.

2d, We must treat of a very distinct idea. No vague effusions. I wish, indeed, the channel of the river to be enlarged, but the river to arrive at the sea, still entire and recognisable.

3d, We must follow closely the idea of the discourse to the conclusion, even when we seem to throw ourselves into a more general one.[2]—It is interesting to see the same rule observed by poets, who do not pique themselves upon a didactic order. (See J. B. Rousseau, *Ode au comte de Luc.*)

I give no other rules. I shall not say: Endeavour that your peroration may be full of the loftiest ideas, of the most lively sentiments, of the most striking images, of the boldest movements. If all this is authorised and favoured by the very nature

[1] Sallust says, "Mortales semper postrema meminere."—Ed.

[2] Bossuet, however, attaches the peroration of his sermon on *Final Impenitence* to this idea, that the worldling arrives at the greatest misery without assistance.

of the peroration, all this cannot strictly be the object of a rule. I grant, indeed, that if we feel ourselves obliged to show as much timidity after, as before, the proof, there is an appearance of our having gained little ground.[1] I grant, that, if it can never be becoming to sound a flourish, at least a firmer tone, and loftier pretensions are lawful at this stage; the peroration is the mouth by which the discourse empties itself, as the exordium is the source from which it flows; and the stream at its mouth is larger, fuller, stronger than at its source. I grant, further, that the hearer, heated by the course, readily falls in with language rich and exciting. But once more, all this does not form matter for a rule. I will rather say: Let the peroration be, what it can be. It is not a separate and independent discourse, it is the result of the discourse, and is only truly beautiful by its relation and proportion to it. We must be authorised by the tenor of the discourse; by the situation in which we feel we have placed the hearer, to give to the peroration the bold, sparkling, or passionate character of which we have just spoken. If there remains anything urgent to be said, let us say it; but often there remains nothing more, than to concentrate the minds of the hearers upon a calm and solemn view of the subject, or into a devout wish. Often the peroration will, quite appropriately, be of a less elevated and less vehement tone than what precedes. Here again the rhetoric of the ancients cannot, in all respects, serve us for a guide and model. "We may recommend the observation of this short precept: Let the orator consider all the means of aiding his cause; and when he shall have seen all that it includes, or appears to include, that is contrary or favourable, that is odious or calculated to excite pity, then let him say what, if he were the judge, would make the most impression upon him."[2] Truly, after such rules of rhetoric, the judges were warned, and must have been upon their guard. That *cumulus* of which Quintilian speaks,[3] as if the peroration was intended to carry to the highest pitch, all the impressions produced by the discourse, is not necessarily the characteristic of the peroration.[4] Above

[1] Compare the exordium *Pro Corona* with the peroration of the same discourse.

[2] QUINTILIAN, book vi., chap. i. [3] Ibid.

[4] See the peroration of the speech of Cicero, *Pro Ligario*.

Claude, however, says, The conclusion, or peroration, ought to be lively and animating, full of beautiful figures, aiming to move Christian affections—as

all, it is not the essential, and constant characteristic of the peroration, or epilogue of the sermon; the sermon may very suitably end in a very different manner.—Observe the generally moderate, and calm perorations of the great masters in pulpit oratory.[1] One might compare them to a river, the waves of which, almost, and altogether sure of arriving, at the sea, flow more slowly near the mouth, and only present to the eye a sheet of water, the movement of which is almost imperceptible.[2]

Moreover, it is easier to cite, detaching them from the discourses to which they belong, examples of exordiums, than examples of perorations. To judge of an exordium, it is sufficient to know the subject; to judge correctly of a peroration, it would be necessary to have seen the whole discourse, because the beauty of the peroration is especially a beauty of connection, and chiefly resides in the suitableness of this conclusion to the discourse. It is especially on the subject of the peroration, that it is proper to recollect these excellent words of Cicero: "To be eloquent, we must be able to bear the yoke of decorum. We shall then say everything, as it ought to be said; we shall not meagrely treat a rich subject; we shall not render a great one mean, neither shall we do the reverse; but the discourse will be in connection and in harmony with the subject."[3] "Wisdom (good taste) is therefore the foundation of eloquence, as of everything else. But nothing is more difficult in oratory, as well as in life, than to know what is becoming."[4]

the love of God, hope, zeal, repentance, prayer, and such like. It should be diversified, *i.e.*, not be content to move one single Christian passion, but many. It ought to be composed of at least four or five reflections, naturally arising from the text: these must be placed in prudent order, so that the weakest may be first, and the strongest last, and so that the discourse may become more rapid as it runs. It would be faulty, however, to finish with motives too violent, as horror, indignation, or heavy censure: it would be much better to close with a tender, or even elevating motive. The conclusion need not be so chaste or regular as the body of the sermon, where more accuracy is required; the preacher may give himself up to the fire of his genius, provided he say nothing extravagant, capricious, or savouring of enthusiasm or declamation.—Ed.

[1] See the *Oraisons Funèbres* of Bossuet, edition of M. Villemain, the end of the first, p. 51, and the remark of the Abbé de Vauxcelles.

[2] In the *Oraison Funèbre de Turenne*, by Flechier, the peroration, after a wholly pathetic discourse, is very much what it ought to be. Likewise, in an opposite kind, that of the sermon of the Abbé Poulle on *Alms*. But it is necessary to observe especially that of the *Oraison Funèbre de Condé*, by Bossuet.

[3] Cicero, *Orator*, chap. xxxvi. [4] Ibid., chap. xxi.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FORM OF THE PULPIT DISCOURSE.

Supposing that no sermon had ever been made, what form would come forth from the precepts which we have given? Would it be precisely some one of the existing forms? Before all comparison of our theory with those forms, we may boldly answer: No. For the pure theory, or, if you will, the abstract idea, and the essential nature of an object, do not determine the form, to the exclusion of every other cause. The times, the places, the circumstances concur to this end; there is history in the form of every work of art, by which I mean, not only a correspondence of this form with the contemporaneous circumstances, but the influence of tradition, and of ancient examples: an influence much more perceptible, and more durable in kinds of oratory in which passion and actuality have less place. Passion, and an actual, palpable interest, exclude in some sort, the arbitrary and the stereotyped; passion and actuality cannot be stereotyped. The bar and the tribune may suffer arbitrary forms to be imposed upon them, but they are not long in shaking them off. These preservatives [passion and actual interest] might seem capable, in the eloquence of the pulpit, of having their place supplied, the one by the immensity of the interest which is its subject, the other by its majestic immutability and its universality; but no: there is nothing that compensates for the want of them, and the spirit, the fashion, or the tradition, which is a fashion in things of this nature, have, and will always have, in this species of oratory, more power than in the others: amusement will occupy more place there, where there ought to be less of it, and the forms of preaching, we may count upon it, will become more frivolous than those of the bar, or of the tribune.—In speaking of frivolity, I speak of pedantry, which is only a grave frivolity.

Our theory, therefore, presents the conditions of an ideal discourse, the forms of which answer only to the end of eloquence, and of Christian eloquence. It supposes no more particular form, it takes into account no convention. It does not teach to make

a sermon in the historical sense of the word; but it teaches to speak to an assembly of Christians of the truths of salvation, in the manner that experience and the study of human nature have discovered to be the most proper for persuading them of every kind of truth. This theory does not sketch before our eyes a particular figure—a species of portrait of the pulpit discourse; each subject,—each want experienced,—each circumstance will give it the form which it ought to have.

Though we have spoken of the exordium and of the peroration, we have not borrowed the idea of them from the ordinary practice of eloquence, but from its very nature,—from its necessities. Doubtless, the exordium and the peroration are not less reasonable, than the division of tragedy into five acts:—

> Neve minor, neu sit quinto productior actu
> Fabula.[1]

We have spoken, as if there were no sermons. We cannot, however, pretend that we forget them—that we keep them out of view, and that we create for ourselves a form absolutely according to the theory. We hold it impossible that, at each epoch, a certain form should not obtain the preference. This form had, perhaps, its reasons and its truth; gradually people lose sight of these reasons—they cease to have knowledge from this form—the exterior alone remains.

The inverse may happen, that is to say, a form not very reasonable may be corrected by use. Such has been the case with the preaching that dates from the scholastic and the middle ages. It was to Bourdaloue and Massillon, what the system of the classical unities was to Corneille and Racine. Men of genius, and excellent methods, do not meet together in the same epochs; the methods are wanting to the men, and the men are wanting to the methods. Would it not be the same with institutions, which are also methods? The form of preaching has been gradually ameliorated, though we can point out, in the interval, no revolutionary genius, by whom it has been overturned and renovated.[2] Nevertheless, there has remained something of the ancient method. In the greater or less variety which different individualities may impress upon it, there is, notwithstanding, a general type, which reproduces, while it modifies, the form of the seventeenth cen-

[1] Horace, *Art Poet.*, ver. 189, 190.

[2] It is mediocrity that corrects—it performs the office of an editor.

tury (not that of the reformed preachers of the first half of that century).

The principle of enumerations, and of distinctions, had become dominant; the parallelism of the parts was preferred to the order in which they succeeded and sprung from each other; the logical, to the psychological method. Symmetry prevailed over internal order, and preaching bore an impress of the old system of the schools, and of a superannuated rhetoric.[1]

Here it is necessary to distinguish the use from the abuse. The use is not only lawful, but often necessary.

But when we have made a *genus* of this form, at what have we arrived? At arbitrary divisions, at least such as are little philosophical, and as science would never have furnished, at symmetrical plans—at the substitution of external, for internal order.

Moreover, superior minds had protested. La Bruyère had said: "It seems to me that a preacher ought, in each discourse, to make choice of a truth, unique but capital, terrible or instructive; the manner full and exhaustive; abandoning all those divisions so far-fetched, so hackneyed, so often handled, and so minutely distinctive."[2]

These abuses have also given occasion to the complaints of Fénelon.[3] In combating them, it seems to us, he ought to have avoided the word *division*, since, in one sense, at least, every discourse is divided. His practice elucidates his theory. It was always faithful to it, if we may judge of it by the two principal sermons he has left us. It is thirty-four years since he wrote that on the *Epiphany*, and sixty-three, that for the *Consecration of the Elector of Cologne.*

To speak only of the first, nothing is parallel in it—all is successive; that is, to speak accurately, the successive predominates, since, without the parallelism, there would be only indications of ideas—no developments. It is a river which, from time to time,

[1] See Bourdaloue on *Passion.* But the ideal of the *genus* is realized in the sermon of Massillon on the *Consummatum Est:* the three parts are parallel; then in each part, the subdivisions, are parallel to each other.—Observe, also, that other parallelism of the recital, of the application, and of the exhortation. There is hardly any gradation in this discourse, and further, the gradation is not the logical succession, still less the logical genesis.

[2] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. xv., *De la Chaire.*

[3] Fenelon, *Dialogue sur l'Eloquence*, second dialogue, towards the end, in the article in which he combats the use of divisions.—See the quotations from Fénelon, p. 270.

expands and slackens its course, but which is always one, and always flowing. The following is the division :—

"But I feel my heart moved within me, and divided between joy and grief. The ministry of these apostolic men (the missionaries), and the calling of these people, is the triumph of religion ; but it is, perhaps also, the effect of a secret reprobation which hangs over our heads. Will it be upon our ruins that these people shall be exalted, as the Gentiles were exalted upon those of the Jews, at the birth of the Church? This is a work which God is doing to glorify His Gospel; but is it not also to transfer it? We must cease to love the Lord Jesus Christ, if we would cease to love His work; but we must forget ourselves, if we would not tremble at it. Let us, therefore, rejoice in the Lord, my brethren, in the Lord who giveth glory to His name : but let us rejoice with trembling. Such are the two thoughts which will fill this discourse."[1]

There are many discourses upon this model in Bossuet. First of all, his orations. He proceeds, in this manner, when he can. He loves, like Fénelon, this dichotomy; and, in my opinion, the divisions into two parts are in general the most beautiful.

What we shall say is not: Choose such or such a form. There is none pre-existent to the work, and to the end of preaching: the form of the sermon should proceed from its end. "It is the spirit which creates the body."[2] But it is to take up a false point of view to say : "What shall I find to say upon this subject? What will this subject give me to say? How shall I fill up this void? How, by dividing and subdividing, shall I succeed in filling my frame?" It is true, I grant, that the art of properly dividing and subdividing is the very art of oratorical development, and the means of instructing. But we must say to ourselves: How shall I serve my subject? (and not: How shall I make use of my subject?) How shall I establish—how shall I recommend the truth? To the constant tendency of a form to take the place of first importance, we must oppose a careful effort to free ourselves from every other pre-occupation, but that of our subject, and of our end. There is nothing but the lively senti-

[1] Fenelon, *Sermon sur l'Epiphanie.*—Here should find place an analysis of the second part of the discourse; but this analysis has not been found, and seems not to have been written.—*Editors.*

[2] "Der Geist ist's der den Kœrper schafft."

ment of the real, and the actual, which can warrant us against formality. The golden rule is, to consider the sermon as a means, and not as an end. To consider it as an end, is a point of view false, frivolous, and barren.[1]

Nothing would, doubtless, be more false, nothing more unworthy of the seriousness of the pulpit, than to seek innovation for the sake of innovation, and independence for the sake of independence. But must it be thought necessary, on that account, not to pay more regard to our subject and to our end than to some consecrated form,[2] and to allow ourselves to be pre-occupied by the latter? Whatever abuse may be made of the word individuality, I feel myself bound to recommend to the orator to be individual; which does not signify, to withdraw ourselves from the general laws, the forgetfulness of which would place us out of the condition of human converse, but to discharge our mission by being intelligent and responsible, and by making account of the particular manner in which we are affected by the truth. Does not the liquid necessarily take the form of the vase into which it has been poured, and does this form at all alter the nature of the liquid? Without individuality, there is no truth. In art as in religion, the objectivity, *i.e.* the objective truth, has for its condition, naturalness (*naïveté*), and naturalness has no place without individuality. When we renounce ourselves in favour of a third party, that is to say, of a model or of a conventional type, what does the truth gain by it? We must, therefore, place ourselves in front of our subject, submit ourselves to its influence, receive from it our law, owe to it our form; and, although profiting by models, accept no other form than that which shall be impressed on our work by the laws of good sense, and the knowledge of human nature. It is evident, indeed, that individuality finds its employment in the structure of the discourse, as well as in all the rest of it.

Theremin fixes this law very high, of which he, in a manner, makes a duty: "In penetrating deeper into the life of faith (or of living faith) which should express itself in the sermon, we are

[1] See Note from Bridges' *Chr. Min.*, on p. 281, above.—Ed.

[2] Somewhat similar to Horace's complaint of the slavish admiration of antiquity, to the exclusion of all modern effort, Ep. ii. 1—

"Indignum quidquam reprehendi, non quia crassè
Compositum illepidève putetur, sed quia nuper."

—Ed.

conducted to the following results regarding the nature of the sermon: The life of faith, in each of those who really live this life, and who do not content themselves, in this respect, with the imitation of a foreign type, is a life quite individual (peculiar to him who is animated by it), which may resemble that of some other individual, but cannot absolutely blend itself with it. This seal, which is peculiar to it, it will be able and ought to impress upon everything that comes from it, upon the ordinary discourse, the conduct, the actions, and, consequently, upon the preaching,[1] which is an action. In this point of view, we may well be astonished that preaching, amongst us, appears chained, as it were, to a form so little varied. A preacher, who is commencing, will doubtless do well to adopt, among the existing forms, that which best corresponds to himself; but we must expect that, in proportion as his internal life shall develop itself with more force, he will break this first form, and will create himself a new one for every new degree at which he shall have arrived. Traditional rules, which are often nothing but narrow and restrictive prejudices, must not stop the preacher here; for there is no pre-existent form which is destined to serve as a model of preaching; but each sermon brings, in its subject, the measure according to which it ought to be judged. Let us, therefore, regard it as a cheering symptom of the present epoch, that distinguished preachers strike out a path for themselves; and that men of consummate experience, such as Tholuck and Harms, give directions, the general sense of which results in setting more at liberty the personality of the preacher. I shall, therefore, willingly render justice to what is new in the existing form of preaching; in so far, at least, as this novelty proceeds from that life of faith of which I have spoken, and not from an ill-regulated imagination, or from the desire of producing a sensation. Only let us be

[1] Hence appears the error of Addison, *Spect.* 106, who recommends the use by the clergyman to borrow the sermons of the best divines, and merely "endeavour after a handsome elocution." G. Herbert well says, "Every man's own is fittest, readiest, and most savoury to him." How can the minister expect the Divine blessing, if he neglects to "stir up the gift that is *in him?*" Until he is "apt to teach" (2 Tim. ii. 24), and "able to go without crutches, and work without patterns," as Burnet terms it, he ought to remain a layman. What is a man's own, gathered by observation and experience, and delivered in faith, though not according to the rules of art, and of inferior quality, will come forth fresher, and will be more likely to have the seal of God's approval, than the borrowed fruits of another man's toil.—Ed.

careful to add, that the ancient form must not, on that account, be thrust aside as absolutely obsolete; it is according to that form that pious souls are accustomed to think; and for souls of the same kind, and at the same degree of advancement, the same form may still serve.

"These principles may suggest to us an equitable judgment on the form of preaching which is most usually practised amongst us. It is that which divides into two, three, or even four parts, the theme drawn from the text, and successively develops all those parts. We cannot deny, it seems to me, that this manner of constructing the discourse has great advantages, since it not only favours, but imperiously demands, a complete and thorough elaboration of the subject, and a luminous arrangement of the ideas; and since it furnishes to the mind of the hearer, so prone to languor, and disposed to wander, a thread, by means of which it can always recover itself. But, doubtless, it has also its inconveniences. While making an idea pass successively through the theme, its divisions, and subdivisions, we are in danger of making it lose something of the force, and the freshness, with which it at first presented itself to our minds. In order to present symmetrically the two, three, or four parts, we may possibly omit, in one, something important,—introduce into another something insignificant. Several times in succession, that is to say in each part, we commence anew, reascending to the idea to redescend to the life; a fatiguing uniformity for the preacher, and for the hearer. This form is met with in the greatest French preachers of the most brilliant epoch, and in them even more strict than with us; for they subdivide the principal parts, and they announce these subdivisions. Even then, Fénelon declared himself against this form, and proposed another; others supported Fénelon. I could not, according to my principles, absolutely reject this method, which, I believe, has assisted more than one preacher, to give his thoughts the fullest and the most vigorous form, and may still render the same services. I would, therefore, counsel all young preachers to try it; to execute it with the greatest strictness, but to depart from it, as soon as they feel an irreconcilable contradiction between this mode of exposition and the progress of their ideas and sentiments. Then, amongst the forms that may present themselves, here is one which might be approved. Renouncing a division, properly so called, let the

preacher announce, in general, his design to recommend to the heart of the hearer the doctrine contained in the text. Let him immediately develop it completely, without cutting it down into several parts, but let him do so as briefly as possible, in such a manner that this development cannot pass for a principal part of the discourse. When he has thus obtained for the hearer a view of the idea considered in itself, let him transport this idea into the life; let him compare it with the manifestations which are in contradiction with it, with those that are conformable to it, and with those which result from it. We thus treat the whole sermon, as we are accustomed, in the other method, to treat each of the parts; the sermon forms, so to speak, only one part, it is all one piece, and it is not divided by interruptions and periodic returns to the initial ideas of each part. The thought, not being included within narrow compartments, moves and turns itself with more freedom; and the symmetry does not prevent the orator from giving more development to what is of greater importance, and from placing everything where it may produce the greatest effect. We have the appearance of freeing ourselves from the rule; we subject ourselves, on the contrary, to a more rigorous rule: we do not the less apply ourselves, to maintain to the end the chief thought, and to select the particular ideas which should serve to throw light upon it."[1]

Let us conclude with a quotation from Herder:

"I have purposely remarked, my dear friend, that the external form of our sermons has not its model in the Bible. What would this pretended model really be? The patriarchs blessed their sons; they recommended to them to walk in the way of the Lord; but they did not preach in our manner. The fifth book of Moses is an address to the people, having for its subject and object the very life of the people; the most sincere, the most powerful, the most urgent address, concluding with the solemn proclamation of the promises and the threatenings of the Lord, to which Moses adds his immortal hymn of praise, and his humble prayer of intercession; but that is not the model of our ordinary sermon. The same may be said of the addresses of the prophets: they are before us like mountains of God; who could say, who would dare to say—mountain, come to me? We have from Jesus Christ sentences and parables, several of which are accompanied by

[1] THEREMIN, *Beredsamkeit eine Tugend*, preface, pp. 22–27.

their explanation, and then, also, some earnest addresses to His disciples and to the people; but nothing of all this has the form of our sermons. The epistles of the apostles are letters, sometimes divided into two parts,—the one, theoretical, the other, practical; they have become to us a series of texts on which we preach, but, in other respects, what a difference between a letter and a sermon! Thus there would only remain for us, of the preachings of the apostles, the narrative which St Luke gives us in the Acts; but this is a narrative, an historical extract; the form does not announce to us the literal reproduction of a discourse. Moreover, all the pieces differ from each other as to the form: which of them, therefore, will be the type of our sermon?

"You see, then, my friend, that the form is not a point regulated beforehand; it is determined by the matter; it is the course of time, that has made it such as we see it. That which is essential to all the Biblical discourses, and that which our sermons ought to have in common with these discourses, is, to announce the will of God, to exhibit to the hearts and consciences of men the word, and the counsel of God, touching our salvation. This is what is done by the patriarchs and prophets, by Christ and His apostles, each in his own manner; this is what we also ought to do in our manner, drawing from the Bible, and speaking according to the Bible: this is what is called preaching."[1]

CHAPTER VII.

MEANS OF ATTAINING A GOOD ARRANGEMENT.

Rhetoric tells us, indeed, how we must arrange, just as it tells us how we must invent, or rather, just as it regulates our inventions; but it cannot be said, on that account, to teach us to arrange. This is a very common error. In all things, rhetoric teaches little more than to use well the resources which we are supposed to have beforehand, and which we find elsewhere.

It offers its counsels, and it can give useful ones, only to him who has a just mind, an open heart, who has formed his reason

[1] Herder, *Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend*, letter xl.

by the study of logic, and who has enriched it by that of philosophy.[1]

Eloquence penetrates, by a great many roots, into science, and into life.

To look at the arrangement of the most of the sermons which we hear, an arrangement usually correct and legitimate, we may think that arrangement is no great mystery, and that good sense and a little practice are sufficient for it.

But all do not attain to it on so easy terms; and it is a remarkable thing, that this aptitude appears to be wanting to those who have at once too many, and too few ideas; it is above and below this, that, with a mind sufficiently just, we succeed best. With very few or many ideas, we have clear arrangements. But this clearness is profound with some, superficial with others; this order is with some more external; with others, more internal; it has force, and efficacy, with the first, it has none with the second; it is eloquent, or it is not so, accordingly; for the oratorical genius displays itself in arrangement.

Now, the business is not merely to do *well*, but to do *better;* and we really do *well* only when we seek to do better. Arrangement may be more or less philosophical, more or less oratorical; the discourse more or less compact, made of inlaid work or cast in bronze, creaking at the joints or playing upon its hinges, with grace and facility, interrupted by what ought to join it, or joined by what seemed to separate, continuous or made up of patchwork.

To attain to the best possible, something more and better is necessary than exercise and practice; exercise must be accompanied by meditation, and must incite to it; we, by the latter, give account to ourselves of the procedure we have employed, note its defects, profit by them, and interrogate our intellectual consciousness.

I will say to those who have time: Do not pique yourselves on a foolish rapidity in composition;[2] do over again what you have

[1] Cicero recommends philosophy less for what it contains, than for what it gives as an exercise for the mind: *Positum sit in primis, sine philosophia non posse effici, quem quærimus, eloquentem: non ut in ea tamen omnia sint, sed ut sic adjuvet ut palæstra histrionem.* (*Orator*, chap. iv.)—It does more.

[2] "Sæpe stylum vertas, iterum quæ digna legi sunt Scripturus."—Horace, *Sat.* i. 10.

"Take time to reject what ought to be rejected, as well as to supply what ought to be supplied."—Cecil.—Ed.

done; regard commonly a first work as only a first trial of your powers, and a blocking out of the matter given. Afterwards, in active life, demanding hurried application, we shall in vain say to you: "Work at leisure, whatever order presses you;"[1] for the order which will press you, will not allow of leisure, as it will be necessary to replace the length of labour, by its intensity. But during the time of studies and preparations, and as long as you have it in your power, labour as artists; the turn of the practical man will come. See how you shall be able, by one trial after another, to attain to better co-ordinating, to better fusing together the different elements of your work. Do not deceive yourselves: be sure of this, that when a first throw has succeeded, and so well that we do not return to it, it is because a strong internal labour had preceded; the vigour of this internal labour has supplied everything, and perhaps several plans had replaced one another in the secret of meditation.

Lastly, study models;[2] analyse their method; try yourself against them; compare models with models upon the same subjects. But take care that they are the same subjects, and not different subjects under the same names; thus, in Bourdaloue and in Saurin, these words: *the Word of God*, do not designate the same subject.

[1] Boileau, *L'Art Poétique*, chant i.

[2] "Vos exemplaria Græca
Nocturnâ versate manu, versate diurnâ."
—Horace, *Ars Poet.*—Ed.

PART THIRD.

ELOCUTION OR STYLE.

CHAPTER I.

OF ELOCUTION IN GENERAL.

You have chosen the arguments, or the principal ideas of your discourse; you have, either at the instant, or by a subsequent operation, classified, and arranged together in your mind, these materials: it remains for you to give a form and a body to the results of these two first operations, to make others think on this subject what you think yourself. It remains for you, in one word, to write your discourse. This is the work of which we have now to discourse to you.

This idea of *writing* is less simple, than it at first appears to be. Is it simply the business to express by words the ideas and the relations, of which the two preceding operations have put you in possession? Nobody thinks so. A discourse strictly reduced to this, is an analysis, and not a discourse. But if to write is something more than to express, by means of language, the ideas which have been obtained by the twofold labour of invention and arrangement, then to write is still to think; to write is to invent; to write is to arrange. In fact, to write is all this.

The work of style, rightly understood, is only a continuation of the two former, the one of which is called *invention*, the other *arrangement*. To write, is still, and always, to invent and to arrange. Does not an image include an idea? Is not a name, a judgment? Is not the law of order and of gradation pursued even to the details? Is not a paragraph, not to say a sentence, quite a discourse?

Just as invention and arrangement are reproduced, on a very reduced scale, in the sentence, and even in the incident, elocution or style finds place in the first rudiments of the discourse, and, so to speak, in the table of contents. Nevertheless, it displays all the characteristics of which it is susceptible, only in the development, and in the ramifications of the thought. The elocution is still the thought, but at its surface, or at its extremities. And this makes us comprehend all the importance of the elocution. The simple enunciation of the principal heads of the discourse little enlightens,—little touches,—the generality of the hearers. It is by the particular ideas, that they are immediately affected. It is with general ideas, as with sapid and nutritive substances; they must be decomposed, and melted in our mouth, in order to obtain the sensation of taste; and they must arrive in our stomach, and be there decomposed in another manner, in order that our body may be nourished by them: in like manner, in general, we know the savour of truth, and it becomes for us a nourishment, only by means of its parts. To make use of another comparison: what would the great blood-vessels do in our body, if they did not go, ramified and attenuated *ad infinitum*, to moisten and irrigate our flesh? Elocution, then, has for its twofold character, to invest the thought with words, and to decompose the truth in such a manner as to render its contact with us more immediate and more sensible. But be that as it may, the work of style is a work of thought, and the direct complement of that which, in the preparation of a discourse, is specially considered as the part belonging to the thought.

It will be said: But there is always this difference, that we invent and arrange without the words, whilst the elocution properly consists in the use of the words.—But first, it is not very certain that we invent and arrange without making use of words; if, as I said, every name is a judgment, every judgment, also, is a name. And again, what does it signify as to the argument, that the elocution more distinctly makes use of these signs, without which it is nothing, seeing that the choice of these signs, and their arrangement, are a work of the intellect? What would the style be, if it was not this? That is to say, what would a word be, if it did not express an idea? The choice of the words, the choice of the forms, is the work of the thought, or it is nothing. There is no essential difference between this part of the art, and

the two others. The signs appear more distinctly, that is all. "To write well," says Buffon, "is at once to think well, feel well, and express well; it is to have, at the same time, mind, heart, and taste; the style supposes the union and exercise of all the intellectual faculties; the ideas alone form the ground of the style; the harmony of the words is only the accessory."[1]

If the principal ideas of the discourse are, for its object, the most important, it must be granted, that the ideas which we employ in the work of the elocution,—the ideas which constitute the style, are of a nature elevated, delicate, and superior, in certain subjects, to the ideas, the exposition of which is the very object of the discourse. "A beautiful style," says Buffon, again, "is such, only from the infinite number of truths which it presents. All the intellectual beauties which are found in it, all the relations of which it is composed, are so many truths, as useful as those which may form the ground of the subject, and perhaps more precious than these for the mind of man."[2] We take care to place no truths above, or alongside of, the evangelical truths; but Buffon only speaks of the human mind, and within these limits, what he says is as true as it is profound.

This point of view, however, not being very nearly concerned with the question we are considering, we adhere to that which we first indicated; and, if it is true, that the elocution is to the discourse, what the countenance, or the hands are to the body of man, we understand well, what is the importance of it, what is also the difficulty of it. If we had in view only the *diction*, it would be another thing, but the question is of the *style;* the diction is not the whole man, whilst the whole man is in the style, or, as Buffon says, "the style is the man himself."[3] Perhaps the style is not merely, as the same author asserts, the order and the movement which a writer gives to his thought; but this order and this movement form part of the style. The style is, therefore, a thing of great importance; and those very persons who would not quite admit the justness of Cicero's thought, will not be astonished that he has thus expressed himself: "To know what we should say, and to know in what order, is indeed a thing of great importance; but to know *how* we must say it, is a thing of much greater."[4]

[1] BUFFON, *Discours sur le Style.*
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] CICERO, *Orator*, chap. xvi.

If the style is from the thought, it would seem that what forms the good mind, will form the good writer; and that we shall neither see a false mind write well, nor a well-formed mind write ill. It is certain that the great qualities of style are strangers to a mind that is feeble, or ill-formed; elegance alone, that is to say, an elegance wholly external, is within its reach; but how many men are there, who can think, and cannot write? These are two branches, proceeding from the same trunk, with an unequal force. To write well, it is necessary to think well, but something more is necessary. Why should we be astonished at this? Are we astonished that a man who walks very well, cannot dance, or that a man who speaks agreeably, cannot sing? Either some ulterior quality is in fault, or, of two arts that are akin, we have studied only the first. We prepare ourselves to write well, in cultivating the art of inventing, and that of distributing a subject-matter; but we merely *prepare* ourselves for it; and the elocution, or the style, is the object of a separate study. The language, besides, which is the material of the style, is wholly without the writer. It is with language, as with a violin; it is necessary to learn to play upon it: we do not come into the world with the power of using the bow in our hand.

It certainly appears strange, that the man who naturally thinks well, is hardly arrived at a certain limit, when he at once ceases to think well, and that he who can do the greater, cannot do the less; this is strange, if we will, but so it is. The thought of the same mind is not equally at its ease in all domains, as the chest of the same man, in all atmospheres. Though to write is still to think, we may think well, and yet write ill.

We should more easily receive this idea, if we considered the style only in its inferior parts, or its last details, that is to say, if we identified it with the diction; for there is a *sense* in which those things cannot be ascribed to all the superior intellects. But it must be granted, that this is true also of the highest parts of elocution,—of the style properly so called; and we then find ourselves very near invention and arrangement,—very near the thought properly so called. Even in this sense, the style is a merit,—a separate quality.

But, if I grant that we can, in a certain sense, think well, and yet write ill, shall I as easily grant, that we may think ill, and yet write well? Yes, I may still grant it, by reducing the

writing well to its most external parts, and to the most slender details of elocution. But the good style, to take this word in the whole of its signification, the style, in the sense in which we may say, that it is the man himself, belongs only to the man who thinks well and strongly.

"Scribendi rectè *sapere* est et principium et fons,"[1]

says Horace; and Cicero has said: *Sed est eloquentiæ, sicut reliquarum rerum, fundamentum* SAPIENTIA.[2] Many works, the thoughts of which are well conceived, are all written; but all the works truly remarkable in respect of style, are more or less so in respect of the thought.

We may conclude from all this, that the preacher, unless he make it a principle to neglect and despise art, ought to devote to style a considerable portion of his care. For the style is not only a considerable part of the whole work, but also a distinct work, which requires an aptitude, and separate efforts.

Some have a scruple about applying themselves to this object. They ask, if it is becoming in the most serious of writers, the preacher, to make a special study of elocution, or the art of writing well? If the question were not repeated every day, we would not be the persons to raise it.

In what respect can this study be unworthy of a serious man, if the style is still a work of the thought, if the care devoted to the expression is the necessary complement of the labour of the thought, and if that serious thought which is all our object, arrives complete and with all its advantages at the mind of our hearers, only on condition of being well expressed?

For this is our point of view; and our doctrine, though, in one sense, of very elevated character, is nevertheless quite utilitarian. In the domain even of pure literature, we discard the doctrine of *art for the sake of art;* how much more in the domain of eloquence, and especially of Christian eloquence? If poetry itself repel with horror this barren doctrine, eloquence, the end of which is wholly practical, is much more repugnant to it. All the arts, I grant, demand a noble disinterestedness of

[1] HORACE, *Ars Poetica*, 309. [Comp. also 311, as implying that there must be subject-matter in the mind first, if words are to follow,

"Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur."—ED.]

[2] CICERO, *Orator*, chap. xxi.

the thought,—all aspire to the pure ideal; but this does not go to establish the position, that art, in order to be pure, ought to be absorbed in attention to the form. "How should it gain anything by belying its origin? Did it exist as a means, before it was presented as an object? Did man first seek ideas for the expressions, or expressions for an idea? What, then, in the view of human consciousness, is art separate from its object, or making for itself a simple occasion of its object? What is certain is, that art, placed upon this basis, decays as art, and that exclusive attention to the form, ruins the form itself. Literary instruction, obliged to treat of the form separately, and to concentrate the attention for years upon words and phrases; the more noisy renown of literary successes; the more attractive charm of labours in which the study of the form necessarily occupies a large place: all this, directed, it seems, to the advantage of art, has only too often the effect of attenuating and weakening it. A great power of thought, and a solid learning, are the first conditions of art; and, as has been well said, "it is only compact substances that are susceptible of a fine polish."

But how much more true is all this of eloquence, and particularly of that of the pulpit! What is injurious to the other arts, the pursuit of an actual and practical object, is to this art its strength,—it is its very principle; and every art, as well as every institution, becomes corrupt in separating itself from its principle. The orator who shall wish, above everything, to please, will not please, just as the virtue which shall propose happiness for its object, will not find happiness. Without insisting too much, and for a good reason, upon this consideration, I say that ambition to speak well,—the literary point of view,—in proportion as it obtains an ascendancy over the minister, degrades his ministry. I say that the preacher is not, as to his chief character, a literary man. I say that there is in the employment of the word a seduction,—an intoxication which must be dreaded. I say that it is necessary to fear being carried away insensibly from action towards the imitation of action,—from reality into poetry. Considering the mysterious connection between what is beautiful in morals, and what is beautiful in literature, this deviation is only too easy. Paul says: "If I sought to please men, I should not be the servant of Christ."[1]

[1] It was a source of bitter regret to Augustine in after life, that his aim in

(Gal. i. 10.) We shall say: "If I sought to please myself." If we would avoid this misfortune, *one* certain means to it is, to despise art; but God has not made our condition so easy for us; Jesus Christ says: "I pray, not that Thou shouldest take take them out of the world," (to withdraw them from the conditions of human life,) "but that Thou shouldest keep them from the evil." (John xvii. 15.) It is betwixt the worship of art and the contempt of art, that God has ordered us to walk. We neither pronounce an anathema upon art, nor say, art for the sake of art, but, art for the sake of God.

From all that we have said, it follows, we think, that a good style is necessary, and that good style does not come of itself alone. If it is not necessary, no more is the rest necessary; if it comes of itself, the rest will also come of itself, and we shall have signed, at once, the proscription of the entire art. For the style is not superadded to all the rest—the style is an integral part of the art; it is not the supplement of it, but the complement. The limit which we might wish to trace betwixt invention and arrangement on the one side, and eloquence on the other, would be purely arbitrary. If invention and arrangement are found again in the style, we may say that the style is already found in these two first parts. There is continuity—there is identity; and the circumstance, doubtless very remarkable, that many persons, who can invent and arrange, cannot write, does not overthrow what we have just said. Though a road become narrow, or its declivity become more steep, and though, at this stage, certain travellers stop, panting and discouraged; it is nevertheless the same road. Because the route becomes, henceforth, more difficult for some, than for others, it by no means follows that we are permitted to stop; since the object, the prize

his early ministry had been, "ut placeret, non ut doceret." "If any man," says H. K. White, "ascend the pulpit with the intention of uttering a fine thing, he is committing a deadly sin." An ancient Father wept at the applause given to his sermons. "Would to God," said he, "they had rather gone away silent and thoughtful!" St Paul's rule ought to be that of every minister, "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord." (2 Cor. iv. 5.) Baxter says, "Woe to him that takes up with the fame of godliness instead of godliness; 'Verily I say unto you, they have their reward.'"—*Reformed Pastor.* "The spirit of man pleases itself with the success of its own travail; and when we seem to propose no other aim but God's glory, the deceitfulness of self-love is less capable of discovery."—Bishop Godeau, *Past. Instr.* 44, 45 pp.—Ed.

of the race, is only at the end of the road—at the extremity of the race-course.

Some persons would see artifice in the care bestowed upon elocution. We might say as much of the two first operations—of all eloquence—of all art. That which characterises artifice is the pursuit of a bad end, or the employment of bad means, or both. Art is merely the knowledge, and the employment of the means pointed out by nature and experience, for attaining a certain end. You do not dispute the end, it is good—it is even the only end which is absolutely good. There is little likelihood of a good end suggesting bad means. If you were tempted to use them, your end would revolt against your means. But in what do the means we propose consist? Do we pretend to add to the truth, or to conduct to the truth by falsehood, or to disturb the imagination, in order to enlighten the conscience? No; we would render to the truth what belongs to it. Do we pretend to do violence to human liberty? No; for without speaking of our end, which is just to restore souls to liberty, our means are conformable to our end; since our only wish is to bring into more immediate contact the truth and the souls of our hearers. There is, therefore, no artifice. Is it so, then, that art itself would be objectionable—no longer on the ground of being contrary to Christian rectitude, but as contrary to nature? We have elsewhere examined this pretended conflict betwixt art and nature [1]—a conflict very like to that which is supposed to exist betwixt nature and civilisation, which is also art, and the first of arts; we have maintained that art is natural—that art is still nature—that the oak, with a hundred arms, is not less natural, than the acorn. There is little opposition here, except betwixt the good nature and the bad. If there are persons to whom it is quite natural, not to study their style, there are others who find it quite natural, to study theirs. I know not by what right, the first would come to impose their deformity on those who have the instinct of the beautiful, and the sentiment of art. They themselves might experience, if they were willing, that art becomes a second nature. Will they pretend, that it is more natural to write ill, than to write well, because to write well supposes more labour? But is not labour the universal law? Is it not intended to be added to all our gifts? Does salvation, the most

[1] See the Introduction.

gratuitous and the most generous of all gifts, exclude labour?[1] Eden, all beautiful as it was, was given in order to be cultivated. And, in fine, is it in negligence that beautiful nature consists? You accuse us of research, and of artifice: might not we, upon much better grounds, accuse you of indolence?

You appeal to facts, and you say, that some have been the dupes of style. Some, also, have been the dupes of logic. But, perhaps, you proscribe logic? Do you wish, because falsehood is armed, that truth should disarm? And do not the same arms, in passing from one hand to another—from being criminal, become virtuous? These arms only return to the party that has a right to carry them. Do not say that, in a well-written discourse, truth puts on the armour of falsehood; it is falsehood, that has stolen the armour of truth. It is at once seen, that this armour does not fit it. We perceive, on the contrary, that truth, in assuming the form of the beautiful, only resumes its rights.

We have already replied to those, to whom the labour of style appears unworthy of a masculine and serious mind. Of what labour are we understood to speak? If eloquence of style consists in suitable expression, *apte dicere*,[2] why should this style, necessarily masculine and serious, be unworthy of the attention of a masculine and serious mind? What have we proposed but a labour of thought? "When I see," says Montaigne, "these excellent ways of speaking, I do not say that they are well written, but that they are well thought." The style comes from within, like all the rest, but it does not come of itself. It is a labour of the mind, and of the soul, which has only to be carried out. Pascal is quoted, who has said: "True eloquence scoffs at eloquence."[3] Yes, at the false, at prepared,—factitious eloquence; "at frivolous eloquence—the study and delight of trivial men;" at artifice, when candour might have sufficed; at conventional rules, to which it is necessary to have recourse, when nature is defective. This pretended eloquence is, indeed, wanting in seriousness; but, on looking closely into it, it is also wanting in art; it is in the other—it is in serious eloquence that art, genuine art, triumphs.

It will, perhaps, be said: But, if to write well is to think well, elocution or style, if we except what is arbitrary and what is ad-

[1] "*Work out your own salvation* with fear and trembling." (Philip. ii. 12.)

[2] Cicero. [3] Pascal, *Pensées*, part i., art. x., § xxxiv.

dressed only to the ear, does not constitute a peculiar art, and is not the object of a special study. Supposing that such is the case with it, this is not denying the importance of style, and our only wish is, that this importance be recognised. He who shall attain to writing well, without having need of a labour *ad hoc* — of a new study, has not to fear that any person will demand of him an account of the road by which he has arrived at this end. It is the end which is of importance, not the road; and nobody will think of recommending labour for the mere sake of labour. If you arrive, by a single impulsion, and without the need of renewing it, at the end which you propose to yourselves, so much the better for you, and you will be under no obligation to us. We are firmly persuaded that things end thus, and that there are writers, to whom writing ill is as difficult, as it is hard for others to write well. But if it were of importance to discuss the question, and if we had not already replied to it, we should say that the experience of all times, and the testimony of all masters of the art, present to us as inseparable, these two propositions: 1st, That without a fund of interesting ideas, we must not flatter ourselves with having a style; 2d, That neither must we flatter ourselves that, by means of a fund of interesting and solid ideas, the style will come of itself. D'Alembert separates them: "Eloquence," says he, "properly consists only in quick and rapid strokes; its effect is to excite lively emotion, and all emotion is weakened by duration. Eloquence, therefore, can reign only at intervals, in a discourse of some length; the lightning darts, and the cloud closes again. But if the shades of the picture are necessary, they ought not to be too strong; the hearer, doubtless, requires places of repose; in these passages the hearer must take breath—not fall asleep; and it is for the tranquil charms of elocution, to keep him in this pleasant and agreeable situation. Hence (what will appear paradoxical, without being the less true) the rules of elocution have place, properly speaking, and are really necessary only for those passages which are not properly eloquent, which the orator composes more coolly, and in which nature has need of art. The man of genius ought to be afraid of falling into a loose, low, and mean style, only when it is not sustained by the subject; it is then that he ought to think of the elocution, and occupy himself with it. In the other cases, his elocution will be such, as it ought to be, without his thinking

of it. The ancients, if I am not mistaken, felt the importance of this rule, and it is for this reason that, in their works on the art of oratory, they have chiefly treated of elocution."[1]

In all this there is a delicate admixture of error and of truth. Eloquence does not consist merely in "quick and rapid strokes;" it has those strokes; but eloquence is everywhere, and continuity is one of its elements, one of its conditions. Elocution is indeed something special, as the author wishes it, but not detached from eloquence. The following passage of Cicero appears to me to present the true principles, upon the subject which we are considering: "A discourse, being composed of thoughts and words, there is no longer occasion for the words, if you retrench the ideas; and the latter cannot be exhibited, if you dispense with the words. We allow ourselves to be ruled by the opinions of the vulgar; half-learned persons, in order to place within their reach what, as a whole, they cannot comprehend, tear and rend it into pieces, and, by detaching the thoughts from the elocution, separate the soul from the body, without considering that death is the result of this separation. . . . . I shall content myself with saying, in passing, that we shall in vain seek the ornaments of elocution, if we have not first of all found and arranged the ideas, and that the ideas can produce no effect if they are not distinctly brought out by the expression."[2]

It is said that, in the work of style, it is necessary to make use of imagination, and that imagination is a deceptive thing. But, first, is everything in the work of style the business of the imagination? Again, is imagination operative of error only? Imagination is essentially the faculty, not of conceiving what is not, but of representing to ourselves what we do not see, not of *imagining to ourselves what has no foundation*, but of imagining (*non de s'imaginer, mais d'imaginer*). In what could we dispense with it? Not in science, not even in faith. The most austere characters have felt its power. Look only at the *Reflections on Eloquence*, by the celebrated Doctor Arnauld. Imagination might from that time say with Boileau: "Arnauld, the great Arnauld, has made my apology."[3]

[1] D'Alembert, *Mélanges*, vol. ii., p. 329, *Réflexions sur l'Elocution Oratoire.*

[2] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book iii., chap. v. and vi.

[3] "Arnauld, le grand Arnauld, fit mon apologie."—Boileau, *Epître* x. See, on the care to be bestowed on elocution, St Augustine, *Christian Doctrine*,

Respectable men are cited, who have disdained, while writing, or speaking on these matters, to bestow care on their style. The apostles, St Paul in particular, are mentioned as instances. I commence by declaring, that I should not be scandalised by defects which might be pointed out to me in the style of St Paul. He might have some, and be none the less St Paul. But, in fact, you do not wish to write in all respects like him. Why do you not allow yourselves his digressions? If the care of expression is blameable, the care of arrangement might well be so also. St Paul had a spiritual power, which might place him above the rules of art: have it like him, and we shall allow to you, as to him, those digressions, and that obscurity which St Augustine has remarked, and which he advises us to shun, while he attributes them to some secret design of God.[1] But after all, write like St Paul; we require of you nothing more, provided you write entirely like him. St Paul has style. How did he come by it? I know not; but have style likewise; that is the whole question. If you can have it without labour, we demand nothing better. The irregularities of St Paul do not prevent us from seeing, in him, a writer. There is no form of style which we can call absolutely good, or absolutely bad, independently of individual circumstances, or the character of the writer; and if St Paul was an ordinary writer, an artist, we might be reminded, by his occasional irregularities, of these lines of Despréaux: "Sometimes a vigorous mind, when too much confined in its course by art, departs from the prescribed rules, and, from art itself, learns to go beyond their limits."[2]

"We have converted, we have edified, we have consoled without the assistance of style." Do this, then; do, without style, everything which you wish to do with the assistance of style, and we will no more speak to you of style. Some have also converted, without the word: do this, and we excuse you from employing the word. But, as a general position, people are converted, and edified, by the word; and the style is no other thing

book iv., and ROLLIN, *Traité des Etudes*, book v., chap. ii., art. i., on the error of too much neglecting the ornaments of discourse.

[1] See 2 Pet. iii. 16.—ED.

[2] "Quelquefois, dans sa course, un esprit vigoureux,
Trop reserré par l'art, sort des règles prescrites,
Et de l'art même apprend à franchir leurs limites."
—BOILEAU, *L'Art Poétique*, chant iv.

than the word expressing, more or less happily, the thought, or the internal life of the speaker: we act by means of the word only, in proportion as the word well expresses all the thought; in this sense there would be neither paradox, nor levity, in saying that we convert by means of the style. Truth is so strong, and, in certain cases, he who listens is so well disposed, that every word, every style, is good. Say, then, that you have succeeded in spite of the imperfection of the language; but go no farther. If you fancy, that this success authorises you to speak without study, and without rule, why do you not also say, that this is the way to speak best? And you must at last come to say so. This will be the doctrine of quietism, applied to the employment of the word. You will be the mystics of eloquence. Moreover, we have not forgotten, in speaking of style, that every one has his own vocation, and his own style. When you shall have the overpowering eloquence of a Whitfield, you may go into the streets, and speak there in what language you will; you will have the style that is suited to your position, and your object; we demand of you no other, but we demand of you this: it is still style. When, like the missionary of the Romish Church, you shall have your hands burned at the beginning of your martyrdom, you will stretch towards the crowd your mutilated arms, and they will speak. When the word itself is superfluous, what signifies the form of the word? But when the word is employed, when it is by means of the word that we would act, the form is of importance. The form and the ground are inseparable, and, in truth, are only one.

Nothing assuredly is more serious, nothing is greater, than the mission of Moses; nothing more eloquent than his life, unless it be the miracles that were wrought at his word. He might, so far as appears, have dispensed with speaking, or with speaking well. "Eloquence is considered amongst the Arabians as the greatest of natural gifts, because it has more influence amongst them, than amongst any other people. Moses, feeling himself destitute of this talent, could have no confidence in his mission; but he no longer shrunk from it, when the Lord associated with him his brother Aaron, saying: *Scio quod eloquens sit.*"[1]

This answers what is alleged by some, that the care devoted

[1] Leon de Laborde, *Commentaire sur l'Exode*, etc., p. 14, Paris, 1841, in folio. [Exod. iv. 14, 29; "I know that he can speak well."—Ed.]

to style, is appreciated by only a small number. I suppose they do not mean by this, that, to be appreciated and admired, can be the object and the recompense of the preacher, but that it may be the sign, and the proof, that the true object has been obtained. Now, it is certain, and I grant it, that a good style is duly appreciated only by a small number; but though nobody should have remarked that your style is good, would it follow that you have lost your labour? When a good style has produced its effect, it is of little importance that the hearer distinctly know, by what that effect has been produced. In time, the assiduous and attentive hearer will observe certain merits. It is for us to form the taste of our auditory, whether or not the Christian preacher think himself called to form the taste of the public.

"The form, however, may divert attention from the substance." This is too true. Just as the thinker, arrived at the moment of writing, may stop, relax his efforts in front of a labour more delicate, and more complicated, perhaps, and let the expression take care of itself, so another will perhaps, in his turn, attach himself in preference to the labour of the style in its more external parts, and in those which are least connected with the interior of the subject, and the substance of the matter. It seems, in truth, that if you form for yourselves a just idea of style, the form will not so easily be able to divert your attention from the substance; for the true style comes from the thought, just as the complexion comes from the blood, and as the flower springs from an effort of the sap: the style is not the mask, but the physiognomy of the thought. Nevertheless, the difficulty remains, and I wish neither to deny, nor to weaken it: I will take care not to do so. I say more, I know but one remedy for it, the spirit of self-denial and the spirit of prayer.[1] For to say: "Let your expressions

[1] *Bene orasse est bene studuisse.* "Prayer without study is presumption; and study without prayer atheism. Omit either, and the other is lost labour." Bishop Sanderson. Bridges mentions some subjects for supplication: Direction, in the choice of texts and topics; also, in entering upon and pursuing our subject, as Cotton Mather used to stop at the end of every paragraph, endeavouring in prayer and self-examination to fix on his heart some holy impression of the subject; the frame of our own minds in the pulpit; the power of our ministry on the hearts of the people. See Acts vi. 4. There must be, says Gurnal, the labour of study before ministers preach, the labour of zeal and love in preaching, the labour of suffering after preaching, and always the labour of prayer, to crown the whole with success.—Ed.

take care of themselves, use none of your advantages, refuse to your thought its form, which is, in a manner, the life and the power of communicating itself," is what we cannot do. Eloquence is a whole,—a unity,—and we cannot divide it. We have imposed on it no form, we have recommended no style in particular, we have only required that the language of the sacred orator should express his thought, and his life, as perfectly as possible: this thought he owes to his hearers in its entire character; it should come to them with all its elements, and with all its characters; now, if this cannot take place without a particular application, and without a labour *ad hoc*, this labour, and this application, are as obligatory as all the rest.[1]

[1] We think it our duty to reproduce the more extended developments which M. Vinet gave of his thoughts in an older version of this part of his course:—

"The labour of style thus conceived, that is to say, as little as possible subordinated to the matter, nay, even subjecting the matter to itself, and making the thought its instrument, instead of being the instrument of the thought, may certainly be a snare, and the form may divert attention from the substance. Such is the case with the man who wishes above everything to be a writer, for whom principles, ideas, facts, have little value in themselves, and are only the *substratum*, so to speak, of the style. As for him, his business is to give value to the most vulgar materials by the carving; and, in fact, he is to the true writer, what the carver is to the sculptor. The charm of his style consists, like the merit of a style more solid, in ideas (for we cannot depart from this doctrine), but in ideas of an indifferent alloy, without roots, and without strength; or if some strong thought is mingled in it, it is without the subject, sustaining nothing, and not being sustained. Hardly can we say, that the form had diverted his attention from the subject, on which, to say the truth, he has hardly bestowed a thought. Here, it is not even necessary to distinguish between the writers, it is necessary to distinguish between the subjects. His are subjects, such that their form is everything; the form is the thought itself, the form is the whole work. I speak of those common thoughts, of those commonplaces (be it said in the best sense), in which everything being given once for all, it only remains that it be well expressed, and which, from one author to another, can differ only in the quality of the expression. 'In that case,' according to the saying of Buffon's, 'the art of expressing little things becomes, perhaps, more difficult than the art of expressing great ones.' And, at all events, the form does not divert attention from the substance, because it is all form.

"Outside of these subjects, the form may divert attention from the substance, I do not wish to deny it, but to the great injury of the form itself; for, in great subjects, the style, that is, the truth and the character of the expression, can only come from great thoughts. Accordingly, in these subjects, the labour of the style may well be a separate labour, a thing *sui generis*, in such a manner that we may have the thoughts without the style, the substance without the form; but we cannot have the form without the substance. If the labour of the style does not proceed from within, if it is not intimately united to the labour of the thinker, and to the internal activity of the man, if it is applied from without,

A man of letters, to whom, when sick, a priest was trying to represent the joys of paradise, interrupted him by saying: "Speak to me no more about it, my father, your bad style would disgust me with it." This profane pleasantry is the extreme of intellectual epicurism. But, candidly, it is not permitted to speak of divine things in a bad style. In vain will it be said, that the things ought to speak; but what is a bad style but something which hinders them from speaking, an unfaithful style, a style that is not true (and in this respect it may be at once elegant and bad); what is a good style, on the contrary, but a style that is in all respects true? For it is truth that is in question,

if it is not produced like the flower, by an effort of the sap, it is neither a style true to its subject, nor true with respect to the writer; for the style is not the mask, but the physiognomy of the thought.

"If, then, we say that the form diverts attention from the substance, it is not of the true form, it is not of the true style, that we speak, since this is consubstantial with the thought. We must not blame the form, but the man; he has not thought of the true form of the object, because he has not thought of the object. But if he has been preoccupied with the true form, it will not divert attention from the substance of the matter; for it is with this substance in his view that he seeks a form, and the form brings him back to the substance.

"This is all that I can say to the preacher; for I do not deny that the external labour of the style, the charm of fine words, the pomp, the harmony, the graces of language may exercise their seductive influence over him as well as over another; and so long as he is young, especially if he has been born an artist, he will have some trouble in resisting it, and in recognising a style in the naked simplicity of a Demosthenes and a Pascal. For a long time, perhaps, he will be under the charm of words and images, and will mistake, in works of art, splendour for beauty.* It is of importance that, without too much repressing a fine or agreeable imagination, he should study eloquence in the models I have named; not that their manner of being eloquent and true, is the only one; that of Bossuet is not less so, since it faithfully renders the internal life and the character of his thoughts; but because it is in their school that he is least exposed to errors, because in that simplicity we better recognise what forms the essence of a good style, and liberty is no longer dangerous, after a certain time of so severe a discipline.

"When, therefore, you are told, that the form diverts attention from the substance, answer that you must, in any case, seek a form for your thought; but the true way is, seek this form in the thought itself; and condemn yourselves alone, and not art, if you have sacrificed the substance to a form which, by that very circumstance, was not its own; for a thought cannot perish in an expression that is conformable, and adequate to it.

"All this discussion is founded on a mistake; there would be no place for it, if it was admitted beforehand, that the essential merit of style, the foundation of its beauty, is its being true: true relatively to the subject, true relatively to the writer."—*Editors.*

* "Professus grandia turget."—HORACE, *Ars Poet.*—ED.

and we cannot give as a motto to eloquence, these so well known words :—

> "Les sucs réparateurs dont la coupe est remplie
> A l'enfant qui se meurt sont en vain présentés ;
> Mais que d'un peu de miel les bords soient humectés,
> L'enfant saisit la coupe, et, trompé, boit la vie." [1]

We wish neither to deceive nor to seduce ; falsehood and error have often destroyed, and never preserved life.

Finally, it is said : How much time is lost in the labour of the style ! But the question is, if that time is lost, if what we obtain is not worth what we sacrifice, and if we gain as much, with regard to the final object of discourse, by composing rapidly and indifferently, as by composing slowly and well. I know not besides, if, by neglecting the style, we really save much time ; I think that we learn, by the same exercise, to compose rapidly and to compose well, and that, in this business as in many others, in order to gain time, we must know how to lose some ; for good style becomes an instinct, and ends by flowing naturally. But I hasten to take up the objection in all its force.

" Time presses," it is said, " every moment that we lose, accuses us ; it is necessary that preaching should abound, and that the preacher should multiply himself ; that the discourses should, if possible, follow each other without intermission, and that each discourse should declare the whole counsel of God."

Should preaching, then, be only a cry of alarm ? Why, in that case, is it necessary that religion should present us with so long a series of facts, so long a chain of deductions, so vast a system of ideas ? [2] This has been the will of God : it is probably our part not to will otherwise, and, in the face of His patience, impatience would ill become us. Whether preaching have for its object to *call*, as it is said, or to *confirm*, it is something else than a cry ; it is a word, an instruction, a discourse. It is slowly that some are called, it is slowly that others are confirmed ; the trouble has its reward, and may have its hour ; but, taking the work as a whole, it may be said in every sense,

[1] " The restorative juices with which the cup is filled are in vain presented to the dying child ; but let the edges be moistened with a little honey, the child seizes the cup, and, being deceived, drinks in life."—Tasso, *Jerusalem Delivered*, chant i. 2.

[2] " However mean and illiterate the congregation may be, fear not to set before them *all the counsel of God* (Acts xx. 27). Open the whole of your message without reservation."—Bishop Horsley. See Ps. xl. 10.—Ed.

that "the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace" (James iii. 18); and we should not be afraid to apply to pastors what has been said to poets:—

"Travaillez à loisir, quelque ordre qui vous presse."[1]

To turn every moment to advantage, and to labour in haste, are two very different things; the second is not implied in the first, and it is precisely that we may compose nothing in haste, that we ought to be misers of time.

The situation, doubtless, is not always the same; there are missionaries as there are pastors, and the pastor, in our days, is half a missionary. Do we wish that the pastor, in order that he may compose better, should compose less? God forbid! But if, when he had leisure, he studied art and practised it, he will speak well quite naturally; he will not spend much time in seeking for the best terms, and best turns of expression; they will come to him of themselves. He will have slowly acquired the secret of meditating rapidly,[2] he will have laboriously rendered himself capable of finding easily just and new plans, happy combinations, interesting points of view. It will be thought, so natural is it, that he owes everything to talent and emotion; he himself will believe it perhaps, but, if he carefully examine his consciousness, he will soon know what to make of it, and will discover with surprise, that he has never paid so much deference to art, as at the moment he thought he was only obeying instinct. In reality, art, with him, has become instinct.

What else have we maintained? What? A certain measure of perfection? Who could determine it? We have maintained only one thing; that is, that every one should compose as well as he can. We have demanded, not so much the practice, as the esteem of art, and the acknowledgment of its rights. If we obtained this, we should think that we had obtained everything. It

[1] Labour at leisure, whatever order presses you.

[2] Jerome says of his friend Nepotian, "By daily reading and meditation in the sacred volume he had made his soul *a library of Christ*." Robinson of Leicester used to say, "Let no man attempt to preach without book, till he has patiently written all his discourses for seven years; let him then begin sparingly and gradually." This rule must vary with different persons. "Whose mind soever is fully possessed with a fervent desire to know good things, and with the dearest charity to infuse the knowledge of them into others—when such a man would speak, his words, like so many nimble and airy servitors, trip about him at command, and in well-ordered files, as he would wish, fall aptly into their own places."—MILTON.—ED.

is a principle, that is in question; and, the circumstances being parallel, the difficulties equal, there will be in the practice a difference *in toto* between him who admits the principle, and him who denies it. It is impossible for one to recognise it, and at the same time to neglect it altogether; for, in a certain measure, it is always possible to practise it. The artist is always an artist. Always, as far as he is able, he does justice to the requirements of art, and, when leisure is wanting to him to prepare himself, he improvises, so to speak, his preparation, and meditates while executing. There have, no doubt, been genuine artists among popular orators, and street preachers; and their theory, the secret of which they would confide to us if they possessed it themselves, is a skilful theory.

Must we repeat, again, that art is to us the means, not the end, and that we only demand an account of the result? Compose for us, without preparation, without meditation, by the mere force of instinct, a discourse that is logical, connected, substantial, pure in language, and natural in expression; then, being happy to see you arrived—we will not ask you, by what way you have come—for what is it to us? Besides, to say the truth, we know it; whatever you may say, you are artists, and your instinct is not a blind one. But as for those, and their number is very great, who compose negligently and badly, nothing shall hinder us from telling them that they compose badly, because they compose negligently; and that in order to compose better, they require to have either more instinct (which they cannot give themselves), or more art (which they will not labour to acquire).[1] If there are so many ministers whom we cannot listen to—if careless discourses are so frequent in the pulpit—if the weakest advocates can hardly descend so low, as the weakest preachers, it is because art, still more necessary in the pulpit than at the bar, is disowned by indolence, or rejected by prejudice. The opposite doctrine would certainly raise the level of ecclesiastical eloquence. Let the younger, among the more zealous, make the attempt; they will not be long in disabusing themselves of the idea, that art is something essentially elaborate, which requires,

[1] A young clergyman consulted the Rev. C. Simeon, saying, "I do not know how it is, that I do not preach extempore as well as I could wish. I suppose it must be owing to *want of faith*." "Ah! dear friend," replied Simeon, "justification is by *faith*, but extempore speaking is by *works*."—Ed.

in order to display itself, a large space, that is to say, much time; they will soon comprehend, and, at a later period, know by experience, that a great deal of art may be contained within an hour: the intensity of the labour fully makes up what is wanting in duration. When they have made this discovery, they have already made a great advance. What, with some minds, has brought art into discredit, is not art itself—is not even the abuse of it—it is much rather the absence of it. A discourse, the gait of which is stiff and formal, the plan painfully symmetrical, the style pompous or brilliant, the periods constantly rounded and sonorous, annoys us, or makes us impatient, by its cold elegance. We highly condemn so false a style. We even dare to censure, in works much more simple and grave, a certain rigidity of forms, and a certain dressing up of language, the last and obstinate vestiges of an era, in which eloquence was a theatrical show. Let us banish, if you will, the rhetoric of the rhetoricians to make room for the rhetoric of the philosopher. Let us claim the rights of individuality, which is to art what liberty is to law. But let us not accuse, nor banish art, with which the whims that have shocked us have nothing to do. Art is necessary—art is immortal—even the reforms we recommend hold of it, and will be its work; and when we shall have obtained them, we shall say with equal justice, and with equal truth: At last nature has resumed its rights—at last art has triumphed! Art, in fact, essentially consists in observing, and, perhaps, in again finding nature. There is only one true opposition—it is not that betwixt nature and art, but that betwixt false and genuine art. If we keep to this formula, it is because this formula is a principle.

Our meaning cannot be mis-understood: we only demand of the pulpit orator, that we have the style corresponding to his thought; but we demand this of him. We demand it in the pulpit of the village, as well as in that of the town: a popular style is not a degree, but a kind, of style. Neither do we maintain that the generality of preachers should surpass, in this respect, the generality of writers; but that the bad style, the style that is trivial, dull, unconnected, and languid, should not seem to be the necessary appendage of the pulpit; that good language should form no exception there; that the preacher, called to reason and to speak, should neither reason nor speak worse than other writers, and other orators.

It would be strange and unfortunate if, at an epoch in which

the world is more exacting or more difficult to please, the pulpit should be more indulgent towards itself, than at an epoch in which less was exacted.[1] This would be, in truth, an odd way of showing that "the weak things confound the strong;" in our opinion, the way is by no means a sure one.[2]

CHAPTER II.

FUNDAMENTAL QUALITIES OF STYLE.

We have to consider the different conditions of the elocution in sacred discourse. Now, the sacred discourse has none that exclusively belong to it. And if we had to abide by what peculiarly belonged to it, we should have to content ourselves with throwing in some loose notes, at the foot of the pages which treat of oratorical elocution in the primary rhetorical sense; presuming, besides, that general rhetoric, that is, without application to a particular species of eloquence, is already known to our hearers. But this is neither possible, nor would be profitable. It is, therefore, necessary to go over the principal matters of a treatise of oratorical elocution, or even of elocution in general, contemplating each rule in its particular relation to the eloquence of the pulpit.

What is to follow will be, therefore, an enumeration of the different qualities of style, as if we were treating of the art of writing in general, but contemplating, at the same time, each of these parts in its relation to the object of sacred discourse. We shall begin by considering those qualities which are indispensable to style of every species, and in all cases, without a certain measure of which, at least, the style would be decidedly bad.

These principal qualities, which constitute the faultless writer, just as obedience to the laws constitutes the honest man, not the virtuous man, are the following: *Clearness*, *purity*, *correctness*, *propriety*, *precision*, *order*, *naturalness*, *suitableness*.

[1] There are not more, there are perhaps fewer, men of genius than formerly; but, now, good speaking is become common, and many more persons are in a condition to judge of it.

[2] To a fanatic's remark, "God has no need of our learning," South replied, "Neither has God need of our ignorance."—Ed.

After the qualities, will come the excellencies, or the style, properly so called, which is the character impressed on the language by the subject, or by the individuality of the writer; after truth, beauty, so far, at least, as these two things can be separated, the beautiful being "the splendour of the true."

D'Alembert distinguishes between diction and style. "Elocution," says he, "contains two parts, which it is necessary to distinguish, though they are often confounded—diction and style. Diction properly respects only the grammatical qualities of discourse, correctness and clearness; style, on the contrary, includes the more particular, more difficult, and more rare qualities of elocution, which mark the genius or the talent of the writer or speaker; such are, the propriety of the terms, elegance, harmony, and ease.

We shall remark, for our own part, that some of the qualities which we first enumerated, and which are about to occupy our attention, are not purely negative, that is to say, consisting in the absence of a defect; propriety, precision, and even clearness, may, by their being carried to a certain point, become positive excellencies of style.

§ I.—Clearness.

It appears to me that, if we consider the chief aim or proximate end of discourse, we cannot hesitate to assign the first rank to clearness: *Nobis prima sit virtus perspicuitas*, says Quintilian.[1]

It ought not to be necessary to recommend clearness; but there is a prejudice in favour of obscurity. Man delights in clearness, but obscurity imposes upon him; because, what is profound is often obscure, obscurity is taken for profundity.[2]

[1] Quintilian, book viii., chap. ii. [So the maxim, "Si non vis intelligi debes negligi."—Ed.]

[2] The "Cautions for the Times," xxix., well says, Many think a *clear* idea is generally a little idea. They judge thought as an unskilful eye estimates the depth of water. Muddy water is esteemed deeper than it is, because you cannot see the bottom. Very clear water seems less deep than it is, because it is so thoroughly penetrated by the sight: reminding us of the story of Columbus and the egg. The danger of a fog is its mixture of light and darkness. If all were darkness, you would not venture out; but there is just light enough to tempt you out, but not enough to make you see a carriage coming, as you cross the street. There is an ideal truth, which is not yet capable of being with definite preciseness embodied in words, but which nevertheless may be so expressed as to be suggestive of thought to the reflecting hearer or reader. It should not

We do not pretend that clearness compensates for every defect. In certain subjects we distrust it. "Clearness, in eloquence, is often in itself alone a great strength—a great means of persuasion. Might we not add that it is often also a snare? It is not always a proof of the justness of the reasoning, far less of the justness of the views; it may, as well as elegance, accompany and decorate error. One may, doubtless, be at once superficial and obscure; but superficiality furnishes the means of being clear to those, whom a higher flight would have bewildered and left in the clouds. It is always necessary to be distrustful of obscurity; but it is not necessary to grant to clearness an absolute confidence. Self-love and indolence conspire to give us a prejudice in favour of what is clear; but, to judge of an author, it is not sufficient that we easily understand him, at the point of view at which he has placed himself: it is necessary, in the first instance, to examine that point of view itself. From the summit of a hill, the horizon is distinct, because it is limited; from the summit of a mountain, that which we embrace may be confused at its limits, but it is immense."[1] We would willingly say with La Bruyere: "One writes only to be understood; but it is at least necessary, in writing, to make beautiful things understood. It is to make a bad use of purity and perspicuity of discourse, to employ them in the service of matter that is dry, unfruitful, without wit, without utility, and without novelty. What advantage is it to the readers to understand easily, and without trouble, things frivolous and puerile, sometimes insipid and common, and to be less uncertain of the thought of an author, than to be wearied by his work?"[2] This is granting enough, I think; but obscurity, indeed, is not a good, but a bad thing. It is a bad thing, wherever perspicuity is requisite. We speak,

be condemned as unreal, because it is not expressed as clearly and definitely as more commonplace truths might be. The *Christian Observer* (Jan. 1858) well says, "He who gains the highest point on the mountain, will be oftenest in the clouds; yet the spectator would not say that he has not ascended, because a mist hangs about him." A French writer observes. "Les esprits qui se contentent d'une certaine portion étroite et distincte de la verité acquise, auront toujours dans la discussion beaucoup d'avantage apparent sur ceux qui cherchent dans l'inconnu une vérité plus vaste et plus idéale."—Ed.

[1] *Chrestomathie Française*, vol. iii., p. 207, 3d edition. Remarks of M. Vinet, occasioned by the discourse of Barnave, on the exercise of the right of peace and of war.

[2] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. i., *Des Ouvrages de l'Esprit.*

in order to be understood, and if we do not wish or do not hope to be understood, it is more ingenuous to hold our peace. What cannot be said clearly, is not worth the trouble of saying. It is true that everything is not naturally clear in the matters of which it is necessary to discourse to men; but, in that case, it is necessary either to overcome this obscurity, or to confess it, if it is invincible, and to show clearly the obscurity of the subject.

For ourselves, let us try to be clear upon this point, and to make it well understood, that the question is only of the clearness of the style, not of the clearness of the subjects. There would be an injustice in accusing an author of obscurity, who is obscure to us, only because the subject he treats is beyond our reach. He might have been wrong in bringing such a subject before such an auditory, and have shown in this a want of judgment; but he may have been nevertheless very clear.

Clearness is defined by its result: the quality of being easily understood well. No man, who has not understood your meaning, has a right to say to you: You are not clear. You ought to be clear, in the exact proportion, first, of the clearness of the subject; then, of the intelligence of the hearer; and, lastly, of his attention.

In the subjects in which we propose, not merely to instruct, but to persuade and to determine the will, we are not strong, unless we are clear;—we are sometimes strong, by the mere circumstance that we are clear. Hence results the peculiar necessity of being clear in the pulpit; but this necessity also results from the nature of public discourse, and from the nature of the auditories to which preaching is addressed. The labour of comprehending hinders the soul from yielding. It is here that the precept of Quintilian appropriately finds its application: *Oratio debet negligenter quoque audientibus esse aperta.*[1]

[We may add, that the French mind is exacting in this

[1] Quintilian, book viii., chap. ii., ["A speech ought to be easily intelligible even to careless hearers."—Ed.]

"I had rather," said Dr T. Edwards, "be fully understood by ten, than be admired by ten thousand." Manton, after preaching at St Paul's, was followed on his leaving the church by a poor man, who pulled him by the sleeve, and said, "I came, hoping to get some good to my soul out of your sermon, but I have been disappointed, for I could understand but little of it." Manton felt the deserved reproof, and replied, with tears, "Friend, if I did not give you a good sermon, you have given one to me."—Ed.

respect. The French language is eminently clear, from the very effect of causes which ought to render it obscure, as is thought. Other languages, in which one is always sure of finding his way again, notwithstanding the windings of the period, are less careful to cultivate clearness. The French language not presenting the same facility, one using it gets off differently. It has formed for itself, in the mind of French auditories, a perhaps exclusive demand of clearness. The preacher ought to satisfy this demand. The mere possibility of a double meaning in a phrase, is sufficient to distract, and to estrange some hearers. It is necessary to accommodate one's self to this susceptibility, so much the more, as it has saved the language, only by an exacting rigour, from the obscurity from which it with so much trouble emerged.]

But clearness should not be carried so far as to render discourse insipid. Time has weakened the notion of the word *clearness* (*clarté*), as that of many others. Formerly it signified *brightness*, *splendour* (*éclat*, *splendeur*), and Racine might speak, in his time, of Jerusalem as "brilliant with clearness" (*brilliante de clarté*). Let us restore to the thing all its force, and let the clearness be not merely negative, but *brilliant*. To explain everything, to omit no detail, to satiate the mind with evidence, is to miss our aim by going beyond it. The style produces effects, not merely by what it expresses and exhibits, but also by what it does not express;[1] clearness excludes neither reticence, nor ellipses, nor half-lights, which are even occasions of activity for the mind. Where the hearer is capable of performing the journey himself, he does not wish to be carried. The orator is doubtless expected to come to the aid of the indolent hearers, but certainly not so far as to be tedious to active minds. He must leave to the hearer neither too much, nor too little to do.

[There is in style a great number of beauties, which are at bottom improprieties of language, exaggerations, obscurities of diction. There are figures of rhetoric which are nothing better. In the hyperbole, we give the hearer something to retrench; in the litotes,[2] something to add; in irony, the true to put in parallelism with the false, etc.] But all this does not trench upon

[1] A suggestive style.—Ed.

[2] A figure in rhetoric whereby less is expressed, than is implied.—Ed.

the rule which we have given. Let us, however, seek the means of observing it, and of having a clear style. These are of two sorts: the one sort outside of the labour of elocution, or preliminary to that labour; the other which have their application in that labour itself. Let us begin with describing the first.

1. Good faith or sincerity.—We do not say *truth*, because truth is sometimes less clear than error,[1] and because we speak only of subjects which are clear in themselves. In this respect, there may be sometimes advantage in defending error. But in error, as in truth, sincerity is a means of clearness. The position of him who defends the truth without conviction, is worse, in this respect, than the position of him who defends error with conviction. The latter may, perhaps, cut the knots which he thinks to untie; but his position is a true one, his state is that of liberty, and of well-being; he has not painfully to reconcile his thought and the truth, to thrust a crooked blade into a straight scabbard. He, on the contrary, whose thought is not in agreement with itself, obliged to reconcile two adversaries, between which there will never be any communion, the error which he defends, and the truth which he cannot hinder himself from seeing, is to be pitied, either in defending the error, or in knowing the truth. Forced to take, in his language, the side of truth, he experiences a perpetual embarrassment, which he endeavours to dissemble, by artifices of words, by laborious ingenuity in the turns of expression, and by the furtive subtlety of the connections; nothing of all this is favourable to clearness, which lives by candour, decision, and unity. Now, a discourse can no more be eloquent in obscurity, than a statute can be expressive in the darkness. A sophist may be eloquent, but he must be a convinced sophist.

2. The distinct conception of the idea, or, to understand one's self well. Boileau has said:

> "Selon que notre idée est plus ou moins obscure,[2]
> L'expression la suit, ou moins nette, ou plus pure.

[1] "Certain heresies have the appearance of being clear," says Bernardin de Saint Pierre, speaking of Condillac. Eclecticism has also the air of being clear, and it is by a great appearance of clearness that certain erroneous systems, and certain heresies have succeeded.

[2] He has not said, according as our idea is more or less *true*—but more or less *obscure*.

Ce que l'on conçoit bien s'énonce clairement,
Et les mots pour le dire arrivement aisément."[1]

The two last lines are true only with a restriction. The words do not always come easily to him who has clear conceptions. It might even be sometimes said, that we conceive clearly only when we have found the words. For we think with words, and the expression is first the analysis of the thought. But it is not the less true that we must not flatter ourselves, that we can make clear to others what is not clear to ourselves. Perhaps our thought is obscure to us, because we have not yet found its expression; perhaps we have not found this expression, because this thought is obscure to us; it matters not; we must not pretend to give what we have not. But if, on the contrary, by any means whatsoever, by the words, or without the words, we have succeeded in giving an account to ourselves of what is in our thought; if our thought, like a logical mechanism, play without effort, and without embarrassment; if there is between the members of our thought no breaking of continuity, we have, at least, a very great chance of being understood; and if it is not an infallible means, it is an indispensable condition of clearness.

3. To take care to place one's self in the position of the hearer. For want of this care, one may be obscure. The signs which suffice to express our thought to ourselves so as to recognise it, are not always sufficient to express it to others. We know what we mean to say, they do not. We may, therefore, in speaking for our own sake, concede to ourselves many things, which we cannot concede to ourselves in speaking to others. Let us recollect how often our readers have met with, in our writings, some equivocal expression,[2] in a sentence which we had read ten times without perceiving it there.

"What a sacred author has said of prophecy, we might dare to apply to human discourse in general, and to the style of written compositions: there ought to be nothing there *of a par-*

[1] According as our idea is more or less obscure, the expression follows it, either less distinct or more exact. What is well conceived is clearly enunciated, and the words easily come for expressing it.—Boileau, *L'Art Poétique*, chant i.

[2] "Vir bonus et prudens . . . *parum claris* lucem dare coget,
Arguet ambiguè dictum, mutanda notabit."—Horace, *Ars Poet.*—Ed.

ticular interpretation (2 Peter i. 20),[1] that is to say, the thought ought to assume a form at once individual, and general, which does not require, in order to be understood and admitted, a conformity in every particular of the mind of the reader to that of the writer. It might happen, that our expression was subjectively true, that it rendered with the utmost fidelity the aspect in which an object presented itself to us, and the impression which we have received from it; it may meet with some one who finds again, in the manner in which we have conceived the idea, quite the same conception which it has produced in his mind; we shall have, perhaps, admirably spoken for this brother-mind; but we have spoken well only for him, at most for some few others; we have thought too solitarily; we have thought and felt, rather than spoken, if it is true that to speak is to seek the mind of others on ground that is familiar to them; their adhesion, their lively assent, their rapid copartnership—all things, the desire of which is one of the first instincts of eloquence, we have too little felt the need of, and it is to be feared that intelligent minds will not come to seek us, in the haughty solitude in which we have secluded ourselves at a distance from them. A book is not a monologue: that is a very long *aside*, which lasts for a volume. It is necessary to write in view and in presence of others; to borrow, in a manner, of the reader, the language which we would hold to him; to listen to him, as much as we speak to him; to make each of our sentences an answer to his mute questions; to allow him to dictate to us our own words. And yet these words must be ours! And in order that they may move the reader, it is necessary that they strike him as strange, while they are suitable to him, as being his own. It is this happy combination that has always formed able writers, and true orators: and, in proportion as the one, or the other, of these elements has been wanting, whether the first or the second is of no consequence, eloquence is defective: for the art maintains itself at once by individuality and sympathy; to live much in one's self, and at the same time to live much in others, is the twofold condition of a powerful utterance.

"The most of writers should be re-translated; few of them come into the world translated, that is to say, clothed in the

[1] "No prophecy of the Scripture is of any private (ἰδίας) interpretation."—*Auth. Engl. Vers.*—Ed.

form that is most suitable for communicating their thoughts. What one has first written for his own sake, he must write a second time for the sake of others."[1]

Pascal, on re-perusing his Thoughts, would not, perhaps, have comprehended them all, and he would have hesitated between one sense and another. If Rousseau, who had so much difficulty in finding words in order to reach others, could write the *Emile* nine times, we may well write our sermons twice, at least.

La Bruyere has said: "Every writer, in order to write clearly, ought to put himself in the place of his readers, examine his own work as something which is new to him, which he reads for the first time, in which he has no part, and which the author would have submitted to his criticism, and then to persuade himself that we are not understood, merely because we understand ourselves, but because we are really intelligible."[2]

It would be necessary, then, to do this, although we wrote only for ourselves. "It is good to give an account of one's thought to others, in order to give an account of it to one's self; we are not quite sure of perfectly comprehending ourselves, until we have done all, to be perfectly comprehended by others; our thought is not good for ourselves, until we have communicated it, and succeeded in making it to be received by others. Otherwise, we run a great risk of remaining in the vague, and in the *almost;* it is good to have to do with people who are not satisfied with this; and rest assured, that the public belong to this class."[3]

In order to put ourselves in the place of our hearers, it is necessary to know them; to see, after the sermon, if, and how, we have been understood.

After these general means of attaining clearness, we give the following particular ones, namely:

1. Avoid expressions too little known, or too abstract. [These would not necessarily render the style less clear; but we speak of a clearness relative to the ordinary auditory of the preacher. The pulpit demands much attention in this respect. One owes to an auditory, in matters which supremely concern their happi-

[1] M. Vinet here quotes himself. See *Le Semeur*, book vii. (year 1838), pp. 307–309.

[2] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. i., *Des Ouvrages de l'Esprit.*

[3] M. Vinet here quotes himself. See *Le Semeur*, vol. vii. (year 1838), p. 309.

ness, to be clear with respect to them. The sacrifices made for the sake of clearness sometimes become—which is a singular thing—obstacles to precision. But clearness above all things![1]]

2. Avoid making too great leaps over what is intermediate.

3. Avoid the use of equivocal expressions, [even when this would not lead into error. In every case, this is annoying and distracting.]

4. Avoid painful, and embarrassed turns of expression. [It costs an unpractised mind much labour to distinguish the principal idea, in a sentence that is encumbered. This does not, however, exclude the periodic style.]

5. Avoid the want of unity in a sentence. [There is nothing to determine the length of a period, but it is necessary that it be one for the thought, grammar, and the ear. Unity of thought exists, when all the ideas are integral parts of the principal idea. The period ought to have the effect of concentric circles, all traced around the same centre.]

6. Avoid introducing into one and the same sentence, too many accessory ideas, or ideas too subtle or refined.

Avoid the want of order in description, narration, etc. [in which the parts would not throw suitable light upon one another.]

§ II.—Purity, Correctness, Propriety, Precision.

These different qualities, and the two last more evidently than the two first, are the Subsidiaries (*succursales*) of clearness. It is from their relation to clearness of style, that purity and correctness are especially recommendable.

Correctness is only a branch of purity. Both consist in a rigorous respect for the conventions of language, [the one, in that which concerns the words, the other, in that which concerns the forms.

Language is a convention which, in this, resembling society of which it is the instrument and the base, binds at once all persons consenting, or not consenting. Language is as sacred as society.

[1] "A man need not fear stooping too low, when he considers himself as the dispenser of the mysteries of abased wisdom."—Quesnel on Mark iv. 33.

Archbishop Tillotson used, it is said, to read his sermons to an illiterate old woman of plain sense, and alter his expressions, till he brought the style down to her level.

Non fumum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem
Cogitat.—Horace, *Ars Poet.*—Ed.

It is not immutable, it cannot be so, but it suffers no arbitrary, and capricious change, no gratuitous violence, no modification purely individual.[1]] There is no convention more respected, though the legislator has not said, "Such a word shall always signify such a thing, or such a thing shall be designated by such a word." However, the very acts of the tribunals are founded on this convention, which is nowhere written. Words are representative signs of intellectual values. Writers without purity, or without correctness, are like false coiners, who introduce confusion into the intellectual transactions, and diminish the credit of expressions. Respect for language is almost a part of morality. [There would be, doubtless, exaggeration and injustice in taxing a man with immorality who speaks ill; but we may well say, at least, that the general corruption of the language is a sign of the degeneracy of the morals.[2]]

Let us add, that a bad style of language brings the preacher into discredit with those who are able to judge of it.

Some of these defects, those which would indicate affectation, or a too intimate connection with the fashionable world, are contrary to the gravity of the pulpit.[3]

Propriety, or *accuracy*, consists in employing no terms but such as are exclusively suitable to each of the ideas which we wish to express.

There can be no perfect synonymes, [for all language is poor, in comparison of the number of ideas to be expressed.] Two forms cannot be applicable to the same idea: these are henceforth two ideas. There is only one expression for each idea; no other expresses it. [When a language is enriched, it is not by gaining something superfluous; the expression, taken in this sense, is improper. No language in the world can include any superfluity. An expression found with difficulty, goes to fill up an empty niche, and to name the solitary idea which was waiting for a visible existence, or which would have had an existence only by

[1] *Le Semeur*. M. Vinet here quotes himself.

[2] For instance, the many softening terms, which, among a degenerate people, come into use, for gross sins. See instances in Trench's *Study of Words*.—Ed.

[3] In certain countries, at certain times, one might be obliged to lower his language to the level of that of the multitude, and to corrupt it in order to be understood: this is not the case with us,—we have nothing between the French and the *patois*, and we have no longer even *patois*. It is from us, that the majority learn French. We are at once guardians of good maxims, and of good language.

means of a periphrasis. It is not that we cannot in certain cases, without sensible inconvenience, replace one word by another, especially when it is the general idea which we have in view. When we define, for example, *indigence* (want of the necessary), and *poverty* (want of everything superfluous), we must mark well the distinction; but when we would speak, in a sermon, of the general idea of *beneficence*, it would be all one to recommend bringing assistance to indigence, or to poverty.]

La Bruyere says on this subject: "Amongst all the different expressions which are capable of expressing a single one of our thoughts, there is only one that is the right one: we do not always fall upon it in speaking or in writing. It is, nevertheless, true that it exists—that every expression which is not *it*, is feeble, and does not satisfy a man of intellect who wishes to make himself understood."[1]

La Bruyere here points out two disadvantages of impropriety: *obscurity* and *feebleness;* and two advantages of propriety; *clearness* and *force.*

Improper expressions do not render style totally obscure, but troubled; that is, wanting clearness. However, by means of impropriety, style becomes decidedly, though not totally, obscure. As to the force, it is always in proportion to the clearness; we may add force to clearness; but we shall never be strong, without being clear; strength is only a higher degree of truth.

The law of propriety condemns, not merely inaccurate expressions (this is only the first degree of it), but expressions which do not lie sufficiently near the idea, or which leave an interval between them and the idea. There is, therefore, impropriety in the last of these lines of Boileau on Juvenal:—

> "Soit que sur un écrit arrivé de Caprée,
> Il brise de Séjan la statue adorée,
> Soit qu'il fasse au conseil courir les sénateurs,
> D'un tyran soupçonneux pâles adulateurs,
> . . . . . .
> Ses écrits pleins de feu partout *brillent aux yeux.*"[2]

[1] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. i., *Des Ouvrages de l'Esprit.* [See Horace, *Ars Poet.* "In verbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis, Hoc amet, hoc spernat."—Ed.]

[2] Whether, on a writing having arrived from Caprea, he break in pieces the adored statue of Sejanus; whether he represent the senators as hurrying to the council, pale adulators of a suspicious tyrant . . . his writings, full of fire, everywhere sparkle *to the eyes.*—Boileau, *L'Art Poétique*, chant ii.

Propriety may be carried to such a point, as to be no longer purely negative, but positive and striking; it becomes an excellence of style."[1] We understand what D'Alembert has said: "In authors that do not rise above mediocrity, the expression is, so to speak, always near to, not at, the idea; the perusal of them occasions to good intellects the same kind of pain, that delicate ears would suffer from a singer, whose voice should happen to be betwixt the false and the true. The propriety of the terms is, on the contrary, the distinctive characteristic of great writers; it is by this that their style is always on a level with their subject; it is by this quality that we recognise the true talent for writing, and not by the futile art of disguising common ideas by a vain colouring."[2]

It is not necessary, in order that the want of propriety should produce its effect, that you should be surprised by the reader in a flagrant case of impropriety; the negative effect is sufficient; that is to say, it is sufficient that the exact relation of the term to the idea be not felt. And how is it felt? It is felt when a use of the term, more or less repeated, has ended in giving to the most of the readers or hearers a just sentiment of the value of the expression; it is impossible that, conformably to the end of its creation, it should not, when employed sufficiently often in its true sense, be engraven on the minds of persons, otherwise the least capable of defining it: therefore, when we use the term improperly, if they do not distinctly perceive that it is improper, they, at least, do not receive from this word the impression—the stamp, so to speak, which they ought to have received from it. The hammer has struck aside of the nail, or struck it obliquely.

Moreover, there may be an affectation of propriety, as there is an affectation of purity. The reader or hearer must not feel the painful labour of distinctions, and analysis.

The care given to propriety of expression would contribute, not merely to the clearness and the force of the discourse, but to the richness and the variety of the language. To what is the poverty of our vocabulary owing? Is it that we are not acquainted with our own language? No; but we are not accustomed to distinguish between words of a like signification, that is to say, ex-

[1] In this Buffon is especially remarkable. See, among others, his *Description de l'Arabie.*

[2] D'Alembert, *Mélanges*, vol. ii., p. 345, *Réflexions sur l'Elocution Oratoire.*

pressing, under a particular shade, one and the same general idea. From not well remarking the different shades of an idea, we employ, for each of them, either the generic term which embraces them all, or one of the special terms, taken at random. This word, rather than the others, almost always recurs; the others remain unemployed, the vocabulary becomes limited, the language is impoverished. There are minds happily constituted —favoured, besides, by education—to whom the language delivers, at all times, all its riches in expressions, and in turns of phrases. We say of them that they know it well; but what does this mean? Are the others less acquainted with it, seeing that none of the terms, of which it is composed, are strange or new to them? The first knows it better, in this sense that, having received from each of these words a more distinct and more lively impression, the word, better seen, better felt, and with which they have had a more intimate connection, is more instantaneously recalled by their thought. We may, up to a certain point, obtain this advantage by study—I mean, in particular, the attentive study of good authors. It would, also, be a useful labour to seek information, when we are uncertain as to the value of a term, or as to the choice to be made betwixt two words; that is to say, to have recourse to the most esteemed works on synonymes. We may, lastly, recommend in this respect, the exercise of translating.

Propriety, in the expression of moral ideas, is difficult and rare; but is not naturally foreign to them. For, though there is hardly a state, or moral fact, perfectly simple, *in concreto*, we come in time to distinguish clearly the elements which are combined in each of these states, or of these facts. I wish no other proof of them than the names we have found for them.

Precision.—These two qualities, propriety and precision, are assuredly not without affinity; the want of the one supposes the want of the other, and we will scarcely meet with a writer who cultivates the one, and neglects the other. They are, however, distinct, and ought to be studied separately.

The word *precision* seems to denote language, which intimates neither more, nor less, than what we wish to express, and it is, indeed, in this sense that the word is often taken; but in the systems of rhetoric, and by the Academy, precision is defined: "Exactness in discourse, by which we confine ourselves to the

subject on which we speak, in such a manner that we say nothing superfluous." The Academy adds, "that it is also used for *accuracy, regularity*."

We, for our part, shall say that, whilst propriety requires accuracy of the signs, precision requires that we should endeavour to reduce their number to what is necessary; but, if it wishes to say nothing too much, it also wishes to say the whole. "Precision," says M. Lémontey, "consists in banishing from discourse everything superfluous,[1] and in admitting nothing that is necessary. It is necessary to distinguish it from one of its branches, which is called conciseness, and which studies parsimony in the use of words, and the compression of the phraseology, rather than the strict adaptation of the expression to the thought. Conciseness lends its assistance indifferently to falsehood and to truth; whilst we cannot conceive of precision, without accuracy and clearness. Conciseness may be, also, only an affectation of the mind, whereas precision especially consists in vigour, combined with judgment, and with character. In man, it is the attribute of force, and of reason; in social order, the language of the law which prescribes, and of the power which commands; in the sciences, the object and the perfection of methods and nomenclatures."

Precision, nevertheless, tends towards conciseness, since, as its name indicates, it retrenches—*cuts round*. Conciseness is distinguished from it only by a greater economy of words, than the object of precision demands; for precision suppresses only what is decidedly redundant, and tends to spare the mind a fatigue, namely, that which springs from the necessity the author has made for us of summing up the thought, or of reducing it to a small number of elements. Conciseness, reducing itself somewhat below what is required, wishes indeed to give the mind not fatigue, doubtless, but labour; and it is thus comprised in the genus of those procedures, or of those figures of which we have spoken above. It is an ellipsis, not of words, but of thoughts. To take it as a figure, or, at least, as a particular force of style,

[1] From the Latin præcidere, *to cut off*. Comp. Horace, *Ars Poet.*, Ambitiosa *recidet*.

Also, "Quicquid præcipies, esto brevis; ut citò dicta
Percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles.
Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat."—Ed.

it can hardly constitute the form of the whole of a writing, and, above all, not of a sermon. It readily produces obscurity[1]—it approaches, indeed, to affectation and the epigrammatic style. It is often only the false semblance of precision, and nothing is easier than to have, at once, much conciseness and very little precision. For we may be, at once, parsimonious and prodigal, and, after this affectation of rigour, leave only vague ideas in the mind of the reader.

Precision interdicts the use of repetitions, useless epithets, pleonasms, patchings;[2] it goes farther, and, becoming a genuine excellence of style, it furnishes us with the turns of expression which are most prompt, without being blunt, and suggests to us the concentration of several words into one, when this word really contains the substance of several. It aims at sparing the reader the trouble of taking the sum of the ideas, which we could make him comprehend at a glance. Redundance, however, and a certain accumulation of circumstances and of words, may be appropriate.[3]

The necessity for precision is not as imperative in one kind of composition, as in another. Prolixity would be displeasing anywhere; but a certain amplification is necessary when, in place of writing, we have to speak, and especially when we have to speak to an auditory of very various capacities;[4] and some dif-

[1] See Rollin, *Traité des Etudes*, book v., chap. ii., art. i.

Horace, *Ars Poet.*, "Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio."—Ed.

[2] See Boileau criticised by Condillac, *Art d'Ecrire*, p. 215, edition de Genève, 1808, and by P. Corneille, vol. i., pp. 129, 132, edition Didot, 1800.

[3] See Peliston, *Discours au roi pour M. Fouquet.* (*Chrestomathie Française*, vol. ii., pp. 254–258, third edition.)—See, also, 1 Corinthians xv. 53–54.

Archbishop Whately warns against the two extremes of conciseness and prolixity: "Extreme conciseness is ill-suited to hearers, whose intellectual powers are small. The expedient, however, of a prolix style, by way of accommodation to such minds, is seldom successful. The feebleness produced by excessive dilution will occasion the attention to languish. Young speakers fall into pompous verbosity, from an idea that they are adding perspicuity and force to what is said, when they are only encumbering the sense with a load of words. A speaker of this class is often said to have 'a fine command of language,' when it might be said with more correctness, that language has command of him; he has the same command of language, that a man has of a horse that runs away with him."—Ed.

[4] "Precision, a stranger to the protestations of love, to the confidences of friendship, to the freedom of the epistolary style, and to the mysteries of diplomacy, meets with legitimate obstacles in eloquence, in poetry, and in the dramatic art. Whenever we speak to several persons at the same time, it is neces-

fuseness is suited to the out-pourings of the heart. A heart that is strongly moved feels it necessary to multiply the thought which agitates it, and to give free scope to it by the number of the expressions, and the images. We also excite but little emotion in others by language too compressed, unless it follow and sum up the thoughts, that have been more copiously expressed.

In the same discourse, there may be found different degrees of precision. But we seldom proceed from more precision to more copiousness. The wave seems gradually to contract itself, in order to rush with greater force. "The oratorical art," says Lémontey, "seems to be prodigal of sumptuous developments, only in order to prepare for its harangues a more urgent summary, and to finish like Demosthenes what it commenced like Isocrates."[1]

Precision is not merely a quality of the isolated sentence. There may be redundant sentences in the paragraph, as well as redundant words in the sentence; and the general contexture of the style may be loose, as well as that of a period. One of the rules which we have given for the discourse, as a whole, should be applicable here; everything must hasten onwards towards the catastrophe. We must not use two sentences, where one is

sary to adapt ourselves to the attention of the most frivolous, to the intelligence of the most simple, and to the indolence of the most sluggish. Whenever the business is to convince various minds, what a variety of tones and images, what redoubled attacks, are not necessary, in order to meet dispositions of various degrees of malevolence, and to meet prejudices, the roots of which are not the same! Thus the sacred pulpit, and the political tribune, attempt it in different ways, and arm themselves on every side with vehemence, authority, unction, imagination, and arguments. . . . ."—LEMONTEY.

[1] *Satius est aliquid* (*orationi*) *superesse, quam deesse.* (QUINTILIAN, book iv., chap. ii.)—"What usually causes obscurity in discourse, is the desire of always explaining one's self with brevity. It is much better to err in being too long, than in being too short. A style which would be everywhere lively and concise, such, for example, as that of Sallust or that of Tertullian, may be suitable to works which, not being composed to be delivered, leave to the reader leisure and liberty to retrace his steps; but cannot be suitable to a sermon which, by its rapidity, might escape the most attentive hearer. We must not suppose that it is always suitable, and the clearness of the discourse ought to be such, that it can bring light into the most inattentive minds, just as the sun strikes our eyes without our thinking of it, and almost in spite of us. The principal effect of this quality is not that people can understand what we say, but that they cannot avoid understanding it."—ROLLIN, *Traité des Etudes*, book v., chap. ii., art. i., *De la manière dont un prédicateur doit parler.*

sufficient. We must not linger, when the reader wishes to advance. We must not proceed with less rapidity than his mind.[1] He may, no doubt, allow himself to be amused on the way by splendid exhibitions of thought, and by flights of imagination; but the pleasure which he finds in these, is no excuse for the orator, whose business is not to amuse the hearer, but to bring him towards a determinate end. Everything ought to conduce to this, even the ornaments of style; oratorical discourse admits only beauties that are useful.[2] What shall we say, then, of windings of thought and flights of fancy which have not even the merit of amusing, of those useless sentences which only retard, of a loose tissue, the frettings of which are not even concealed by the embroidery? Let us form for ourselves this general rule: let nothing separate the ideas which complete each other, and between which the mind does not require to make a pause. If something intervene betwixt two ideas, it must be an idea which is fitted to render the passage of the one to the other more gentle, like those sluices in rivers, which save a boat from making a too rough and too rapid a descent. Without these intermediate ideas, I grant that the texture of the style would be compressed, even to the risk of being hard and inflexible. But when they are superfluous, the style is loose and dragging. The orator is a traveller; the hearer travels along with him:

"De leur robe trainante ils relèvent les plis."[3]

We must in no case, and with this I conclude, allow precision to make the style abstract and dry. In habitually seeking for turns of expression in which the thought is reduced, and condensed, we, doubtless, fall upon lively strokes, we attain to elegance, which is so much akin to precision, we become ingenious, but the whole is deficient in richness and in colouring.

Precision, applied to the general fabric of the diction, becomes *rapidity*. [This is not merely a form, but a quality of style.

[1] See D'Alembert, *Réflexions sur l'Elocution Oratoire*, in the *Mélanges*, vol. ii., p. 345.

[2] The mind of man has its bounds and measures; and as the eye is dazzled with too strong a light, so is the mind offended with the glare of too great an assemblage of beauties. Further, it would destroy the end of preaching, which is to sanctify the conscience; for when the mind is overloaded with too many agreeable ideas, it has not leisure to reflect on the objects; and without reflection the heart is unaffected.—Claude.—Ed.

[3] "They lift up the folds of their trailing robe."

Style is to composition in general, what man is to the world, a *microcosm;* man is a world in miniature, and style is discourse in miniature, with all its laws, and all its characteristics. Rapidity is not precipitation, but the saving of time and space.] There are two forms of style: the one which concentrates the elements of each idea; the other, which proceeds by amplification. [The sentence of Bossuet is the paragraph of Massillon; and we can find fault with neither the one, nor the other. Bossuet is sometimes too rapid, and Massillon too long; but they are often, also, the one brief, the other long, at the proper season. The march of Bossuet is more majestic, more striking; the sentence of Massillon, all florid as it is, is sometimes languid. The *Petit Carême*, which is regarded as the most exquisite of his works, is not, however, the most eloquent. It develops often, and develops perfectly well, the ideas; but it also amplifies, expressing one and the same idea under two or three different forms. There is a difference, because the words differ; but it is almost nothing, and was not worth the trouble of being employed. This form is a little fatiguing, when it is continued through an entire volume. Without doubt, Bossuet is often wrong in going too rapidly. In short, it is necessary to develop at the proper time; but it is also necessary to know how to retrench.[1]

[This leads us to speak of proportion, which consists in giving to each idea the place, and the degree of development, which belong to it in the plan of the discourse.] It is in the proportion, that Bossuet most frequently errs in his sermons, [and it is for this reason, that we rank him, as a preacher, after Bourdaloue and Massillon, though he has more genius than either. If everybody reads Massillon, and many Bourdaloue, Bossuet is little read, though abounding in flashes of eloquence, because he is deficient in proportion. This defect injures the effect of passages otherwise very good.][2]

§ III.—Order.

Precision has led us to speak of the texture of style. We have

[1] We contrast Bossuet with Massillon, in a passage taken from each of them.—See Bossuet, *Oraison Funèbre de Michel Le Tellier* in the *Choix d'Oraisons Funèbres*, edition Villemain, 1827, p. 273),—and Massillon, vol. vii., p. 128, edition Méquignon: "Nous n'avons le grand." . . . The paragraphs of Massillon are so many couplets. This is deficient in freedom and variety.

[2] See, on this subject, the sermon of Massillon on *Forgetting Injuries*, and that of P. de la Rue, on *The Dying Sinners*, p. 569.

condemned everything which retards, or interrupts the succession of the thoughts; this was applying to style, what we have said of the general composition of the discourse; this is still that continuous progression recommended by Théremin, but in reduced proportions. We now come to another quality of style: order.

All the other qualities of which we have spoken, are, as it were, lost, without order, which puts in its proper place each paragraph in the discourse, every sentence in the paragraph, every word in the sentence.[1] And as to clearness, of which we have first spoken, it cannot exist without order; order is the principal condition of it. Without order, no clearness; and without clearness, no force. Besides, independently of clearness, it is with a style in which order reigns, as with a wall, the stones of which are well joined; it is much more solid and strong. Now, in style, the effect of order is, that the ideas are properly joined, and the result of this is strength.

The law of order proscribes not merely gross faults, evident cases of misplacing of the parts; it rejects everything in the arrangement of ideas, that is not so well ordered as it might be. It requires that the texture of the style should be as compressed as possible. It declares this, by the very formula which it makes use of; since, according to this formula, for which we could not substitute another, it is necessary that each idea should be followed by that which, of all those which the author expresses, is the nearest to it. I do not say absolutely the nearest possible, since this would be to interdict that suppression of the intermediate ones, which makes the rapidity of style contribute to its beauty. If the idea which is logically the nearest to another idea is separated from it, in the discourse, by some other, there is already a disorder, which may not indeed be visible, but which is not the less, on that account, without consequence. And if this fault, a small one, perhaps, is repeated several times in succession; if this negligence is habitual; there results from it an effect, inappreciable, perhaps, because it is negative, but nevertheless considerable, namely, a fatigue and uncertainty in the mind of the hearer, under the influence of which it can receive no complete, and sustained impression.

[1] Ordinis hæc virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor,
Ut jam nunc dicat jam nunc debentia dici,
Pleraque differat, et præsens in tempus omittat.
—Horace, *Ars Poet.*—Ed.

Every mind has the instinct, and the desire of order. Every mind delights in order and suffers from its contrary.[1] It suffers from it without perceiving the cause of its suffering, without perceiving, perhaps, that it does suffer; it is like the unpleasant feeling which we experience in a vitiated atmosphere, or, not to go out of the intellectual sphere, it is like the suffering produced by a sophism, even when we do not unravel it, so as to discover the error in the reasoning. If it is the destiny of man to err; his natural element,—his essence, so to speak, is nevertheless the truth. The mind that is worst balanced, and which allows itself the most extravagances, does not permit them in others. The same mind, which does not lead others well, wishes to be well led, and every great deviation from that route which itself perhaps cannot indicate, disconcerts and fatigues it. The simple interposition of a thought, which the train of ideas did not yet call for, or which it no longer called for, destroys the growing interest. The mind, deceived by vain promises, and perplexed, no longer lends itself to the intention of the orator, if, indeed, we can say that he has one: for we see him assailed by several ideas at once, not knowing which to attend to, and, in this perplexity, breaking down his thought at every turn, retracing his steps, mistaking the gradations, and confounding the relations. No matter though we do not remark the fact, it is not the less real on that account; and, decidedly, where there is less order, there is so much the less power.[2]

If order, or the connection of the ideas, is everywhere necessary; it is especially so in the eloquence of the pulpit, in which it is necessary to spare the hearer even the least degree of needless, and unprofitable trouble. We must, indeed, leave to the hearer, as to the reader, something to do; but what is in nowise permitted, is, to oblige him to do over again our own work.

There is in style the same distinction between logical and ora-

[1] Connect the parts of your division together. To make a division of many parts, which have no connection, is exceedingly offensive to the hearer. Besides, the human mind, naturally loving order, will more easily retain a division in which there appears a connection.—CLAUDE.—ED.

[2] M. Vinet proposed to insert here two pieces on *singularity*, written by him with the object of bringing out, by their comparison, the importance and the necessity of order. We have found only one fragment of the first of these pieces, and as it is thus impossible to establish the comparison which the author had in view, we have thought it better to suppress this unfinished paragraph.—ED.

torical order, as in the whole of composition. We apply, therefore, to style the rules of the oratorical art, by saying:

That what is more general ought to precede what is more particular;

That what is less striking ought to precede what is more so;

That the form which concentrates an idea, should come after that in which it is given more at large.

What causes the want of this order, is precipitation, is the charm of accidental, or *terminal* ideas, which form true connections, but not connections that are true to the object of the discourse.

No great writer, no writer classed among the models of composition, shows himself defective on this point, any more than on any of the preceding; or, rather, none of the writers by whom this law is not severely and delicately observed, has ever been ranked among the models, though he might have besides much invention, force, and splendour. It is very proper to observe that, if even the union of all the qualities which we have enumerated, does not constitute the great writer; neither are the others, though they appear of a superior nature, sufficient to effect this, without the first.

Examine, in respect to this, these lines of Racine in the *Athalie:*

"L'entreprise, sans doute, est grand et perilleuse;
J'attaque sur son trone une reine orgueilleuse,
Qui voit sous ses drapeaux marcher un camp nombreux
De hardis étrangers, d'infidèles Hébreux:
Mais ma force est au Dieu dont l'intéret me guide.
Songez qu'en cet enfant tout Israël réside.
Déjà ce Dieu vengeur commence à la troubler;
Déjà, trompant ses soins, j'ai su vous rassembler," etc.[1]

And these lines of André Chénier in the *Mendicant:*

"Il ouvre un œil avide, et longtemps envisage
L'étranger. Puis enfin sa voix trouve un passage:
Est-ce toi, Cléotas? toi qu'ainsi je revoi!
Tout ici t'appartient. O mon père! est-ce toi?

[1] The enterprise, doubtless, is great and dangerous; I attack upon her throne a haughty queen, who sees a numerous train of bold strangers and infidel Hebrews march under her banners: But my strength is in the God whose interest guides me. *Think that all Israel resides in this child.* Already this avenging God begins to trouble her. Already, eluding her vengeance, I have been able to assemble you.—Racine, *Athalie*, act iv., scene iii.

Je rougis que mes yeux aient pu te méconnaitre.
O Cléotas ! mon père ! O toi, qui fus mon maitre,
Viens ; je n'ai fait ici que garder ton trésor,
Et ton ancien Lycus veut te servir encore." [1]

Let us compare the same group of ideas, differently arranged, in the two following pieces. The subject is the foolishness of Christianity.

I. "Those who accuse Christianity of foolishness ought, at least, to grant that it has foreseen this reproach, and has braved it. It has itself hastened to accuse itself of this. It has professed the bold design of saving men, by means of foolishness. It acted, therefore, under no illusion ; it knew that its doctrine would be considered foolishness ; it knew this, before its having experienced it ; it knew it before any person had said it ; and it went forth, this foolishness in its mouth, this foolishness for its standard, to the conquest of the world. Christianity, therefore, has not left to unbelief the satisfaction of taxing it with foolishness, and if it is foolish, it is in good earnest, and willing to be so."

II. "Christianity has not left to unbelief the satisfaction of taxing it with foolishness. It has been in haste to bring the accusation against itself. It has professed the bold design of saving men by foolishness. It acted, therefore, under no illusion ; it knew that its doctrine would be considered foolish ; it knew it, before having experienced it ; it knew it, before any person had said it ; and it went forth, this foolishness in its mouth, this foolishness for its standard, to the conquest of the world. If, then, it is foolish, it is in good earnest, and, indeed, willing to be so ; and those who shall reproach it with its foolishness, will be, at least, forced to grant that it has foreseen their reproach, and has braved it." [2]

[1] "He opens an eager eye and long regards the stranger. At last his voice finds a passage : 'Is it thee, Cleotas ? thou whom I thus again see ! *Everything here belongs to thee.* O my father, is it thou ? I blush that my eyes could have mistaken thee. O Cleotas ! my father ! O thou who wast my master, come ; I have here done nothing but preserve thy treasure, and thy old Lycus wishes to serve thee still.'"

[2] Vinet, *La Folie de la Verité* in the *Nouveaux Discours sur quelques Sujets Religieux.* Study, with the same view, a paragraph of Massillon on *l'Oubli de Dernier Jour :* "Sur quoi vous rassurez-vous encore," etc., and the pieces of Fénelon and Bossuet criticised by Condillac, *Art d'Ecrire*, book iii., chap. ii.— Massillon winds up an idea admirably.

§ IV.—Naturalness.

Naturalness, is one of those things which can be defined only by their effects, or their symptoms, seeing that every other definition would itself require to be defined. We shall say, then, that the natural style is that in which art does not manifest itself, either because there is no art mingled with it, or by the pure force of art.[1] For it is the triumph of art either to make itself be forgotten, or manifest only to reflection.

Art is not purely the imitation of nature, as it was long said to be; we can reject this definition, and acknowledge that art aspires to give to its creations the character of the productions of nature. It has succeeded, when it has been able to combine the true with the extraordinary. [The true which is not extraordinary, and the extraordinary which is not true, are not objects of art.]

What appeared natural in one age, or in one country, does not appear so in another. [The panoply of St Paul (Eph. vi. 13–17) is not natural at our point of view; the oriental style no longer appears so.] The epochs of half-civilisation, epochs the usages of which appear a kind of artlessness (*naïveté*), and those of extreme civilisation, are little favourable to naturalness. The culture of the mind brings back to it.

Naturalness pleases as a pledge or sign of sincerity. The absence of it makes us suspect the absence of sincerity; though one may be very sincere without being natural; but in that case one must be very sincere (so as to be so, in spite of the want of naturalness). [Who is more sincere, more moved, and more moving than St Augustine and St Bernard? and yet they are not natural.]

In works of art and in writings, naturalness is doubly pleasing, as being more unexpected, and more rare. It is partly the rarity of this perfect naturalness, that produces the pleasure which we experience when we meet with it. "When we see a natural style," says Pascal, "we are quite astonished and enraptured; for we expected to see only an author, and we find a man. Whereas, those who have good taste, and who, in reading a book, think to find a man, are quite surprised to find an author."[2]

[1] "Maxima ars celare artem."—Ed.

[2] Pascal, *Pensées*, part i., art. x., § xxvii.

Boileau, in his *Eloge du Vrai*, has not forgotten to praise naturalness:

"Cessons de nous flatter. Il n'est esprit si droit
Qui ne soit imposteur et faux par quelque endroit,
Sans cesse on prend le masque, et, quittant la nature,
On craint de se montrer sous sa propre figure.
Par là le plus sincère assez souvent déplait.
Rarement un esprit ose être ce qu'il est.
. . . . . .
Chacun pris dans son air est agréable en soi:
Ce n'est que l'air d'autrui qui peut déplaire en moi."[1]

Naturalness may rise to artlessness (*naïveté*), and this artlessness is admirable in grave men, and in grave subjects. [Naturalness in the child, is artlessness; that a man should become a child, without losing anything of his gravity, and maturity of judgment, is a thing very rare and very beautiful.] The difference between naturalness and simplicity is this: naturalness, possesses and knows itself; artlessness, neither possesses nor knows itself; it allows itself to be surprised by its own impressions; when all is over, it will be itself surprised at what it has said. Bossuet has passages striking for their naturalness.

It is very difficult, outside of the situations of actual life, to be perfectly natural, that is to say, perfectly true. It would be necessary, either to be able to discard all prepossession for art, or to surrender one's self entirely up to it. Sincerity itself is no guarantee of naturalness. This is so rare that, when we meet with an orator perfectly natural, [we are tempted to demand of him]:

Est-ce vous qui parlez, ou si c'est votre role?[2]

If we ever have pleasure in finding a *man*, it ought to be in the discourse from the pulpit; and one would think that *there* the pleasure of surprise ought to be less. Shall we dare to say, that it is actually greater? What would be natural as poetry, would not be so as eloquence, and the pulpit [the pulpit of truth,

[1] Let us cease to flatter ourselves. There is no mind so upright that it is not on some side deceitful and false. We are constantly assuming the mask, and quitting nature, we are afraid of showing ourselves in our proper figure. In this way the most sincere is very often displeasing. It is rarely that a mind dares to be what it is. . . . Every man, taken in his own manner, is agreeable in himself; it is only the manner of others that is displeasing in me.—Boileau, *Epitre* ix.

[2] Are you speaking in your own person, or are you playing a part?

where we come to speak of God, and of the most pressing interests] has been longer than the tribune and the bar, in becoming natural.

[The cause of this, according to Théremin, is partly in the physical position of the preacher, removed from his auditory, and raised considerably above them. It requires all the zeal of Christian charity, to transform the discourse into an actual business.] D'Alembert, complaining of the academic style, says, "that it would be better named the pulpit style."[1] Fénelon has made great efforts to bring back to the pulpit the natural style, with naturalness of conceptions and of plans;[2] for all these are closely connected.

I do not undertake to point out the various ways of being deficient in naturalness. Why enumerate them all? And, upon this subject, what would avail negative rules? We do not become natural by previously fortifying ourselves against each of these defects. Naturalness has a source more positive, and more lively. The light ought to swallow up the darkness. We shall not avoid one defect, only to fall into another, if we strongly attach ourselves to the principle; and, in order to attach ourselves to it, we need only wish to be true, and to make our discourse an action, and not a work. It is to this point of view that Brougham attributes the superiority of the style of Demosthenes. What, in reality, is that which a man will call natural in a discourse which he hears? It is the expression, which he feels that he would have involuntarily made use of, if he had been in the situation, or the disposition, in which the orator professes to find himself? It is the expression, which causes him to say to himself: It could hardly have been expressed otherwise. And is it not the first expression which would have come into his mind?

Without speaking, therefore, of affectation, of exaggeration, of witty conceits, of prolonged metaphors, of antitheses,[3] etc., . . let us only say that we are in danger of not being natural, by transporting into the pulpit traits, and forms which are natural in other people, or in imitating the individual form of masterpieces of the same species of eloquence that we are cultivating.

[1] D'Alembert, *Mélanges*, vol. ii., p. 348.

[2] See his *Dialogues sur l'Eloquence.*

[3] These create the impression that the speaker preaches himself, and aims at displaying his own genius, instead of preaching Christ Jesus under the power of His Spirit.—Ed.

It is, therefore, only with precaution and reserve, that we must study the great orators.

Be what you wish to appear.

§ V.—Suitableness.

In a very general sense, all the qualities recommended above are *suitableness* of different natures. What we here call suitableness in a particular sense, is the fitness of the expression to the character of the ideas which it has to clothe—to the species of the composition, the subject which we treat, and the end which we propose. Style may be clear, proper, precise, and natural, without being suitable. Suitableness results from *a just perception of the nature of the subject*, and consists in not injuring, or in not obscuring, that perception in others.

Let us pass immediately to the particular species with which we are occupied, to preaching; for what can we say in favour of suitableness in general, which its name alone does not already indicate?

A preliminary question presents itself. Men speak of a language of the pulpit. Is there a language of the pulpit? This is not doubtful, if we mean, by this, the whole of the suitableness, to which a religious discourse is subjected, that is associated with Divine worship, and delivered in a sacred place. But if we go farther—if the question is, not of *suitableness*, but of *convention*, if we have in view a certain dialect—if we intend to impose upon the language of the sacred orator other rules still, than those which result from the nature of his mission, and which the feeling of his position suggests to him, we say: No; in this sense there is no language of the pulpit.[1] Let us allow, for a moment, M. Théremin to speak:

"To the question: What is the language suitable to the pulpit orator? some reply: The language of the Bible; others, that of books; others, still, that of ordinary life; these, a simple and natural language; those, a language artistically elaborate—a poetical language, rich in imagery. Sometimes, also, there is given, as a type, the language of some well-known orator. For myself, if I am asked what language the preacher ought to employ in the pulpit, I can only answer: His own. A Christian life has been born within him, and it nourishes itself incessantly from the

[1] *Kanzel*sprache,—*Kanzlei*sprache.

Word of God, a great number of the expressions and images of which have become familiar to him. Now, this Christian life does not form in his life a separate current, but unites and blends itself with the whole of his inner life, composed of his imagination, his sensibility, his character, all the faculties of his mind, experiences of his life, and his scientific and literary culture. From all these combined elements results his internal speech, the language in which he speaks to himself, and to God, of the truths of salvation; and this is the fundamental tone of the language which he will make use of in the pulpit. Let every one, therefore, allow his individuality to appear, without exaggerating it —without showing more or less than what is in him, and always apply himself, not to exhibit all the asperities, and angularities which may belong to his character, but rather to mortify them, by the imitation of the most perfect of models—Jesus Christ." [1]

These ideas, well meditated, conduct to the whole truth regarding the style of the pulpit. Let us, however, consider more in detail, what are the suitablenesses of it.

The first is *simplicity*, which must not be confounded with *naturalness*. Naturalness, which ought to reign in every style, cannot serve to characterise the style of the pulpit. But simplicity, which is not rigorously demanded in every species, is one of the suitablenesses of sacred eloquence. Moreover, simplicity may form the object of a rule; it may be reduced to rules—naturalness cannot.

We sometimes confound naturalness and simplicity. It is true, that these two things have some affinity. We can hardly be simple, without being natural; but we might be very natural, and not be simple. Naturalness consists in being one's self—a thing certainly very rare; therefore, perfect naturalness is not

[1] Theremin, *Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend*, pp. xxvii., xxix. ["The phraseology dictated by the Holy Ghost is peculiarly calculated for public preaching. There is no book so intelligible as the Word of God, none that has such power over the hearer's heart, or that connects itself so readily with his popular feelings and interests."—Bridges. Watts speaks of preachers," who have so nice a taste for what is called polite, that they dare not spoil the cadences of a period, to quote a text of Scripture in it." Vitringa says, there is such weight in Scripture phrases, that no other word whatever can be compared with it, in respect to simplicity, propriety, and naturalness.—*Method. Homil.* "Avoiding terms in which Inspiration has clothed its mysteries, through fear of exciting disgust, is unevangelical in spirit, and substitutes a lower standard of preaching, than that of the Gospel."—Bridges.—Ed.

very common, artlessness (*naïveté*) still less; but art furnishes no means of becoming natural; all that it can do, is to show to those who thoroughly examine it, that we gain nothing by departing from nature, and that the beautiful is inseparable from the natural. Moreover, the natural is not an object of art—it is the first gift of art—it is, in a manner, a guarantee against the abuse of art—it is the basis of art: restorations of literature have been essentially only a return to the natural; we cannot imitate the natural,—the affectation of naturalness is the worst of affectations.

But as we might, without exactly wanting naturalness, want simplicity, as naturalness is equally necessary in all kinds of style, whilst some demand more, and others less, simplicity, there is, in a course of rhetoric or of homiletics, something to be said of simplicity.

Etymologically speaking, simplicity is the contrary of *multiplicity*. Simplicity, the absence of every *fold* (Latin *plica*) or *plait* (*pli ou repli*), would exclude even the expression of a second idea, when the first is sufficient. This makes it, at the first view, resemble conciseness; but conciseness is a sparing of words—simplicity is the economy of means. It is this form of style which interrupts least the labour of thought, and makes it take the most direct road to the object. It has, besides, something relative. What is not simple enough for one class of readers, is sufficiently so for another. Here we shall call that simple which will appear such to all the individuals, or, at least, to all the classes which usually compose the auditory of a preacher; and, this being understood, we add, that simplicity excludes, on one hand, round-about forms of expression and useless complications, profuseness of figures, ambitious ornaments; on another, refined thoughts, subtlety, abstraction. It does not exclude, however, either shadings or richness of colouring. We may be, at once, magnificent and simple[1]—simple and delicate.

Simplicity recommends itself by more than one claim to the pulpit orator.

It adorns great thoughts,[2] just as clearness adorns profound

[1] Simplex munditiis.—Horace, *Carm.* i. 5.—Ed.

[2] Over-ornate language rather mars, than heightens the effect of great thoughts.

"Ambitiosa recidet
Ornamenta."—Horace, *Ars Poet.*

ones; now, the thoughts which the preacher has it in charge to transmit, are all great thoughts.

Simplicity is inseparable from seriousness. Nothing appears less serious, nothing is better adapted to render sincerity doubtful, than research and refinement.

Lastly, simplicity forms part of that consideration and respect, which the preacher owes to an auditory of various degrees of intelligence.

The true name of simplicity, in the oratorical discourse, is that of *popularity*.[1] Popularity, which already supposes much suitableness in the choice of thoughts and of arguments, consists, in respect to style, in forming its language of expressions familiar to the greatest number. Popular language is that which is comprehended equally by all classes of society, the common ground on which they meet and communicate with each other; it is a language to which, in their habitual practice, some add, and from which others retrench something, but which is none the less the language of everybody, and the only language of everybody, although, properly speaking, it is perhaps the particular language of nobody.

In the present day, the word popularity awakens the idea of a particular species in art and in style, and an idea that is more or less derogatory. A popular writing is a distinct species of writing, and almost beyond the pale of literature. This distinction did not always exist. Not to speak of the epochs of barbarism, in which all classes were equally rude, it is ages of high culture that have only one language. Greek literature has no writings, that are specially popular; popularity is the character of all. Even seen from our point of view, the great productions of ancient art may pass for popular. And among the masterpieces of modern times, the most eminent, taking them as a whole, are the most popular, and we need not be astonished at this: that which is interesting to men of all classes, is above that which can be comprehended and relished only by men of a certain class. We may be popular without being great, but we can

Philip Henry "did not shoot the arrow of the word *over the heads* of the audience, in the flourishes of affected rhetoric, nor *under their feet* by homely expressions, but *to their hearts, in close and lively application*."—*Biogr.*, p. 59.—Ed.

[1] Simplicity and point are needed—simplicity, without undignified familiarity—point and energy, without unnatural labour, to produce effect.—Bridges.—Ed.

hardly be great without being popular. We are pathetic, we are sublime, only when we touch the notes which are the same in all men, by setting out from the *mean* degree of culture and of development.[1]

Before a mixed auditory, we are in danger of not being popular, we always come for the purpose of being so. What we do in the way of popularity, that is to say, in order to reach at once the greatest number of well organised minds, is not lost for the most cultivated; they even relish it so much the more, the more they are cultivated; and the beauties which the orator gathers in this way, are, in their opinion, of the highest order; whilst that which we do with the special view of captivating a certain class, is lost for the others, without reaching the more thoroughly that class whose approbation and assent we have eagerly coveted and sought for.

The true region, the natural medium of eloquence, is formed of the thoughts of all, and consequently, as much as possible, of the language of all. Eloquence is a contact of man with man, by those sides of them that are not accidental or individual, but human. The language that is suitable to eloquence is, therefore, a language that is general, common, usual. Nothing rare and exceptionable would there be in place. I do not say that we cannot be *eloquent* on subjects very special, or in their behalf; but we cannot be oratorical on such subjects, except before a very select auditory, to whom these subjects present no difficulties, and who can promptly reduce the special ideas to general ideas, the only ideas that are oratorical. Cicero, doubtless, felt himself supported by experience, not less than by theory, when he said: "*In dicendo vitium vel maximum est, a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere;*"[2] a passage of which this, from D'Alembert, seems to be the translation: "The orator should never forget that it is to the multitude that he speaks, that it is the multitude that he must move, affect, persuade. The eloquence which is not for the greatest number, is not eloquence."[3]

[1] Hence arises the universal popularity of Shakspere, whose sayings are familiar as "household words."—Ed.

[2] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book i., chap. iii.

[3] *Réflexions sur l'Elocution Oratoire*, in the *Mélanges* of D'Alembert.

It is well said that the surest road to popularity is to defend prevailing opinions with a show of originality; and that a Prime Minister should be a man of ordinary opinions with extraordinary talents. Proverbs are a sample of lan-

This maxim could not be just when applied to eloquence in general, without being so, in a very particular manner, when applied to the eloquence of the pulpit. Nothing is more popular than the subjects of preaching; for nothing is more general, and more common to all. Nothing effaces more completely the distinctions which are established amongst men by rank and education. Nothing is more purely human. It is, therefore, if we may so express it, a language purely human which is demanded by the subjects of the pulpit. Here, to wish to rise, would be to descend; to descend, is to rise. Just as the body is more than habit, substance more than accident, and the *genus* more than the *species*, man is more than any of the conditions, or particular forms, of humanity; we rise by reaching man through all the subdivisions, and shades of difference; and the majesty of the pulpit, shows itself above all, in separating man from everything that is accessory, or is added by events, in order to lay hold of him in that high generality, in which he corresponds to God, and touches the infinite. The eloquence of the pulpit will, therefore, be great in proportion to its popularity, and popular in proportion to its greatness. Its language, therefore, discarding what is peculiar to some, ought to decide, in the choice of its elements, for that which is common to all. The preacher will interdict himself from the use of abstract terms, formulas of the schools,[1] erudite allusions, subtleties and refinements, ingenious but complicated turns of expression, a certain kind, and even a certain degree of elegance, certain delicacies of art,[2] much appreciated by literary men, but lost upon the people.

But *popularity* is not yet the true name for the simplicity of the pulpit: this word indicates, at what height we place our auditory, rather than the relations in which we make or suppose ourselves to stand to them. Now, the auditory of a preacher is better than a people, it is a *family;* and the simplicity of the

guage universally popular: they have been well defined, "the wit of one man, the wisdom of many." The one man that originates the proverb, only embodies in a happy form the common wisdom of the people in general.—Ed.

[1] "Of all kinds of ignorance learned ignorance is the most contemptible."—Campbell. Grammatical, critical, and philosophical observations and citations, are mostly out of place. "This farrago is only a vain ostentation of learning, and often they who fill their sermons with such, know them only by relation of others."—Claude.—Ed.

[2] Ward (*Coal from the Altar*) says of this abuse, "The sword of the Spirit is put into a velvet scabbard, that it cannot prick and wound the heart."—Ed.

evangelical discourse is not only popularity, it is also *familiarity*. Familiarity, long confined to the order of the relations from which it has borrowed its name,[1] was not intended to reduce itself within so narrow a circle; it came to exist between men who are not united by the ties of blood, who were not born, and do not live, under the same roof. It is useless to recall here the causes which have contracted it within the actual limits, and which have rendered ceremony and *decorum* so indispensable among persons who are formed of the same clay, ruled by the same necessities, and equally subject to death. Among strong minds that are suited to each other, intimacy soon brings familiarity, that is to say, that becoming and noble freedom which beseems brothers. Familiarity has so great advantages, that it would be necessary to establish it, when it did not come of itself. "There is no school," says Vauvenargues, "that is better or more necessary than familiarity. A man who has entrenched himself all his life within a reserved character, commits the grossest mistakes when occasions oblige him to come forth from it, and to engage in the affairs of life. It is only by familiarity that we cure ourselves of presumption, timidity, and foolish haughtiness; it is only in a free and ingenuous intercourse, that we can become well acquainted with men, that we try ourselves, that we unfold ourselves, and that we measure ourselves by them; there we see naked humanity, with all its weaknesses and all its strengths. . . . Those who have not the courage to seek truth in these rude trials, are far beneath everything that is great."

Among persons whose relative position does not bring them together on the footing of equality, if there is a third party that can create this relation, assuredly it is God, or the thought of God; a thought in which all differences and all inequalities disappear. Now, he who, in virtue of his office, comes forth to speak to his fellows of God, and of God only, can no longer see them in any other light than as men and brethren; he addresses them only in this quality, assembles them around him only under this title, in the very name of this relationship; not only is this familiarity becoming his discourse, but every other character would be unsuitable to it. The ceremonial of polite conversation, introduced into the pulpit, would take away from the discourse of the preacher all communicative virtue; there would remain I

[1] *Familiar* is derived from *family*.—Ed.

know not what between the man who speaks, and those who listen. There exists, in the usages of friendship, one of those symbols of which our social life, of which our languages are full, and which long survive the remembrance of the ideas they expressed: two friends, when they meet, grasp each other by the hand; if the hand is covered, they commence by uncovering it; it is necessary that man should touch man; that, in the contact and the pressure of these two naked hands, they should each feel that the other lives. The preacher who is not familiar, and who brings into the pulpit the proprieties and the periphrases of worldly civility, who stands upon reserve, who does not surrender himself, is a friend who holds out the hand to his friend, but a gloved hand, through which he feels neither warmth nor life. What, then, will be the relation of him, who shall take care to clothe his hand before presenting it to his friend,—I mean, of the preacher who shall permit himself less freedom, less effusion of heart, in the pulpit, than he permits himself in the ordinary meetings and superficial intercourse of social life? If we well understand the position of the preacher, invested, at least for some moments, with the liberty of a father, and of a brother, his language will be familiar in this sense, that it will be full and quite composed of terms, of movements, and turns of expression, borrowed from the relations of the family, and of friendship. This language will mark, in a lively manner, the relation which he feels to exist between his auditory and himself; this language will produce the feeling, that it is not a simple idea, but a common, actual, dominant interest, that is the question between him and his hearers: this language will bring them near to him. It is superfluous to distinguish the familiarity which we have in view, from another indecent, and profane familiarity: the business is, in all things and before all things, to be animated by a Christian sentiment; this sentiment at once creates, and limits familiarity; if it is Christian, it is accompanied by that holy reserve, which is not alien to the more free effusions of two Christians in their mutual intercourse.

Familiarity was not wanting, as it appears to me, in any of the masters of pulpit eloquence; this character is even more marked, and more complete in the most eminent among them. The orators of the tribune and the bar are almost strangers to it; they may be popular, they can scarcely be familiar. And how should

they? Is their auditory to them a family? And are even those citizens, or those judges, for a single instant, to the orator, *men*, and nothing but men? Are they not always citizens and judges? I should not, then, be far wrong in making familiarity the exclusive characteristic of the eloquence of the pulpit.

In the daily relations of life, and of individual to individual, familiarity brings with it the habit of calling things by their own names; it prefers individual to generic designations, direct affirmations to reticence and allusion, precise indications to vague ones. Something of all this ought to be not only permitted, but recommended to the pulpit; it is on these conditions, that it will give to the objects of which it treats a lively impress of reality.

There is one feature of familiarity, upon which we ought to dwell for a little. It seems to us difficult, for the feeling of a familiar relationship to his hearers not to lead the preacher to speak of himself. We justly blame, in the minister of the word of God, his being too much taken up with himself; we are right in wishing him to forget himself; but one may, in the exercise of Christian charity, completely forget one's self, and, nevertheless, speak of one's self. Oratorical discourse is not a book, it is an action direct, near, personal, and instantaneous. In it, the personality of the orator counts for something. It is himself, it is a man who comes to us on the part of God,—but with spontaneity, since it is with love,—to converse, about their interests and his own, with a certain number of his fellows and of his brethren. In all cases, but especially if he addresses his parishioners, he is in the position of a father of a family, and not of a stranger. He is an ambassador or a deputy, in another sense than a man sent by men; he can, nay, he ought, to speak as of himself, though the doctrine he teaches does not come from himself. Remark, then, two points by which personality breaks forth, in whatever one may do; it is as father, and it is as brother. As father, he exhorts, he conjures, he urges; he is delighted with sympathy, he is afflicted by indifference, he is alarmed at his own impotence, he counts upon the power of God, he invokes His assistance, and He appeals to Him for it. As brother of his hearers, what he says to them, he says to himself; he feels the desire to make common cause with them, and to testify this to them, not to appear to have no interest in the things, by which he endeavours to affect them. Doubtless, he never seeks to turn

upon himself an attention which ought to be directed to another quarter; he would reproach himself with it, as an act of unfaithfulness; but this is not to deprive him of the advantage of testifying his personal feeling of the truths which he announces, and that, too, in common with the hearers whom he addresses; and how can he manifest this sympathy, without speaking of himself? does not every sympathetic movement bring out our personality, at the very moment, and by the very fact, of its union with the personality of others? Thus, then, charity, and humility, will regulate, but not interdict, the manifestations of personality.

Here I do not speak of that oratorical form, in which the preacher personifies in himself the whole of his auditory, and expresses, in his own name, the sentiments with which he supposes his hearers to be penetrated. This is a figure of style, very suitable in certain moments, and in which the *I* and the *me* do not designate the orator personally,[1] but the flock considered as a single individual. Nobody can be deceived by it, nobody is deceived by it. "There are," says Maury, "some occasions in which a Christian orator may modestly suppose himself the subject of a moral development, which concerns the multitude. But it is not in order to draw upon himself the attention of the auditory, that he then, as it were, holds himself up to view; it is, on the contrary, to concentrate upon himself alone, the weaknesses, the illusions, the extravagances, and the inconsistencies of the human mind, or heart; and in this view, the more he should speak of himself, the less he would be found to be personal. Massillon excels in this humble method of thus putting himself in the place of sinners, in deploring his own contradictions, his errors, his anguish and his remorse. He excites the most touching interest, he affects his hearers even to tears, whenever, depicting them with the most striking truth in his own person, he unveils the depths of his conscience, he denounces himself to God as an *ingrate*, as a *wretch*, and as a *madman*." [2]

There is not one of the preachers recognised as models, who does not frequently speak of himself in his discourses, but he always does so with the intention, and in the spirit, which we

[1] See Romans vii. 7–25.

[2] Maury, *Essai sur l'Eloquence de la Chaire*, lvi. *De l'Egoïsme dans les Orateurs.* See two ways of speaking of one's self, in Massillon, *Sermon sur le Jeûne*, at the end of the exordium, and at the end of the discourse.

have laid down as limits to this oratorical familiarity. Their *me* has not the same sense as the *me*, so directly personal, so truly egotistical, of a Demosthenes, and of a Cicero. It is the *me*, communicative of sympathy, and of humility.

Simple, popular, familiar, all this the style of the pulpit ought to be, without ceasing to be *noble*. There is, doubtless, nothing more noble than Christian truth; and this nobleness is even the first characteristic which strikes us in it. The style ought to correspond to this; it ought to be noble. But in what does the nobleness of style consist? Nobleness in style, as well as in society, conveys the idea of distinction, and even of exclusion. There is a class of images, and of words, reputed noble, as there is in aristocratical constitutions a class of men, that is separated by a visible and distinct barrier, from the common class of citizens. Language has also its plebeian element, confounded in dictionaries, but not in discourse, with the aristocratic element. A term that is not noble, is a term which forces our thought into too immediate contact with an object which it disdains, that is to say, which it deems unworthy to occupy it, except in cases of absolute necessity. Man does not submit willingly, or he does not wish to have the appearance of submitting willingly, to that which too distinctly warns him of what is humiliating in his nature, or in his condition. Nobleness in manners, acts, or language, consists in the care of human dignity; and every one feels that this dignity resides in the thought, or in that part of ourselves which thinks. Hence results, first, the exclusion of certain ideas, or, next, when we cannot absolutely discard them, the exclusion of words which too directly recall them, and the preference given to terms which present them in an oblique manner, and with an evasive side to a mind that evades them. The business, then, is to see if such a word, from any cause whatsoever, deals a blow within our souls at the respect which we feel for ourselves, or for such an object as we could not despise, without despising ourselves. It is this impression which we should spare our hearers, first, by the choice of the thought, next by the choice of the word. But let us be well understood. We will have respect for legitimate, and invincible repugnances, not for those which originate in refinement of manners, and of culture; these last we must sometimes be able to brave, in order to be truly noble; and nothing is less noble than the reciprocal

conventions of a mongrel politeness. Let us leave them in their own place, and not seek to disturb them; but let them no more come to impose their yoke on the generous freedom of apostolic language. Religion, which includes within it true nature, and true naturalness, constantly tends to bring back civilisation to its true conditions, and brings it nearer to nobleness, in proportion as it removes it from false refinement: for if grossness is ignoble, spurious refinement is scarcely less so. This spirit of Christianity ought to be that of the pulpit. The preacher, in the choice of his terms, will have respect to the state of the society, from the midst of which his flock is drawn; but this proper attention will have nothing of a puerile complaisance, and he will make a bold effort to raise above itself, and above its vain delicacy, that society which Christianity alone can bring back to the cultivation of the beauty of naturalness.

Nobleness of style, according to Buffon, depends on "taking care to name things only by the most general terms."[1] And it is true that everything that extends the horizon of thought—everything which, disengaging it from its points of support, raises it towards its source, and gives it free scope—is conformable to the nature of man, and suitable to his dignity. We feel ourselves rise in passing from the notion of the individual to that of the species, and from the idea of the species to that of the genus; our liberty, and our spirituality, are revealed to us in this ascending movement. But if general expressions are the noblest, they are neither the most lively, nor the most touching; and eloquence would want air in that ethereal region.[2] Doubtless the general ideas must soar above the particular ideas; and one must feel in the particular idea the presence of the general idea; but this does not justify in eloquence the exclusive employment of the most general terms. Nobleness of style is not obtained at this price. The grandeur of the monarchs of the East consists in making themselves invisible; there is something of this greatness in a style which makes itself invisible as far as it is able, by replacing the presence of the objects by a train of formulas, and by making language, which should be a painting of the thought, a species of algebra.

[1] Buffon, *Discours sur le Style.*

[2] "Ne dum vitat humum, nubes et inania captet."
—Horace, *Ars Poet.*—Ed.

Let no one misapprehend our meaning. The conditions of the sermon are not those of a poem. Preaching would appear more taken up with our amusement, than our edification, if it sought to describe precisely and particularly, as poetry loves to do, and has a right to do. Preaching, it is true, aims, like poetry, at rendering objects present to us; but these are different objects. There are certain facts which it details, others which it merely names by general expressions. What good would it serve, when it wished to represent the earnestness of our projects, and the ardour of our enterprises, under the so natural image of a chariot, or a horseman rushing forward in the race, curiously to describe how the reins were attached to the foaming mouth of Bucephalus, or how the rowels of Alexander's spurs were stained with blood? What would it avail, in scrutinising our good faith in matters of momentous interest, to accumulate the technical terms which compose the whole of the special language of the Exchange and the counter? It is rare that, in such cases, a general designation does not suffice. But these same terms we must be able not to avoid, when by employing them we have the hope of being better and more readily understood.

The periphrasis, which is not the condition of nobleness of style, is a rule of propriety for avoiding directly naming things, the true name of which would produce a sensation of shame, or disgust. The periphrasis is often the very definition of the object,—its true name. It is often a way of giving prominence to what is most interesting in the object. Sometimes, in fine, its object is to avoid the word.

It seems almost superfluous to speak of the *gravity* of the style of the pulpit, because what we have said of the *nobleness* of that style, implies, or supposes gravity. In ascending to the principle of the one, we ascend to the principle of the other; and that which impresses upon our discourses the first of these characters, infallibly engraves upon it the second. Nobleness, and gravity, are nevertheless distinct. We have stated what the first avoids and rejects; gravity, which according to the etymology of the word, carries the *weight* of a great thought, or of a great interest, does not permit itself, or the mind of the hearer, to be distracted from this thought, by thoughts of much less importance, or of no importance in respect of the object of preaching; it wishes

much to interest us, never to amuse us, still less to raise in our minds anything like a mischievous, or profane levity. The most innocent smile, even that which would not be excluded by a very religious conversation, is not innocent in a place of worship —I mean to say, that one is not innocent in having provoked it.[1] The conditions of the two kinds of discourse are not the same. There is something more there, than in the most serious conversation—a consecrated place, a solemn assembly, a worship of which the discourse forms part, and of which it assumes the character, all the emotions are contagious, spread themselves electrically in an assembly, strengthen, and aggravate, while they multiply themselves; what, then, will an emotion of levity become? and what becomes of the house of God? what becomes of the hour devoted to worship, in which we remember having laughed? (The serious impressions are all thereby lost.) I do not suppose in the preacher the intention of making his hearers laugh or smile; I only warn him to watch over his expressions, so that this effect may not take place in spite of him.

We have interdicted the preacher from using the weapon of ridicule.

In short, gravity consists in not occupying the mind, even cursorily, with any idea that is unworthy of occupying it in a sacred place, and in an act of worship.

It remains for me to speak of a suitableness of the pulpit style, of the last importance—a particular suitableness, but which is none the less the summary, and pledge, of all the others—namely, to speak of the *scriptural colouring* of the language. Here I shall try to guard myself against every prejudice. A discourse may, no doubt, be Christian—eminently Christian—and not have the colouring of which I speak. The reverse may

[1] He that negotiates between God and man,
As God's ambassador, the grand concerns
Of judgment and of mercy, should beware
Of lightness in his speech. 'Tis pitiful
To court a grin, when ye should woo a soul,
To break a jest, when pity would inspire
Pathetic exhortation; and t' address
The skittish fancy with facetious tales,
When sent with God's commission to the heart!
So did not Paul.—He would not stoop
To conquer those by jocular exploits
Whom truth and soberness assailed in vain.—COWPER, *Task*, ii.—ED.

also take place—that is to say, a discourse strongly coloured with Biblical expressions, or allusions, might not be Christian. It is not even suitable to express our thoughts and impressions only by Biblical formulas, and to make a sacred discourse a mere chain of scriptural centos.[1] On this subject let us recall the maxim of Théremin: "It is necessary that every preacher should speak *his own* language; it is necessary that the Christian thought should individualise itself in him; it is necessary that the word of God should become *his* word; the truth will become his own, only when he is in a condition to give to it a form which is his own; and, in fine, a sermon wholly composed of passages, and even of the most beautiful passages, will not be a *discourse;* it will want unity and oratorical power, because we will not feel in it the continued presence, and progressive action of a soul, in which all the truths which the discourse may contain, are in some sort personified." But all this being well understood, let us also acknowledge:

1. That we have a written religion which we ought neither to forget nor suffer to be forgotten, and that when God has condescended to give a form to the truths of salvation,[2] it would be strange and contradictory to our faith, not to cite, and that even copiously, expressions which, though they proceeded from human mouths, have a character of authority which no other words can have. Their presence in preaching imparts to it majesty, and recalls to believers what we ought ourselves to remember in citing them—namely, that we are only messengers, and ambassadors, that we only accommodate, to a certain time and to a certain place, words which are not our own, so that if any one despises our words, it is not a man that he despises, but God Himself.

Moreover, the question is not only of language and of colouring, but of facts and personages. All the memorials in the Bible

[1] Augustine estimates the preacher's wisdom according to his proficiency in the Scriptures. He does not, however, recommend a long string of texts composing the sermon, but a ready application of Scripture, and a colouring of the language with it. Robinson says that, instead of multiplying testimonies from it, one or two texts are as good as one hundred. On the other hand, "If anything be spoken without Scripture, the knowledge of the hearers halteth."—Chrysostom on Ps. lxxxvi. See 1 Cor. ii. 13, 14.—Ed.

[2] Maury has made a singular reconciliation between the Bible and Mythology. (*Essai* lxix., *De l'emploi de l'Ecriture sainte.*)

ought to be present to us; for all are proofs or symbols of the truth; and this history is the national history of the Christian Church; these are its originals; these are its title deeds. The history of the reign of God upon earth, no doubt, presents still other facts to be cited, and we must refuse nothing within this domain; but the facts, the memory of which the Bible has consecrated, have undoubtedly the first claims, and the greatest authority. After all, the principal substance of the Bible, and of our religion, consists of facts, and of persons; could we, then, properly cite only doctrines, and precepts? It is of much importance to preserve to religion its historical, and dispensational character; we must constantly recall it either directly, in making the facts serve as starting-points, or as confirmations of our reasonings, or indirectly, by multiplied references and allusions. There is abundance of opportunities for doing this to the preacher, who has been nourished by the Holy Scriptures, and endowed with some imagination. Saurin, wishing to show the necessity of the trials of this life, in order to make us desire a better, says that, "when the dove found, without the ark, the winds let loose, the waters overflowing, the flood-gates of heaven open, the whole universe buried beneath the waves, she again sought refuge within the ark. But when she found plains and fields, she stayed in them. My soul, this is an image of thee." Further, when insisting on the necessity of joining prayer to labour in the work of our salvation, he says: "We should imitate the example of Moses, attacked by the Amalekite; he shared with Joshua the labour of obtaining the victory. Moses ascended the mountain, Joshua descended into the plain; Joshua fought, Moses prayed; Moses stretched forth his supplicating hands to heaven, Joshua raised the warlike arm; Moses opposed his fervour to the wrath of Heaven, Joshua opposed his arms, and his courage, to the enemy of the Jewish people; and by this wise union of prayer and action, of confidence and vigilance, Israel triumphs. Amalek is put to the rout."[1]

We have for our Master Him, who is the Word, full of grace and truth, Him to whom the Spirit has not been given by measure, Him who alone having truth in Himself, as He alone had life in Himself, has taught with *authority*. Would it be possible that we should not be happy, and eager, to rehearse His words

[1] Saurin, vol. i., p. 56, new edition.

with respect, with a marked attention, and not as common citations?

2. The Bible contains thoughts "which would never have entered into the heart of man," sublime paradoxes regarding our nature, our condition, our dangers, our futurity, the intentions of God with respect to us, and, to make use of an expression which we can hardly avoid, regarding the character of God. None of these extraordinary, unheard-of thoughts, could have received a more complete and a purer form, than that which has been impressed upon it by the same spirit who conceived it. This form is sacred, and fundamental; the thought which it clothes can never be entirely separated from it; we may express it, and develop it in our own language; but we cannot dispense with recalling the same expressions as those have employed who first revealed it to us: we must be supported by extraordinary authority, in order to say extraordinary things. It seems to me, that we cannot possibly treat of that which is most ineffable in religion, exhibit the incomprehensible mercy of God, or rehearse His terrible threatenings, without taking, for a starting-point at least, the very words of Holy Scripture. Are we not happy to find ready-made forms for truths which man can hardly dare to pronounce, so far do they transcend and confound him?[1] Examples:—

"Every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually." (Genesis vi. 5.)

"The heart (of man) is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked." (Jer. xvii. 9.)

"All have come short of the glory of God." (French version, "Man is deprived of all glory before God.") (Rom. iii. 22.)

"As the wicked clothed himself (French version, *The wicked shall be clothed*) with cursing as with a garment, so let it come

[1] "These passages (of the Bible) are, as it were, a rich vein of gold winding through other gross metals."—Richardson.

Locke well says, "The Bible has God for its Author, the salvation of man for its end, and truth *without any admixture of error* for its subject-matter." "If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God." 1 Pet. iv. 11. Beza explains 2 Tim. ii. 15, ὀρθοτομοῦντα, "Quod ad doctrinam ipsam attinet, nihil prætermittat, quod dicendum sit; nihil etiam adjiciat de suo, nihil mutilet, discerpat, torqueat; deinde spectet diligenter, quid ferat auditorum captus, quicquid denique ad ædificationem conducit."—Ed.

(French version, *It shall enter*) into his bowels like water, and like oil into his bones." (Ps. cix. 18.)

"For after that in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe." (1 Cor. i. 21.)

"Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb! Yea, they may forget, yet will I not forget thee." (Isaiah xlix. 15.)

"And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend." (Exodus xxxiii. 11.)

"In all their affliction he was afflicted." (Isaiah lxiii. 9.)

3. I shall not attempt, after Rollin, and especially after Fénelon, and after Maury, to speak of the eloquence and of the poetry of the Bible. I shall only observe, that what distinguishes it, and places it above all the master-pieces of literature, is, that its beauties are not literary, that the thought has everywhere given the form in such a manner, that the union of the form, and of the thought,[1] was never so intimate. The beauty of the language of the Bible, therefore, has everywhere something substantial, which immediately fixes the mind upon that which lies at the very bottom of the subject-matter, without permitting it to amuse itself with the beauties on the surface. We are struck before we have had time to enjoy, or even to admire it.

It is also a remarkable thing, that this Oriental language, so strange at the first aspect to the notions of the West, should be, at the same time, so human, and by that very circumstance, so universal, that it should easily assimilate itself to all nations, to all forms of civilisation, and to all languages, much better than could be done by the language and literature of any age, and any people, much less remote from us. All in the sacred books that relates to man,—all that paints man, is characterised by a depth, and a simplicity which nothing has ever equalled; the Bible, on these subjects, has spoken a universal language,—has displayed a universal poetry; the Bible was framed, in this respect, as in every other, to be *The Book* of the human race.[2] Setting aside every reason founded on authority, we could

[1] Scripture throughout is "a word fitly spoken, like apples of gold in pictures of silver." Prov. xxv. 11.—Ed.

[2] Implied by its very title, Bible, "*The* Book."—Ed.

borrow from no other source, images and traits more suitable to the subjects which we treat in the pulpit, nor adorn religious discourse with beauties more becoming, and more grave.

All the kinds of beauty, proper to the religious discourse, abound in Holy Scripture, and our position, *face to face* with it, gives us the right, and imposes upon us the duty, of appropriating to ourselves all these beauties. There are none but We, who can do this; that which, everywhere else, would be plagiarism or affectation, is one of the highest kinds of suitableness in the case of preachers, and is the truth of that species of eloquence which we cultivate. Who would not wish,—yet who would dare,—in the other kinds of oratory, to sow his discourse with so many lively allusions, and to colour it with so many reflections? But the Bible is more than a source, or a document; the Bible is almost our subject; we have to speak of it; our voice serves to echo it: it is like a forest which we fell, like a field which we reap; this labour is less an addition to our task, than it is our task itself; it is, therefore, boldly and frankly that we may draw from this treasure. And what a treasure! This book reaches the sublime of all subjects. The most finished types of the grand, and of the pathetic,—of the human, and of the religious,—of the strong and of the tender, are there as in a repository. Among all the books which expressed ideas of the same order, if one were free to choose, and if their authority were equal, it is to this that we would always return. The names which it has given to all the things of God and of man, are definitive,—are irrevocable. What it has expressed in one manner, cannot be expressed in any other manner, without being enfeebled. Whole nations have possessed themselves of this language, and have blended it with their own; the Bible has given to human speech a multitude of expressions, as it has given to human thought some of its most consecrated forms. In repeating to men the sayings of the Bible, we recall to them family traditions.

Have you another image to give of creative power than this: "God said: Let there be light; and there was light?" (Genesis i. 3.)

Does there remain, in order to paint the authority of the Creator over the two-fold world of physical and moral beings, anything more after this saying: "He stilleth the noise of the

seas, the noise of their waves, and the tumult of the people?" (Psalm lxv. 7.)

Will you ever better reach the sublime of grief, than it has been reached in these words: "A voice was heard in Ramah, lamentation and weeping; Rachel, weeping for her children, refused to be comforted for her children, because they were not?" (Jer. xxxi. 15; Matt. ii. 18.)

Will you ever express the desolation of sin, with an energy as threatening as Isaiah has done, when he says: "The light is darkened in the heavens thereof?" (French version, "*There will be darkness in its ruins.*") (Isaiah v. 30.)

Can you find, in order to paint the divine harmony of all the perfections of the Eternal, and the ineffable unity of His designs towards us, anything that approaches the mildness and the grandeur of this saying: "Righteousness and peace have kissed each other?" (Psalm lxxxv. 11.)

But it would be necessary to transcribe the entire Bible. Let us make one remark more; and that is, that it is to deprive ourselves of a great number of the most original, and striking beauties which the Bible can furnish us with, not to draw from the Old Testament, as well as from the New. We must admit, the Old Testament is a continued parable, or a rudiment, of the New;[1] and the application of the Old Testament to the ideas of the New, by the very circumstance that it is less direct, than that which can be made of the Gospel-passages, has a peculiar, and inexhaustible charm, which must not be neglected. Without making gratuitous allegory, and without forcing anything, merely by natural accommodations, the whole of the Old Testament places itself at the service of Christian ideas, and presents them under an aspect that astonishes and moves. An attentive study of the Old Testament brings out a multitude of happy, and natural accommodations, after all that have been already discovered, and obtained from it.[2]

Let us remark, however, that all these beauties are discoloured

[1] The Law is the Gospel in bud; the Gospel is the flower fully expanded by the Sun of Righteousness, who "came not to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfil."—Ed.

[2] We may cite here the exordium of Saurin's sermon on *The Song of Simeon*, and the peroration of that of Bossuet on *Final Impenitence*. See this last piece, p. 186.

"As there is a legal mode of preaching the Gospel, so there is an evangelical

or lost in a discourse without individuality,—in a discourse which has no foundation, or intrinsic value,[1] just as flowers, whose stalk has no roots in the soil, hang their heads, grow pale, and die.

4. When I review in my thoughts all the suitablenesses, to which I have thought it my duty to subject the style of preaching, viz., simplicity, popularity, familiarity, and nobleness, it seems to me that I see them all reunited in the scriptural style, and that this is, as I said a moment ago, the summary and the pledge of them. It seems to me, that the Bible is the true diapason of the preacher, to whom it marks, in a sure manner, the general tone of his discourse; it is in the Bible that his imagination ought to be steeped, it is from this medium that it must go forth, in order that it may unite strength with moderation, simplicity with grandeur, familiarity with nobleness and gravity.[2] I will remark in particular, that it is the Bible which impresses upon the pulpit-discourse, and preserves to it, that just measure of popularity which, in the existing state of civilisation, we are constantly liable either to come short of, or to go beyond.

That which I have called *popularity*, I would willingly call *humanity*. This expresses everything that recalls to men their common origin, and their common condition. It is the lively impress of that, which makes a man the equal, or the like of another. This equality, or likeness, is too much forgotten, either in great politeness of manners, or in too intellectual habits. Even in a middle condition, life is so artificial, and nature so translated, that we no longer distinguish the savour of the original text; and as to the poor and the miserable, they have beneath their eyes only a corrupt text, which repels and saddens them. I am pleased, I confess, to see a divine authority bring back all the classes of society towards a world, in which nature and common life count for something,—in which kings speak like shepherds,—in which the first of teachers are boatmen and

mode of preaching the Law. We cannot have too much of the Gospel; but we may have too much of the Law."—BRIDGES.

The typical allusions in the law have been beautifully compared to characters faintly traced with invisible ink, which are brought out fully to view by the light and heat that fall on them from the Sun of Righteousness.—ED.

[1] Such as are discourses made up of a mere stringing together of Scripture texts, without the writer having one definite idea of his own throughout.—ED.

[2] "The more the preacher sees the poverty of his own store, the more needful is it, that he should enrich himself in the treasures of Scripture."—AUGUSTINE, *Doctr. Christ.*, iv. 5.—ED.

tent-makers,—in which, the language of the poor becoming the language of all, the poor man feels himself divinely exalted, and the rich holily abased. The Bible corresponds to the medium, and the centre of human life, and to its most sincere form; it reunites in it the two extremities of society, those who are beneath, and those who are above this region; it renders man sensible of his pure quality as man, and, by that means, of his true grandeur, veiled by too hard necessities, or diminished by too delicate conventionalities.

We have already said, that this aspect of humanity is the grandest, from the very fact that it is the most general. Now, nothing better supports a simple and artless form, than that which is truly great. The Bible, in lending its grandeur to our discourses, will lend to them its artlessness. It will place us, along with itself, on a height from which we can say everything. While mingling it with our own words, we embolden our style, which is at once ambitious and timid; and it becomes, as a whole, and in due proportion, grave and free. The Bible serves sometimes for a safe-conduct, sometimes for the inspiration of ideas, and strokes of oratory, which, without it, we should not have hazarded: what we would not dare to say in our own name, we say on the part of Scripture, and in its expressions. What other image would better express the destructive principle which brings with it infidelity, than the following one: "This iniquity shall be to you as a breach ready to fall, swelling out in a high wall, whose breaking cometh suddenly at an instant. And he shall break it as the breaking of the potter's vessel that is broken in pieces; he shall not spare; so that there shall not be found in the bursting a sherd to take fire from the hearth, or to take water withal out of the pit?" (Isaiah xxx. 13, 14.) Here is an image which we would not have thought of, or which, having found it, we would scarcely dare to present, but which, coming from the Bible, is freely employed, and willingly accepted. He who should wish to paint the insufficiency of human doctrines, to answer all the questions, and satisfy all the wants of man, would not dare, perhaps, on his own authority, but would dare, after the Scripture, to employ the following image: "The bed is shorter than a man can stretch himself on it, and the covering narrower than he can wrap himself in it." (Isaiah xxviii. 20.)

The God whom the Gospel reveals to us seems to advance

towards us with this speech: *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*[1] But it is for Him to say so; it is He whom it befits to borrow from the language of men all the expressions capable of expressing the inexpressible condescensions of His free love. Let it be Him, then, who says in our sermons: "The Spirit of the Lord has conducted them very gently, as one conducteth a beast that descendeth into the plain."[2] (Isaiah lxiii. 14.) "Ye shall be borne upon the side, and one shall dandle you upon the knees."[3] (Isaiah lxvi. 12.) But the more we shall cite the Scripture, the more we shall dare to speak as it does. We shall finish by saying also: *Homo sum.* We shall become so in reality. Nothing is so human, as Christianity; no one is Man so much, as a Christian. While drawing inspiration from the Holy Scriptures, the eloquence of the pulpit will, without difficulty, attain to that grandeur blended with familiarity, and that familiarity full of grandeur, which ought to be, but which has not always been, the inimitable seal of preaching.[4]

We cannot give particular rules regarding the manner of introducing the words of the Bible into the discourse from the pulpit. The only one which I should wish to give, and it is a quite general one, is this: Nourish yourselves from the Bible, live in the Bible, unite yourselves to it; let it abound in your memory, and in your heart; let a frequent perusal of it, intended for your own benefit, have revealed to you the force, and given you the secret of a multitude of passages, which, without this, would remain for you in the state of commonplaces, and would take no root in your memory; mingle the remembrance of them with your emotions, with your prayers, with your most important occupations; let its language become gradually the natural and involuntary form of your inmost thoughts;—then meditate on a subject for the pulpit, write, preach; your expressions will come all impregnated with the juices, and all shaded by the colours of that inspired word: the language of the prophets will be fused into yours; it will not be distinguishable

[1] Terence, *Heauton*, act i., scene i.

[2] Engl. Vers., The Spirit of the Lord *caused him to rest*, as a beast *goeth down* into the valley.—Ed.

[3] Engl. Vers., "Ye shall be borne upon her sides, and be dandled upon her knees."—Ed.

[4] An old man well said to Musculus, one of the Swiss Reformers, "Si vis fieri bonus concionator, da operam, ut sis bonus Biblicus."—Ed.

from it; it will not appear applied to it from without; it will not injure the individuality of your expression; you will never become copyists; and this is indeed, as the nature of evangelical preaching requires him to be, a *man* whom *men* shall have understood.

CHAPTER III.

SUPERIOR QUALITIES OR EXCELLENCIES OF STYLE.

---

§ I.—Of Strength and Beauty of Style in General.

Although several of the qualities which we have recommended, may, by rising to a certain degree, from simple qualities become excellencies, it is nevertheless true, that we have given negative rules, rather than positive precepts or methods; we have raised barriers, circumscribed the field of eloquence. All these qualities are summed up, I confess, in the idea of *truth;* it is always, under different points of view, truth which we have recommended. What is there beyond truth, to suppose that truth should not be everything? There is, if we will, the *extraordinary*,—"the superfluous, a thing very necessary;" the union, or reconciliation of the true and the extraordinary, is the problem to be solved. In the class of compositions which we are considering, the proper name of the extraordinary, is eloquence,—an eloquent style; but this word teaches us nothing: we knew it beforehand. But in what does this *extraordinary* consist? Of what elements is this eloquence of style composed?

We shall be right in saying, that it is composed of *strength* and *beauty;* and this will be now, to have said something. Here there is some information. Truth, doubtless, is not a purely negative thing; strength and beauty are perhaps only the truth at its highest pitch; nevertheless, the word *truth* may be taken, and is often taken in a restricted sense; and in this sense, truth is distinguished from beauty, and from strength, and remains on this side of them. In one word, style cannot be eloquent, if it is not true; but it can be true, without being eloquent.

Thus we may say, that in collecting together, in the preceding chapter, the elements which compose the truth of style, we have raised barriers, in the interior of which we leave eloquence to move. *Leave* is the word, because there are no rules, or method, for being eloquent; we cannot give to him who has not. But, on the other hand, we can give to him who has; an exposition of the resources, and of the expedients and procedures of eloquence, may be profitable to him who has the talent of eloquence.[1] It cannot be unprofitable for him, to reflect upon the causes of the effects which are produced by oratorical genius; this study conducts to the exercise of the unconscious faculties; and just as we preach morality to the regenerate man, so we may preach art to the man of talent, in order that he may employ all his force, and also in order that he may learn to regulate it.

Strength and beauty, the essential attributes of moral and religious truth, ought to be found in the form in which we clothe them. Now, strength in works of art, is everything that exalts within us the perception of life; beauty is that which, in this exhibition of life, gives us the perception of harmony, and proportion. It is with strength and beauty, as with so many other pairs of things, which aid, by resisting each other, and complete, by appearing to restrict each other. It is with them, as with righteousness and peace, which, distinct, and often apparently opposed, "meet and kiss each other." (Ps. lxxxv. 11.)

Strength is not exclusively appropriate to certain kinds of composition, and beauty to others. But there are kinds in which we, above everything, aspire to strength; others, in which beauty is more studied. There are times also which, very sensitive to one of these merits, hold the other very cheap: the more decided inclination towards strength, or towards beauty, distinguishes also certain nations, and certain epochs, from one another. These differences of taste are connected with other more profound differences. The ultimate ground of moral existence discovers itself in the diversity of these tendencies.

In applying the names *strength* and *beauty* to that which, in eloquence, is beyond the simple truth of style, we have not indicated the plan of what remains for us to say; we have only summed up under two principal ideas, what, in eloquence, is the complement of the *truth* of style.

[1] "Doctrina vim promovet insitam."—HORACE, *Carm.* ED.

One might be tempted to make a distinction between poetry and eloquence, according to the predominance, or exclusive presence, of the one or the other of these two elements, strength and beauty. It is not, however, by this, that they must be distinguished; for neither does poetry dispense with strength, nor does eloquence exclude beauty. We must seek elsewhere the difference between these two kinds. It consists in this, that the one, eloquence, has for its objects, facts; the other, ideas; I mean eloquence, in so far as it is eloquence; and poetry, in so far as it is poetry; for these two arts sometimes touch each other, and are more or less blended together. Eloquence aims at affecting changes in the real world, poetry wishes to produce changes only in the conceptions of the mind. Eloquence does not ignore ideas, poetry does not set aside facts; but the former proceeds from the ideas to the facts, the latter proceeds from the facts to the ideas; that is to say, eloquence transforms ideas into facts, and poetry transforms facts into ideas. Eloquence must necessarily take its point of support in ideas (the ideas of justice, of honesty, and of suitableness), but, like a lever, it makes use of this point of support, in order to move facts; in like manner, poetry must necessarily take its point of support in facts, in reality, and in experience; but it does so in order to rise with it towards ideas, or towards an ideal. Let us only remark, that the word *ideas* does not signify the same thing in both cases; in the first, it signifies laws, the laws of nature, of reason, and of conscience; in the second, the ideas are only types, more pure or more complete, of all existences, than can be presented by any real[1] and concrete existence taken by itself, or by all of them taken together. Eloquence, therefore, carries us to action; poetry, to contemplation. Eloquence is a combat; poetry is a spectacle or a vision. Eloquence speaks of that which is; poetry creates that which ought to be.[2] Eloquence flows in the same channel as life; poetry hollows out for itself a bed by the side of life. Eloquence mingles itself, so to speak, with the tide of life, which it swells, and hurries along; poetry suspends its course. I do not speak here, let it be understood, of the internal or contemplative life, but of the ex-

[1] It is in this sense that Aristotle, *Treatise on Poetry*, says that poetry is a more philosophical and excellent thing than history, for its object is *general* and universal or ideal truth; that of history is *particular* truth.—Ed.

[2] As Sophocles said that he represented men, οἵους δεῖ εἶναι.—Ed.

ternal or practical life. The two streams are not always separate; they may, from being at a great distance from each other, unite and flow together; poetry may become eloquent, eloquence may become poetic; but eloquence and poetry are none the less distinct in their principle, in their end, and consequently, in their means; and this is so true, that eloquence, which is an action, if it cease to act in order to contemplate, ceases to be eloquent; and poetry, if it forget to contemplate, in order to act, ceases to be poetry.[1]

The rule for each is, not to deny itself, but to remain faithful to its principle, to maintain it without ceasing, and to make use of the other art, without allowing itself to be absorbed by it. We have here given no counsels to poets; our business is only with orators. What shall we say to them?

Everything ought to be with you subordinate to the action,[2] everything, even to the minutest details of the style; everything ought to act with you, everything that does not act, is lost; all your words ought to be winged, and armed. And if you do not yet understand us, if you say that in poetry also everything tends to an end, everything marches towards a goal, and that, in this sense, poetry is also an action, we shall succeed in making ourselves understood, by adding that poetry is an internal action,—a contemplative, ideal action, whilst eloquence is a real action, of man upon man, of will upon will, and, by means of will, upon the world; it is this action which the orator proposes to himself; it is this aim which makes him an orator, and which he ought not to lose sight of for a single instant.

Must it be concluded fromt his, that poetry ought to be excluded from the oratorical style? It must merely be concluded from it, that poetry is its means, and not its end; for, otherwise, how should we dispense with it? How could we distinguish from poetry the talent, or the art, of him who renders the objects of his discourse present to himself, and renders them present to

[1] See the reflections on the difference between poetry and eloquence in the first *Mélanges de Philosophie et de Litterature*.—D'Ancillon, vol. i., p. 269.

Eloquence is derived from *eloqui*, "to speak out," *i.e*, simply, naturally, and what is true; saying what one has really to say: not *grandiloquence*, which aims at saying *grand* things.—Ed.

[2] Similarly, Demosthenes, when asked the first requisite for an orator, replied, Action. The second? Action. The third? Action. He meant every means (including the delivery), whereby the desired effect is produced on the hearer.—Ed.

his auditory,—who gives to the ideas a body, which transforms the definitions into pictures, which invents, which creates, and which colours? Imagination and poetry are one and the same thing; and if, in the economy and combination of our faculties, reason and sentiment do not dispense with imagination, how should eloquence, which is at once reason and imagination, dispense with it? But the river, in order to reflect the rays of the sun, or to be tinged by the colour of its banks, has no need to slacken its course, and eloquence has no need to suspend or to nullify itself, in order to make apparent the poetry with which it is penetrated, and which flows along with it. [In short] it is necessary to do justice to beauty, as well as to strength,—to poetry, as well as to the oratorical element. Style must be allowed to appropriate to itself everything that is suitable to it; only, one character should everywhere predominate, accentuate everything, and constitute the general tone; this character is action,—the active style.

It is this principle of action, already laid down by us in the chapter on oratorical arrangement, which we feel obliged to lay down anew, in treating of the superior qualities or the excellencies of the oratorical style. We had no need of recalling it to your remembrance, so long as the question was only of qualities which did not put in peril this principle; neither purity and correctness, nor clearness and precision, nor naturalness and suitableness, threatened, even from a distance, the principle of action; none of these qualities displays itself at the expense of action, none requires it to be suppressed, or suspended. It is not so with the ulterior or superior qualities, as we would call them; for though they have nothing to lose, but rather much to gain, by the observation of the principle of action, they are liable to become isolated, and to arrogate to themselves an independent existence; style may seek, irrespectively of this principle, strength and beauty; and we ourselves, when we undertake to state the elements, of which the strength and the beauty of style are composed, would be accomplices in the same error, if, at the outset, we took no care to lay down certain general principles which ought to guide and govern the writer, in every part of his work.

The first of these principles is that, in eloquence, nothing can be conceded to the pure desire of pleasing, that it admits only

useful beauties, that nothing with it is pure ornament.[1] And this term *utility* has here nothing vague; the utility which the orator studies, is that of proving, convincing, and determining. Eloquence, in this respect, has its type in nature, where all that is beautiful is useful, or springs from the useful. Nature has so admirably reconciled the useful and the beautiful, that, according to the side on which we view it, it seems, at one time, to have had in view only the beautiful, and, at another time, to have only thought of the useful. Nature hastens towards the result; but, looking at all the beauties which she brings to light in her progress towards that end, shall we always say that she refuses herself leisure? Nature, under another aspect, seems a lyre with a thousand vibrating chords,—an immense mirror of ideas; but all is action, all is life, all is production in the sounds of this lyre, and in the images of this mirror; nature is not merely a poet (by this title she would exhibit in her works an end,—a severe unity), nature is also an orator; she acts, she produces, she concludes; all that she has made is beautiful, but all that she has made is also useful—that is to say, fitted to produce in that which is external to her, the feeling of happiness.

It is from Cicero, that we borrow this comparison between the works of eloquence, and those of nature: "That which we wish in eloquence, nature has admirably realised in all her works; she has provided that what was the most useful, should also have the most dignity, and even the most grace. The entire system of things in the whole universe has for its object universal preservation, and well-being; as, for example, the rotundity of the heavens; the central position of the earth, maintained in its place by a force which is peculiar to it; the circular course of the sun, which, from the hibernal constellations which it first approached, gradually passes towards other signs of the zodiac. These combinations are of such importance, that were they changed ever so little, everything would be disturbed; and they have, at the same time, so great beauty, that we can imagine

[1] "Inceptis gravibus plerumque et magna professis
Assuitur, latè qui splendeat unus et alter
Purpureus patmus."—HORACE, *Ars Poet.*

In poetry, it is permitted to introduce episodes for the mere purpose of pleasing, if they be not absolutely incongruous to the general design: in eloquence, only *useful* beauties are permitted.

"Aut prodesse volunt *aut delectare* poetæ."—HORACE, *Ars Poet.*—ED.

nothing more magnificent. Consider, again, the conformation and the figure of men, and even of animals. . . . What shall I say of trees, in which there is nothing, from the trunk to the branches, from the branches to the leaves, which does not belong to the nature and the destination of the tree, but of which, at the same time, there is no part which does not attract the eye by its beauty? Let us leave nature, and look at the arts. . . . It is the same with eloquence; everything that you there meet with that is useful or even necessary, is accompanied by the pleasing, and the graceful."[1] Cicero gives, as an example, *number*, which is intended to spare the speaker fatigue.

Now, eloquence, like all the arts, is a product, and a development of nature. It ought to present the same phenomena as nature. It is impossible, if it is cultivated in the direction of nature, that it should not produce the beautiful, in producing the useful; but just as, in morality, the useful is produced by the honourable, and not the honourable by the useful, so that we can arrive at the useful only through the honourable;[2] in like manner, in art, the beautiful,—the true beautiful,—can only spring from the useful. Here the useful takes the first place; but the useful in this domain is conviction; it is the precise determination of the will; and the useful, according to the laws of morality, blends with the true, the just, and the good. It is, therefore, from the very bottom of the subject, that we ought to draw our ornaments; the only true ones, consequently the only ones truly beautiful, are there; nothing is absolutely beautiful by itself, but a thing is beautiful by the place which it occupies; it would, therefore, be a bad calculation, to seek ornaments beyond the limits of our subject, that is to say, beyond the limits of our object. Our subject connects them with our arrangement; there is no need of our wandering away from it.

"Most frequently," says Quintilian (and I, for my part, would say *always*), "the best expressions are connected with the matter itself, and discover themselves to us by their own splendour (*optima rebus cohœrent et cernuntur suo lumine*); nevertheless, we search for them, as if they hid themselves, and wished to avoid our observation. Presuming that they are never near to

[1] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book iii., chap. xlv.–xlvi.

[2] As Archbishop Whately well says, "Honesty is the best policy; but he who is honest only because honesty is the best policy, is not an honest man."—Ed.

the things, of which we have to speak, we travel far from the subject, and, after having discovered them, we do violence to them, in order to drag them in to serve our purpose. The beauty of eloquence requires more masculine ornaments, and when it is sound and vigorous, it has no need of so much trimming and embellishment."[1]

To this first rule we attach a second; or rather, from the first we shall draw a second; that is, never to sacrifice the whole to the details. This rule is less a new rule, than another form of the preceding one. To subordinate the beautiful to the useful, is to subordinate the details to the whole, since the useful in an oratorical discourse does not renew itself from time to time, being one and the same from the beginning to the end of the discourse. If we depart from this condition, there is still room for the charms of diction, but not for genuine beauties of style; let us say more correctly, that, apart from this condition, there is no style. If a useless beauty is not a beauty, since the beautiful in every kind of style is inseparable from the useful, a beauty of detail which is not related, or which is not subordinate, to the whole, is not a beauty, since the idea of utility, and that of being a whole,[2] are alike inseparable from the oratorical discourse. The period, and sentence, cannot be worked separately and for their own sakes; and the nice care which is given to them, is the effect of an unhappy diligence, if it injures the continuity, the proportion, and the general effect. If the orator is not constantly engrossed with his object, if, at every moment, so to speak, his whole subject is not present to him, if every passage is not really a *passage*,[3] a step (*pas*) towards the terminus, his

[1] Quintilian, book viii., preface.

[2] "Æmilium circa ludum faber imus et ungues
Exprimet, et molles imitabitur ære capillos;
Infelix operis summâ, quia ponere *totum*
Nesciet: hunc ego me si quid componere curem
Non magis esse velim, quam pravo vivere naso
Spectandum nigris oculis, nigroque capillo."—Horace, *Ars Poet.*

So Aristotle *on Poetry*, in defining tragedy, says, it must be the imitation of an *entire* (τελείας) action; *i.e.*, one "that has *beginning, middle, and end*," as he defines it; adding, that "the parts should be so connected, that if any one of them be either transposed or taken away, the *whole* will be destroyed or changed: for whatever may be either retained, or omitted, without making any sensible difference, is not properly a part."—Ed.

[3] *Action de passer* (act of passing), first sense attributed to the word by the Academy.—Ed.

discourse will be all made up of patch-work, that is to say, of pieces which have no relation to each other, and the detail will not suffer less than the whole, since the idea of the beautiful cannot be separated from the idea of suitableness, and of relation. Under this point of view, writers might be divided into three classes; some write the discourse well; others the paragraph; others the sentence. The first are not the most numerous.

"You see most writers," says Quintilian, "attach themselves to the detail, whether the business is to invent, or to weigh and measure what they have invented. Even though, in this research, they should always stop at the excellent, we must nevertheless detest this unhappy prepossession, which slackens the course of the language, and which extinguishes, in the delays of indecision, all the warmth of the thought. He is an orator to be pitied,—he is, so to speak, a very poor orator,—who cannot make up his mind to lose a single word. He, on the contrary, will not lose any word who has, in the first place, studied in its principles the art of speaking; who then, by the perusal of numerous and well-selected authors, has laid in a rich store of words, and has studied the art of placing them well; and who, lastly, has so strengthened himself in all these particulars by repeated exercise, that everything that he needs, is always within his reach and before his eyes. We may count upon it, that the ideas will not come to him, without being accompanied by the words to express them."[1]

Quintilian has pointed out the stumbling-block; namely, the desire of losing nothing, an ill-judged covetousness which loses everything, from a desire to gain everything; it is the love of effect,—a love which has always characterised writers without genius, or declining epochs, but frequently, also, in all epochs, genuine talent, at the age of inexperience. Has it never happened that a young man has undertaken a discourse, in order to have an opportunity of giving a place to a picture, or a happy movement? has he never happened to make a vast subject the frame which surrounds a favourite expression? A humiliating excess,—but one which we must represent to ourselves, in order to perceive all the danger and all the littleness, of such a mode of writing; *miser et pauper*, says Quintilian. "It is because we

[1] QUINTILIAN, book viii., preface.

are afraid," says Buffon, "to lose isolated, fugitive thoughts,[1] it is because we wish to place everywhere striking traits, that there are so many works formed of patch-work, so few that are founded at a single cast. Nothing is more opposed to warmth of style."[2]

I should not wish to exclude striking traits; they are useful;[3] but they come, as it were, of themselves, to a man of talent, in the natural series of the ideas in a well arranged discourse. They are perhaps never so striking, so happy, as when they have not been sought for, and when a kind of logical necessity has brought them in. Of what class of writers have so many kept their ground, as of those who have never sacrificed the whole to one of the details of the composition? "For myself, I regard these luminous traits of style, as the eyes of eloquence; but I do not wish that the body should be covered with eyes, nor that the other members should lose their employment."[4]

The qualities of an eloquent style seem to us capable of being reduced to two general ones; the *colour*, and the *movement*. To represent objects of any kind whatever, in such a manner as to replace the direct view of them, or even to procure for ourselves a more lively intuition of them, than that which we could receive from the objects themselves—this is the first element of the eloquence of style. I have called it *colour*, for want of another term;[5] but this talent subdivides itself, and is not quite expressed by the word *colour*. One writer holds more of the painter, and another more of the sculptor; the style of the one

[1] "Sed nunc non erat his locus; et fortasse cupressum
Scis simulare; quid hoc, si fractis enatat exspes
Navibus œre dato qui pingitur."—HORACE, *Ars Poet.*—ED.

[2] BUFFON, *Discours sur le Style.*

[3] For instance, "Do not leave everything to your heirs; know how to be heirs of yourselves."—BOSSUET. "The fool shut before him his impious lips, and, retaining under a forced silence his vain and sacrilegious thoughts, contented himself with saying in his heart: There is no God."—FLECHIER.

[4] QUINTILIAN, book viii., chap. v.

[5] The German has the word *Anschaulichkeit.*

HORACE, describing the dramatic and graphic power of the poet, says:—

Ille per extentum funem mihi posse videtur
Ire poeta, meum qui pectus inaniter angit,
Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet,
Ut magus, et modò me Thebis, modò ponit Athenis.—*Epist.* ii 1.

Colour in the preacher is similar, only that his subjects are real, not imaginary as the poet's.—ED.

is a picture warmly coloured, that of the other a bas-relief deeply chiselled. Both have happily expressed by language the objects which they wished to make known; but the one has attached himself to the bringing prominently out the very idea of the object; the other, to indicating it by its effects, or its circumstances. Examples:—

"He who is most like to the dead (*i. e.*, the aged), dies with most reluctance."

"Death ravishes all, without shame."

"The people ought to be the favourite of a king."

"He who has pity on the poor, lendeth to the Lord."[1]

"True eloquence scoffs at eloquence."[2]

"Without envy, without ornament, without ostentation, always great in action and in repose, he appeared at Chantilly as at the head of the troops. Whether he embellished this magnificent and delightful mansion, or provided a camp in the midst of the enemies' country, and fortified a place; whether he marched with an army amidst dangers, or conducted his friends in these superb alleys to the sound of gushing fountains, which were silent neither by day nor by night; he was always the same man, and his glory followed him everywhere."[3]

La Bruyere, an admirable sculptor of thoughts, has other modes of proceeding:

"False greatness is unsociable and inaccessible; as it feels itself weak, it conceals itself, or, at least, does not show itself in front; and lets itself be seen, only so far as is necessary to overawe."[4]

"A great mind is above injury, injustice, grief, and ridicule; and it would be invulnerable, if it did not suffer by feeling compassion."[5]

"Everybody says of a coxcomb, that he is a coxcomb; but nobody dares to say so to himself: he dies without knowing it, and without any person being *avenged*."[6]

To arrange the ideas amongst themselves, to measure the march of the language in such a manner as to procure to the hearer the perception of the action, of the progress, and of a series of distinct phases in the drama in which he is associated,—not to leave him long in the same situation, and to transport him

[1] Proverbs xix. 17. [2] Pascal, *Pensées*, part i., art. x., § xxxiv.
[3] Bossuet, *Oraison Funèbre du Prince de Condé.*
[4] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. ii. [5] Ibid., chap. xi. [6] Ibid.

in a lively manner to another,—in one word, to give him an intimate and continual consciousness of his life—this is a second law,—in truth, it is the general and supreme law of the oratorical discourse, but one which, realising itself in the style, ought to be studied where it is realised. These two laws (*colour* and *movement*), though distinct, still at times admit of being fulfilled, the one by the other; the images may aid the movement, the movement may, in its turn, become a painting; the orator should even aspire to obtain one of the effects by means of the other; but these two effects are not the less distinct the one from the other, and require to be considered separately.

Let us then inquire, in the first place, what are the principal means of painting the thought, or of giving character and relief to the objects, and colour to the style.

§ II.—Of Colour.

[All discourse,—that of books, and of conversation,—aims at supplying the want of immediate experience, by something which may hold the place of it, and reproduce its impression. Speech ought to be something more than the bare statement of the things. We know a thing only when we have the image of it; the image sometimes produces an impression equal to that of the reality. Nothing short of this will do in the pulpit; thought must be painted.] I require that the expression should form an image; that is to say, that it should give us, not only the idea, but, in some sort, the sight, or lively intuition of the things, physical or moral, which are spoken to us; that the ideas be clothed for us in a form that vividly and distinctly represents them to the imagination. We may consider in this act, the act itself, the nature of the ideas in regard to which it is exercised, its immediate object or its mode, and the means which it employs. Let us take them in their order.

I. The act itself.—It is necessary to give to each of the objects which enter into the subject of the discourse, its character and its value. [What is it to paint one's thought, if it is not to add to the clearness a vivacity which does not usually belong it, and a force that is unknown to it. The business, then, is not to paint for the mere sake of painting; this is the means, and not the end. This traces the limits, and excludes tediousness and prolixity. In general, the business is to paint, and not to de-

scribe, to make us find out (see for ourselves), and not to show us everything. All is subordinated to instruction, and emotion. I like almost as ill to see splendid imagery in a discourse from the pulpit, as to see gold on the vestments of the priest, or luxurious decorations in the sanctuary. Nevertheless, it is necessary to render objects sensible. We require figures somewhat bold; the style that has little colouring is little suitable in the house of God. I tell no person to force his nature; for here also, "Whatsoever is not of faith is a sin." (Rom. xiv. 23.)

II. The nature of the objects [which it is necessary to represent].—These are sometimes material objects, sometimes immaterial; sometimes personages, sometimes situations or scenes; sometimes individual facts, sometimes collective facts.

III. The immediate object, or the mode of the representation.—Sometimes it is the character, or the idea of the object, and sometimes its external symptoms [which the image brings out]. The one of these procedures more resembles sculpture, the other painting. When they are in perfection, they have an equal value. Bossuet excels in both kinds.[1] Often we characterise by a word: "The lightning cleaves the cloud, the night returns;" but, "we have *seen*," suffices. We may, therefore, seize the idea either by means of some special characteristic circumstance, or by means of various details. It is painting, doubtless, which should be most frequently employed, because it is within the reach of a greater number of persons. However, the other procedure which consists in placing before the eyes the object itself, has great force when seasonably employed. It is familiar to La Bruyere.

IV. The means which are employed.—They are *direct*, when we keep by the object itself, which we have to make known and exhibit; *indirect*, when we have recourse to what is supplied by accommodation.

A. The *direct* means consist in the enunciation of the characteristics of the object. The most ample form of this procedure is *description*, that is to say, the indication of the circumstances which may render an idea sensible to the imagination, or as visible,—as present as it can be, in the absence of the object.[2] I have said *indication*, not *enumeration*, because, though sometimes

[1] "Fountains that are silent neither by day, nor by night."—Bossuet.

[2] In the antique *genus*, from which ours differs too much, contingent circumstances are added to the principal fact; it seeks always to descend from the genus to the species. [See my note from Horace, p. 377.—Ed.]

a complete enumeration may be useful, as likewise in certain cases redundance, or, at least, accumulation, more frequently a trait well chosen is sufficient for our design. It is not the number of the details, it is the choice of them that is of importance; there are suggestive (and characteristic) strokes which are as good as the complete and methodical analysis of a character, and of a situation. It is necessary to seek the point where the rays converge, and where the light becomes flame.[1]

To great writers, a small space is sufficient to enclose a whole picture. They know how to bring together the elements of a thought or of an image, to suppress the intervals, to substitute for the juxtaposition of the parts their combination; thus Bossuet: "These words of comfort carried away her holy soul to the abodes of the just."[2] And elsewhere: "He expired while saying these words, and he continues with the angels the sacred song of praise."[3]

In the most concise narrations of the Bible, the characteristic, comprehensive expression, is never wanting.[4]

Massillon excels in the art of fusing the images into the body of the style, though he does not refuse bold images such as this: "Your actions put your titles to the blush;" but even these appear only in so far as is necessary, because they have been occasioned, and made legitimate, by what went before.

Often, moreover, that which paints best, is not happy combinations and phrases, but the simple and artless expression, which, without pretending to paint, aims at nothing more than to designate the idea. Thus, we read in the Bible: "Let there be light, and there was light" (Gen. i. 3); and in another place: "Rachel weeping for her children, refused to be comforted because they are not." (Matt. ii. 18.) But often, also, something more is necessary.

[1] "Pontum adspectabant flentes."—VIRGIL, *Æneid*, v., 616.

> "Son coursier bondissant, qui sent flotter la rêne,
> Lance un egard oblique à son maitre expirant,
> Revient, penche la tête, et la flaire en pleurant."

His bounding courser, feeling the reins at liberty, darts an oblique look at his expiring master, returns, bends his head and smells him while lamenting him.

[2] BOSSUET, *Oraison Funèbre de la Princesse Palatine.*

[3] Ibid., *Oraison Funèbre de Le Tellier.*

[4] See the exposition of the song over Pharaoh, by M. Herson, in the *Traité de Etudes de* ROLLIN, book v., chap. iii., § ix., and *Interficiet eos manus mea*, for *Interficiam eos.* See also Genesis xliii. 26–31.

[A powerful and dangerous mean, is the *epithet*, and it is frequently to this that the image is reduced. The epithet is a word added to the name of the object or of the action, to signalise a character of that action, or of that object.] Every epithet is an adjective, or an adverb; every adjective is not an epithet. That adjective, or that adverb, without which the sense would remain incomplete or suspended, is not an epithet; but that is a useless epithet which does not give a more complete view, or a more lively perception of the object.

[In all languages writers of moderate ability make a great abuse of the epithet; it is an easy resource for indolent minds, the insufficient supplement of an imperfect meditation, and the cause of that feebleness of style,[1] which is remarked in several writers.] The epithet is useless, if it does not sum up a judgment, if it is not an abridged picture. It ought not to be the rule, but the exception. [Whenever the epithet is not useful, it is injurious,] and useful epithets are much less useful, than injurious epithets are injurious. See the imitation of the nineteenth Psalm by J. B. Rousseau:

"Quel sublime cantique," etc.

Who does not feel himself fatigued, in the first strophe, by those epithets which he did not require, because they were comprised in the substantive? We may here once more recall the principle of activity: it is necessary to leave something for the mind to do, and it does not thank you for what it would have found itself, or for what it has actually found. (See my note above.—Ed.)

It is necessary to distinguish the cases in which the substantive brings with it the whole train of accessory ideas, or in which every accessory idea would be unseasonable, and in which the

[1] Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii., characterises the poetical style (for instance that wherein epithets occur, "long, unseasonable, and too frequent") in prose as "*frigid* (τὸ ψυχρόν) and *indistinct through its prosing loquacity* (τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν), inasmuch as it obtrudes on people what they know already." It may be thought strange, says Archbishop Whately, that such a style should be termed frigid, because '*warm*,' '*glowing*,' seem metaphors applicable to poetry. This very circumstance does in reality account for the use of the other expression. We are, in poetical prose, *reminded of*, and therefore *miss* the warmth and glow of poetry; on the same principle that we speak of *coldness* in the rays of the *moon*, because they *remind* us of sunshine, but want its warmth; so an empty fire-place is apt to suggest the idea of cold. Demetr. Phaler. Ἑρμην. § 116, also applies the term frigidity to that which is next neighbour to grandeur (τοῦ γειτνιῶντος τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ).—Ed.

substantive serves for an adjective to itself; for, at bottom, is not every substantive, by implication, an adjective?

A very lively feeling alternately suppresses, and multiplies epithets. In a close, urgent argumentation, the words, crowding forward for utterance, reject the qualifying attributes which are not absolutely necessary. There may be a style formed altogether of substantives.

But if the adjectives are concealed and comprised, so to speak, within the bosom of the substantives, yet, whenever the thought concentrates itself, when it girds up its loins in order to proceed more rapidly, there are moments of effusion in which the epithet reappears and multiplies itself; we have not enough of means to characterise the objects. There, the adjective is as necessary as the substantive; it forms a part of it. In such a case, redundance itself may be pleasing:—

"Your crime is enormous, execrable, odious."[1]

Description loves to multiply epithets, when they form an image, or when they characterise the object, and place it in relation to, or in contrast with, the situation.[2] [But the more prodigal we are of them, the less are we permitted to employ trivial ones; they must express something. It is not that we ought to seek the extraordinary; the most simple epithet, that which would suggest itself to everybody, is often the best;[3] it is the truth of style. But, in general, they ought to be striking, to

[1] Ducis, *Hamlet*, act v., scene iv. See also the exordium of the third oration of Cicero against Cataline.

[2] Virgil is admirable in this respect; see *Georgics*, book iii., verse 494–500, and 515–524; *Æneid*, ii. 204–211.

Archbishop Whately, *Rhet.* 213, says, that epithets should not be introduced, except to fulfil one of these two purposes; 1st, to *explain a metaphor;* as Æschylus, "the winged hound of Jove," *i.e.*, the eagle. 2dly, When the epithet expresses something which, though *implied* in the subject, would not have been likely to occur at once spontaneously to the hearer's mind; and yet is important to be noticed with a view to the purpose in hand. Epithets employed by a skilful orator will be found to be in fact so many *abridged arguments*, the force of which is sufficiently conveyed by a mere hint. *E. g.*, "We ought to take warning from the *bloody* revolution in France:" the epithet suggests one of the reasons for our being warned.

[3] Artlessness of ancient epithets. The most common are likely to become again piquant. We are beginning to say, *the perfumed rose, the fresh Aurora, the rapid river, the green meadow.* We say well: *the blue lake.*—I could not censure such epithets as those in the *Esther*, act i., scene ii.:—"*Sacred* mountains, *fertile* valleys! From the *pleasant* country of our ancestors, shall we for ever be exiled?"

present a picture, or to include a judgment.] There are some epithets which paint, others which characterise; the first are images, the others thoughts. [The following is an example of the employment of both]:

> " Et dans les flancs affreux de leurs roches sanglantes
> Emportent, à grands cris, leurs dépouilles vivantes."
>
> " Poursuivant des proscrits les troupes égarées,
> Du sang de ses sujets souillait ses mains sacrées."[1]

Combined epithets have often great force:

> " La mort pâle et sanglante était à ses côtés."
>
> " . . . . . De l'enfer il ne sort
> Que l'éternelle soif d'une impossible mort."[2]

" After all the factions were put down, he alone appeared still to resist, and alone still to menace the victorious favourite with his sad and intrepid looks."[3]

We may say as much of epithets in antithesis:

" Death, more powerful, took her away from us, while in these royal hands."[4]—" Time, that changeable image of an unchangeable eternity."[5]—" To repair the irreparable outrage of years."[6]

[If we are able, we shall do well to employ as new epithets, adjectives somewhat turned from their ordinary sense; it being well understood, however, that this be done without doing violence to the language, as is done in the following associations of words]: " Luminous disciple, an irreparable man; a grievous soul."

But I could not recommend to the pulpit epithets too extraordinary: it must beware of astonishing.

And, in general, be moderate in the use of epithets; be assured that their abundance betrays the feebleness of a style not very substantial, in which the adjective is added to the substantive, in order to make weight. Observe the masters in the art, how

[1] " And into the horrid sides of their blood-stained rocks, they carry away with loud cries their living spoil.—Pursuing the misguided troops of outlaws, he stained his consecrated hands with the blood of his subjects."—VOLTAIRE, *La Henriade*, chant ii.

[2] " Death, pale and bloody, was at his side. . . . From hell there proceeds only the eternal thirst for an impossible death."

[3] BOSSUET, *Oraison Funèbre de Michel Le Tellier.*

[4] Ibid., *Oraison Funèbre de Henriette d'Angleterre.*

[5] J. B. ROUSSEAU, *Odes*, book iii., ode ii.

[6] RACINE, *Athalie*, act ii., scene v.

economical they are in the use of them. [Massillon has more of them than Bossuet; but he is very far from being lavish of them, though he knows how to multiply them on the proper occasion.]

B. [*The indirect means* of painting relieve the object by giving prominence to the features; and heighten the colour, by the bringing in of some other object. Here we approach the figurative style.]

[Antithesis is one of the strongest, but also one of the most dangerous means, of bringing out the object.] It is an opposition of ideas marked by the words, in such a manner, that there is no antithesis when the things alone, or when the words alone, are contrasted. But, in the first case, there has been one figure less than what there seemed to be: in the second, it is a puerile figure, a play upon words, a falsehood in the expression.[1] "Those who form antitheses by marking the words," says Pascal, "are like those who make false windows for the sake of symmetry."[2] The taste for antithesis especially belongs to epochs, and to minds, that are wanting in simplicity; it is one of those spices, that are intended to stimulate a blunted palate. Good authors hardly ever employ it. It is unknown to Demosthenes, rare in Bossuet; we find it, on the other hand, in Fléchier [who was not afraid to say, in his funeral oration for Turenne]: "Is it that, after so many actions worthy of immortality, he had no longer anything mortal to do?" [Wit is a bad supplement of eloquence, and it is much more common; therefore the orator ought to be the more on his guard against its snares. The polished antithesis is always bad;[3] it is perhaps only admissible when it escapes

[1] In the first case, there is a real antithesis between the things: The antithesis between the words ceases, when you lay aside the antithetical form in which the orator has placed them. In the second case, there is no true antithesis between the things, but a merely seeming one, between the words, when placed in the antithetical form. This probably is Vinet's meaning, which is somewhat obscurely expressed.—Ed.

[2] Pascal, *Pensées*, part i., art. x., § 22.

[3] The *Edinburgh Review*, xc., p. 278, truly says, "The sure sign of the general decline of an art is the frequent occurrence, not of deformity, but of *misplaced beauty*. Thus tragedy is corrupted by eloquence, comedy by wit." So eloquence, by ornament, elegance, and wit out of place. Aristotle commends antithesis, because "it sets side by side contraries; and things in contrast are the most easy to be perceived; and because it resembles a syllogism, which is a bringing together of two things by means of a third, or middle term. It is sometimes combined with *equipoise* (παρίσωσις) and *alliteration* (παρομοίωσις); *e. gr.* Mil-

involuntarily, and proceeds from the soul.] When there is opposition between the things, we must not be afraid of marking it in the words; but opposition in the ideas sometimes gains by not being marked by the words.[1]

Christianity has been favourable to antithesis, and we may say, that it is itself full of it. In order to reconcile certain oppositions, it was necessary, first of all, to bring them clearly out. Therefore, Christian writers of all ages have more or less abounded in antithesis. Modern languages are all Christian on one side; and we may also say so, up to a certain point, of the manners, and thought. It is this which explains the difference which we may remark betwixt ancient and modern authors, with respect to the use of antithesis. Paganism suppressed it, so to speak, because that gave to life a certain unity, a factitious unity, no doubt, and one which consisted in the negation, or the ignorance of one of the terms of those grand contrasts which human life presents to us. Christianity, by bringing out clearly those contrasts which it wishes to reconcile, has brought to light the antitheses of our existence. We need not, therefore, be astonished that several of the greatest effects produced by the Christian pulpit are the result of the antithesis. But once more, we must, in regard to this, abide by that which comes out naturally from the subject-matter, be on our guard against witty conceits, and an easy, and cold rhetoric, which characterises the declining epochs, and testifies a want of inspiration.

[The *metaphor*, a name under which we may comprise all the forms of the figurative style, is one of the surest means of giving character, and colour to the expression.[2]] It consists in transferring to an object, the qualities proper to another class of

man, *Apollo Belv.*, "Too fair to worship, too divine to love." Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 10, speaks also of a *false antithesis*. Archbishop Whately says, In a true antithesis, the opposition is always in the *ideas* expressed. Some writers abound with a kind of mock antithesis, in which there is little or no real antithesis between the clauses expressed in a contrasted form: the sentiment in the first clause is the same, or nearly the same, as in the second.—Ed.

[1] See the beautiful expression of St Paul, Rom. xvi. 20: "The God of peace shall shortly bruise Satan under your feet."

[2] "To be happy in metaphor," according to Aristotle, *Poet.* 37, "is the mark of genius (εὐφυΐας σημεῖόν ἐστιν); and consists in discerning the point of likeness." Such a one not only sees common analogies, but those more remote, and those which, though the multitude seldom invent, they seldom fail to recognise.—Ed.

objects. [The reason of this substitution is, that the mind is more struck with an idea, when it is applied to an object in which it does not expect to meet with it. Metaphor has two forms, founded on the mixed nature of man.] Man alone unites in himself the two natures (bodily and spiritual); they mutually influence each other; they continually recall each other; and he is always seeking to effect their reunion. Hence it happens, that we give a body to metaphorical objects or morals, and a moral life to physical objects. These two forms of metaphor, or of transference, are as ancient as man; but the primitive metaphors have ceased to be figures;[1] they no longer form prominences on the ground of language.

The first of these two forms of metaphor, that which consists in giving a body, a form, and a colour to things which have none, is the most common; languages have, by constraint, a materialistic element. The other, that which names the physical by the spiritual, is of a more elevated order; it testifies our superior nature, as having the precedence of our physical nature. Metaphors of this kind prove that mind governs all; for although we are forced to give names drawn from physical order to the things of moral order, we are not forced to give spiritual names to physical things. These intellectual metaphors are of great beauty; they abound in the Holy Scriptures: "For My sword shall be bathed in heaven (French version, *Because My sword has made itself drunk in the heavens*); behold it shall come down upon Idumea, and upon the people of My curse, to judgment" (Isaiah xxxiv. 5); but they are to be found in the very texture of all languages. The pantheistic instinct, which is the poison of so many modern writings, has contributed to their revival; but they are by no means dependent on this system; and they are of all times. Observe Bossuet: "O voyage, very different from that which she had made upon the same sea, when, coming to take possession of the sceptre of Great Britain, she saw, so to speak, the waters bow beneath her, and subject all their waves to the mistress of the seas."[2]

It is useful, and necessary to use metaphor; it is, as it were, a mirror, in which we see what is behind us, and what we could

[1] By long use the mind has ceased to regard them as metaphorical, and takes them as if strictly and literally applicable to the object.—Ed.

[2] Bossuet, *Oraison Funèbre de la Reine Henriette.*

not perceive without it. It is often as good as a syllogism. Besides, it gives one idea more, an idea more rich and more full of the object. For instance, La Bruyère has said of true greatness that "it bends by kindness towards its inferiors, and returns without effort to its natural disposition."[1]

We might demand of the pulpit a style less incorporeal, less abstract, more full of imagery than that which it commonly employs. Our style, as Bossuet says of that of Calvin, is somewhat gloomy. We have to do with the people, for religion reduces all its hearers to the quality of men, brings them back again to nature, and makes them all people and children together. "As soon as one surrenders himself to the impressions of the senses, he becomes a child, like all the world," says Marmontel. I would reverse this proposition, and add with him: "Our natural condition is that of the people. It is, therefore, necessary for us, in a certain sense, to speak like the people;" and the popular language is metaphor. Nevertheless, let us not force our talent; in literature, as in morals, what is not done in faith is sin. The abundant use of metaphor supposes a certain fertility of imagination, which does not belong to all. (See second note on the 368th page.) But as for those whose turn of mind carries them in this direction, it is necessary to warn them:

1. That the habit of expressing everything by figure, may become indolence of mind, and make us forget the true names of things.

2. [That one may come, and this is a great evil, to be satisfied with images, and adopt feebleness of ideas, however much the internal void may be disguised by the elegance, or the splendour of the form. Upon this subject, Vauvenargues has excellently said that, "when a thought is too feeble to bear a simple expression, it is a sign that it ought to be rejected."[2]]

3. [That, by the abuse of metaphor, the preacher would incur the danger of introducing false ideas. Metaphor, which animates inanimate things, and personifies abstract ideas, may be dangerous in this respect. It has sometimes given a false direction to moral and social philosophy, or retarded its progress—as, when it represents society, as an individual being.

4. Lastly, that luxuriousness of imagery is unsuitable in the

[1] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. ii., *Du Mérite Personnel.*
[2] Vauvenargues, *Réflexions et Maximes.*

pulpit. If the style of the preacher ought not to be gloomy, still less ought it to be frivolous; and a profusion of images, though they might otherwise be perfectly suitable, considered in themselves, deprives it of its gravity. With the same view, we must interdict ourselves the use of metaphors that are too ingenious, and which approach to wit. There is war betwixt wit and eloquence in general, but especially betwixt wit and the eloquence of the pulpit, the special proprieties of which banish every appearance of frivolity.

Voltaire would wish metaphor to be always furnished by passion; a rule too absolute, but valuable notwithstanding. It intimates to us that the beauty of style, and its strength, ought to be one and the same thing, and that it is necessary, as far as possible, that what interests the imagination, should touch the heart. An image in which the soul of the writer is revealed, is much more beautiful than any other, in which we only see his wit.

Bossuet is admirable in this respect. It is he who has said, for example: "Thus we go on, always drawing after us the long dragging chain of our hopes."[1] It is necessary that the ornaments should be intimately united to the ideas, and, as it were, blended with the very texture of the composition.

Allegory, very little used in preaching, though it has for its authority divine eloquence itself, would be a form suitable to be introduced anew by the preacher, whoever should have the talent for it. It is antique, but it would be possible to render it modern; and though it might astonish at first, it would be favourably received; for it is eminently popular.[2] However, if metaphor has its dangers which we felt bound to specify, allegory, which is a prolonged metaphor, can be employed only with great precautions; for it may readily appear to be an amusement of the mind. The parables of the gospels, which may be reconciled with allegory, have a character eminently serious, which does not permit the mind to be distracted from

[1] So Goldsmith in "The Traveller,"

> "Where'er I roam, whatever realms I see,
> My heart untravell'd fondly turns to thee,
> Still to my brother turns with ceaseless pain,
> And drags at each remove *a lengthening chain.*"—Ed.

[2] *Ex. gr.* Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," the most popular of uninspired books in the English language.—Ed.

the religious object, and to lose itself in amusement.] We would not risk in the present day an allegory like that on age, in Eccles. xii. 2–9; it is probably an enigma; but an allegory like that of the vine, in Isaiah v., might find a place in a modern discourse. Moreover, we must make a distinction between the audiences which we address.

Comparison (*Simile*) is an explicit metaphor, just as metaphor is an implied comparison. Comparison is more artless, and, in so far as it is an ornament, more antique than the metaphor; [it abounds in Homer, who unrolls all its folds; whilst with the moderns, it has a more rapid, and a more concentrated form. It is somewhat slow in its nature, it walks for pleasure, instead of travelling, or running; it seems to suppose that we have leisure, and that we may linger by the way; it is more poetical, than oratorical. We cannot think of banishing it from the pulpit, but it is not eminently suited to it.] The great preachers, Bossuet excepted, make little use of it, but even he employs it more willingly in the panegyric, and in the funeral oration, than in the sermon.[1]

We recommend rapid comparisons, thrown cursorily into the midst of the narration, and of the reasoning :—

> "Henri, plein de l'ardeur
> Que le combat encore enflammait dans son cœur,
> Semblable à l'océan qui s'appaise et qui gronde."[2]

> "Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno."[3]

[1] See the *Panégyrique de Saint Paul* and *l'Oraison Funèbre du grand Condé*.

Archbishop Whately, *Rhet.*, p. 200, says, The Simile or Comparison differs in form only from a Metaphor; the resemblance being in that case *stated*, which in the metaphor is *implied*. Each may be founded either on *direct* resemblance between the objects themselves (as when we speak of *table*-land, etc.), or on the analogy which is the resemblance of Ratios—a similarity of the relations they bear to certain other objects, as when we speak of "the *light* of reason." We are carefully to distinguish between an *Illustration* (*i.e.*, an *argument* from analogy or resemblance), and a Simile or Comparison, introduced merely to give force or beauty to the expression. The aptness of an illustration sometimes leads men to overrate, and sometimes to underrate its force as an argument.—Ed.

[2] "Henry, full of the ardour with which the combat still inflamed his heart, like the ocean, which grows tranquil and still murmurs." . . . —Voltaire, *La Henriade*, chant vi.

[3] "Like the winged winds, and resembling most a fleeting dream."—Virgil, *Æneid*, ii., v. 794.

And Bossuet: "Greatness, far from weakening goodness, is made only to aid it in communicating itself further, as a public fountain that is raised up, in order to spread its waters;"[1] or again: "There remained that formidable infantry of the Spanish army, whose large battalions in close array, like so many towers, but like towers which could repair their breaches, remained immoveable."[2] Besides this rapid comparison, we do not wish absolutely to condemn extended comparisons, even in the sermon.

They may be familiar, nay, they ought to be so, in the sense that they ought to be borrowed from known objects;[3] but they must be noble. This of Bossuet is not so: "The soul has no less attachment, the inclination is not less sensitive, in dearth than in plenty. It is with it, as with the hairs of the head, which always inflict the same pain, whether we pluck them from a bald head, or draw them from a head that is covered with them."[4]

Saurin is happier in this piece, already quoted:

"If God had given us a life full of allurements, we would have taken little care to procure ourselves another; it is natural to love an abode, where we find delights; everything that attaches us to earth, relaxes the ardour which we should have for heaven; the inward man is renewed, when the outward man perishes; and our faith is established upon the ruins of our fortune. When the dove meets without the ark, the winds unchained, the waters overflowing, the floodgates of heaven open, and the entire universe buried beneath the waves, she seeks refuge in the

[1] Bossuet, *Oraison Funèbre du Prince de Condé.* [2] Ibid.

[3] Demosthenes has said: "Like potters, you fabricate taxiarchs and tribunes, for display, not for war." And again: "As in an edifice, or in a ship, the lower parts ought to be the most solid, so we make justice and truth the foundation of state policy." "So long as a ship, great or small, is not yet lost, sailors, pilot, passengers, ought all to co-operate with eagerness in preventing the perfidy, or the imprudence of destroying it; but if the waves have surmounted it, every effort becomes fruitless. So, Athenians, so long as your republic is still standing, supported by great forces, by innumerable resources, and the most brilliant reputation, what will you do?" The great Grecian orator may serve as a model in respect of the comparisons he employs. They are remarkable for their rapidity, and their practical character.

"The Simile (εἰκών) or Comparison has its utility in oratory, though but seldom; for it is best suited to poetry. But they ought to be introduced as metaphors."—Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 4.—Ed.

[4] See the artless Comparison with which Signeri commences his first sermon on *Christiano instruito nella sua legge.*

ark. But when she finds plains and fields, she stays in them. Here, my soul, is an image of thee."[1]

§ III.—Movement.

This is the second characteristic, or the second element, of an eloquent style. Physical movement is transportation from one place to another; it ought to be the same with internal movement; the movement of style, therefore, will consist in transporting the hearer from one moral place,—from one moral situation,—into another. This movement is not life, but it is the effect and the sign of it. We have no conception of life, without movement; and, in time, immobility appears to us to be death. These two ideas of movement, and of life, unite themselves so naturally in our mind, that wherever we see movement, we suppose, or we imagine life.[2] A peaceful lake, by the clearness with which it reflects its banks, charms us in vain; we wish to see it agitated, and to see the image of its banks tremble in its waters. So with style; it does not suffice us, that it reflect the objects with clearness, we require movement in it; but there are two differences between these two mirrors (a *lake*, and *style*); these are, that, in the second (viz., *style*), we always require movement (whereas a lake is at times quite still), and yet that the objects do not tremble in it—that is to say, that the movement of the style in no respect trouble the clearness of the representations.

That which the orator has wished to do, if he is truly an orator, is not merely to give us representations that are clear, and even of a brilliant clearness; neither is it, to connect his ideas with his ideas in an exact manner, so as that, between his starting-point, and his conclusion, there should be, logically, no breaking of the continuity; it is not even, further, that this chain should be so close, that there should not be one moment lost for the proof, and that the discourse should be, so to speak, all at one breath. The oratorical discourse is an *action;* this action, which proceeds from the soul, supposes *emotion;* it would represent, therefore, only one part of that which it ought to represent, if it was only logical, clear, brilliant, and even pro-

[1] Saurin, *Sermon sur le jeûne célébré à l'Ouverture de la Campagne de* 1706.

[2] See Marmontel, *Eléments de Littérature*, vol. iv., pages 441–444, article *Du Mouvement.*

found; and the hearer would receive from it only one part of the impressions which he ought to receive. If the orator does not unite himself entirely to his subject—if the discourse is not the action of man upon man—if it is not, as we have said, a drama, with its plot, its turns of fortune, and its catastrophe, it wants that communicative life, and, we may even say, that truth, without which the oratorical discourse misses its aim for the most of the hearers, who require to feel the truth, as it were, identified with him who expounds, and seeks to disseminate it.

The orator, excited by his subject, and by his auditory, will necessarily infuse into his style the emotion which he experiences; now, the emotion is a movement, that is, to speak accurately, the passage from one moral place to another; a momentary emotion is a change of place; a continuous emotion is a succession of changes, which mutually produce one another. It is necessary to distinguish *the* movement from movements in general. There are hurried movements, which are very beautiful; but, nevertheless, the oratorical movement is not necessarily hurried. Different in different orators, it is mild in some, and racy in others. In vain should we strive hard—multiply the shocks to the utmost, the soul of the hearer yields itself only to a true movement. To adopt any other, "is to leap," says Cicero somewhere, "not to walk."

Movement is the royal beauty of style, the characteristic of the great authors—of the great epochs. In the models, the images blending with the movement, are furnished by the movement itself. Colour and life come both together. Thus, the pale countenance of Atalanta becomes coloured in the rapidity of her course. Images are not contrary to movement—they even contribute to it, since they may be impassioned; but, in themselves, they no more produce it, than a mirror, since they are only the mirror of the things. The movement corresponds to the soul: eloquence may dispense with everything, with the exception of truth and movement; the style that is most naked, the most austere, the least coloured, may be eloquent. Beauties *in white*, are of the first order.

Experience teaches us, that one may have been much interested in his subject, without the style having movement—the strength of the thoughts, and the seriousness of the language, may, up to a certain point, supplement it. It is equally certain,

that a discourse of a grave, calm, and, so to speak, immoveable style, may, in certain cases, produce a sufficiently great impression. But, in general, the emotion of the hearer is in the direct ratio of that of the orator, if the subject is worthy of it; and as the Christian orator has a twofold object of interest, his subject and his hearers, we have more reasons for expecting to see him moved.

Nevertheless, the eloquence of the pulpit prescribes to itself narrower limits, than the other kinds of eloquence.[1] It can hardly be vehement, that is to say, impassioned. [The preacher is an instructer, as much as an orator—the movement of his discourse will, therefore, be more tranquil than that of political, and forensic eloquence. Although the love which the minister of the word of God ought to bear to divine things, be a boundless love, we would not venture to give to this love the name of passion. Respect imposes discretion; and Christianity would win us to goodness only by good means.]

Movement has forms that are very different, [and a great number of which are difficult to seize, and to name. We can only indicate the least delicate.] We must first distinguish those which may find place in the expository style, and those which consist in going beyond the limits of this style.

The expository style is the style for *repose*. (But I distinguish here the movement of the style from that logical movement which we have spoken of, in treating of *arrangement*.) Already, it is true, in the expository style, the movement may manifest itself by rapidity in the succession of the ideas, and by the vivacity of the turns of thought. But the movement of the style announces itself, most especially, when we depart from the expository style. The expository style, strictly speaking, has in view only the idea, making no account of the personality of him who expresses it, and of those who listen to it. We depart from it by everything that takes these elements into account: as, for instance, by *direct address*. This is not a momentary characteristic—an accidental form; it is the normal, permanent character of the true oratorical style; and this single character carries with it, more or less, all the rest—I mean, all the movements by which the style may be animated.

The *direct* style, which might, perhaps, be also called the

[1] Read the third Philippic of Demosthenes.

frank style, is that which never arrives at its object by an oblique path, or by windings, but which approaches the idea in front, openly, and by means of expressions, which the most immediately awaken it in the mind of the hearer. Here, however, the question is not of a moral quality. A style may breathe frankness and candour, though it has not the character of which we have just given an imperfect idea. The question is of that which is called in law-suits, going straight to the facts. There is an indirect or oblique march, which may have its appropriateness, and its charm, in certain compositions. There is no style more indirect than that of La Bruyere—there is none better, as regards the intention of the author: "I suppose men to be eternal upon the earth, and I then meditate on that from which I might learn, that they would, in that case, make a much greater ado about their establishment, than they do in the actual state of things."[1] What should we say of the Provincial Letters, if they were written in the same taste? No other style than the direct, will ever be suitable in a work intended by its nature to be popular—to produce an instantaneous impression upon the masses. The less interval that there is between the thought and the expression, the less transformation will the expression have to undergo on the part of the hearer, in order to be the immediate impress of the idea; in one word, the more your language shall have been the vehicle, and not the retinue of the thought, the better you will have succeeded as an orator. Sly, devious, ingenious, sinuous, you may be elsewhere; elsewhere, ellipses, reticence, allusions, reflexes, flying glimpses, affected indifference and doubts, simulation, the principal given as accessory, and *vice versa*—all that makes a style spirited will be permitted you; elsewhere, it will suffice that you make others understand what you mean—here you must *say* it.

The means of remaining in the direct style, is to use the form of address. Without it, a discourse is not a discourse, but a book; it is the employment of this form, which will always bring you back by force to that direct style, which is the style that is truly powerful, truly oratorical.[2] I recommend this form

[1] La Bruyere, *Les Caractères*, chap. xi., *De l'Homme*.

[2] Massillon's preaching is said to have been so pointedly direct, that no one, after hearing him, stopped to criticise or admire. Each carried away the arrow fastened in his heart, feeling himself to be the person addressed, and having no

in these two respects, first, because by constantly maintaining it, one is almost sure of attaining a direct style, which is a thing so rare and so difficult; then, because, in the discourse properly so called, it is true,—the only true one, and because everything that is false is feeble. But this form itself—how can we maintain it, at least when one writes his discourse? for we have hitherto reasoned, and given our instructions on this supposition.

Facts, as shown by the example of the great masters, prove that this is possible. In writing a discourse, one may truly speak it, and address it, not to a public, but to an auditory, place one's self in thought in the position of the orator, in short, write as an orator. Whoever wishes to write thus, assembles his flock around him, and this is a habit which is easily contracted.

The style of the orator, therefore, is never purely expository. But the preacher is at the same time a teacher; he instructs, and the simple exposition may consequently find a place in his discourses. We shall first indicate the figures, or movements, which remain within the limits of the expository style.

1. [The simplest, the most natural, and yet one of the strongest, and sometimes one of the boldest, is *repetition*. We must not risk it imprudently, for, purely in consequence of the elementary character of this form, we fall very low, if we have not complete success. It is with it, as with the burden of a song in poetry,[1] which has great force when it is well introduced. But it is necessary that the repetition spring forth in some sort from the subject, that it come without being sought for, and, as it were, undesignedly. Repetition is an artless (*naïve*) figure. It supposes the orator to be deeply moved, and absorbed by his subject. Bossuet is artless; and he alone has this characteristic among the great masters of the pulpit. The Bible is artless, and might furnish us with remarkable examples of repetition]: "And I also have given you cleanness of teeth in all your cities, and want of bread in all your places; *yet have ye not returned unto Me, saith the Lord.* And also I have withholden the rain from you, when there were yet three months to the harvest; and

inclination to apply it to others. Louis XIV. is reported to have said to him, "When I hear other preachers, I admire *them;* when I hear you, I hate myself."—Ed.

[1] For instance, the repetition in each verse of the 136th Psalm, "For His mercy endureth for ever."—Ed.

I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereupon it rained not withered. So two or three cities wandered unto one city, to drink water, but they were not satisfied; *yet have ye not returned unto Me, saith the Lord.* I have smitten you with blasting and mildew; when your gardens, and your vineyards, and your fig-trees, and your olive-yards increased, the palmer-worm devoured them; *yet have ye not returned unto Me, saith the Lord.* I have sent among you the pestilence, after the manner of Egypt, your young men have I slain with the sword, and have taken away your horses; and I have made the stink of your camps to come up into your nostrils; *yet have ye not returned unto Me, saith the Lord.* I have overthrown some of you as God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, and ye were as a firebrand plucked out of the burning; *yet have ye not returned unto Me, saith the Lord.* Therefore, thus will I do unto thee, O Israel; and because I will do this unto thee, prepare to meet thy God, O Israel."[1]

2. *Gradation*, [which is an essential form of movement, and an essential quality of style, rises, in certain cases, to the rank of a figure, by the bringing together of the parts, their harmony, and the rapidity of their succession. Thus, in the end of the fourth Provincial, the summary of the doctrine of the Jesuits on homicide, and, in particular, the last words]: "Recollect that the first crime of depraved man was a homicide, in the person of the first righteous man; that man's greatest crime was a homicide, in the person of the Chief of all the righteous; and that homicide is the only crime which destroys all at once the State, the Church, nature, and piety!" And in the *Satyre Ménippée:* "Thou hast little supported thy king, so gracious, so easy, so familiar, who had become, as it were, a fellow-citizen and burgess of his city. . . . What do I say? little supported? It is much worse; thou hast driven him from his city, from his house, from his bed. How driven? thou hast pursued him. How pursued? thou hast assassinated him, canonised the assassin, and made bon-fires of joy at his death."[2]]

3. *Accumulation*, [which is often combined with gradation,

[1] Amos iv. 6–12. See also SENECA, *Natural Quæst.*, book vi., chap. xxiii., and the Life of BRIDAINE, p. 170.

[2] Harangue of M. D'AUBRAY for the third estate.

may also produce a powerful effect. The sermon of Massillon on the *Passion of Jesus Christ* might furnish numerous examples of it. We quote only one of these]: "I conjure thee, said he to him, in the name of the living God, to tell us, if Thou art the Christ, the Son of God? But if it is a sincere desire to know the truth, to what purpose interrogate *Himself* regarding the holiness of His ministry? Ask John the Baptist, whom you have regarded as a prophet, and who has confessed, that this was the Christ; ask His works, which none before Him had done, and which bear witness that it is the Father who hath sent Him; ask the witnesses of His life, and you will see if imposture has ever been accompanied by so many characteristics of innocence and of holiness; ask the Scriptures, you who have the key of knowledge, and see if Moses and the prophets have not borne testimony to Him; ask the blind whom He has restored to sight, the dead whom He has raised, the lepers whom He has cleansed, the people whom He has fed, the sheep of Israel whom He has brought back, and they will all tell you, that God has never given such power to mere men; ask the heavens, which so many times opened above your heads, in order to inform you that this was His well-beloved Son; and if these testimonies are not sufficient, ask hell itself, and you will learn from the devils, who, in obedience to His command, went out of the bodies possessed by them, that this is the Holy One of God. But here, this is not a serious investigation of the truth; it is a snare which is laid for innocence; and, just as it often happens to the great especially, prejudiced by their passions, they inquire, and yet do not wish to be undeceived; they make a show of wishing to be instructed, and they would be vexed by being enlightened."

4. *Reticence*[1] [cannot come into frequent use in the pulpit: the preacher speaks with open mouth, he has nothing to conceal. The orator, however, may pause before the development of an idea from various motives, in particular, in order that he may not present too vividly to the imagination gross, or odious pictures.[2] One understands how the occasion for reticence presents

[1] Often called Aposiopesis.—Ed.

[2] The preacher must be *chaste*, making a judicious choice of his expressions, when treating of delicate subjects (*ex. gr.* the love of Jesus Christ to the Church), in order to keep his hearers' minds at the greatest possible distance

itself more frequently to the orator of the tribune, or of the bar, than to the preacher. We cannot, however, absolutely interdict him from employing a movement, which can be so effective. But the condition of reticence is, that the hearer should certainly know that which you do not express. I have neglected this rule in the discourse upon *the principle of human equality*, in a reticence the effect of which is lost. "How very quickly, in fact, does inequality creep in among brethren according to the flesh, whom fortune has unequally favoured! How often has a brother found a haughty protector in a more powerful brother, and the latter, a low and servile *complaisant*, in a less fortunate brother! How often even. . . . But let us not go farther; let us not designedly profane the idea of the sweetest of terrestrial societies."[1]

5. *Correction* [is an excellent figure when it is not a mere studied figure, namely, when the orator perceives that his emotion has involuntarily got the better of him, and he owns his error without reserve, in order to rectify, restrict, or complete what he has said. It may be very beautiful, or very vulgar. The *What-do-I-say?*s so common in oratorical discourses, are very far from being always happy. But Bossuet is admirable in this passage of the *Funeral Oration on Henrietta of England*]:

"No, after what we have just seen, health is only a name, life is only a dream, glory is only an appearance, graces and pleasures are only a dangerous amusement; everything in us is vain except the sincere confession which we make before God of our vanities, and the judgment decreed, which makes us despise all that we are. But am I speaking the truth? Is man, whom God has made in His own image, only a shadow? What Jesus Christ came from heaven to earth to seek—what He thought He could, without degrading Himself, purchase with His own blood—is that nothing? Let us acknowledge our error. Doubtless, this sad spectacle of human vanity overawed us; and the hope of the public, frustrated all at once by the death of this princess, carried us too far. Man must not be permitted to despise him-

from all carnal and terrestrial ideas. The likeliest way is, to beware of pressing metaphorical terms too far; to explain the metaphorical terms *in few words*, and afterwards to cleave entirely to the thing itself.—CLAUDE.—ED.

[1] *Nouveaux Discours sur quelques Sujets Religieux*, edition of 1841, p. 284. See an example of reticence in CICERO, *Pro Ligario*, chap. x.

self entirely, lest, thinking with the ungodly that life is only a game, in which everything is governed by chance, he should walk without rule and without guidance, at the pleasure of his blind desires."[1]

6. *Pretermission* [has the appearance of wishing to pass over in silence a thing too well known, or too evident, to need to be mentioned, and says it with so much the more emphasis, in proportion as the orator seems to enjoin himself not to dwell upon it. Cicero has often made a happy use of it.[2] Pretermission serves to class two orders of ideas or arguments, and, while appearing to set aside the one, which it nevertheless takes care to mention, in order to leave the impression that they are far from being without value, it gives beforehand a great idea of the force of those that are to follow. But the ideas, thus introduced, must correspond to the expectation which has been excited.[3] Perhaps a too frequent use of this procedure would ill accord with the candour, and the frankness, of the discourse from the pulpit. Massillon appears to be prodigal of it; for he often presents a complete argument in the form of pretermission.]

7. *Irony*, [much employed by the ancient orators,[4] cannot be banished from the pulpit; for the Bible makes frequent use of it; but it ought to be introduced only with caution, on account of the dangers which it brings along with it. There, it should always be serious; and it should never offend charity. We may quote here the commencement of the application of the first sermon of Saurin on "Deferring Conversion"]:

"In order to be truly converted, it is not sufficient to perform some act of love to God; it is necessary, that this love be the

[1] Compare the *correction* of Fléchier, in the *Oraison Funèbre de Turenne*: "Mais que dis-je? il ne faut pas l'en louer," etc.

[2] *Pro Milone*, chap. xi.; *In Pisonem*, chap. xxxvii.

[3] See Fléchier, *Oraison Funèbre de Turenne*: "Je pourrais, Messieurs, vous montrer, vers les bords du Rhin, autant de trophées que sur les bords de l'Escaut et de la Sambre," etc.

[4] See Demosthenes, *Second Philippic*. "You, tranquilly seated, find by your sagacity or in your harangues, how to reason better than Philip, according to the principles of justice. But now, when the business is to repulse energetically his efforts, you are withheld by an unheard of indolence. Hence, by a necessary consequence, it happens that both of you succeed in that which is the object of your study, he in acting well, you in speaking well." Cicero pushes irony even to sarcasm. See *Pro Milone*, chap. vii., and *In Catilinam* i., chap. x.

ruling disposition of our heart. There are visionaries who are offended, when we press these great truths of religion, and who do not cease to cry, at the hearing of these maxims: 'Be on your guard, Christians! They are shaking the foundations of your faith! There is poison in this doctrine.'

"My brethren, if this were a subject less grave and less serious, we could not refrain from turning such scruples into ridicule. Be indeed upon your guard, there is poison: we wish to bring you to love God with all your heart; we wish to bring you to consecrate your whole life to Him; we wish to induce you not to defer your conversion,—to prepare yourself for a holy death, by the continual exercise of piety and penitence. Does it seem to you, that there is need of much precaution against such a doctrine, and that the Church would be in a very deplorable condition, if all its members assumed these dispositions? But, as we have just said, this is a subject too grave, and too serious, to give room for raillery."

8. [We may mention *hyperbole*, which is very ancient, and abounds in the Bible. But we can hardly give positive rules as to its employment; here everything depends upon the position, and the movement impressed upon the mind of the hearers.]

9. *Paradox* [approaches near to the hyperbole; it gives a striking, often captivating form, to a thought, and engraves it upon the mind. St Paul frequently has recourse to this means of, in some sort, forcing, and of fixing the attention. But we must use circumspection, when we employ it in the pulpit. The preacher speaks to men who cannot always understand him, inasmuch as only half expressing himself; and he must beware of giving to the simple, errors instead of truths.

10. [Lastly, let us mention *vision*, or *oratorical hypothesis*, a supposition by means of which the orator places before his eyes certain objects, thus communicating a lively impulse to the soul. This is one of the boldest figures. Bourdaloue sometimes employs it: but certainly the eloquence of the pulpit has very rarely risen to the height of this passage of Massillon, in the sermon upon *The Small Number of the Elect:*

"I confine my attention to you, my brethren, who are here assembled; I no longer speak of the rest of men; I regard you, as if you were the only persons upon earth; and here is the thought which occupies me, and fills me with dread. I suppose

that this is your last hour, and the end of the universe; that the heavens are about to open above your heads, Jesus Christ to appear in His glory in the midst of this temple, and that you are assembled in it only to wait for Him, and as trembling criminals, on whom He is about to pronounce either a sentence of pardon, or a decree of eternal death: for, in vain do you flatter yourselves, you will die such as you are at present hoping that you will be; all these desires of change which amuse you, will continue to amuse you even to your deathbed; this is the experience of all ages; everything new that you will then find in yourselves, will perhaps be a somewhat larger account, than you would now have to render; and, from what you would be, if you were to be judged at this moment, you may almost determine, what will happen to you at your departure from life.

"Now, I demand of you, and I demand it of you, struck with terror, not separating on this point my own lot from yours, and placing myself in the same situation, into which I wish you to enter; I demand of you, then: If Jesus Christ should appear in this temple, in the midst of this assembly, the most august in the universe, in order to judge us,—in order to make the terrible separation between the goats and the sheep, do you think that the greater number of all of us who are here present would be placed on the right hand? do you think that the numbers would at least be equal? do you think that there would be found even ten just men—which the Lord could not find, on another occasion, in five entire cities? I demand it of you; you know it not; I myself am ignorant of it; Thou alone, O my God! knowest those who belong to Thee. But if we know not those who belong to Him, we know at least that sinners do not belong to Him. Now, who are the faithful here assembled? Titles, and dignities, must be counted for nothing; you will be stripped of them, before Jesus Christ: who are they? many sinners who do not wish to be converted; still more who would wish it, but who defer their conversion; many others who would never be converted, but in order to relapse; lastly, a great number, who think they have no need of conversion. Remove these four kinds of sinners from this holy assembly; for they will be removed from it, on the great day: appear now, ye just; where are you? remnant of Israel, pass to the right; wheat of Jesus, separate yourselves from this chaff, destined to the fire. O

God! where are Thine elect? and what remains for Thy portion?"

We now come to the figures, which go beyond the limits of the purely expository style.

1. *Interrogation*, [which is frequently employed, and which is often abused, is a form of affirmation; it is affirmation strengthened by a kind of challenge, and so very distinct from ordinary interrogation, that we pronounce it with a different tone. It may be employed in argumentation, to which it gives a very urgent character; but it is necessary to be well on our guard here, for this form readily becomes monotonous.[1]]

2. *Exclamation*, [a very simple figure, easily falls into the commonplace. It is a ready resource of cold minds. Buffon censures J. J. Rousseau for his prodigal use of it.] But this common figure is heightened by genius, and still more by a true emotion. [It is always beautiful, when it is well employed, that is to say, when it is artless (*naïve*), and proceeds from the heart; as that which the remembrance of a recent sorrow forces from the soul of Bossuet]: "O disastrous night! O dreadful night! in which suddenly resounded, like a clap of thunder, this astounding news: The queen is dead! the queen is dead!"[2]

Exclamation presents itself, as it were strengthened, in the *apostrophe*, and the *prosopopœia*, figures of great boldness and of great effect. The apostrophe is an interpellation addressed to a person absent. The following is a fine example from Massillon: "An angel must descend from heaven to console him,—to strengthen Him,—to aid Him, like Simon the Cyrenean on Mount Calvary, to carry this invisible cross. . . Angels of heaven! this was not in former times your ministry; you approached Him only to serve Him and to adore Him; now He is abased beneath you."[3]

[The prosopopœia (personification) approximates to the apostrophe, from which it is only distinguished by this, that its interpellations are addressed to inanimate objects, or to persons who are dead. It is necessary that the employment of means, so energetic, should be justified by the emotion of the orator, and by the situation in which the discourse has placed the hearers.

[1] See a celebrated example of this form at the commencement of the oration of Cicero against Cataline: "Quousque tandem," etc.

[2] Bossuet, *Oraison Funèbre d'Henrietta d'Angleterre.*

[3] Massillon, *Sermon sur la Passion de Notre Seigneur.* We recall, also, the celebrated apostrophe of Saurin to Louis XIV.

The thing essential here is to be true; what is false and affected, is cold and displeasing. The peculiar quality of eloquence consists in feeling with its hearers, in associating itself with their impressions, while measuring them, and in saying what they can bear. Saurin very often employs the figure, without, however, being prodigal of it]: "Yield, yield to our miseries, ye catastrophes of the past ages, ye mothers whose tragical memory astonishes posterity, because ye were forced by the horrors of famine to eat the flesh of your children, and to preserve your life by violently taking it away from those who had received it from you! Cruel as was your condition, you, after all, took from them only a transient life; and by one and the same stroke you rescued them, and yourselves, from the rigours of famine. Here all follow each other into the same abyss, and, by an unheard-of prodigy, the mother—the mother—feeds, if we must say so, on the substance of the soul of her child, and the child in its turn devours the substance of the soul of its mother."

[Bossuet abounds in prosopopœia]: "Why will men have prodigies to cost God so much trouble? There is no more than one single prodigy, which I now announce to the world. O heaven! O earth! be astonished at this new prodigy! It is that, among so many testimonies of the Divine love, there are so many unbelievers, and so many who are insensible to it."—And elsewhere: "O death! we give thee thanks for the light thou hast shed upon our ignorance. Thou alone convincest us of our baseness; thou alone discoverest to us our dignity. If man esteem himself too much, thou canst humble his pride; if man despise himself too much, thou canst raise his courage; and, in order to reduce all his thoughts to a just moderation, thou teachest him these two truths, which open his eyes to the right knowledge of himself; that he is infinitely contemptible, inasmuch as he comes to an end in time, and infinitely estimable, inasmuch as he passes into eternity."[1]

Let us quote, further, an example taken from Massillon: "Jesus Christ, in this deplorable condition, came forth from the prætorium. Behold the man! said Pilate to them. *Ecce homo.* Holy kings, who have sprung from the blood of David! inspired prophets, who announced Him to the earth! is this, then, He whom you so ardently desired to see? Do you behold, then, the man? *Ecce homo;* do you behold then, at last, the Deliverer promised

[1] Bossuet, *Sermon sur la Mort et l'Immortalité de l'Ame.*

to your fathers so many ages ago? Do you behold the great Prophet, whom Judea was to give to the earth! Do ye behold the Desire of all nations—the expectation of the whole universe—the substance of your figures—the fulfilment of your worship—the hope of all your just men—the consolation of the Synagogue—the glory of Israel—the light and the salvation of all nations? *Ecce homo.* Behold the man! Do you recognise Him by these marks of shame?"[1]

3. *Dramatism* [in style, which consists in presenting in action what might be presented under another form—didactical or narrative. The oratorical discourse, as such, is a drama: every word of the preacher is a question, which the hearer answers within himself; and his answer becomes, as it were, a new question, to which the orator replies. There is, therefore, an intimate conversation, in the whole oratorical act. But this general character may become more marked in certain passages, just as a high region may be dotted with eminences. These are, as it were, so many accents, more or less lively. Dramatism takes place in a discourse, every time that a distinction of persons appears, where the nature of the idea does not demand it—where the business is with another relation of persons than that which exists quite naturally betwixt the orator and the hearer. This figure is not peculiar to eloquence—it is one of the beauties of poetry, of history, and of all animated discourse. The actions make known the man; but the words bring out the actions: "Speak, that I may see thee." We do not condemn the discourses, which the ancient historians put into the mouths of their personages, in order to manifest outwardly, that which is within. The Bible makes the prodigal son speak, though his actions beforehand speak in themselves. Moreover, dramatism ought not merely to be introduced in large pieces, but to insinuate itself into the minutest details of the discourse. "Have you an important secret?" says Bossuet, "pour it out fearlessly into this noble heart; your case becomes his by confidence."[2]

[A very bold form of dramatism consists, in putting into the mouth of God Himself the instruction which the orator wishes to impart. We may employ it; but, in this case, there is an infinite necessity for reverence, moderation, and caution. The prophets

[1] Massillon, *Sermon sur la Passion de Notre Seigneur.*
[2] Bossuet, *Oraison Funèbre du Prince de Condé.*

often make God speak; and the orators of the pulpit have followed this example: "That which hinders you from fulfilling the law," says Bourdaloue, "that which even makes you despair of ever fulfilling it, are, you say, the vicious inclinations of your hearts—it is this flesh, conceived in sin, which revolts unceasingly against the Spirit. But imagine to yourselves, my brethren," replies St Chrysostom, "that God speaks to you in these terms: O man, I wish now to take away from you this heart, and to give you another; you have only the strength of a man, and I wish to give you that of a God. It is not you alone who will act, you who will combat, you who will resist; it is I, myself, who will combat in you—I, myself, who will triumph over these inclinations and this corrupt flesh. If God should address you in this manner, if He should make you this offer, would you still dare to complain? Now, in how many passages of Scripture has He not made this promise to you? Was it not to you that He spake by the prophet Ezekiel: *I will take away from you this hardened heart, and I will give you a new heart, a heart docile and obedient to My law?* . . . What do you fear then? that God will not keep His word? But this is to doubt His faithfulness. That, notwithstanding the promise of God, you would find it too hard to keep His law? But this is to doubt His power."[1]

The personification of the entire auditory in the preacher, is another form of dramatism. We remark it in the following passage of Saurin, already quoted in part: "When the dove encounters, without the ark, the winds unchained, the waters overflowing, the floodgates of heaven open, the entire universe buried beneath the waves, she seeks a refuge in the ark. But when she finds plains and fields, she stays in them. My soul, here is an image of thee! When the world sets before thee prosperity, dignities, riches, thou listenest to the voice of the enchanter, and thou sufferest thyself to be surprised by its charms. But when thou findest in the world nothing but poverty, disgusts, and misery, thou turnest thine eyes towards heaven, in order to seek there happiness in its centre. *Now*, notwithstanding the disappointments with which our life is accompanied, it costs us infinite pain, when it is necessary to tear us away from it. What would it be, then, if everything prospered in it according to our wishes!"[2]

[1] Bourdaloue, *Sermon sur la Sagesse et la Douceur de la Loi Chrétienne.*

[2] Saurin, *Sermon sur le jeûne célébré a l'Ouverture de la Campagne de* 1706.

[The most complete form of dramatism is the dialogue. Demosthenes frequently employs it; but one of the most beautiful examples of it that we can quote, is the following passage from Saurin: "But as we consider the whole of this text in respect to you, my brethren, you are permitted to-day to give full vent to your complaints, and to tell, in the face of heaven and of earth, the evils which God has done you. *My people, what have I done to thee?* Ah! Lord, what things Thou hast done to us! Ways of Sion covered with mourners, gates of Jerusalem laid waste, priests groaning, virgins wailing, sanctuaries thrown down, deserts peopled by fugitives, members of Jesus Christ wandering upon the face of the earth, children torn from their fathers, prisons gorged with confessors, galleys filled to overflowing with martyrs, blood of our fellow-countrymen shed like water, dead bodies, venerable in that you served as witnesses to religion, cast out notwithstanding, exposed on the highways, and given for food to the beasts of the field, and to the fowls of heaven—ruins of our temples, dust, ashes, mournful remains of the houses consecrated to the service of our God—fires, racks, gibbets, punishments unheard-of up to our day—all of you answer, and testify against the Lord."[1]

4. [Lastly, It is necessary to mention prayer, as an efficacious mean of contributing to the movement of the discourse; although, of course, the preacher ought not to permit himself to employ it, as an oratorical mean only. But this mean itself is very beautiful, when it is employed in season. In certain serious, critical moments of the discourse, a concentrating of the affections in God has great force, and produces a great impression; only let the seriousness and the truth, which ought to preside over the employment of such means, never be forgotten.]

[It remains to us to speak of some qualities of the oratorical style, which are connected at once with the imagery, and with movement. We mention *variety* first]:

> "Sans cesse en écrivant variez vos discours.
> Un style trop égal et toujours uniforme
> En vain brille à nos yeux, il faut qu'il nous endorme.
> On lit peu ces auteurs, nés pour nous ennuyer,
> Qui toujours sur un ton semblent psalmodier."[2]

[1] SAURIN, Sermon on the famous Fast at the Opening of the Campaign of 1706, vol. viii., p. 112, new edition.

[2] In writing, vary your discourses continually. A too equal and always uni-

I would not confine the matter to this single point of view: variety is strongly allied with truth, with propriety, with precision; a style furnished with these qualities would, from that very circumstance, be varied; no one thing being exactly similar to another, to say everything just as it is, whether in respect of the words, or in respect of the turns of expression, is to say things differently; variety springs from the very subject-matter of the things, when the things themselves are different.

The constant return of the same forms, and of the same modes of speaking, is commonly connected with a rough, or, at least, imperfect analysis of the thought. In order to be, not refined and subtle, but only true, it is necessary to have, internally at least, distinguished well, and analysed well. It is the practice of too many authors, to do what is done in a printing-office, where they keep in type words, and even whole phrases, which they foresee that they shall have occasion to use. There are in circulation a number of segments of sentences, or of centoes, which every one appropriates to the thought then present, even when they have little exact correspondence with it. Very individual writers are distinguished by this, that they are easily recognisable in almost every line, and yet, from one place to another, are very different from themselves. Bossuet is an example. There are no stereotyped phrases, no frequent return of the same turns, no bad habits, and no repetitions (*point de tic—point de refrains*) in him.

The penetrating analysis of the thought is, therefore, the first condition of variety, but it is not the only condition. It is necessary to have studied, not only the object itself, but also the instrument, namely, language. And remark, that the study of the instrument, or of the means which language presents, proves beneficial to the study of the object, because, to seek a sign for an idea, is to seek for the idea itself. In general, people study

form style sparkles in our eyes in vain; it must lull us asleep. Those authors are little read, who, born to weary us, seem always singing psalms in the same tone.—Boileau, *L'Art Poetique*, chant i.

So Horace, Sat. i. 10, of a poet,—

Est brevitate opus, ut currat sententia, neu se
Impediat *verbis lassas onerantibus aures*:
Et sermone opus est modo tristi, sæpe jocoso,
Defendente vicem modò rhetoris atque poetæ,
Interdum urbani, parcentis viribus, atque
Extenuantis eas consulto.—Ed.

language too little; they know it only in the gross; they do not explore its resources; they do not exercise themselves in its management; they allow those who have the instinct,—the lively and intimate perception of language,[1]—to have the advantage; they do not seek to appropriate to themselves all that which, with less material talent, they are capable, by study, of appropriating. Language remains poor in words, and is reduced to a small number of connecting links, in hands little practised; it is only to men of a different stamp that it renders all that it is capable of rendering.

Finally, it is necessary, after all this, to exercise a continual watchfulness over one's self, for every one has his favourite expressions, and forms, which he is ever liable to fall into. This is the fault which writers of a secondary order commit. It is not met with among the masters.

Variety of expression, of turns and of movements, is of special importance in didactic works, and, above all, in the pulpit.

Elegance.—The variety, of which we have just spoken, is one of the elements, or at least one of the conditions of elegance; but we have thought it our duty to consider variety separately, as a merit of style which may exist more or less apart from elegance, and which may be the object of a special attention.

The meaning of the word *elegance*, in the language of the seventeenth century, seems to be revealed by the use which Boileau has made of it, in two well-known passages of the *Art Poetique*:—

. . . . . une élégante idylle.[2]
. . . de Marot l'élégant badinage.[3]

This is the avoiding of the common, and the flat, as being that into which the pastoral, and the sportive, are the most apt to fall. Everywhere, besides, as in the idyl, it is a *choice* of forms[4] which are removed from trivialness, without falling into the far-fetched (*recherche*), and without betraying anything like labour. It is to style, what polished refinement (*distinction*) is to manners.

[1] "*Ingenium* cui sit, cui mens divinior, atque *os*
Magna sonaturum, des nominis hujus honorem."
—Horace, Sat. i. 4.—Ed.

[2] An elegant Idyl, chant ii.

[3] Marot's *Elegant Pleasantry*, chant i.

[4] *Elegance* comes from *Eligere, to choose.*

But this vulgarity, and this frivolity, which have to be shunned, are not only that which offends some moral, or social propriety; they are, moreover, that which offends the proprieties of the mind, since the mind has also its proprieties. The mind has a repugnance to that which, though clear and just, is gross in form, dull, awkward, too much loaded, or too naked. It rejects repetitions, uniformity, embarrassed or dragging turns of expression, a burdensome exactness, and a too formal logic. It wishes freedom, and agility in the movements; it is pleased with a neat and easy conciseness; it loves expressions of a delicate propriety; it smiles at ingenious turns, which appear only a happy *rencontre*;—a style which imparts to it these various pleasures, is an elegant style.

The elements of elegance often escape us, and it might be said to be entirely negative in its character; but there is something positive in its means. Elegance supposes the aptitude to multiply the relations of the ideas, to combine, and to sum them up; it does not polish merely; it also cuts the diamond. It goes beyond the greatest and most necessary relations; it seizes the relations that are only accessory, the sides that are least perceptible; it supposes, then, imagination, or, certainly, wit at least; there is always *wit* in an elegant style, though there should be none in the thought; for elegance is composed of the same ideas which constitute wit.[1] We shall be able to judge of it by some examples:

"In every kind, the first species have carried off our eulogies, and have left nothing to the second species, but the contempt, resulting from the comparison."[2]

"The work obtained in the whole of Europe a degree of success, which malignity rendered injurious to Louis XIV."[3]

"The Bishop of Antioch hastened to attach to the society of Christians the hope of so fine a genius."[4]

It is not merely in the isolated sentence, it is also in the succession of sentences, and in the texture of the diction, that elegance reveals itself; very simple sentences may, by the manner in which they succeed, and are connected with one another, form an elegant *whole*. [We have pleasure in citing Massillon, in the case before us.]

[1] Montesquieu, however, has much wit, and yet is not elegant.
[2] Buffon. [3] M. Villemain. [4] Ibid.

"It is a small thing, that the corrupting of our own times should be almost the sole work of the great, and the powerful; ages to come will perhaps owe to you a portion of their licentiousness, and of their disorders. That profane poetry which would not have come into existence, but for you, will still corrupt men's hearts in the ages that will follow you; those dangerous authors whom you honour with your protection, will pass into the hands of your posterity, and your crimes will multiply themselves with the dangerous poison which they carry along with them, and which will be communicated from age to age; your very passions, immortalised in histories, after having been an occasion of stumbling to your own age, will become so again to following ages; reading the accounts of your irregularities, preserved for posterity, will make others imitate you after your death. Men will still go to seek lessons in crime, in the recitals of your adventures; and your disorders will not die with you. . . . Such is the destiny of the vices, and of the passions, of the great and the powerful; they live not for their own age alone; they live for the ages that are to come, and the effects of their bad example will be as lasting, as their name."[1]

Elegance is not beauty; but it holds the place of it in style; just in the same manner as in the female form, the gait, the bearing, and the dress, of a woman of rank. The structure of verse sets off elegance, which becomes more sensible by the twofold exactness of rhythm, and of thought. So it is in Racine.

Elegance becomes easily cold, because it is less the work of the imagination which paints and which colours, than of the intellect which designs and engraves, (unless this were so, would geometry ever have been able to boast of having elegant demonstrations?) and because it does not accord, but up to a certain point, with a lively emotion of the heart. For a too great degree of elegance, in such moments, would not be the supplement, but the contrary, of beauty. Do we love to see a person in the transport of grief, solicitous lest her gestures should derange her toilette, or her tears should wash away her paint?[2]

[1] Massillon, *Petit Carême*. Sermon on the Vices and Virtues of the Great.

[2] Telephus et Peleus quum pauper et exul, uterque
Projicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba
Si curat cor spectantis tetigisse querela.
—Horace, *Ars Poet.*—Ed.

Neither does it, except up to a certain point, accord with gravity. Elegance is social; it is worldly. It originates in the refinements of society, and all its graces breathe the leisure, and the numberless complications of the polite world.

There is, however, a degree of elegance to which, even in grave subjects, and in the pathetic, it is necessary to accustom one's style; I mean, a chaste elegance, which scarcely makes itself to be remarked, and which is scarcely distinguished from naturalness, justness, and conciseness; these qualities alone are apparent, and attract notice, and it is only at a late period, that elegance is recognised. The preacher, as such, requires practice, in order *to be* elegant, and another, and much greater effort, not to *appear* so; the elegance which announces and shows itself, is unskilled and infelicitous; but chastened elegance is suitable to the pulpit.[1]

[1] Perhaps I may add one suggestion, which Vinet does not give: it is, as to the *length* of sermons. The late Sydney Smith said wittily, though not very reverently, "Some preachers seem to think, that sin is to be taken out of man, in the same way as Eve was taken out of Adam, namely, by throwing him into a deep slumber." No invariable rule can be given as to length. Uneducated hearers are less able to keep up their attention long than the more educated. The speaker, too, ought to ascertain the measure of his powers of interesting the congregation, and proportion the length of his discourse accordingly. One preacher will become tedious much sooner than another. Francis de Sales says, "Length is the great fault of preachers. If the vine throws forth much wood, it produces the less fruit. So words may be multiplied, and the effect be diminished. The more a speaker says, the less the hearer remembers. When a discourse is too long, the end effaces the middle, and the middle effaces the beginning. A middling speaker is acceptable, when short: the most excellent is burdensome, when too long." Aristotle's rule for the fable or plot of a tragedy is not altogether inapposite in preaching: "There must be a certain magnitude; for beauty consists in magnitude and order. Hence it is that no very minute animal can be beautiful; the eye comprehends the whole too instantaneously, to distinguish and compare the parts: neither, on the contrary, can one of a prodigious size be beautiful; because, as all its parts cannot be seen at once, *the whole*,—the *unity* of object—is lost to the spectator; as it would be, if he were surveying an animal many miles long. A *certain magnitude* is requisite, but such as to present a whole *easily comprehended by the eye:* so in the fable, a certain length is requisite, but such as to present *a whole easily comprehended by the memory*."—Ed.

CHAPTER IV.

MATERIAL PART OF THE DISCOURSE, OR SOUND.

If we are not called to flatter the ear, we ought at least to manage it, and the counsels which we shall give in this chapter may be shown to refer to this last object.

[Undoubtedly we should be scarcely able to speak of harmony, any more than of the other qualities of style, if it demanded from the preacher a too engrossing attention, and such as might have power to distract him from more necessary cares; but art is not, or ought not to continue, a troublesome and trifling labour; it ought to become a second nature. Habit renders easy, what was intricate at the outset: the movement of the hand upon the keys of the organ ends in becoming right playing; and in itself it is not so difficult, perhaps, as that of the eye upon the keys of the alphabet. Art would not exist, if it did not become nature. There is no inspiration possible, but upon condition that all the faculties concur in it, without mutually cramping one another in their action; and it is at this equilibrium of the faculties, that it is necessary to arrive. All art ought, without doubt, to teach itself; and this is true of the art of writing, as well as of the other arts; but let habit be once acquired, and art have become nature, and it will be as difficult to write ill, as it would be, without it, to write well.

[Harmony includes three things: euphony, number, and imitative harmony. This last belongs to the language of poetry;[1] and without wishing to interdict the pulpit from the use of it, it is necessary to interdict it, at least, from courting it. But we ought to say something of euphony, and of number.

[1] "The form of the diction ought neither to be in metre, nor yet void of rhythm: for the former seems as if it were got up for the occasion; and also it draws off the hearer's attention, since it makes him to attend to the similarity of cadence, looking for it, when it will come again. On the other hand, to be without rhythm would be to have no limit. Now that which is unlimited is unpleasing and indistinct. But the rhythm must not be too strict."—Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 8. *Rhythm* is proportion applied to any motion whatever. *Metre* is proportion applied to the motion of words. The sentence or paragraph *ought not to end with a short syllable,* according to Aristotle, *as this would give a curtailed effect, but with a long one.*—Ed.

[Euphony is the concourse of agreeable sounds, and the exclusion of such as are discordant. This last point, care to avoid cacophony, is doubtless the essential one.]

"Fuyez des mauvais sons le concours odieux."[1]

I do not add:

"Le vers le mieux rempli, la plus noble penseé,
Ne peut plaire à l'esprit quand l'oreille est blessée."[2]

I am not so delicate; but the ear offended indisposes the mind.

[Doubtless, there is a harmonious placing of words which becomes a sort of music, and inebriates the ear; and it is necessary to be on one's guard against awakening or nourishing frivolity, by effeminacy, and a sort of epicurism of style; but neither is there any need for falling into the contrary excess.] Cacophonies are of less consequence in languages strongly accentuated, and vibrating, where the prosody makes up for the euphony; [but the French has not these advantages; it does not sound well, is nasal, it abounds in *e*'s mute, and has more cause to fear than other languages the *superbissimum aurium judicium*, of which Cicero speaks. We should be wrong, then, in not paying some attention to euphony; for it would, to all appearance, be not much less trouble to distract attention by bad sounds, than to attract it by beautiful ones.]

[Number is quite as important.] The sentence, which is a unity to the mind, ought to be also one to the ear; but unity is not perceptible, except by means of plurality; where we do not perceive the second, neither do we perceive the first. It is with the sentence, as with verse, whose musical unity is not made sensible, except by the division, or the cæsura. In prose, as in poetry, there are spaces, intervals, and numbers or number. But the difference betwixt these is, that in prose every number of syllables is proper, either to the sentence in whole, or to each of its parts, whilst verse chooses, once for all and exclusively, certain numbers, and certain divisions, which render more perceptible the musical intention, and it verifies them by means of rhyme. Poetry sings; prose does not sing precisely, it speaks;[3]

[1] "Shun the odious concourse of bad sounds."

[2] "The best completed verse, the noblest thought,
Cannot please the mind, when the ear is offended."
—Boileau, Art of Poetry, chant.

[3] "Orationem non adstrictè, sed remissius numerosam esse oportet."—Cicero, *de Orat.*, iii. 48.—Ed.

but the ear demands its pleasure, which consists in intervals well placed, spaces well measured, and happy cadences, sometimes sonorous, sometimes deadened, now masculine, now feminine—cadences which correspond to rhyme in verse.[1]

The first object is not to amuse the ear; it is, above all, the object, to spare the hearer the painful impression which is experienced at seeing an orator out of breath; for he involuntarily unites himself to him, he measures the reach of his voice, and he perceives when he would have need of rest.

"A discourse," says Gaichiès, "is not pronounced entirely with one breath, the pauses serve for occasions to take in breath again, and facilitate to the voice the use of that variety which pleases; thus the necessary has introduced the agreeable."

Cicero had before said: "It is the necessity for taking breath which has established the rests and the intervals, which we place among the words, and the various members of the sentence; there always results from this such a charm, that we could not tolerate an orator, the strength of whose lungs permitted him to speak all with one breath, and without stopping; and it is found that that which pleases the ear, is at the same time possible, and even easy for the chest of the orator."[2]

The least expert hearer perceives when this measure has been exceeded, and when proportion fails; the skilful almost perceives even a single syllable too much.

The care which is taken with respect to this, facilitates the understanding of the discourse, and assists in retaining it; in a place of worship, number supports the voice, and is favourable to hearing.

There is no occasion for seeing in the employment of this means an artifice unworthy of the gravity of the pulpit. Without doubt, one ought to know how to sacrifice number to thought.

"Le *nombre* est un esclave, et ne doit qu'obéir;"[3]

"Number is a slave, and should only obey;" but it can always obey; language presents so many resources, that the sacrifice of the thought is never necessary; and if good poets have been

[1] See the description of the Swan by Buffon in the *Chrestomathie Française*, vol. i., p. 172, third edition.

[2] Cicero, *De Oratore*, book iii., chap. xlvi.

[3] Boileau says so of rhyme.—Ed.

able, under the yoke of rhyme, to have so much freedom and so much justness, how much better might the orator have these under the much less heavy yoke of number? It is essential, that number should appear to present itself of its own accord,—an appearance which changes into reality after a season of practice: "*Ut numerus non quæsitus, sed ipse secutus esse videatur*," says Cicero.[1] We cannot, moreover, permit to ourselves all that, which the Grecian orators, and even those of Rome, permitted, or rather enjoined upon, themselves before an artistic people.

[Number ought not to be confounded with the insertion, into the discourse, of sentences which form verse, and are measured in the same manner. Paul Louis Courrier often employs such sentences, and they have been extolled by eulogiums in which we, for our part, could not unite.] This is a sort of dissonance; this gives to the character of prose something equivocal, and undecided; we are betwixt singing and speaking; [and, besides, there are affectation and puerility, in making such matters a serious object of care.[2]]

Number is not exclusively peculiar to the periodic style; whatever style we employ in writing, number is necessary. Nevertheless, it is in the circumvolutions of the oratorical period, that number shows itself to most advantage; it is there, that a harmonious style is really indispensable. [Let every one be on his guard against rendering the style periodic, with a view to number, when this form would be unsuitable for the occasion.] The periodic style was not suggested by the ear alone, and has no relation to it at first. It delights in collecting around one and the same thought, just as around a single trunk, a certain number of thoughts, which, blossoming of themselves, form above the principal idea, as it were, a tufted summit. This style produces an idea of calmness, of power, and of dignity; the period is, therefore, suitable to a lofty, and solemn style. But this is not a kind to study, as the painter studies, according to the nature of his talents, the landscape, or the portrait; it is a form which style ought to take, according to the movement of the thought; and we must be specially on our guard against

[1] Cicero, *De Oratore*, chap. lxv.

[2] Examples: "Vous avez un garant qui vous respond de tout. Osez sur sa parole, être sage tout seul."

getting entangled in long sentences; there is no getting out of them again.

I say the same of the *loose* style (*coupé*). There is no need for making it a habit to use either the one or the other. The *style coupé* has precision and vivacity; it sometimes breathes authority; and it is good in its own place. The *periodic*[1] *style* has pomp, grandeur. It is sonorous, but it may retard the springs of thought, and it is far from favourable to the emotions of the heart. It is, therefore, necessary to intermix these two forms of style, and to alternate them with one another. Bossuet, who is to be preferred to Fléchier [is in this, also, an excellent model, well worthy of being studied]; recognisable almost at every line; it is, nevertheless, always different from itself. [But for the happy mixture of the style *coupé*, and the style *periodique*, Massillon, above all, is very perfect.]

[1] "The *period* is a sentence so framed, that the meaning remains suspended, until the whole is finished. A *loose* sentence, on the contrary, is one whose construction will allow of a stop, so as to form a perfect sentence at one or more places, before we arrive at the end."—Archb. Whately, *Rhet.* p. 253. The connection between the beginning and end of the periodic sentence gave rise to the name περίοδος, a circuit. The *loose* style is called in Greek εἰρομένη, the *continuous* style, in which the sentences are *connected* by mere conjunctions. "It is unpleasing," says Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 9, "because it has no definite end; and all wish to see the end: just as racers are more distressed and dispirited at the turns, than when they have the goal in sight." However, in pithy, terse, speaking or writing, it has considerable weight, and gives an air of authority by its *curtness*.

In conclusion, whilst preachers ought to aim at the highest standard, hearers should endeavour, by a humble and prayerful spirit, to extract all the good that is possible out of those sermons which fall short of it.

> "The worst speak something good. If all want sense,
> God takes the text, and preaches patience.
> He that gets patience, and the blessing which
> Preachers conclude with, hath not lost his pains."—Ed.

APPENDIX.

DISCOURSE DELIVERED BY M. VINET,

ON HIS INSTALLATION AS PROFESSOR OF PRACTICAL THEOLOGY, IN THE ACADEMY OF LAUSANNE, ON THE 1ST NOVEMBER 1837,

ADDRESSING THE COUNCILLOR OF STATE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION; THE RECTOR AND MEMBERS OF THE ACADEMY; THE REGENTS AND TUTORS OF THE ACADEMICAL COLLEGE, AND THE STUDENTS OF THAT ACADEMY.

Respected Hearers of every Order,

Gentlemen,—The addresses which we have just listened to,[1] may well suffice to grace this solemnity, and to lessen the formidable aspect which it must of necessity bear to me; they have satisfied your minds, and refreshed my heart; and if this ceremony had no other object in view, there would be nothing to prevent its now coming to a close; but the law which has imposed upon me the difficult task of succeeding two orators, in every respect worthy to attract, and engage your whole attention—this law, no doubt, is not without its reasons, and aims at something more than merely gratifying our ideas of propriety. The man, who is called to give instruction in our academy, is not appointed to discharge his important functions before the public; nevertheless, he is responsible to the public; he belongs to the public—he is the man of the public; and, as such, it is reasonable that, once at least, when entering on his charge, he

[1] Alluding to the addresses of M. Jaquet, President of the Council of State, who presided on the occasion, and that of M. J. J. Porchat, Rector of the Academy.

should appear before that public to do honour to his sureties—to those, I mean, who have chosen him—to those chief delegates of the public who have appointed him, and set him over the public. It is reasonable, at least, that at their risk, and his own, he should make himself known. It is, above all, reasonable that, when a serious mission is concerned, all men should know the spirit in which it is to be fulfilled. It is in this last point of view, that I look at the duty which I am this day called upon to discharge, and which I shall fulfil, though not without reluctance, by what I am now to say. Bound, above all things, as I am, to establish well, from the very first, what my opinions are, and what kind of person I am, and that, too, although I should see it for my interest, to do otherwise; ignorant, as a new comer, of what it is needful for me to say, what to conceal, and what to be silent on, whatever be the subject I treat, I shall make myself thoroughly manifest, with all the bad or good qualities I may happen to possess, and, as an affected silence would betray me still more than my words, I shall at once come to the questions which immediately concern the duty which is entrusted to me. Only may He, whose kind providence makes it a necessity at once of my situation, and of good sense, to be *candid* this day, add to candour truth in my words, so that, in speaking, I may speak according to the oracles of God, and that my discourse may communicate grace to those who hear me.

Called to direct my thoughts henceforth to preaching, to that which is the principal lever of the Gospel ministry, I have not been able to look at it in a purely abstract sense; it could not present itself to me as an art merely, of which I should have to inquire into the principles, and to trace the theory, but as a real business, in the management of which I was called to co-operate, as a Christian work in which I had to take a part; I could not forbear from placing it, in idea, at the point of view of a certain time, namely, our own time,—and of a certain place, namely, our own country; and at the outset a twofold question demanded of my mind a distinct answer, namely: 1st, In what respects the circumstances of time and place have modified preaching? and, 2d, What influence preaching, in its turn, may be able to exercise upon the same state of things which has modified it?

I could put to myself this question, before all examination of

the facts; for neither the action, nor the reaction, was doubtful to me; I could not be ignorant of anything, but only of their nature. Every epoch has features more or less striking; and if the influence of these reaches to private existence,—to the life of the individual,—not his outward life merely, but his very inner life, how could it be possible for a public transaction like preaching to escape that influence; above all, in a country where religion is one of the "affairs," and, in a manner, one of the properties of the state? It is true that religion, not taking its rise from any human transaction, and, by its very nature, claiming the right to universal ascendancy, appears to be withdrawn by its origin from that mysterious principle of attraction, which draws all the concerns of an epoch into the orbit of a single idea or passion; but still, religion, in man, becomes human; man transports it into his own sphere, making use, for the purpose of drawing it to himself, of the chain which binds it to him; unchangeable in itself, religion, notwithstanding, sees its institutions and its features change more or less, in the atmosphere of human passions; some of the dust of this world attaches to its sacred feet; in a word, all that comes from religion, all that reunites itself with religion, and, above all, preaching, which is its most lively representation, receives inevitably the impress both of the time, and the place.

Every epoch has its distinctive features; but all epochs have not, as their distinguishing impress or characteristic, a powerful fact which strikes the least attentive; a fact, which, assuming a material form in its results, becomes, by means of its external appearance, familiar to all, and receives from all a popular appellation; a fact, in one word, about which, indeed, there may be a variety of opinions, but which no one thinks of denying. Such an impress is not wanting to our era; and the fact which characterises it, among many, is that which it has been agreed to call the religious movement (*le mouvement religieux*).

The very name of this fact appears to entitle it to exclusion from the number of those, of which I have before spoken. It is religious, and its influence on religion may appear a spontaneous evolution of religion itself. It is not so, however. A religious fact is not religion. Accomplished by the intervention of men, it is a human fact, a fact, at least, of a mixed nature, in which the presence of the divine idea, and the influence of human

nature, make themselves mutually felt at once. But, whatever be its nature, perplexity on that point, if any such exists, does not reach to the question which we have put; and nothing, in right reason, is more legitimate than to ask ourselves, What has been the action of the religious movement upon preaching, and in what manner, in its turn, preaching will react upon the religious movement?

We see it to be a matter beyond all dispute, that a movement has taken place in the sphere of religious things. The outcries of some, the blessings of others, and the attention of all, attest this movement. And as we are among those who bless it, the question which we have proposed, resolves itself naturally into this, What has preaching received from this religious movement, and what can it impart to it in its turn?

Should we here inquire into the date, trace the history, determine the extent, appreciate the nature, and conjecture on the future of a fact at once so vast, so serious, and so delicate? This task, perhaps, does not belong to our subject; and, at all events, it goes beyond its limits. Our subject, itself, however, requires us to notice some parts of it. It is by means of its most essential elements, that the religious movement has exercised an influence upon preaching; these elements ought to be ascertained and stated.

That which neutral or cautious witnesses call a religious movement, has received from another class of persons a name which involves quite a judgment; according to them, this movement is an *awakening* (*reveil*). We enter fully into their meaning, when we define it, in our turn, an effort of Christianity towards its source,—towards a more enlarged comprehension of the scheme of the Gospel,—towards a more strict and more extensive application of the principles of Christianity to human life. But let them not impute to us the having ascribed to this movement, viewed in its object, a character of complete novelty; that character we refuse to it, or, better to express our meaning, we repudiate it; for its being absolutely new would be to us a reason for distrusting its reality. Jesus Christ has promised to His Church to be with it to the end of the world; now, Jesus Christ is not divided; the truth, which is Himself, and by which alone He abides with us,—this truth is one and indivisible; none of its essential elements can perish; every truth, without which the

truth would be incomplete, continues without interruption; and we are certain of finding it again, virtually at least, wherever we meet with life. Forms may fail, distinctions disappear, and then, without doubt, one may be led to think, that the idea has become obscured; now, the idea could not be obscured, but because the sentiment, or the faith, has suffered; such is the order of facts of a like nature. Nevertheless, wherever we recognise life, the truth is not far remote; wherever, also, one part of the truth is frankly avowed, and cordially professed, the other parts, although covered over with silence and shade, and even, perhaps, to appearance, pushed out of existence, have a secret abode in the soul along with the other elements of truth, from which they are inseparable. If Jesus Christ can be divided in theory, that is to say, in formulas and in words which are external to the man, He cannot be divided in sentiment, which is the man himself. If, then, life has at all times flowed in the Church either in great abundance, or in stinted measures, there has been, in a sense, continuity of the truth, as well as continuity of life; an unbroken chain of tradition stretching across the darkness, connects eras the most remote and most diverse from each other; those epochs, even, which are called epochs of awakening, are, in this respect, the offspring of epochs going before; the strong are the descendants of the strong; life springs from life; and although there can be no doubt that the Supreme Head of the Church can, at every moment, bring fertility out of nothing, history testifies that He has always employed that which was in being for the benefit of that which was to come into being, that His will is, that men should receive the truth from God, and from their fathers, at the same time, that every generation should be indebted to the one that preceded it, and that it should be absolutely out of the power of any to disown its senior.

Nay, more: in proportion as an epoch has been more embarrassed by sophisms, and more unpeopled of believers, those who, at such a time, nourishing the flame of life, have, by that fact, protested for the truth,—those very persons, I say, should they have forgotten a portion of the doctrines of salvation, should they have misunderstood the mutual and indispensable relations between them,—should they even, in their prejudice, have declared against the dawn of that new day which they will bless through eternity,—those, I say, in order to keep alive the *smoking wick*

(*lumignon*),—in order to continue the holy tradition of ages, to provide a starting-point for the next generation, had need of more courage, and, every way, of more faith at first, than will perhaps be necessary to their successors. If the truth is inherited, it is no less true that courage is either borrowed, or communicated; surrounded by a cloud of witnesses, and supported by countless sympathies, it is easy for one to be sincere and strong; but it is not good for man to be alone; one cannot live alone any sort of superior life, and in a certain sense, one cannot believe alone. If Jesus Christ was acquainted with this state of solitude, if He went out of this world without having tasted the sweets of spiritual communion with other men; and if, notwithstanding, nothing led, in His case, to the decay either of His confidence or of His love, the reason is, that He was in every respect the only unique (*l' Unique*). There is something, however, which faintly recalls this inimitable model, and that is, the life of His servants in times of declension, and of unbelief; woe to us, if we respect it not, and if some speculative errors, even such as are calculated to prove serious, as regards both their principle and their consequences, should have power to prevent us from extending our homage to those brave yet humble men, who have been the means of handing down a perpetual testimony.

More fortunate, gentlemen, than some other nations have been, we have not seen, in the midst of us, the truth disowned, either in its documents, or in its essential parts, or in the accuracy of its expression. The monuments of the faith of our fathers have remained sacred for the children; and examples are not wanting, in our theological history, of an explicit acceptance of that inheritance, in confessions substantially identical with those which, three centuries ago, raised the standard of the everlasting Gospel; we may, at least, say that, in our church, Jesus Christ has never been wrapped in the shroud of forgetfulness, nor clothed in derision with the mantle of Socrates; that His holy name, at no time blasphemed, has been at all times adored and blessed among us; that, in our early days, our ears were accustomed to hear, and our lips to speak, His praises; and that we ourselves, in particular, who are His messengers, were wont to hear a voice, which claimed our respect, commend to us the love of Christ the Mediator, as the primary condition, and the alone strength, of the Gospel ministry. Heirs themselves of more ancient witnesses,

the Reals, the Curtals, and others besides, have bequeathed to us convictions, and examples; and if they were not, in their days, the centre of a movement similar to that which we are privileged to behold, it is because God has His own times and designs, which He has not seen meet to reveal to another.

It behoved me, gentlemen, to make these reservations, less for the honour of certain men, than for the glory of God. But, in respect of this glory itself, there is need to acknowledge, in the present time, an advance upon the past, a movement of reform and of renovation. This is neither the place, nor the time, to exhibit the defects in this human work, or the human nature visible in this work; let us, this day, look only at that which the "Master" has put into it; and let us hasten to say with thanksgiving: Pale faith has lighted her torch again; convictions are more frankly declared, and more clearly described; faith, which had fallen into the state of a mere collective, and, so to speak, social affair, has again become personal, and, therefore, a living principle. Many souls, rendered serious, have laid hold of the good part which cannot be taken from them; a still greater number, arrested in a less immediate, and more superficial manner, have begun again to respect at least that which they love not as yet, and the people at large are so much accustomed to hear certain truths declared, that they would now be as much disquieted by the absence of such truths, as perhaps they were, but lately, offended by their presence. Let us acknowledge that some, in whom, hitherto, the real man borrowed almost nothing from the religious man, have been brought to feel the need of a strict consistency in life; that Christianity, jealous of consequences, has developed its doctrines externally in works, as vast as itself is grand; that it has made its presence, and its reality, felt in all circles, reaching to all, even the highest, ranks in life; that it has compelled society to reckon with it; and, in a word, that a crowd of questions, all of which suppose religion to be a living thing, and its importance to be felt, and which, only lately, would have been regarded as frivolous and out of date, have become actual and urgent questions. Such is the aspect exhibited by the fact which we are endeavouring to paint, not from memory, but from nature, for it is present with us, and placed before our eyes. But if we approach the ideas themselves whence it has drawn its power, and the doctrines which it has

made its object, it is impossible not to know that it has drawn, not from the tomb, but from the shade, certain parts of the scheme of the Gospel that had fallen into desuetude; that, to truths which have always been held, it has found out a necessary complement in other truths, which proscription appeared to have overtaken; that, raising again a fallen side of the mysterious triangle, which makes Christianity the exact image of God Himself, it has reinstated in its place the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and thereby restored a substance to the words, now for a long time empty and dead, *regeneration* and *conversion;* that these words, having become powerful ideas, have reanimated, and thrown light upon, many others; that Christianity has from that time formed one chain in the thought, one chain in the life, and has shown itself imperious, and pressing, in regard to both of these. It is by these features, gentlemen, that, in spite of a variety of differences, the religious movement of the nineteenth century discovers itself in every country, where it is propagated. Admirable constancy,—striking uniformity, because it has nothing forced,—because in every country it has had, as its principle, the restoring to its place the Word of God, which, whenever it recovers in men's hearts the respect that is due to its worth, invariably brings back into the Church the same convictions, the same Christ, the same God!

If it is by means of preaching, that the religious movement is communicated; preaching is not, however, the cause of it; it is, therefore, lawful to inquire, to what extent, and in what sense, it has modified preaching.

But, as we remarked before, there is nothing in this case entirely new; there is nothing which did not exist before, at least as an exception; and what we have precisely to show is, the exception making itself the rule.

Preaching has become more strictly scriptural; not merely in this sense, that quotations from the text of the Bible are frequently introduced into sermons, and that the language made use of by our ministers is, further, steeped in that of the apostles and prophets (in this respect the new style of preaching would have even to acknowledge some abuse); but in this, a much more important sense, that the Word of God has abounded there in its substance, that the Divine authority has everywhere impressed its seal upon it,—that the preacher, losing sight of him-

self in his mission, has allowed to appear only the ambassador of the Most High. If this has not been attained, except by the loss of individuality, a thing which cannot be denied, that is our own fault, and is not to be imputed to the principle, which, so far from demanding such a sacrifice, does not even accept it. The truth demands, that it be personified in every man; it wishes, in order the better to make its unity appear, to multiply itself as many times as there are souls who receive it; it does not hold itself enriched by our losses; it does not make ruins around it; a living thing itself, it associates not with death; it makes of James, of Peter, and of John—Saint James, Saint Peter, and Saint John; but, in adding sanctity, it does not take away humanity. Besides, God, by establishing preaching, willed that there should be contact between man and man. He has attached to this contact a mysterious and incomparable efficacy; now, who does not know, that there is no real man but the individual, and that it is by his personality that one man acts upon another? Moreover, when the preacher is animated by true zeal, individuality knows well where to recover itself, it is always with our own souls that we love, that we supplicate, that we lament; and through a too great uniformity of language and of method, the personal being breaks forth, even in spite of it, and its seal is impressed upon a work, for which its timid humility has desired to take no credit to itself.

This profound respect for,—this worship of,—the inspired Word, has made it literally to abound to overflowing in our pulpits, whence formerly it used to descend only in drops. The sermon has more frequently given place to the homily, and the paraphrase; to explain the Holy Scriptures, and, as much as possible, to explain them by means of themselves, has appeared, as in the early days of the Church, to be the most immediate mission of the preacher; the Gospel has flowed with a full channel into our churches, reviving at one and the same time the eloquence of the minister, and the attention of the hearers; the charm of perpetual novelty has made itself to be felt by the most insensible; prejudice itself has frequently expired before the divine unction of the Word; its most severe denunciations have been found less offensive, than our best contrived discourses; and preaching, when pervaded by this fresh savour, has seemed to gain in sweetness, as well as in authority.

Pulpit instruction, in becoming more scriptural, would necessarily appear more consecutive, more connected, and more complete. Every truth, in a system which is truth itself, calls for another truth as a complement or support to it, and stops not until the whole chain, being travelled over, has joined again, in indissoluble union, the infinity of our misery with the infinity of the Divine wisdom and goodness. The mind alone, independently of every other consideration, would demand this consequence; and there is no doubt, that God has designed to give peace to our understanding, at the same time as to our heart. Now, such is the satisfaction which pulpit discourses have had power to impart to us, since the time that the whole doctrine has been prominently set before us. When we have seen every individual subject conduct irresistibly to the beginning and to the end of Christianity, and the whole of religion enter, as it were of itself, within the limits of every sermon, we have then accounted for what formerly we had obscurely felt at the conclusion of some of the best sermons; we bethink ourselves, when far too late, that many a truth had appeared as suspended in air —that such another supported nothing—that all of them together did not have as their aim, life taken in all its length and depth; that, in one word, incoherence and incompleteness were clearly perceptible even in the best connected works of the most logical talents.

It is true, that a joy which ought to penetrate the *heart* especially, has been diverted too much towards the *understanding;* and in virtue of the intimate connection subsisting between the different parts of our being, it is possible that we may have been sometimes deceived, as to the seat of this joy. It is possible that a religion, perfectly connected, since it is perfectly true, may have charmed some minds, as a perfect syllogism; it is possible that, in the satisfaction of being able to reason our religion, we may have sometimes reasoned a little too much; it is possible that we may have been too desirous to draw it, soul and body, from the abstractions of dialectics, and that, the effect answering to the cause, we may have procured a certain number of conversions, more intellectual than moral; it is even possible, that we may have attempted to perfect the divine logic, that, in order to open to Christian reasoning a more level and direct road, we have discarded, at least by omitting to notice it, such a passage of inspiration,—and, consequently, such a truth as God had laid as a

snare for the pride of logicians; to sum up all, it is possible, that a little of that rationalism, which is so keenly attacked by orthodoxy, may be one of the features of the new orthodoxy. But this abuse, the serious nature of which we ought by no means to conceal, is very far from counterbalancing, in preaching, the indisputable merits of a more systematic mode of instruction,—merits, the practical results of which will make us feel all their importance.

If logic may be defined a necessity of the inner man, then every element of our being has its logic, since every element conceals the germ of a necessity. The heart has its logic, the conscience its logic, as well as the intellect; for each of these parts of our inner man, as soon as a principle is acknowledged and felt, immediately demands its conclusion, as a sacred debt. Now, when these three necessities meet in one and the same point, when, added to one another, they weigh upon the will with the weight of the entire man, how could the will resist the whole man? or rather, is not the will already absorbed in that which absorbs the whole man? Say, gentlemen, what, armed with this triple logic, the Christian preacher becomes; say, what liveliness will be in his words, what urgency in his appeals; say, with what force souls will be bound together by a doctrine, in which the knots are so firmly tied; say, what importance preaching will have, every discourse of which, by a fortunate necessity, contains the whole counsel of God.

But do you wish thoroughly to penetrate into the principle of this urgency, and of this vehemence of reason, (I may well call it so, for it lies in the matter, not in the discourse; and the most temperate eloquence leaves to it its full liberty); contemplate the characteristic doctrines of the awakening; that vividness of colouring which has quite effaced all the demi-tints; that thought which, summing up the whole Gospel into the most urgent and imperious dilemmas, divides the whole of mankind into two classes, the friends and the enemies of the truth, and the whole of the life into two thoroughly distinct eras—that of the natural man, and that of the new man,—the reign of the flesh, and the reign of the spirit. Contemplate the new sense which is given to this word "conversion," which no longer signifies a gradual and partial reformation of morals, but a resurrection of the whole man, torn away from the most radical of errors, and re-

stored to the most fundamental of truths. Contemplate the abolition of that indulgent, but mournful, supposition, which, taking for religious sincerity the most superficial external profession, raised into believers all those whom baptism had devoted to the faith, and distinguishing between them only by the different degrees of zeal and purity manifested by them, reduced the preacher to the necessity of preaching really nothing but sanctification, that is to say, to demand the consequence, before he had obtained the principle. It must be confessed: Jesus Christ had become, in preaching conceived after this manner, not intentionally, but logically, a veritable "beside the question" (*hors-d'œuvre*); He was no longer the starting-point of morality, except only by His example and by His instructions; and even then it was necessary carefully to take away from these very instructions, all that which suspended the moral destiny and the eternity of man upon some other thing than man himself; the only means of reaching the moral life in its roots, of transplanting it into a new soil, of changing the wild olive-tree into a good olive-tree, of grafting a divine life upon a human nature, of raising man up to himself and of restoring him to God,—rationally, no longer existed; and the most solemn words of Christ, yea, His very blood, were lost, and His name was a pleonasm in our discourses; and against the Gospel, thus conceived, there arose the most fearful of presumptions, the most encouraging to the hopes of the unbeliever, namely, that God, who is always faithful to proportion the end to the means,—God, who observes, in all that He does, the strictest economy, and an exactness absolutely mathematical, had done less than He had undertaken, and moved in vain, that is to say, without wisdom, the heavens and the earth; that, in one word, God, who always calculates justly and acts always surely, had been deceived!

A sounder comprehension of the Gospel has therefore saved, in the eye of reason, the honour of the Divine government; and as for the preacher, it has furnished him with a longer lever, if one may use the expression,—a lever capable of going deep even underneath the very roots of our life. The preacher's word has become more energetic, more lively, more penetrating: it has been enabled to arm itself on every occasion with the whole Gospel, to charge, with the weight of the whole truth, every truth of detail, or of application. Hence, in our churches, that quick

surprise and that alarm, as if a new Gospel had been announced; hence those emotions, hitherto unknown, those salutary wounds, which close not again, until He who made the wound, come to bind it up; hence those rumours in society, that disorder in relations recently tranquil,—to be plain,—those rents in families, a result which is sometimes occasioned, we are bound to say, by the terrors of insensibility startled out of its sleep, and the rude attacks of an over-hasty zeal. In a word, preaching, in the midst of these very temples, of these consecrated forms, and under this official costume itself, reascended, by means of the Gospel, to forgotten ages, and reproduced their courage, their vehemence, and at times even their rudeness. Under the ministerial robe of the nineteenth century, discovered himself often a reformer of the sixteenth; the pastor, in the midst of his parishioners, appeared as a missionary; he seemed to come from a greater distance, than the neighbouring chief town, and in reality he did come from a greater distance; he appeared, all of a sudden, a stranger in the midst of his flock; and in reality he was a stranger; he was so upon the earth; how much more, then, in his own village, and in his own town! and it might be said of him without exaggeration, and almost without a figure, "that his place, even, knew him no more." (Psalm ciii. 16.)

The form of compositions for the pulpit, was naturally obliged to feel so serious a change in the substance of instruction. The zeal of the messenger, stimulated by the very nature of his message, led him to multiply himself, and to abound, so to speak, with the places, the persons, and the occasions. Discourses in which the doctrinal consequence took the place of the connecting of the ideas, and of the regularity of the didactic march,—discourses in which follow hard upon one another the familiar analogies, the pointed allusions, those lively apostrophes which appear to decompose the audience, in order to establish a conference betwixt each individual and the preacher, and those pressing alternatives which, forcing the hearer, during the sitting, to declare himself for or against the truth,—make the hours devoted to worship really hours of trial and initiation, and naturalize in the bosom of our churches the popular eloquence of the public places, or of the desert. From the manifold demands made upon the preacher, in season and out of season, arose the practice of *improvising*, a thing all but unknown among us. This had, besides,

come to be felt as needful by those of our ministers, who wished that around them, as well as in them, religion should assume all the properties of a reality, and who would not allow themselves to see a living word in a recited word. Even discourses that are composed and committed to memory, sometimes become, by the haste with which the labour is gone through, a second kind of improvising. What is called *meditation*, that is to say, the mode of preaching which is the least premeditated, became very prevalent. The use, perhaps, inclined towards the abuse of it. It appeared to be forgotten, that improvising, in its full sense, is warranted only by necessity; that, in ordinary cases, the not committing to writing does not exclude, but, on the contrary, demands a severe preparation, and that nothing, in a word, ought to be more premeditated, than improvising. At this day, perhaps, content with having by practice secured to ourselves an aptitude which was wanting to us, we shall think ourselves obliged by the importance of pulpit subjects, either to cultivate this aptitude with extreme care, or to reserve the use of it for the circumstances which peremptorily require it, granting the right of habitually practising it only to those special and consummate talents which do not establish a precedent, because the very display of their power forces upon us the salutary knowledge of our own weakness.[1]

[1] Unpremeditated speech was promised to the apostles *in emergencies, as a gift of special inspiration*, Luke xxi. 14, 15; Matt. x. 19, 20. But no uninspired man can presume on the same promise, without premeditation, on ordinary occasions. 1 Tim. iv. 13, 15, shows that even in the apostles' days, premeditation and study were needed *ordinarily*. Where the preacher has command of thought and language, *and has previously studied well his subject*, unwritten sermons are more effective than written. But Gibbons, *Christian Minister*, well says,—

> "Rather read every sentence word for word,
> Than wander in a desultory strain—
> A chaos, dark, irregular, and wild—
> Where the same thought and language oft revolve
> And re-revolve, to tire sagacious minds;
> However loud the momentary praise
> Of ignorance, and empty fervors charmed.
> But never to your notes be so enslaved
> As to repress some instantaneous thought,
> That may like lightning dart upon the soul,
> And blaze in strength and majesty divine!"

Baxter, in answer to the Quaker's objection, "You read your sermons out of the paper, therefore you have not the Spirit," replies, "It is not want of your abilities, that makes ministers use notes; but it is a regard to the work and good of

In describing thus far the action of the religious movement upon preaching, I could not avoid indicating an immediate reaction of preaching upon the same movement. But the former reaction is quite spontaneous in its character; it springs, without premeditation, from the very nature of things; there is another that is voluntary, the result of deliberation and of free choice, in which preaching, not restricting itself to bringing back towards religion, by a natural inclination, the advantages which it draws from it, proceeds to draw from other sources other advantages which study and reflection in their turn discover to it. In this it appears purely as a means, as an instrument, and offers to Christianity the tribute of certain resources, which it does not directly borrow from it. There is no profane temerity in expressing one's self thus upon the subject; there would be such, only in wishing to add to the intrinsic worth of Christianity,—to bring it to perfection,—to mend it; to say that we wish to serve Christianity, and to say even that it has need of our services, is not to ascribe to it a perishable and precarious existence; rather, it is to enter into the very spirit of its Author. In the moral world, the "force" of God, a thing that is incomprehensible, is made up of our "forces," just as the work of His Providence is very frequently the sum of our works; if you decompose into visible elements the power which Christianity displays, you will find, at the conclusion of the analysis, only human forces. All that God works in this order, He works by our instrumentality, but it is He who evokes our will—who determines it; it is He who penetrates, and co-ordinates the elements which our nature offers to Him; we give to Him only what He has given to us; we do only what He does in us; He is, in a word, the force of our forces, and, consequently, He is everything; our life is His life, and we are He Himself continually.[1]

the hearers. I use notes as much as any man, *when I take pains;* and as little as any man, when I am lazy and busy, and have not time to prepare. It is easier for us to preach three sermons without notes, than one with them."—Ed.

[1] Is there any one, for whom these last lines require to be explained? No one will see in them, I would fain persuade myself, anything but what I have put into them, namely, the conviction that all good emanates from God, and ought to be ascribed to Him; that every moral agent, in performing what is good, fulfils the design, and does the work of God; that it is impossible to distinguish and separate from the work of God, that which He does not work directly and personally, that is to say, in two words, all that which is not miracle, properly so called; that it is even a contradiction in terms to suppose that any-

Now, these principles being supposed, in what can the pulpit aid the religious movement? It will be answered: It does so, on one side, by bringing it to perfection, and on another, by giving it authority. But this distinction is superfluous: the latter of these effects is contained in the former; all that which will perfect the movement will, at the same time, propagate it. There is no occasion, indeed, to misunderstand what the Gospel declares concerning the opposition of man, by nature, to the truth of the Gospel salvation. This opposition is but too amply attested; but, what is no less so, is the harmony of the Gospel with the profoundest wants of our nature, and, to include the whole in a single word—the humanity of Christianity. When any heart is gained to the Gospel, it is gained by the Gospel, by something inherent in the Gospel; and for fear that you should attribute this change to some indescribable secret power, and, as Saurin expresses it, to some mysterious "fabulous enchantment," that heart will take care to tell you, what that is which has gained it, and tell it you too so well, that you will no longer be astonished but at one thing only, namely, why it is that all hearts which have the same entreaties pressed upon them, are not gained also. It is there that the mystery lies, and there only: the Gospel is the reason itself; it is on this account that it gains us. The Gospel is the reason itself; it is on this account that it repels us. Be this as it may, its power lies in showing itself such as it is; and all that will manifest it more fully, will render it more powerful; and the more it will show itself Divine, the more it will be human. It has not ceased to be human, that is to say, adapted to, and in harmony with, human nature, save only when man, stripping it of its crown of miracles, and of its veil of mysteries, has presumed to bring it down to his own level. When Jesus Christ has ceased to be perfectly God, He has ceased to be perfectly man. In order, then, to spread the religious movement, it must be purified. If it has been confined to

thing of that which is true, anything of that which really *is*, can *not* flow from Him in every instance and at all times. You see my idea of this matter, not that I think there is any confounding of essence betwixt God and man, not that our personality is absorbed in that of God, not, above all, that our responsibility is lost in His liberty. In my opinion,—an opinion in which every man who examines his conscience will agree,—man, in respect of what is good, or of God, is a channel that is living, personal, and free, and God is the fountain that flows into this channel.

narrower limits than we might have anticipated, it is, on the one hand—I hasten to acknowledge it—because it was Christian; but it is also, on the other hand, because it was not sufficiently so. The period in which repulsion was to prevail, is fast wearing out; let us hasten that period in which its power of attraction shall have the predominance. What must we do for this end? Imitate Jesus Christ.

Jesus Christ, by His acts, as well as by His nature, was perfectly man. Let us consent to be so. Jesus Christ accommodated His words and actions to the circumstances, in the midst of which He spoke and acted; His apostles followed His example. Let us follow their example and His. Let us have always before our eyes human nature and our own times. Let us descend (if, indeed, it is to descend) from the pure region of the ideal, into the domain of the real, and the actual. This is to bring us nearer to Christianity and the Gospel.

Thus the preaching, which is faithful to its mission, faithful to its own track, will continue to publish those doctrines which abase all human pride before the counsel of God; it will announce this God upon earth, this God upon the cross, this standing "foolishness" to the Greeks of all countries, this standing "stumbling-block" to the Jews of all ages; it will proclaim, as the only condition of salvation, that new birth, the necessity of which, preached, raises in rebellion every particle of pride that is in the human heart—a dangerous sort of preaching, which, in the world, irritates the most gentle, and makes the most ignorant laugh you to scorn. This way, sown though it be with thorns, is the right way. Let preaching always walk in it. But, faithful in every sense to the example of the "Master," let it apply itself always more and more to the characteristics of human nature, and of the time being.

Our imagination does not labour here without the means of help. The existing pulpit, you are aware, gentlemen, presents to us beautiful models, even in the sense to which our wishes point—evangelical orators, attentive to the signs of the times, and to the characteristic properties of human nature.

Neither have we to range under two distinct heads, namely, human nature, and the time being, the small number of ideas which it remains for us to propose to you. They correspond to both of the two at once, and this is what ought to be; each par-

ticular time, taken in its reality, conceals the real man quite entire; and that which fulfils the legitimate wishes of an era, fulfils the exigencies of human nature.

Thus the present Era wishes what human nature wishes, when it demands that the rational side of Christianity, its philosophy, should be placed in relief, and that it should become the instrument of an intellectual regeneration, as well as of a moral. This want, or this claim, and, consequently, this duty, is of all times; there never has been an era, for certain, in which the Gospel could dispense with being reasonable. We may even, in a sublime sense, designate *reason* that which, in all times, has determined men's minds to yield themselves to the Gospel.[1] But the *equilibrium* which we demand in the present day, has not been always so distinctly demanded. The conscience and the heart, whose modes of operation are essentially summary and synthetical, have often left small room for the analysing processes of reason. We may even say more: the conscience and the heart often, in that case, took upon themselves to be reasonable, in the place of the reason which was not so; and all was clear and logical in the heart and conscience, when all in the intellect was embarrassment and subtlety. The era in which we live, seems to have taken for its device the apostolic precept: "Let your obedience be reasonable."[2] It does not, perhaps, demand the exposition of the external evidences of religion, so much as the demonstration of its internal coherence, and of the harmony of its entire system with all that belongs to the heart,

[1] "Fond as we are, and justly fond of faith,
Reason, we grant, demands our first regard;
The mother honoured, as the daughter dear.
Reason the root, fair faith is but the flower.
The fading flower shall die, but Reason lives
Immortal, as her Father in the skies. . . .
Wrong not the Christian; think not reason yours;
'Tis reason our great Master holds so dear;
'Tis reason's injur'd rights His wrath resents;
'Tis reason's voice obeyed, His glories crown:
To give lost reason life, He pour'd His own.
Believe, and show the reason of a man;
Believe, and taste the pleasure of a god;
Believe, and look with triumph on the tomb.
Thro' reason's wounds alone the faith can die."
—Young, *Night IV.*

[2] Engl. Vers. Rom. xii. 1, "Your reasonable service."—Ed.

and to human affairs. It demands from Christianity an account of its philosophy. It is not, gentlemen, a philosophy which it wishes to obtain in exchange for Christianity, but a philosophy which it wishes to receive from the hands of Christianity.[1] Neither is it an intellectual spectacle, which it solicits for certain proud spirits; it is a satisfaction which it aims at making the reason of the people to share in. That which it demands as its end, it demands also as its means; it reckons that Christianity thus taught, will become, to a people, the most active stimulant to reflection, the most efficacious mean of ennobling the intellect, and the source of all those safe and sound ideas, by which they would have to regulate their lives. I hasten to say it, preaching, by the very fact that it has been Christian, has anticipated these wants and wishes; but who knows, if the attentive observation of man, and of the time, be not necessary to it, in order to answer to these still better, and, strange to say, in order to become, in this respect, more Christian? for, such is the correspondence betwixt the Christian religion and human nature, that each of these, well apprehended, should lead back to the other, and, accordingly, faith towards nature, and nature towards faith.

When we speak of the philosophy of Christianity, we have the appearance of speaking of a thing extraordinary, remote, and accessible only to a few minds; and yet to say that Christianity is philosophical, is to say, in other words, that it is in accordance with itself, and with our nature, that it is human, simple, consistent, and practical. Thus we cannot better bring out the philosophy of the Gospel, nor better enter into the spirit of the times, nor better serve the cause of the religious movement, than by making the morality which abounds in the Gospel itself, abound in preaching. In this respect, the Christian pulpit has a position to reconquer; and, until this is done, the preacher will not know what, in an era like ours, his authority and his power may be. Let him examine, then, under a new aspect, the Book of God; he will there see morality break forth everywhere, sometimes completing the doctrine, and sometimes being completed by it; he will there see those two branches of the truth, not only in harmony with, but a continuation of, each

[1] "Dogmatics are certainly a philosophy, and, as such, they must be studied, only a philosophy framed from the Bible, and this must always continue to be its source."—HERDER'S *Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend.*

other. Let him admire this continuity, let him make it the admiration of his hearers. Whenever he hears the world demand the preaching of morality, let him not repel that demand, out of contempt for the motives which may have inspired it; it has its foundation in justice, it deserves to be both rectified, and satisfied; let the preacher do both of these things; let morality, resting on its own solid basis, have free scope in his discourses; let him show us, with equal care in both cases, that morality is entirely doctrinal, and that doctrine is entirely moral; let the one of these make the other to abound; let this beautiful science of life and morals, the natural appendage of preaching, reascend by means of profound study to the rank from which it has fallen; let morality, by turns descriptive, speculative, and practical, mingled with all subjects as intimately as the blood is with the flesh, fill all our discourses with its substantial riches; in a word, let the minister of the Gospel resume possession of his ancient prerogative, viz., of being the most intimate confidant of the human heart, the most instructive and practical of moralists.

To perfect the forms of sacred discourse, is, further, to listen to the counsels of the era, and to aid the religious movement. The time has gone by, if it ever existed, when the pulpit could remain, as regards precision, and purity of language, behind the other branches of the art of writing. To drive away from the threshold of the conscience, those prejudices which may have the power to keep back for a long time some scrupulous minds, it is absolutely essential at this day, that the language of the Gospel minister should not be rude and unpolished; it is absolutely essential that, when compared with the other productions of the intellect, it should not allow itself to be convicted of any sort of inferiority, and that no one should be able to say, with any appearance of reason, that it exercises no influence over any but vulgar ears. To go along with society towards all progress, by indicating to it the only progress of which it is not sufficiently desirous, is to be on better terms with society, to acquire a real authority over it. To restore to the truth its native beauty, to express it clearly and energetically, is to strengthen the impression of the truth. And let it not be supposed, that the merits of a careful composition, by not being everywhere appreciated with the same reflection, can be in any part lost. The true good (*bon*), and the true beautiful (*beau*), find in every mind a point

which is capable of being affected by them. Their peculiar suitableness to all the primitive wants of our souls, makes them penetrate into it in the long-run; the discernment of just expressions and of choice forms, gradually becomes an instinct in the multitude, and the preacher, by caring for the logic of his composition, and the contexture of his language, acquires a new authority over the people, of whom he is no longer merely the spiritual guide, but, in many respects, the governor.

The pastor, who has at all times been the first chief teacher (*pedagogue*) of every parish, would thus become so in a more special manner; the Church would be the High School of adults, and of young children; religion, in short, in an evident manner, the centre of all civilizing ideas. For, by applying itself more than it has ever yet done, to the cultivation of the entire man, to imparting a pure nourishment to each of his faculties, and, above all, to establishing among them the order and the unity of which it alone has the secret, religion would cause the seeds of civilization, which is nothing else than the relative perfection of the human condition, to run down from the elevation of the pulpit into the furrows of society. Let us beware of engaging it in any of the questions which the Gospel has shown no desire either to awaken, or to resolve; it is not for it to transport itself into the city; on the contrary, it is for the latter to transport itself to religion's point of view; but it belongs to religion, to open up its way to it, by making perceptible to it the sympathy of religion for man, and the knowledge which it has of all our true interests. Preaching has no need, in order to effect this, to forsake its good part, and to be taken up, as a new Martha, with many other things; it is only necessary for it to know well all that is implied in "the one thing needful;" it is necessary for it, moreover, to have a fellow-feeling for all the distinctive features of human nature, not to be ignorant of the purpose for which man is made, not to give him occasion to believe, by the uniformity of its tone, by a studied dignity, by a factitious asceticism of language, by an affected evasion of certain details and of certain allusions, in a word, by I know not what eccentricity, that it dwells far remote from him in the void, and that to begin to be a Christian, is to cease to be a man. It seems to me, that religion would appear much more a real, immediate, and necessary concern, when it should be seen as a pure and divine blood palpitating every-

where in the life, and if preaching, after having shown us its reasonableness, made us feel it as living, that is to say, human.[1]

If, from a long date, the somewhat stiff structure, and the somewhat arbitrary forms of preaching have taken away from it this character of a speech quite real, and from its object that of a positive business, characters which the tribune and the bar have never lost, this disadvantage will be much more considerable in the era in which we live. If there be anything that distinguishes our age, it is that positive spirit which brings back to their proper sense, all the metaphors of life, and which demands from every sign an account of its value, and from every form an account of its reason, which wishes every word to be a fact, and every discourse an action, which banishes from style, as from society, all arbitrary or unintelligible ceremonial, and which wishes that eloquence, in particular, should render an account of its processes, no longer to I know not what art, to I know not what proprieties, but to life. Without stopping to inquire whether this tendency does not run into excess, let us confess, that the traditional form of the discourses from the pulpit, a form which their object has never entirely justified, is at this day a real anachronism; and that in the midst of a movement, the effect of which is to transform the idea into a business, there is great inconvenience in giving to the most positive, as well as to the highest business, the lying appearance of a mere idea. Formerly, at least, when all was enveloped in formality, there was no room for troublesome comparisons: but from what, in our days, would the religious movement have more to suffer, than from a parallel which would make us see it, alone among all human interests, dissembling its reality, and, in this respect, alone faithful to the traditions of the past, which make it thus, in spite of itself, a thing of the past, a dead thing?

We shall not invoke, in favour of these exceptional forms, the interest of the dignity of the pulpit.[2] It would be rather singular for a form to be more dignified, in proportion as it less answered to its presumed end! It would be a sad thing if dignity should exclude simplicity (*naïvete*), intimacy (popularity; familiar condescension to the people), and even good sense (for

[1] See the note at the end of the Discourse.

[2] A great man well said, "The pulpit will die of dignity."—Ed.

it suffers more than all the rest, from a costume which disfigures every subject)! Oh! certainly, we do not wish that the ministrations of the Gospel, in order to be familiar, should cease to be august![1] No! Let Christianity lose none of its majesty; let it, in an era in which respect is departing, continue the object of a last feeling of respect, and let it bring back all the others: respect for the conscience, for law, for age, for feebleness, and for misfortune! but in a positive age, let it show itself more positive still, and more real than all the rest; let it trust to its incomparable dignity, to counterbalance the familiarity of forms; and very far from fearing that ridicule attaches to the artless (*naïves*) expressions of nature, and to the vivid colours of reality, let it know well that it is permitted to the pulpit alone, to be familiar with impunity, and that never will ridicule more surely descend upon it, than from the use of a ceremonious politeness,—a manner so opposite to the freedom of the prophets,—and from a dressing up of forms which is so different from the pathetic *abandon*, and from the impetuous logic of the apostles. All the precautions, the purpose of which is to disguise the true form of things, may be suitable to other kinds of eloquence, which have to conceal in their object I know not what secret nothingness; but Christianity, all life and all substance, the only object, among those which engross us, that is really serious and solid, Christianity gains everything by exhibiting itself without a veil.

Preachers! your business is a business; still more than tribunes and advocates, you are advocates and tribunes; be the one and the other; let your pulpit be to you, by turns, a tribune and a bar; let your word be an action, directed towards an im-

[1] I cannot refrain from throwing in here a remark. The place and the time are not unknown to us, in which preaching has become (or almost so) a serious and familiar conversation, the pulpit, an arm-chair, the church, a conventicle; in some respects, this is well, but let us not go too far, and let us preserve to preaching that majesty which is partly connected with the idea of a great community, of a confederation of consciences, and of an action upon the masses. Let not the stranger who enters into a temple take for a confidential conversation, a discourse in which he expected a reproduction of the apostles, of the fathers, and of the great orators of the ancient pulpit.

[The two extremes to be guarded against are similar to those stated in Horace, *Ars Poet.*,—

"Ne . . .
Migret in obscuras humili sermone tabernas,
Aut, dum vitat humum, nubes et inania captet."—Ed.]

mediate end; let your hearers come not so much to hear a discourse, as to receive a message; seize upon yourselves, seize them by all the advantages attached to the subjects of the pulpit; your eloquence has more sides that are artless, more colours that are lively, than that of the tribune and of the advocate; nothing condemns it to be abstract, everything pushes it towards sensible facts. Your religion was a history, before it became an idea; and, now, after being too long stagnant, the lake becomes a flowing stream again, the idea becomes a history. What hinders you from adding in the pulpit the marvels of the present time, to the miracles of the past, and from relating, day by day, the history of God! Why will you not mingle with your instructions, the grand news of the kingdom? and why will you not make to resound in our places of worship, both the cries of distress, and the songs of triumph, yea, if need be, the murmurs of the Church militant? Why not show in Christianity, not only a doctrine, but what is before everything, a living fact, continually gushing out, and, this day, God be thanked! in large and rapid floods? Is the history which you have to relate, finished? Has God fallen asleep? Or, have His past works, indeed, to blush for His new works? Or, really, has all which is done for the glory of God by other hands than salaried hands, and with other resources than the treasures of the State, no claims to be mentioned in your official pulpits, and before the flock which is assigned to you? And, are we still to regard as an affair of religious luxury, and of Christian dilettantism, the labours which occupy the very first rank among our duties? And, shall we reserve to the conferences of the initiated, the accounts of a work which continues that of the Peters and the Apolloses, of the Pauls and the Timothys?

Either I am much deceived, gentlemen, or the present age demands from Christianity facts, and from the pulpit recitals. Mixed, in due measure, with formal and direct instruction, these recitals would interest all classes of hearers. They would convince the multitude more than all reasonings could, that Christianity is a living principle, that religion is a thing for humanity. I would not wish to surfeit the imagination, nor even to amuse it. I would not go, in preference, to seek beyond seas, and under unknown skies, for extraordinary scenes. Nearer to myself, methinks, within the circle of our own country, and of our

own manners, I would often lay hold of serious and simple facts; I would choose such as are modest, obscure, and from within; I would cite, if I could, lives rather than acts; I would extend, only in season and at intervals, the horizon of my audience; I would do everything to the end that the religion, which I publish to them, should by degrees assume, in their eyes, the aspect of a business, and of a business that is pressing; I would not fear to make the felt need of it the business of the country, of the parish, and of the place; but I would only touch discreetly on these points, for fear of making the interests of the individual be forgotten in those of society, and the question that relates to eternity, in one that relates to what is merely local and transitory.

You see, gentlemen, I have treated you to few ideas, and very long details. The subject was susceptible of being treated more fully, and yet more briefly. Excuse me, both for what I have omitted, and for what I have too long dwelt upon. I long to release your attention, which must be fatigued; but can I do so before relieving, by a few words, a heart that is too full—which was bound to contain itself up to this time—which desires to restrain itself still, but not to enjoin upon itself a silence that it is impossible to maintain?

One thought has for long filled and weighed upon my heart, and would readily break forth in my conversation—it is that which springs up in me from comparing what I am, with the chair, the duties of which are entrusted to me. But this chair I have, at length, accepted, and whatever the state of my mind and my ideas in regard to my future career may be, I know that, from henceforth, it is no longer to man that I ought to speak of these things—an instinct which will be understood, puts a seal upon my lips from this moment forward.

But this is what I can say—what I ought to say. I enter upon my new career with two sentiments which, if God preserve them to me, ought to give only one direction to my labours, and only one tenor to my life.

The first of these feelings, is that of the serious nature of my charge. I have to take the place of a man, whose Christian virtues, and great experience, whose long and valuable services, whose wonderful integrity of mind, and admirable prudence of character, gave to him an authority to which I shall never pre-

tend to aspire. I have to labour after him, conjointly with my honourable colleagues, in the work of giving worthy ministers to the Church of Jesus Christ. If the responsibility of the minister is great, what, then, is ours? What, especially, is that of the professor who is called more directly to counsel the candidates for the ministry, in regard to the manner of performing their duties, and to determine by his instructions their whole character, and the whole tenor of their lives?

This idea which has laid hold of me—this idea I have held fast with a sort of love; I have not been willing to let it escape from me; I have hardly permitted any other idea to unite with it, in order to temper, and sweeten it; I have desired to taste its severity without distraction, and if I may dare to express myself so, its holy bitterness; and, in a just distrust of myself, I have repelled, or, at least, put off for the time, the sensible consolations which were, and still are, offered to me, which I view at a distance with thankfulness, but which I will accept only when God will permit me.

Do not think, gentlemen (addressing the students), that, on this account, my heart rejects beforehand the sweet communion to which, without doubt, it will be tempted by your friendship. This heart, I may tell it to you, readily opens. It asks, in reality, but little; and it would not even accept sentiments of respect, rising too far above those which it deserves; but confidence and esteem are the temperate atmosphere in which I require to live, and out of which the few abilities that I possess are overcast, and vanish. I do not speak to you of the dispositions with which I come to you; I should be afraid of telling you too much of them, at a time when an all-absorbing engagement does not allow the most natural sentiments to escape from my heart; and I should be afraid, also, under the burden of this engagement, of not telling you enough of them. Let us, then, gentlemen, allow the time for it to arrive, and the facts to speak; and, in the meantime, be assured of this, that, in accepting my charge, I have had a regard to your interests, that my predominant thought has respect to you; and that which is the object of your own wishes, and of your most serious prayers, is, from this moment, the first care of my life.

Be generous, then, in your demands with respect to me this day. I could speak to you of the affection which I bear to you;

and every one would believe me sincere. Choose, rather, that I should speak to you of the object of our common affection, and of the point of view from whence I look at our common vocation. Be satisfied with my telling you, that I come in the name of God, and invoking His assistance, to study along with you a human art, made divine by the manner of its employment,—made divine by its means. Especially, be well pleased to know, that the man who offers himself to serve as the director of your meditations and studies in regard to preaching, thoroughly resolved to propose to you all the natural resources which give their relative perfection to the works of art, is yet more penetrated by the thought that God alone knows the art, that it is His Spirit alone that is eloquent in our discourses, and that, according to an expression of my venerable predecessor, "in order to paint, so as to profit, the great things of the kingdom that is everlasting, it is in the azure of Heaven that we must dip our pencils."

The other sentiment which I feel it needful to express, is that of gratitude. What occasion have I not had to make use of, and to practise this sentiment, the purest and the most useful in the human soul? The object of the most touching favours in the heart of the honourable and illustrious city where I have passed in peace the half of my life, I have seen, if I may use the expression, my dear country stretch out its arms to me; I have seen my native place, after twenty years, again acknowledge and demand me back, and no fewer than three bodies at once, than which there are none among us more considerable, nor more respected, entering into a mutual understanding, in order to attach me again to my country, by the most honourable bonds. I venture to offer to the Council of State, through you, Sir (addressing the Councillor), as their organ, the homage of my respect and gratitude for the confidence in me which they have shown, and for all the precious privileges with which they have been pleased to surround my office. Be pleased then, as President of the Council of Public Instruction, to give assurance to that authoritative body which does, and prepares to do, so much good in the midst of us, of my profound desire that the appointment in which it has substantially concurred, may, with the help of God, be one day reckoned among the good which it has done. And you, Sir (the Rector), and gentlemen (the Members of the Academy), you, to whom I owe the same sentiments, since you were the first to set

agoing the series of acts which had for its end to associate me with you in your labours,—receive with a generosity worthy of you,—treat with indulgence a novice who will, perhaps, long continue one,—bear with his inexperience, and pardon him if his state of health, now long since altered, does not permit him to co-operate with you with all the energy to be desired, in the various labours which he is about to share with you. If a willing mind is accounted as anything; if it may even, in the eyes of favourable inclinations, hold the place of positive advantages, it is a good Colleague that you have just now obtained. May God, the God of peace and holiness, of justice and love, be continually betwixt you and this new colleague; and may He grant to me, not too painfully to disappoint your just expectations, those of our Honourable Government, and those of my country! I add no more.

NOTE RELATIVE TO PAGE 439.

Would it be true, that zeal should have for its condition a certain narrowness of view,—a certain poverty of ideas? Some persons appear to think so, and some facts have the appearance of giving them grounds for so doing. Many men, zealous for religion, show themselves somewhat jealous of doing justice to all the faculties of the soul, to all its tendencies, and to the whole of human nature. The following lines, though made for quite a different use, might well be said to be applicable to them:—

> "De la *limite* rigoureuse," etc.
>
> "From the straightened limits
> In which the heart seems confined,
> It receives that happy force,
> Which raises it to the highest degree of energy;
> Just as the river, compressed within its banks,
> Darting forward with increased rapidity,
> Heaves itself high in air."

Perplexing contradiction, if it really exists; for zeal is not an irregularity, and an error; zeal is also a truth; how, then, can it be found at variance with other truths? unless, indeed, it should be attached to some falsehood; for every falsehood is contradictory, not only to some particular truth, but to all truths together.

But the contradiction has no existence. It is impossible, from the nature of things, to prove that one cannot love and serve one truth, but at the expense of despising and doing injury to other truths; and, besides, since there are to be found men of intelligent and comprehensive minds, who have been at the same time zealous in a given direction, the scandal falls to the ground of itself. All that can be conceded (and doubtless, it is necessary to concede it), is that, in our disorganised nature, force will always be less rare, than equilibrium in force; that this equilibrium is more common in mediocrity of talent, or in a state of indifference, just as it exists naturally between the two scales of a balance which carries nothing; that a strong conviction easily destroys it, man not having too much, not even enough, with all his will for the true when he has discovered it, and for the good, when he has recognised it. It then throws itself with impetuosity towards the side that is important, or up till then neglected, or menaced at the present. Be not too severe towards the narrow man; he is narrow only by being severe towards himself. Respect the motives, while you find fault with the effects; prefer everything to indifference, and ascribe to the narrow, but conscientious, man all the affections which he has not, but which he would have, if his conscience had permitted him to have them, and which he will have, as soon as he shall know them to be just and necessary. To him, that time has not yet come. Undoubtedly, the Truth is One; and to determine for one truth, is to declare one's self for all truth at once. Yes, in principle, in an abstract sense; and it is certain that the friend of one truth is not, intentionally, the enemy of any truth. But this agreement, this unity of truths is still necessary to be recognised; it is still necessary to perceive, how facts distant, and to appearance, isolated, unite by invisible bonds; how, above all, institutions, and works, all covered with our vices, are, nevertheless, of Divine origin, and of Divine right, as well as that supreme truth, in the light of which we shall one day acknowledge them. Let us grant it: the actual world is made in a manner to throw into some perplexity the positive Christian; and to pretend that, at the first glance, he shall make it enter into the "frame" of his faith, is, generally speaking, to pretend the impossible. If you say that his religion, provided it be true, ought to make room in its compass for an entire world; that the Christian ought to

include, necessarily, the artist, the man of learning, the man of industry, the politician, the philosopher; that all religion, less great than human nature, is not true; and that it is necessary either to prove his nature false, or to accept it entire, and with all its consequences,—if you say all this to him, he will not, perhaps, deny it, but he will be perplexed in the application; perhaps, also, he will retrench from human life what he cannot make to enter within the dimensions of his system; and, thus, the truth will, in appearance, be a new bed of Procrustes. So far, however, from excluding anything, it is the truth which embraces everything, which makes room for everything, and it is it alone. The Gospel alone is as large as life, because it is infinitely larger, because, in every sense, "God is greater than our heart;" religion is to life, what the rational horizon is to the visible horizon; and it is nowhere but in its capacious bosom that all things true recognise and embrace each other. In a world conformable with the Gospel, there is room for everything, but in no other. A complete world, in which there is no jarring, but all is harmony, is only possible by the Gospel; and if it does not appear so, it is because the majority of evangelical men (I say not the Gospel) cannot, at the first attempt, make to themselves a representation of the complete world which the Gospel carries in its bosom, and have not previously under their eyes, as the type of the social world, any other than that unformed foul copy (*brouillon*) which the actual reality presents to them, and which calls itself the nature of things. These men, in the embarrassment which arises to them from this twofold circumstance, choose to retain the Gospel *minus* its developments, and its applications, *minus* human life, *minus* a whole world; to call world and human life, that mutilated remnant which has no longer meaning, nor use; to give, then (unwillingly, it is true), the lie to the Gospel itself, and to stamp it, in the eyes of the multitude, with a seal of narrowness and exclusiveness which does not belong to it. But this error does not continue in sincere and reflective minds; and even without the help of reflection, the Gospel is so human, that it descends of itself, and makes them descend along with it towards life; it sweetly establishes its harmony with nature; it makes good silently its relationship with man; it associates with everything, by purifying, correcting, organising everything; it reconstructs within its own sphere a world in which there is room

for all our faculties, nourishment for all our forces, horizon for all our thoughts; and this world of the Gospel or of grace is, in an eminent sense, the world of man and of nature. Where, you will say, where is this world? where shall we seek it? In no constitution that I am acquainted with, in the manners of no people taken collectively, but in many an individual, in many a family, where it is realised with a marvellous completeness, and an admirable sweetness.

THE END.

MURRAY AND GIBB, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.

WORKS OF PROFESSOR VINET OF LAUSANNE.

HOMILETICS: OR, THE THEORY OF PREACHING.

Second Edition, carefully revised and edited, with copious Notes.

BY THE REV. A. R. FAUSSET,

Editor of Translation of "Bengel's Gnomon." Demy 8vo., price 9s. (Copyright).

EVANGELICAL MEDITATIONS.

BY THE LATE ALEXANDER VINET, D D.,

Professor of Theology in Lausanne, Switzerland. Crown 8vo, price 3s. 6d cloth.

CONTENTS.—I. The Waters of Shiloah and the Waters of the Great River. II. The Jews consulting Jeremiah. III. A First Gift, the Pledge of all others. IV. Sanctification. V. Joy Unceasing. VI. Jesus Instructing the Rich Young Man. VII. Human Equality. VIII. The Fasting which God regards not. IX. Jesus Fulfilling the Law. X. The Centurion's Faith. XI. The Rash Judge. XII. Christ's Union with the Church the Image and Model of Marriage. XIII. Aquila and Priscilla. XIV. The Waters of Bethesda.

"The name of M. Vinet is so well-known, that the simple announcement of a New Translation of one of his works is sufficient to recommend it. The only but absolute requisite is, that with a writer whose style flows on so clearly and purely, the translation be a good one, expressed in classic and forcible English. Professor Edward Masson has accomplished his task so admirably, that few modern English books could be found to equal this translation in style and language. These Meditations are upon a variety of subjects: 'The Waters of Shiloah;' 'The Jews consulting Jeremiah;' 'Sanctification;' 'Joy Unceasing;' 'The Fasting God regards not,' etc. etc. The subjects are all, or nearly all, related to the practical Christian life. The thoughts, purely as abstract thoughts, and, apart from the rich imagery in which they are clothed, are often most striking and original. When to this element is added the overflowing wealth of illustrasion which the writer employs, not for the sake of effect, but as the natural atmosphere in which he himself lived, these 'Meditations' may be classed among the most excellent writings of the kind."—*News of the Churches.*

PASTORAL THEOLOGY:

THE THEORY OF A GOSPEL MINISTRY.

In post 8vo, price 3s. 6d. cloth. 2d Edition.

"All that might be expected from the pen of the first of modern French theologians."—*British Quarterly Review.*

"By far the most complete and most practical treatise hitherto written on the subject."—*Literary Gazette.*

"One or two rapid readings will not suffice to exhaust the treasures of Christian and pastoral experience, of enlightenment, of tenderness, of practical directions, of elevation, and of edification, which fill these pages. We will find it to our profit to read at least once a year this precious volume, if it were only as the means of serving us pastors for the examination of our consciences."—*Archives du Christianisme.*

"Highly instructive, and written in a practical and religious spirit."—*English Review.*

VITAL CHRISTIANITY:

ESSAYS AND DISCOURSES ON THE RELIGIONS OF MAN AND THE RELIGION OF GOD.

Translated, with an Introduction. By ROBERT TURNBULL, Pastor of the Howard Street Church, Boston. Post 8vo, 2s. cloth.

"The Chalmers of Switzerland."—*D'Aubigne.*

HISTORY OF FRENCH LITERATURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY,

Including VOLTAIRE, ROUSSEAU, MONTESQUIEU, etc. Translated by the Rev. JAMES BRYCE. 8vo, 500 pp., price 9s.

"A work of great interest, which abounds in illustrations of the profound views and broad literary sympathies of the author, and is the first attempt to estimate the literary age of Montesquieu, Fontenelle, Voltaire, and Rousseau from a Christian point of view."—*North British Review.*

"Vinet combines the brilliant details of Villemain with the grand philosophy of Barante. We heartily commend the work as most valuable and most seasonable."—*Guardian.*

WORKS OF
PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D.D.,

PRINCIPAL AND PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE FREE CHURCH COLLEGE, GLASGOW.

In Demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d., cloth,

HERMENEUTICAL MANUAL: OR, INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGETICAL STUDY OF THE SCRIPTURES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

By PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D.D.,

Principal and Professor of Divinity in the Free Church College, Glasgow; Author of "Typology of Scripture viewed in connection with the whole series of the Divine Dispensation," 2 vols. 8vo, *Third Edition*, price 18s.; "Ezekiel and the Book of his Prophecy, an Exposition," 8vo, *Second Edition*, 10s. 6d.; and "Prophecy viewed in its Distinctive Nature, its Special Function and Proper Interpretation," 8vo, price 10s. 6d.

CONTENTS.

PART FIRST.—Discussion of Facts and Principles bearing on the Language and Interpretation of New Testament Scripture.

PART SECOND.—Dissertations on Particular Subjects connected with the Exegesis of New Testament Scripture.

PART THIRD.—The Use made of Old Testament Scripture in the Writings of the New Testament.

In Demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d.,

PROPHECY VIEWED IN ITS DISTINCTIVE NATURE, ITS SPECIAL FUNCTION AND PROPER INTERPRETATION.

"I venture to say, so far as I am permitted to judge, that a more admirable contribution to theological literature has not appeared for many years than this work of Dr Fairbairn on Prophecy. Its completeness, its clearness, its thorough investigation of the whole subject, in a systematic way, from first to last, will render it, I think, the standard work on Prophecy from this time. It seems to me that I read it with the same sort of feeling with which one reads an epic poem—so complete, having beginning, middle, and end; and carrying the reader forward from the most simple exposition of first principles, to the most sublime spiritual contemplations in the view of the approaching Millennium."—*Rev. Dr Candlish.*

In Demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d., Second Edition of

EZEKIEL, AND THE BOOK OF HIS PROPHECY.
AN EXPOSITION.

"A work which was greatly wanted, and which will give the author no mean place among the Biblical expositors of his country and language, for in it he has cast considerable light upon one of the obscurest portions of God's Word."—*Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature.*

"In the department of critical exposition, it is long since anything comparable to it has appeared in this country; and on that particular portion of Scripture to which it is devoted, it stands alone. What was wanted in this country was an indigenous and independent production, to which, with foreign aids, English criticism and theology should throw their highest light on this very important part of the living oracles, and this, we can assure our readers, they will find in the work before us. Further remarks we must reserve for the present. Meantime we congratulate the author on this, the happiest effort as yet of his able pen."—*Free Church Magazine.*

In Two Volumes, Demy 8vo, price 18s.,

THE TYPOLOGY OF SCRIPTURE,

Viewed in Connection with the Whole Series of the Divine Dispensations.
Third Edition, Greatly Enlarged and Improved.

"It is by far the soberest, most systematic, and most satisfactory work of the kind that we have yet seen, and will, we trust, very speedily obtain extensive reputation."—*Church of England Quarterly Review.*

"A learned, judicious, and truly evangelical work."—*Dr Pye Smith.*

"I now say, NO BIBLICAL STUDENT should be without Dr Fairbairn's Typology."—*Dr Samuel Lee, in his "Events and Times of the Visions of Daniel."*

In Foolscap 8vo, price 3s. 6d., cloth,

JONAH: HIS LIFE, CHARACTER, AND MISSION,

Viewed in Connection with the Prophet's own Times and future Manifestations of God's Mind and Will in Prophecy.

PUBLICATIONS OF T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

The Sinlessness of Jesus: an Evidence for Christianity.
By Dr C. Ullmann. Translated from the Sixth German Edition.
[Crown 8vo, 5s.

A Plea for the Ways of God to Man: Being an Attempt to Vindicate the Moral Government of the World. By William Fleming, D.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.
[Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Gotthold's Emblems: or, Invisible Things Understood by Things that are Made. By C. Scriver, Minister of Magdeburg in 1671. Translated from the 28th German Edition. [2 vols. crown 8vo, 10s.

Evangelical Meditations.
By Alex. Vinet, D.D., Professor of Theology, Lausanne.
[Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

The Suffering Saviour: or, Meditations on the Last Days of the Sufferings of Christ. By F. W. Krummacher, D.D., Author of "Elijah the Tishbite." Fourth Edition. [Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Light from the Cross: Sermons on the Passion of the Saviour. By Dr A. Tholuck. [Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Life in Israel: or, Tales Illustrative of Hebrew Character and History at various Epochs. By M. T. Richards. [Crown 8vo, 5s.

Brown's (Rev. Dr David) Christ's Second Coming; Will it be Premillennial? Fifth Edition. [Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Manual of Church History.
By H. E. Guericke, D.D., Professor of Theology, Halle. First Six Centuries. [Medium 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Commentary on the Book of Genesis.
By Martin Luther. Translated by H. Cole, D.D. [Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Zwingli: or, The Rise of the Reformation in Switzer- land. A Life of the Reformer, with Notices of his Times and Contemporaries. By R. Christoffel. [Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.

The Prophets of the Restoration: Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi. A New Translation, with a Commentary. By Rev. T. Moore, D.D. [Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclo- pedia. Being a Condensed Translation of "Herzog's Real Encyclopedia." With Additions from other sources. Edited by Dr J. H. Bomberger. Volume I. now ready, price 24s., bound in half calf.

Princeton Theological Essays.
First Series. [Royal 8vo, 10s. 6d.

The Prophecies of Daniel and the Revelations of St Joh
Viewed in their Mutual Relation, with an Exposition of the Principal Pa
sages. By Professor C. A. AUBERLEN. [Crown 8vo, 7s. 6

Internal History of German Protestantism since th
Middle of the Last Century. By Professor KAHNIS of Leipsic.
[Fcp. 8vo, 4s. 6

History of the Apostolic Church; with a General Intro
duction to Church History. By Professor SCHAFF. [Demy 8vo, 2 vols., 1

Dr Patterson's Commentary, Expository and Practica
on the Epistle to the Hebrews. [Demy 8vo, 10s. 6

Dr Patterson's Commentaries on 1st Thessalonians, James
and 1st John. [Fcp. 8vo, 4s. 6

Neander on the Epistle to the Philippians and on James
[Post 8vo, 3

American Pulpit: Containing Sermons by Barnes, Cheever
Hodge, etc. [Royal 12mo, 4s. 6

Schleiermacher's Outline of the Study of Theology.
[Post 8vo, 4s.

Nitzsch's System of Christian Doctrine.
[Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Hamilton's Pentateuch and its Assailants; or, a Refuta-
tion of the Objections of Modern Scepticism to the Pentateuch.
[Demy 8vo, 7s. 6

Dr Forbes on the Symmetrical Structure of Scripture.
[Demy 8vo, 8s. 6d

Hengstenberg's Egypt and the Books of Moses.
Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Hengstenberg on Daniel and Zechariah, and on the His-
tory of Balaam. [Demy 8vo, 12s.

Lewis (Rev. G.) The Bible, the Missal, and the Breviary:
or, Ritualism Self-illustrated in the Liturgical Books of Rome.
[Demy 8vo, 2 vols., 15s.

Nettleton and his Labours.
Edited by Rev. A. A. BONAR. [Fcp. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Cole's Discourses of God's Sovereignty.
[Fcp. 8vo, 4s.

Pike and Heyward's Religious Cases of Conscience.
[Fcp. 8vo, 4s.

Barnes' (the Commentator) Practical Sermons.
[Fcp. 8vo, 3s.

Spring on the Lord's Prayer.
[Post 8vo, 2s.

251K
V754Ef